

3. New leadership (1989-1992)

The events leading up to Luo's removal set the stage for bringing in a new leadership. The causes of Luo's dismissal directly related to the upper level's marching orders given the new administration. The policies of the new leaders were, with few exceptions, counteractions to Luo's policies. Thus, the new administration can, in part, be understood not as an entity with its own identity and purpose, but rather as a mechanism of response to Luo Zhengqi. The hiring of the new leaders was singularly based on Luo's firing. In other circumstances, they would never have been selected to captain China's premier experimental university.

The leaders

One important criterion determined the selection of leaders to succeed Luo: political correctness. Other criteria may help justify the selection of Wei Youhai as president and Wu Zewei as Party secretary, but political correctness, above all, was the reason they were hired. Guangdong authorities had found themselves forced to hire new leaders on short notice; they picked a transitional team that, because of age, would not serve very long, perhaps not more than a few months. "How much damage could they do in such a short time?" faculty asked themselves.

Wei Youhei was born in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, in 1927, making him already two years past official retirement age (60) when he arrived at SZU. From 1945 to 1948, he had studied in the mechanical engineering department of Beijing University, and in 1951 he graduated from the aviation department of Qinghua. After working as a training commander in the air force military training department, he began teaching aeronautics in the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1954. He advanced through the ranks to become a full professor. In 1985, two years before mandatory retirement, he was appointed vice-president of Wuyi University, a newly founded university in Jiangmen, Guangdong.¹ He was considered qualified for the SZU presidency because he had participated in the first four years of Wuyi, a university that resembled SZU in size, age and scope. He also had traveled extensively abroad and spoke almost fluent English. According to a Hong Kong newspaper report, Wei was chosen because of his foreign contacts in the education field.²

The new Party secretary Wu Zewei, who had been born in Yangjiang municipality, Yangchun County, Guangdong, arrived at SZU six months shy of his sixtieth birthday. In 1949 he had studied in the Guangdong Legislative Commercial College and then had attended political theory classes in the provincial Party school for two years and at the CCP central Party school for another year. He first worked as a teacher of Marxism for the Guangdong Party Committee and then in the policy research office, propaganda department, and the culture and education committee, all at the provincial level. He worked his way up through the Party ranks and served as head of the provincial student recruitment office. Later he received associate professor's qualifications in ideological and political education and eventually became Party secretary of the Guangdong Technical Institute, a post he held at the time he transferred to SZU.

The Wei-Wu appointment was announced while they attended a higher education meeting in Guangzhou where they were studying documents approved by the fourth plenary session of the CCP. This was probably propitious, as the new leaders' main task during their first year was to make sure students and teachers studied similar CCP documents in order to correct the mistakes they made during the spring of 1989.

From its arrival, the Wei-Wu administration was hampered by two facts. First, because of their ages, they were perceived as transitional, or in American parlance "lame ducks." As one informant said at the time: "Here today, gone tomorrow. We must hear them, but we need not listen to them." Second, they were seen as political lackeys, owing their allegiance to the same politicians who were responsible for sacking Luo. Opinion among faculty and other staff had always been divided on Luo. Many SZU staff were especially upset with their low wages (given rising costs-of-living) and the continuing staff housing shortage that had plagued the university since its inception. Some blamed Luo for their misfortune. Still others disagreed with Luo's thesis that students should be the focus of the university. According to their view, students were only transients; it was the faculty and staff who set the framework for education. Some faculty believed that it was they, themselves, that should be the focus of school operations. Although staff may have disagreed with Luo, there is little doubt that he commanded the respect of almost everybody. He was hard-working, a fair and open administrator, who at least acknowledged others' views although he often did not follow other's advice. Even before Wei and Wu arrived, the new *lingdao* commanded little respect, referred to disparagingly by staff as "tired, old men."

In October 1989, while the first-year students were sent to military training (a custom that had begun in 1986), the rest of the SZU community attended 11 days of political re-education. Staff and students were separated into their work-units or homeroom classes, and their leaders ran three-hour sessions that reviewed relevant central-level documents. Informed at the start that the results of these sessions would be entered into their personal files (*dangan*), both students and staff attended mandatory re-education to learn the official government view of the events of the spring. Essentially, they were told that the Beijing students had been manipulated by a small band of “black hands” and had been exposed to bad influences from the West (including Hong Kong media). The idea that some bad influences would inevitably appear as a by-product of China’s opening-up policy was captured in the metaphor of a few flies coming through an open door. Apparently, the Beijing students and sympathetic faculty (and by extension their counterparts in Shenzhen) had been bitten by too many flies and were suffering an illness serious enough to require two weeks of document study.

