

## 6. PARTY AND POLITICS

### *Introduction*

Over the almost two decades of post-Mao reform, the role of the Communist Party at Chinese universities has rarely been hard and fast. The CCP's part has not been strictly scripted; a high degree of ad-libbing by the major actors has been permitted by both a flexible stage-play and a directorial staff that sit off-stage and respond only when the production gets out-of-hand. Occasionally, the "upper levels" issue guidelines which the directors use in rehearsals. These events are sometimes put on for the benefit of visiting inspection teams. Organized study groups often do not influence the content of the play. A flexible and tolerant environment has at times—especially at the ends of the '70s and '80s decades—permitted the actors to display a degree of creativity and innovation that sometimes catches Western observers off-guard. Those who stereotype China's brand of Leninism as a ruthless, fascist system of control ignore the obvious: that many Chinese people themselves, including intellectuals, not only accept but indeed support the system, some enthusiastically, others somewhat grudgingly. What permits an amorphous political system from turning into chaos?

The savior of Chinese communism from the defeat that similar ideologies have suffered in Eastern Europe is the Chinese public's understanding and implicit agreement about the importance of China's paramount political party. A public respect for the CCP and its generally good reputation permit it to continue to serve as the structure of government. It was the Party that brought China out of feudalism and civil war. It is the Party that is lifting China up into modernity. The Party is improving the material quality of life of China's educated class. That is, of course, not to say that the Party is without its critics. But the Party, itself, serves as its own chief critic, and from time to time it engages in self-criticism and rectification campaigns to steer itself back onto the right path. Only a relatively small number of Chinese—including expatriate intellectuals—would suggest even in their private thoughts that China would be better off without the Communist Party. From the president of the nation to the manager of the smallest government bureau or state-owned factory, those in positions of leadership since the 1950s have been Party cadres. The Party has become so institutionalized that its dissolution is beyond the dreams of all but its most severe critics; the Party itself is intolerant of outside criticism and dissent that might lead it down a path of

destruction. And this nightmare often fuels the Party's campaigns against dissidents.

The early 1980s was a time of political innovation in China. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the entire political system was overhauled. At the national level Deng Xiaoping consolidated power, constantly changing his newly forming economic policies to address the concerns of his critics, such as Chen Yun, within the reform branch. At that time defining economic reform was a major task for the CCP. Much was happening quickly. Even if the Chinese leadership had desired that the lower levels strictly adhere to a state-written script, there was no script in place at the time. Furthermore, after the Cultural Revolution the state lacked effective Leninist mechanisms of micro-management. The early '80s were indeed a period of political innovation.

### ***Early Party history at SZU***

The earliest document in SZU's history, the proposal to establish SZU by the preparatory committee of the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, did not specifically mention any CCP role. Then the municipal government's response to Guangdong (co-authored by the Shenzhen Party Committee) projected the university's new leadership as being "cadres who are faithful to the Party's educational undertaking...The university will practice the president responsibility system under the leadership of the school Party Committee."<sup>1</sup> Guangdong's subsequent request to the State Council was brief, and it excluded this and many other provisions. Yet, in notifying Shenzhen that it had requested State Council authorization to set up SZU, the Province noted only that "in terms of Party and administrative work, SZU would be mainly under the leadership of the municipality."<sup>2</sup> Thus, from the beginning, no precise role for the CCP at SZU was articulated. This imprecision resulted in a false impression among some overseas visitors that SZU was purely academic, devoid of politics, with only a president and no Party secretary.<sup>3</sup> The Party's involvement at the university was, in fact, complex and it changed greatly over time. The Party's role depended on general convention and directives from the upper levels; it was influenced to a large degree by local interpretation of upper-level guidelines.

**Ten points for Party members, 1988**<sup>4</sup>

- (1) Party members should follow the CCP constitution.
- (2) CCP members should have a harder life. Their workload, including teaching and administration, should be higher than that of non-members. Average academic performance for student member branches in each department should not be lower than that of non-members.
- (3) CCP activities should be effective and not perfunctory and should be in spare-time, rather than during working or teaching hours.
- (4) CCP cadres should work on part-time, non-paid basis.
- (5) Each Party member should do at least one good deed for the school and one good deed for the public.
- (6) Each year each Party member should get one or two non-Party members to participate in the Party's activities and to study CCP documents.
- (7) Party members should take the lead in following the Ten Pleases and courtesy principles of SZU.
- (8) Party members absolutely cannot cheat on exams. If probates cheat, they lose their status. CCP members who cheat will be persuaded to drop out of the CCP or will be given other severe punishments.

Through its first year's experience, the university had developed its own system of administration, and this was confirmed in its first set of reform proposals.<sup>5</sup> The so-called presidential responsibility system had the president report to the Party committees of both the municipality and province. SZU's own Party Committee was responsible for guaranteeing that Party guidelines were implemented and for ensuring moral/political education. In the late 1980s, the Party Committee of SZU included Vice-president Luo Zhengqi as Party secretary and chair of the committee, Yu Zhongwen, the vice-chair (who served in the administration as a presidential assistant), SZU's two other vice-presidents, and three additional members. All of the members had full-time jobs in the administration; none worked exclusively for the Party. Luo, of course, was more than the Party secretary. He was also the first vice-president, the designated successor of president Zhang Wei, who was empowered to manage SZU during the long periods when Zhang remained at Qinghua University to attend to his duties there as vice-president. By the time the university moved to its new site in September 1984, the role of the Party had become clearer. In terms of school management, a tri-partite system had emerged, with the president (or his surrogate Luo) running SZU, the professors in charge of academics and the Party in charge of Party affairs.<sup>6</sup>

Party members were asked to abide by a ten-point program (listed on the previous page).

In his first report on Party work in 1986, Luo explained his vision, by then already implemented, for Party work at SZU.<sup>7</sup> He stressed the need for a “proper” relationship between Party and administration. SZU practiced presidential responsibility, and the Party’s role was only to serve as a guarantor. Furthermore, the SZU CCP was to employ a simplified structure. SZU did not need to open the various Party offices found in other CCP organs, such as departments for propaganda, organization, Party security, students’ affairs, or the *tongzhanbu*.<sup>8</sup> The university’s Party branch would have but a single office with only six staff. Another aspect of Luo’s philosophy related to “recovering the glorious tradition of the Party in which it serves the people.” Party cadres should have more difficult lives than others. Luo rhetorically asked whether the armies of liberation had had full-time Party members who went off to study when non-Party members spilled their blood in battle. He suggested that the Communist Party in China had grown into a bureaucracy with “too much formalism and superficiality” and that its work was burdened by useless meetings and superfluous documents. “We should be determined to tear down the mountain of documents and fill in the sea of meetings,” he opined.

### San hua (the Three -izations)

Luo’s overall goal was to create a system that took advantage of past experience and learned from the Party’s previous mistakes. Most importantly, it was to cater to SZU’s individual needs. The three fundamental aspects of the new political system were that (1) Party work was compulsory for cadres, (2) Party work was to take place only in cadres’ spare time, and (3) Party cadres were part-time, not full-time, personnel. These became known as the *san hua*, or the Three -izations, standing for compulsory-ization, spare-time-ization, and part-time-ization.<sup>9</sup> This direction for political work was especially appreciated by cadres who had seen the powerful role politics had played in education, notably during the Cultural Revolution. During part of that period, politics had consumed education. A merit-based admission policy was replaced with an emphasis on correct family background and other manifestations of political correctness. Classrooms had been devoted to studying political theory at the expense of academic subjects. Teachers were denounced by students, some institutions closed altogether, and many schools and universities became chaotic, some with rival Red Guard factions meeting each other in violent confrontations. The notion of an alternative system that took out the negative aspects of political involvement in educa-

tion appealed to SZU staff and teachers, many of whom had witnessed firsthand the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