Although Wei and Wu may have supported this exercise in political correctness, they did not initiate it. Rather, orders came from the upper level, which in this case included numerous entities—the SEDC, the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, the Shenzhen Party Committee and its delegates responsible for education. Thus, right from the start of the new administration, it was clear that they would exercise less control in running the university than Luo had. Yet, Wei had sent out another message—that SZU’s reforms would be preserved. In an interview with a Hong Kong newspaper, he had said:³

As a higher education institute in the first special economic zone, Shenzhen University will firmly stick to the concept of two basic points, that is implementing the open-door policy and insisting [on] the Four Cardinal Principles...The school administration should not only continue with the open-door policy but also accelerate the reform pace by increasing the contracts and exchange with the foreign countries.

The Four Cardinal Principles were the subject of the 11 days’ re-education. They included a commitment to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, acceptance of leadership role of the CCP, allegiance to socialism, and the principle that government is a dictatorship of the proletariat. It is notable, however, that Wei, even before he arrived at SZU and almost in the same breath as he recited Party dogma, chose to highlight foreign exchanges. This was not one of the essential reforms or innovations in the university’s first

six years. Several delegations of university officials had traveled abroad each year, and SZU had received hundreds of overseas visitors. But foreign delegation travel was expensive, time-consuming and not especially productive or efficient. To set up exchange programs required several exchanges of high-level leaders, numerous banquets and gift-giving. Foreign exchanges were a normal part of Luo's operations and were run out of the President's Office, but it was not one of Luo's major concerns. Wei, however, would leave this as his major mark on SZU. In office less than a month, he appointed an English teacher to head up the newly created *chu*-level Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) and gave him the mandate to increase exchanges and, by necessity, delegation travel. Staff in foreign affairs realized that Wei wanted to visit all the world's continents by the time he left SZU, and they started designing travel strategies; Wei also wanted to ensure that his children could attend foreign universities.

Wu, in contrast, had little interest in foreign matters, although he too traveled extensively abroad during his tenure as Party secretary. He and other Party officials repeated the Party line that criticized the West for espousing "peaceful evolution." This term, coined by John Foster Dulles during the Cold War, suggested that youth of socialist countries could lead their nations in a peaceful evolution from socialism to capitalism.⁴

New administrative directions

Party Management

The major task of the Wei-Wu administration was to create the CCP anew at SZU. The leaders dis-unified the Party from the administration and established a separate Party structure that resembled what existed at other Chinese universities, setting up a new track to coexist with the administration. This was consistent with the general post-Tiananmen attitude that the Beijing trouble could have been avoided if the Party had been stronger. This view held that the Party should be given a greater role in running all aspects of China, especially higher education. Thus, dozens of staff were re-assigned and new staff were hired exclusively for Party work; separate Party departments were created for organization, propaganda, student affairs, security, and one for coordinating work with the officially recognized non-CCP political parties. Each academic department created a new position of political tutor who was to oversee students' moral and political education. Courses on moral/political education were revamped,

and more time was devoted to formal, organized social investigation, in which students went out in large groups to experience the real world. These and other changes to the SZU CCP are covered in Chapter Six.

The CCP aimed to take the dominant position in managing the university, advocating a number of tripartite policies. According to the Party secretary, SZU should practice *yi feng dai san feng*, or “one wind leading the three winds.” In other words, the Party should direct the administration (*xiao feng*), the students’ study atmosphere (*xue feng*), as well as teachers’ work (*jiao feng*).⁵ Three changes were needed in Party construction: from lightened to reinforced, from serving as an appendix to becoming nuclear, and from being a monorail back to being on the conventional dual track.⁶ Restoring order was also a primary concern. The Three Orders (*san ge zhixu*) were to be stressed: dorm life under the Student Affairs Office and General Affairs Office; classroom teaching order under the Academic Affairs Office; and campus security under the Security Office (SO).⁷ Establishing this new order at SZU brought a period of great upheaval at the university. Dozens of new regulations were issued, each of which required hundreds of staff hours in preparatory meetings and individual work. The new leaders retained the vice-presidents they inherited; each vice-president pledged allegiance to the new administration and denounced Luo and his policies. At separate times, they were sent off for political study and *ting*-level cadre re-certification. Most departments received new heads as well as Party secretaries to fill the positions in the newly created political track. Party work took up most of the time of both the Party secretary and the president, who himself served on the Party Committee. The rest of the leaders’ energy was devoted to improving campus management and the university’s teaching and study atmospheres, which they contended were in a state of disrepair when they arrived.

Campus management

Improving campus management was a major objective of the Wei-Wu administration. To enhance security on campus, the new leaders built a perimeter wall around the formerly unwalled campus and put up street lights (half of which failed to work within six months). Entry to the campus was restricted to three entrances, each with a gate and an around-the-clock guard force. In July 1991, SZU publicized its regulations on management of campus appearance, traffic and security (see Box 3.1, next page).