SZU's design for Party participation was no secret. The new directions were accepted by the Shenzhen government, which was fully apprised of the university's reforms. The reforms were not opposed by—and thus by inference were endorsed by—the municipal Party Committee, headed by Shenzhen's mayor and Party secretary Liang Xiang. Mayor Liang, who had close relations with Luo, was himself a reformer who initiated numerous innovations in the Shenzhen SEZ. Liang, an “expansionist reformer par excellence,”<sup>10</sup> had been responsible for approving SZU's new campus construction and had supported all of Luo's initiatives. The university's first Party reform initiatives were consistent with Liang's overall policy of *gaige* (reform).<sup>11</sup>

The university's second set of reform proposals in 1986 articulated the Party's full integration into the running of the university. It raised the slogan: Party members should have a harder life.<sup>12</sup> It reiterated the *san hua*, that cadre's political work should be on a part-time basis and Party activities were to be held outside normal working hours. Furthermore, cadres would not get extra subsidies or be given lighter work-loads while they engaged in Party activities. Only Luo as Party secretary could cancel the practice common in other universities where the Party secretary had his work-load decreased by one-third in order for him to make room for Party work. Political studies that were considered a waste of time and perfunctory were also canceled, the idea being that moral education should be incorporated into daily routine activities and not segregated into specific courses.

The nature of SZU Party work, which may be characterized as forced volunteerism, was made possible by Luo's example. Being the top CCP official at SZU, Luo personified the *san hua*. Luo's tireless dedication and determination, as well as his loyalty to the CCP, were well perceived on campus. In *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, a 1988 volume with a 20,000 press run that did much to establish SZU's reputation for reform, editor Tang Cairu commented that Luo worked over ten hours each day.<sup>13</sup> Some informants report the figure as high as 15. With Luo serving as a model to emulate, rank-and-file members were to practice volunteerism as follows:<sup>14</sup>

Each semester each Party member should do at least one good thing for the Party organization, one good deed for the public, one good deed for the school. Each year, each CCP member should participate in at least one weekend Party school, write one study summary, donate one good book to the

weekend Party school library, and at least once should visit the week-end Party school reading room to study documents.

In October 1986 when the Party Committee recruited volunteers for Party work, many applied.

Party officials from the upper level who visited SZU often supported Luo's reforms, and their support was in turn used to reinforce the legitimacy of these reforms. For example, Hu Qiaomu, a central level reformer in the mid-1980s who was sometimes critical of the SEZ's "unsocialist ways,"<sup>15</sup> visited SZU on 8 December 1987 and commented that part-time Party work was well within the CCP tradition. "In the revolutionary period," he is quoted as saying, "we did not have so many full-time cadres because no one could provide free food."<sup>16</sup>

Luo's reforms came out of his personal experiences, a background shaped by a decade at Qinghua as well as his long-time participation in the Communist Party bureaucracy. Over his political career, Luo had sat in on thousands of hours of what he regarded as worthless meetings. Although dedicated to worthy goals, the meetings themselves produced little of consequence. In March 1988 this is how he described such meetings:<sup>17</sup>

I have been engaged in ideological/political education for students for over 30 years. Not long ago, a SZU cadre attended a Guangdong conference on ideological/political education work. I have attended this type of meeting many times, year after year, conference after conference. Always the same things are discussed. It is like *san bu qu*, three-part music which is always the same: a-b-c, a-b-c, a-b-c... First, the strengthening of ideological education work is discussed; second, an attempt is made to find new work methods that adapt to new situations; third, we resolve to strengthen the construction of the ideological work team and to solve their problems of salary, housing, qualifications, etc. This type of conference also produces resolutions. The resolutions that passed in the early '60s still basically apply to the late '80s. Everyone can play this *san bu qu*. I myself can play, very skillfully. But to emphasize and repeat these things at a new meeting is just like admitting that these things are useless [because they lose their meaning with endless repetition, meeting after meeting].

The Party secretary did not want this experience to be replicated at SZU. Luo was a strong advocate of *effective* ideological/political education as well as an idealist who refused to join the ranks of cynical cadres whose adherence to traditional ways reflected, in his opinion, *de facto* abandonment of pursuing the goal. His innovations came as a response to the failures of the past and his determination to abandon these well-trod dead-ends. He sought an entirely new path. Referring to a four-sentence poem by Lu You of the

Song Dynasty, Luo likened his journey for a better political education system to wandering in vain through a forest, searching for a new village: “We are at the end of the mountain, the edge of the water. There seems to be no end to this road. Then, as we pass the willows and flowers, a village suddenly appears.” By 1988, Luo admitted that the experiment was never ending. “We have not found another village yet, not to mention even entering a new village. We have been walking hard, looking for another village. Perhaps, another village will appear soon.”

According to Luo, his philosophy was not preconceived by himself or anyone else before they arrived to SZU. The guidelines for the Party’s role emerged out of the first year’s experience of the university’s operation. After Luo fell from power, he was criticized by his successors for making the Party at SZU unimportant. But, as the following quote suggests, Luo intended to do just the opposite. By integrating the Party and school administration, he was attempting to give penultimate importance to the CCP. This approach, of course, could threaten those whose *raison d’être* was Party affairs. The professional cadre, whose status and functions were owed to the Party bureaucracy, had to adapt to SZU’s new system. Some may have felt threatened, especially those who had few managerial skills. In the early 1980s, however, few of SZU’s new teachers and administrators saw the need for a separate Party. Luo explained the Party’s guidelines:<sup>18</sup>

While advocating the good tradition of the Party, we should reform the structure of ideological work. During its revolutionary period, the CCP had a good tradition in ideological work. The work structure was simple; the method flexible. Most cadres were part-time. After the CCP came into power, these traditions changed or moved to the opposite direction. Ideological work began to focus on class struggle and was used as a means of persecution. Cadres gradually evolved into full-time personnel, detached from production and actual work. Ranks appeared in Party affairs; cadres began to occupy certain administrative quotas. CCP member cadres were permitted to have lightened work-loads; organizations became swollen and complex. Working methods became more rigid, even inflexible. If this continues, the CCP will lose its reputation. The first thing we did when establishing SZU was to cancel Party members’ privileges. We changed the focus in three aspects: (1) we changed the past tense to the present or future tenses. Ideological work instructs us not to pay attention to the past (e.g., what I did wrong yesterday), but rather to what needs to be done today and tomorrow. In the past, focus was 80% on the past. Now, we suggest 20% on the past, 40% on the present, and 40% on the future; (2) we changed from a “fire-fighting” to a cultivation-type attitude. In the past, ideological work was like rushing to extinguish fires. Rather, we should have a good plan, select a good piece of

land, seed it, fertilize it, water it, weed it, and kill its pests; (3) we changed from lecturing and criticizing, to providing service and encouragement. General discussions at meetings are good, but often limited, and sometimes harmful. The public needs to see something solid and physical. Doing one good deed for the public is better than giving a hundred speeches. Ideological work should solve problems by giving examples.

Party-administration unification is certainly nothing new in China. One Western scholar commented to me that Luo's system was actually a "regression, not an improvement" and characterized Luo as "one of them guys, no different." All too often, observers outside China view the CCP as an obstacle to reform. All politicians are seen through the same lenses. Many believe that China would be better off without the Communist Party, an effective discussion terminator, but also a fantasy. The more realistic approach taken by some who live and work in China (rather than view it from afar) is to accept the CCP's actuality while trying to improve its effectiveness. This is what Luo attempted to do at SZU. He presented a way to improve the Party's reputation, while removing its bureaucracy. In the early 1980s, many intellectuals had been alienated from the CCP. Luo attempted to bring them back into the Party fold. In the nearby Shekou Industrial Zone, Luo witnessed a de-politicization of commerce and industry. In many of Shenzhen's state-run companies, not to mention foreign joint-ventures, the CCP had been separated from company management. It stuck to political matters and only slightly interfered in the day-to-day running of business. This was the model Luo was adopting at SZU.