Box 3.1: Campus management regulations, 1991⁸

Posters and bills are relegated to authorized poster boards. No posters are allowed on posts, trees or walls. Posters for sports events outside SZU need approval from the Propaganda Department and should be cleared when the event is over. Off-campus work-units and individuals need Propaganda Department's approval for all posters. Violations: ¥20. **Misuse of school land:** Except by permission, prohibit construction, the renting or selling of space, planting vegetables, raising fish or livestock, or failing to return lands for temporary use upon expiration. **Public hygiene:** no spitting, littering, or disposing of rubbish/sewage. Vehicles with muddy wheels are not allowed on campus. No smoking in public places. Violations: ¥5-200. **Storage on campus** should not block road or in public places. Construction should have identifying signs. Violations: at least ¥200. **Landscaping and gardening:** no picking leaves, flowers, or fruits; breaking branches; or nailing trunks. Violations: ¥5-100, and ¥5 fine per piece of fruit. **Traffic:** No parking on lawns; violations: ¥50-200. **Noise:** horns prohibited. Entertainment should end before 11:30 p.m., permission of Propaganda Department required for exceptions. Electrical drills/other tools, housing repair, and cement mixers not permitted from noon - 2 p.m., 10 p.m. - 7 a.m. Family activities using speakers should be volume-controlled and prohibited during these hours. Stores and vendors need Security Office permission. Unauthorized vendors fined, goods confiscated. Rubbish collectors, roadside shoe repairers, breakfast hawkers and peddlers prohibited. Off-campus work-units that exhibit need President's Office approval. Vendors and stores should not sell out-dated goods, or manipulate weights. **Miscellaneous:** no dogs allowed. Violators: ¥200; Security Office authorized to kill dogs. Do not cut holes in the perimeter fence for illegal entry. **Traffic and security:** maximum speed 20 km./hr. Learners not permitted to practice without Security Office permission. No one can drive on campus without a license. Vehicles should not carry heavy or over-loaded goods. Violations: ¥5-100. **Gate:** staff/students who enter must hold badge or valid certificate. Staff family must hold SEZ residency certificate. Residents of *yue haimen cun* [Guangdong Delta Village] who enter campus must hold SEZ ID card. Visitors who attend meetings must hold SEZ certificate and ID cards. Normal visitors enter after registration. Non-SZU vehicles remit license to be detained by security guards. Bulky goods/equipment transported out need verification at department-head level. No guns, knives. Bike riders should dismount when passing through school gate. No one may enter by climbing over fence or gate. **Public security:** visitors from outside need SEZ temporary certificate or SEZ pass. Except for those who stay in hostels, persons who stay at SZU over three days must hold temporary *hukou* issued by Security Office. No work-unit should hire Three Withouts or violators of family planning regulations. Temporary workers should be reviewed by Security Office. Dorms for temporary workers should be well managed, no co-habitation. Those who refuse to be checked by guards are fined at least ¥5. Visitors must leave before midnight. No fire works. No bird shooting, or gun confiscated. No one may dwell in empty rooms without permission. Thefts, fights, spreading pornography, visiting or soliciting prostitutes, and gambling prohibited.

Table 3.1: Campus security reported cases⁹

Year	cases	percent successfully terminated
1989	163	42
1990	153	70
1991	75	53
1992-93	158	63
1994	178	43
1995	165	53

Campus security

Prior to the change in administrations, the campus security force had included fewer than a half dozen professionals, assisted by numerous students who worked as part-time guards. Unarmed and un-uniformed, the students patrolled the campus grounds and made sure that buildings and doors were secured. This system had been appropriate for the times; but, according to the head of security, students needed to be replaced by a professional service because midnight work hurt students' daytime study and the work was becoming too dangerous for unarmed students.¹⁰ In January 1990, Wei-Wu put in place a full-time security team, including 27 new recruits, and excluded students from guard duty. Security matters, which had been previously assigned to the President's Office, were relocated to a separate department directly under the school administration, a move which in effect put it under Party control. The 14-person office managed security in residential halls as well as overseeing fire-fighting and traffic control. Special attention was devoted to management over public places where problems were likely to occur: pool hall, skating rink, swimming pool, coffee shop, café, restaurants, and dance halls.

Before 1990, no detailed records on campus security were maintained. Informants could recall of no serious or violent crimes ever having occurred in the first five years of school operation at its new site. Thefts, however, were not uncommon. Computers went missing from the administration and teaching buildings; bicycles were frequently stolen. From 1990, statistics were kept, and these provide a picture of campus crime during the Wei-Wu years. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for campus police work that indicate dramatic decreases for 1991, 1992 and 1993. This appears to be an aberration; it is unclear whether the decline can be attributable to fewer violations, bad reporting, or more lenient enforcement for those years.

In the yearbooks published from 1989, the university's Security Office presented details of campus offenses. Although the lists are not all-inclusive (e.g., several known rapes, mayhem, and homicides were not mentioned), they provide a picture of the campus' deteriorating public security during the Wei-Wu years. As the Security Office pointed out, many of the crimes were committed by non-students, usually transients who felt the negative effects of reform (and economic recession in the early 1990s). The people who committed economic crimes were often characterized as Three Withouts (*san wu*), referring to those who lacked permanent housing, permanent employment and residential registration.

As befits a special economic zone, most crimes at SZU in 1989 were economic in nature. The litany of offenses for that year, as presented by the Security Office, disguises the culprits' and victims' given names:¹¹

2 February: ¥11,050 was stolen from #2 Shangshen Garment Factory, a SZU-run enterprise. Staff from the Security Office [SO] and police from Section 2 of the Public Security Bureau [PSB] worked for three days and discovered that student Sun from Overseas Chinese Town Middle School had taken the money.

18 February: Four persons including Tang XX and Tang X, who are gang members of Shisan Taibao,¹² broke into Room 303 Hongliu men's dormitory and blackmailed student Pan XX for ¥200. They were caught by SO and PSB police on the spot.

24 March: Student Tan of 1986 Public Relations major reported that HK \$16,000 which he kept for others was stolen. Investigators formed suspicions and after three months student Tan confessed that he had taken the money himself.

17 July: Graduating student Luo from Economics and *sui du*¹³ student Fu from 1988 International Trade and Finance broke into a staff apartment brandishing knives and iron chains and stole ¥400 and HK \$360. They were caught by SO.

17 July: Student Cai from the video and tv class reported having ¥14 and US \$1,000 stolen. SO believed that the thief was 1989 Foreign Language *sui du* student Peng XX. Afraid of further investigation by PSB and SO, Peng secretly returned the money to Chai.

November: SO learned from Management Department students that *sui du* student Liang of the Chinese Department introduced people to study at SZU, taking ¥120,000 of their money. Con artist Liang was detained by PSB.

5 November: Zhang XX and Li, members of Shisan Taibao, broke a window of the students dorm and stole property valued over ¥2,000. They were caught and the case was reported in *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*.

21 November: While investigating a fight, the SO discovered that someone had stolen and was selling SZU diplomas. With the help of PSB, SO exposed the ring and retrieved 13 diplomas involving over ¥20,000. Zhu XX, Tan XX, Yang XX and Chen XX were detained by PSB.

These and other cases involved ¥126,500 and HK \$ 6,360 in cash. Bicycle theft, however, represented the most frequent case. In 1989, 196 bikes were reported stolen; Security caught eight bike thieves, who confessed to stealing 29 bikes, of which 11 were recaptured. Only two of the 16 perpetrators listed in the eight incidents above were regular students, who were part of the state-plan enrollment. The rest were auditors or outsiders. The Security Office reported that 88 (62%) of the 142 persons they caught were students; presumably, most of these were irregular students such as auditors.

In 1991 the Security Office regained property valued at ¥128,910, cracked three gangs, and confiscated 133 unregistered bicycles, which were turned over the Nantou Finance Bureau. Their case load included 19 crimes (four robberies, two blackmail, one unsuccessful rape, 12 thefts) and 55 other cases (including 22 thefts, 19 fights, four morals violations and three gambling. Ten persons were caught stealing bicycles; 120 stolen bikes were retrieved. Three cohabiting couples were discovered as well as six pairs engaging in sexual acts in public places (most likely on Cuckoo's Hill, the campus condom-strewn forested area, a former burial site). During the year, the Security Office made sure all those residing on campus held either permanent or temporary residency permits. It "drove out" more than 20 Three Withouts from campus. Tightened gate security detected five thieves trying to leave the campus with two computers and 20 desks/chairs.

During the last year of the Wei-Wu administration, 1992, financial crimes continued. Li Wenbo, a 1989 *zhuanke* student, together with his elder brother, who worked as a clerk in the SZU-run Experimental Bank, used a client's name to embezzle ¥120,000. Li was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment by the Nanshan District Court.¹⁴ In July, the Security Office helped the Shekou Public Security Bureau crack a degree counterfeiting ring. One of the counterfeiters was Wang Yusheng, a *daipei* graduate, who possessed fake chops and certificates. Twelve people, including five SZU students, were involved. Public Security seized 211 certificates and 40 official chops.¹⁵ In addition to the official reports, a 1993 newspaper article

put the number of campus crimes between 1990 and March 1993 at 274, 47 of which were committed by students, including 14 robberies, one blackmail, one murder. Altogether, 113 students were involved; 18 were dealt with by Public Security and the rest by SZU Security Office. The article also reported that fee-paying Economics students lived illegally in a campus dorm between December 1991 - January 1992, during which time they broke in and robbed other students dorms of over ¥1,000 in cash.¹⁶

The increase of campus crimes at SZU reflected larger phenomena. The Shenzhen SEZ itself experienced increased crime, statistics for which were reported usually only during various crack downs. Times series data, however, are not readily available, but the early 1990s were likely a time of increasing criminal activity.¹⁷ Campuses around China were experiencing crimes.¹⁸ What was happening at SZU might have been different only in degree.

Teacher and student management

It was not totally Wei-Wu's fault that they lacked the respect of students and teachers when they arrived at SZU; attitudes in the university community were controlled to a large degree by circumstances. But, during their years in office, Wei-Wu did little to improve the situation. Indeed, they probably commanded less respect when they left than when they had arrived. Part of the reason for increased disrespect was due to their treatment of students and teachers. They openly criticized both groups as irresponsible. In numerous speeches, teachers were told they should spend more attention to teaching and take their jobs more seriously. They were accused of devoting too much time to moonlighting or working on private affairs.¹⁹

The Committee of Professors that had been intended by Luo to provide faculty input in the form of periodic "town meetings" was abandoned. In its place came a Teachers and Staff Representatives Conference which was very much a CCP-controlled and *lingdao*-managed annual meeting. Leaders at the department level put forward their candidates along with any volunteers, with the winners being "elected" by secret ballot by the department staff. The elections were never transparent; in any case, the results were not binding, just advisory. In such a way the election of leaders' candidates was virtually assured. The Teachers and Staff Representatives Conference was held concurrently with the annual meeting of the Workers' Union; consequently this "double meeting" diminished any power over policy that could be exercised by the latter organization, the members of which were democratically elected by department. Under Wei-Wu ordinary teachers and

staff had virtually no say in the running of school affairs. Department *lingdao* controlled the sub-work-units; the CCP controlled central school management.

Students were castigated for slack discipline and poor academic performance. Regulations that were among the earliest set issued by the new leaders addressed these perceived student problems. At the same time that the political tutors team was established, Wei-Wu issued rules on students' discipline:²⁰

Principles for the SZU student should include: (1) Four Cardinal Principles; (2) the Three Loves²¹; (3) study hard, seize the moment; (4) emphasizing sports, military training and labor; (5) respecting teachers and elders, caring for the collective, unifying with classmates and becoming Four Haves²² socialist, new style university students; (6) be humble and self-disciplined, self-critical, get rid of the Two *Qi*: *jiaoqi*, being arrogant; *jiaoqi*, being spoiled; (7) embrace the opening and reform policy, be pioneering; (8) follow social conduct and protect public property, be frugal, hygienic, non-rude and civilized; (9) follow the law and all regulations; (10) care about the big events of state, be ready to be summoned by the country.

With time, the administration took credit for improving study, as indicated by the reported fact that fewer students were expelled for academic reasons as the Wei-Wu administration became effective.²³ Students were criticized for their entrepreneurial activities as well as for practicing poor sanitation and exercising loose discipline due to capitalist "freedom-ization" (*ziyou hua*). By March of 1990, as part of a national campaign, the university had set up a Cracking the Seven Harms work-group.²⁴ Students were assigned dorm areas to police for rubbish, and the university's security office was beefed up and told to guard against theft, fighting, pornography and gambling.

Undisciplined students posed a grave concern for Wei and Wu. In their opinion, they had inherited a situation that bordered on the lawless. Luo's policy of the Three Selves—self-independence, self-discipline, self-strengthening—lay at the base of his educational philosophy. Luo had set up mechanisms for the students to control their lives. As he had explained his beliefs:²⁵

In a school with several thousand students, it is normal for a few students to cause trouble, such as fighting, stealing and cheating. There are two attitudes for dealing with this: either let it be, or increase the number of political tutors/moral education cadres. We think neither of the attitudes is suitable for

SZU. Our solution is to implement the Three Selves spirit, respect the youth, and let the youth deal with their problems themselves.

The new administration found this attitude irresponsible on the part of the university; it closed the Psychological Counseling Center. In its place, it established a network of political tutors and conducted annual “learn from Lei Feng” exercises, in which the model soldier made famous by Mao Zedong was studied and memorialized. This education, along with tightened discipline, produced positive results as measured by the drop in number of reported disciplinary cases. More students were punished in 1990 than in previous years; the next year the number of disciplinary cases decreased (presumably as the result of better behavior rather than weaker enforcement), and no students had to be expelled (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Student disciplinary actions, 1987-1991²⁶

Year	total punished	of which expelled
1987	25	4
1989	na	26
1990	90	11
1991	61	0

Dorm management

Regulations on student dorm management, as first promulgated in 1987, had presented general guidelines such as instructing students not to rent out their rooms or entertain overnight visitors (Persons of the opposite sex were not allowed to stay together past 11 p.m.)²⁷ In addressing slack dorm discipline, the Luo administration issued regulations in 1988 that identified possible dorm discipline violations and established five levels of punishment.²⁸ The mildest punishment was a warning, followed by a negative notation (bad record—BR), a severe negative notation (big bad record—BBR), probation and finally expulsion. As far back as 1986, when the 20 Regulations were introduced, the Luo administration had recognized a deterioration of campus study atmosphere (*xue feng*). This concern continued through the remainder of Luo’s tenure, but it is impossible to access what effect, if any, those regulations had on improving study atmosphere, given that Tiananmen changed administrations, rules and attitudes.

Regulations introduced by the Wei-Wu team within months after they arrived on campus attempted to strengthen the existing rules by specifying

monetary penalties for violations, in other words hitting problem students where it would be felt—in the pocket book.²⁹ Penalties generally reflected a ranking of misbehavior in terms of severity consistent with the Luo administration's view, except that one area—sleep-overs with the opposite sex—commanded harsher penalties. In addition to fines, a point deducting system was employed so that the basic scholarship (¥30/month) would be canceled for students whose point total exceeded 20. This system largely replaced the work of the Student Self-disciplinary Committee, whose status was put on hold after Wei-Wu took over. More offenses were added to the list, including gang fighting (BBR or expulsion), noise after midnight (warning), taking advantage of power/water failures to initiate a riot, smashing bottles or starting fires (BR or above), smuggling and marketing forbidden commodities (Public Security notified), prostitution or rape (expulsion or sent to Public Security). Eating in a restaurant and refusing to pay (*bawanfan* or general rice, a practice that exempts leaders from paying for food) earned a BBR.³⁰

Student behavior changed, but probably not because of these rules. The dorms had never been places for solitude or contemplation. Students believed those purposes to be the library's. The dorms, instead, were for relaxation and letting off steam. They were noisy, but a description written by a Wu associate probably exaggerated the situation:³¹

In the past SZU students could freely choose roommates, regardless of class, major or year. Therefore, students drank and sang late into the night and played mahjongg all night long. Some students stayed in bed until the sun was high in the sky. Even students of different sex stayed together overnight.

In any case, dorms in 1990 became quieter at night, and their exterior perimeters gathered less rubbish. The other problems had not existed to any great degree. For example, few students (at least until the 1990s) had had sexual experiences, nor did they “insult, curse or beat up dorm managers,” possibilities raised in the regulations. Defacing the dorms was not widespread, either. Ironically, damage did not occur until students were forced to change rooms in adherence to a new 1990 policy that required them to room together as a unit by department, major, year and class. Previously, the selection of roommates was not restricted to one's own classmates. The 1990 forced relocation angered many students, who damaged the rooms they were leaving by breaking windows, yanking out wiring, jamming door locks, and disassembling furniture. Repairs cost the university over ¥170,000, a loss that Wu attributed to Luo's lax ideological education.³² Room

relocation the next year were closely supervised; no excessive damage was reported.

The Party secretary's attitude toward students was somewhat schizophrenic. Sometimes, he attempted to reach their patriotic souls, in speeches and writing that can best be described as rambling.³³

University students should have a life outlook that fits with the times and which demonstrates the life value of the times. Students experience a crucial time in life as they form their world outlook. What is the purpose and value of life? What kind of life is meaningful? University students must firmly believe that socialism follows the law of historical development. Communism is a beautiful society for humanity; students should firmly believe in the CCP and firmly believe that socialism can save China. Only if university students contribute to the magnificent construction of socialism by adding bricks and tiles and studying hard to fulfill this splendid goal, while developing themselves completely in morality, knowledge and physical prowess and becoming highly educated protégés of the socialist cause who adhere to lofty ideals, ethics and discipline, can they have a meaningful and value-laden life.

In the next breath, however, Wu would break out into a harangue against the students, using the opportunity to attack his predecessor Luo:³⁴

Some university students, influenced by western thoughts, develop money-worshipping; only money can prove their value and can make people admire them. Some students of SZU give up study and turn to business. With the money they earn, they show off. However, the former major leader of SZU did not criticize these students. Instead, he praised them and called them heroes and 'pioneering *rencai* [talent].' With his support, some students bought and sold cigarettes over a long distance, speculating to earn money, regardless of professional ethics. And some students rented out their dorms to outsiders or played pornographic videos on campus. Some girl students shamelessly say: 'I am willing to be a rich *tai-tai* or noble women (*gui furen*). Some students say that the hourly payment of ¥1 is not attractive.

According to Wu's critics, his arguments suffered from factual inaccuracy and flaws in logic. In all of Luo's writings, the former president never suggested that students take up business rather than study. This type of student, only a few of whom existed prior to 1989, was never praised by Luo as 'pioneering *rencai*.' Logical flaws in Wu's pronouncements resulted from improper generalizations from specific cases (real or imagined), representing them as the norm. Perhaps during vacation a northern student bought cheap cigarettes in the South and sold them for a profit back in his hometown. Although no informant was able to confirm such a story, or even the rumor

of such an event, it is certainly possible that such an incident took place. But it is equally unlikely that more than a few students were involved; there is no evidence they had Luo Zhengqi's support or encouragement, although Wu believed that they would have had the former president's support. If renting out rooms and showing pornographic videos existed, they both occurred on a small-scale. In Wu's thinking, however, as evidenced in his writings and speeches, such activities characterized the typical SZU student.

Educational management

Being busy creating a new SZU CCP and developing systems to regulate the campus and the members of the university community left the leaders little time to reform education. Educational reforms—ones that more directly involve teaching and learning than do CCP restructuring or personnel management—took a back seat to the other changes. The major academic reforms of Wei-Wu came in the form of terminating or suspending various systems that Luo Zhengqi had put in place. Some of these abandoned reforms were later reinstated after the Wei-Wu transitional team was retired.

Inflexibility established

Luo's system had permitted a high degree of flexibility. Under lenient conditions, students could change majors, graduate ahead of time or delay graduation. Students were not required to attend most classes. Double majors and double degrees were allowed. Since students could study on their own and get credit for the course by passing the final exam, they could sign up for several courses given at the same time. This allowed some students to register for as many as 60 hours of class a week (tuition was standard, not based on credit hours). The philosophy of the Three Classrooms implied that the traditional classroom was not the only source of education for university students. As educational traditionalists, however, Wei-Wu found these policies abhorrent; Luo's reforms were in effect all canceled.³⁵ New regulations did not specifically prohibit students from changing majors, but this is what in fact happened as department heads, acting in spontaneous unison, refused to permit changes. The cancellation of double degrees was actually enforced retroactively so that several dozen students who had enrolled in 1987 and had obtained sufficient credits for double majors or double degrees were denied them when they graduated in 1991. Lengthy regulations affected examinations by instituting numerous detailed changes but offered little of substantive value.³⁶ Detailed regulations concerning the

postponing of exams were subsequently implemented; the grade of “0” was given for incompletes (which could only be changed through an involved process); exam absences were permitted only with medical verification.³⁷

Permitting students to skip classes was seen as anathema to the new administration. In an article published in the university’s internal journal and reprinted in the *1989-1990 Yearbook*, the leaders used a pen name when they pointed out weakened study atmosphere.³⁸

SZU’s classroom management has always been bad. Students could freely be absent from classes and arrive or leave the classroom freely. Student affairs management has not been serious. If you failed *benke*, you can go to *zhuanke*. If you failed *zhuanke*, you could go to night school. Therefore, there exist bearded [old] students. Students do not care about grades at all. This time we expelled over 20 students who failed courses, and many students were shocked.

In their first year in office, the Wei-Wu team negated most of Luo’s reforms that had directly affected students. In their second year, they promulgated only one regulation that related to *xuefeng*: students were prohibited from taking pagers into classrooms.³⁹

Closing the second classroom

The Wei-wu administration did not formally terminate the part-time jobs program. Students, as late as 1991, were still cleaning classrooms at night; but few other jobs were made available. Eventually, no jobs existed, although the work-study program was still on the books. A major “adjustment” to the program was that students could no longer become managers. The new school leaders forbade students from running school-enterprises under contract.⁴⁰ Thus, the student-run print-shop, laundry, beauty salons, hostels, café, and stores were all turned over to teachers and staff. These enterprises had earned student managers as much as ¥3,000 per month; running them was quite appealing to SZU staff who were themselves looking for part-time jobs to offset the zone’s high living costs. The rationale for these policy changes was to eliminate the student attitude of emphasizing business, while neglecting study. Wei-Wu also attempted to rid the students of their money-worshipping philosophy—seeing everything only in terms of money (*yi qie xiang qian kan*).⁴¹

Politics in charge

The legacy of the Wei-Wu administration is more than the fact that it politicized the campus and diverted the course of educational reform. The most negative consequence of the leaders' tenure was the degree of factionalism that their leadership brought to SZU. Wei and Wu had been chosen because neither was well connected with either the provincial or municipal authorities, and each was acceptable to both levels of government. That they did not have experience running a university or familiarity with Shenzhen's unusual economic and socio-political environment was not an important consideration. What mattered to municipal and provincial officials was that neither man was the candidate of the competitive branch of government. Given imprecise responsibilities of the two levels of government, each government supervisor was involved in constant negotiations over a wide range of issues. The education officials preferred to have a lesser qualified candidate than one who was "owned" by the rival government unit.

Not having patrons at the upper level made the need to have supporters from within the university community all the more important. Wei and Wu separately pursued patron-client relationships. Soon after Wei and Wu arrived at SZU, Luo's vice-presidents lined up with Wei and the fledgling CCP lined up with Wu. The new Party secretary had to increase his line of support, which he did by staffing a new Party structure. The appointments, however, were not his alone to make. Wei was also on the university's Party committee. New staff, as well as existing staff assigned to offices in the new Party structure, immediately became either "Wei people" or "Wu people." In time, these staff members became competitors for power. Staff loyal to Wu or to Wei were positioned in each department. The additional staff were placed where they were needed for political balance. Existing staff were moved as part of a general reshuffle. The resulting mixture of loyalties created the type of factional politics that are not uncommon in China. Staff, with little substantive job description, spent their days witnessing the skirmish for power among the top leaders; soon this was replicated in most administrative and academic departments. Academic staff who preferred to stand clear of the political fray were forced to take sides on an issue-by-issue basis. The factions intensified, leaving some departments with warring groups that were hardly civil to each other.

The inability of Wei and Wu to rule in a united fashion resulted in a power vacuum that was quickly filled by heads of the departments. Under

the previous administration, heads reported directly to Luo, and they were given much autonomy in supervising their faculty. Policy was negotiated in advance of announcement and almost always adhered to after it had formally come down from the president. In contrast, policies by Wei and Wu were often totally ignored by department heads, renegotiated, or allowed a lingering death. As a colleague explained to me:

A weak president or Party secretary means that his orders don't have to be followed. If a department [head] has good relations (*guanxi*) with the president he can ignore orders from administrative offices such as the Academic Affairs Office and the Finance Office.

Wei and Wu were hired under a general understanding that they would stay no more than four years. Both leaders, however, were retired after only three years. In one of their few areas of agreement, education officials from both the province and the municipality realized that the school's leadership had to be replaced. The years 1989-1992 were recognized by all upper levels as a managerial disaster. The lessons learned during that period directly affected the setting up of the university's next administration.

1. The mandatory retirement age of 60 is often waived for presidents and vice-presidents of universities.
2. Cheung, "Shenzhen University leader to preserve reform," 1989.
3. *Ibid.*
4. See Zhang, *Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping*, 1996, p. 176.
5. Wu Zewei, "Speech at the advanced worker appraisal meeting in celebration of 'July 1,' 1 July 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 60.
6. "Report on Party construction: striving two years to achieve three changes, 29 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 54.
7. "Party work plan for 1991, 23 January 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 69.
8. "Campus management regulations, 18 July 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 247-50.
9. Sources: *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 107; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 26, 39, 158; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 227
10. Jiang Shiquan, "Security," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 108.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Literally, 13 gangsters. The term denoted senior military rank in the Qing Dynasty, in other words, the right hand of the emperor. Hitler's generals were also referred to as Taibao, which is slang for KGB, and a term that gangsters like to call themselves.
13. *Sui du sheng* (literally, accompanying study student), is a type of irregular

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- student, probably one who joins the program in the middle of the term.
14. Security Office, "Report," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 227. According to another report, a student from the Chinese Department cheated customers seven times from November 1991 - May 1992, netting ¥40,000 and HK \$80,000: Tang et al., "Will Shenzhen University Be as Shining as Before?", 1993.
 15. *Ibid.*
 16. *Ibid.*
 17. By 1994 the local press was reporting on the zone's general crime wave. See "Shenzhen is about to launch "crack-down" of strength," 1994.
 18. See "The crime alarm sounds on campuses," in Wu & Luo, 1995, pp. 87ff.
 19. See Agelasto, *Educational Disengagement*, 1998.
 20. "SZU students discipline, 19 September 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 197.
 21. Love for motherland, love for people, and love for the SEZ.
 22. Have ideals, have ethics, have culture, have discipline.
 23. Thirty-four students were expelled in 1989, 13 in 1990 and only six in 1991. See "Major points of SZU work report, 30 April 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 25. These statistics, however, fail to prove the point that academic performance improved. It is possible that standards had lowered or that enforcement of rules had become lax.
 24. The Seven Harms probably referred to a national campaign against the Six Evils: prostitution; manufacture, sale or dissemination of pornography; abduction and sale of women and children; illicit drug cultivation, abuse or trafficking; gambling; and cheating or harming people through feudal or superstitious practices. The SEZ had processed 1,579 cases against these evils from April - July 1992: Beijing Xinhua, "Shenzhen making progress in combating social evils," trans. in *FBIS-CHI-92-145*, 28 July 1992, p. 44.
 25. Luo Zhengqi, "Implementation and contemplation of reform: looking forward to SZU's fifth anniversary, April 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 83.
 26. For 1987, Luo Zhengqi, "Letter to students, 26 February 1987," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 117; for other years "Major points of SZU work report, 30 April 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 26
 27. "Student dorm regulations, 21 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 152-5.
 28. "Punishments, 30 November 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 201-3.
 29. "Draft student dorm management regulations implementation plan, Oct 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 213-4.
 30. "Punishments for violating regulations," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 217-9.
 31. Li Zao, March 1990, "Truly enhance Party leadership over the school," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 30.
 32. Zhang Bigong, "All for the cultivation of students," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 199.
 33. Wu Zewei, "Development of the times and life goals of contemporary university students," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 18.

34. *Ibid.*
35. "Student affairs management regulations, October 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 198-203.
36. "Examination regulations, 1 December 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 206-9.
37. "Procedures for postponing final exams, 26 June 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 211.
38. Li Zao, "Truly enhance Party leadership over the school," *Shenda Tongxun* (no. 9, 1990), p. 7, reprinted in *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 30.
39. "No beepers in class, 30 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 252.
40. "Work plan for SZU part-time jobs, 13 March 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 238.
41. "Freshen up you spirits, march forward boldly: Party Committee's work prospects for 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 15.