Just as the Party should not be given a separate identity, Luo believed that "ideological work should be included in routine life and study." Luo opposed the continuing of the "never-ending political campaigns" he had been exposed to most of his adult life. He explained his opposition to full-time ideological staff:<sup>19</sup>

How can we, on one hand, advocate merging ideological work into routine study while at the same time ideological staff do not do routine work and routine study? How can they be put together in this way? At SZU's beginning, we had to abandon the idea of having full-time ideological staff for several reasons. We did not have enough teachers, even for teaching. How could we afford full-time political staff? We were trying to minimize staffing quota. Furthermore, we had only freshmen and could not select tutors from senior students. Since students took part-time jobs and used the credit system, the concept of dividing students by classes became vague. The traditional way of tutors' work [tutors being distributed to certain classes] did not work. So we were forced to do political work on a part-time basis. We found out that doing so on a part-time basis was even better.

In theory CCP members at SZU took the same approach to Party work as their inland counterparts. They were to serve as exemplary members of the university community, and more was expected from them than of the non-Party staff. Perhaps the biggest difference was that they were not subjected to Party structure, such as meetings or required study sessions, nor were they to receive special benefits or compensation for executing Party duties.

### 1985 rectification

Rectifications (*zheng dun*) are periodic attempts in which the CCP verifies the caliber of its membership to ensure that the Party itself is heading down the desired path. Rectifications have followed such upheavals as the Cultural Revolution and the events following 4 June 1989. A nationwide rectification after the lunar new year break in 1985 was part of a campaign against bourgeois liberalization. This coincidentally accompanied a peak of criticism against the SEZ by national leaders. In November 1984 Zhao Ziyang, then Premier, had complained about the special zone's imbalance in foreign exchange. The rectification was a serious undertaking. Like most endeavors at the university it had special SZU characteristics, as explained by Luo:<sup>20</sup>

Problems within the Party must be resolved by criticism and self-criticism, and things that can be solved outside meetings should not be brought to meetings for discussion. Normal problems and conflicts that can be solved through mediation should not be brought to the Party. Rectification should focus on big problems in reform. All we require is that general mistakes by some Party members should be corrected, and we must discard the Cultural Revolution's way of cruel struggle and merciless crack-down. There should be no revenge-taking and no cliques. Party rectification should not interfere with routine work. Problems that commonly concern the public should be dealt with first. We will establish a weekend Party school and organize CCP members to receive training there. Party rectification is from the upper to the lower [meaning that no one, however high, be exempt].

As overseen by the university's Party branch, the 1985 rectification at SZU undertook four tasks:<sup>21</sup>

- to build SZU into a new style socialist university with Chinese characteristics. Party rectification was to follow the new work style of the commodity economy; new problems demanded new concepts. The Party committee advocated, in reference to Lu Xun, a major literary figure earlier in the century, the taking in of good things from capitalist countries, while throwing out the bad.
- to deepen and thoroughly deny the Cultural Revolution and further free the Party from the confinement of the leftists.

- to advocate a revolutionary spirit of wholeheartedly serving the people. All staff should fight against gaining wealth through power politics and bureaucratic maneuvering. It was essential to arrest people's fear that the system was not perfect. "[We] must not be defeated by the difficulties of reform and return to the old systems employed inland."
- to encourage Party members to take the lead in acquiring new knowledge.

These tasks were pursuant to instructions from Mayor Liang and the deputy mayor, Zhou Erkan, who noted that the campaign was *Party* rectification, not *Party member* rectification.<sup>22</sup> Its purpose was to examine the general principles of the Party; the targets were *not* individuals. "We allow people to take back what they say, to correct their mistakes, to explain themselves." Just like Luo, the city leadership very much opposed the Cultural Revolution practices of "pulling pig-tails, putting on dunce caps, beating people with sticks, putting them in bags."

Luo as Party secretary was "in full charge" of rectification, in which all Party members were required to participate, except for those who had been rectified in their previous work-unit just before coming to SZU. The process consisted of several phases that began in February and lasted through August. Some cadres were sent to the municipal Party for further training. Ten weeks were allowed for the study of Party documents, four weeks for criticism and self-criticism, four weeks for discussion on further reform and how Party work fit in with the commodity economy, and four weeks for member re-registration. The last month was devoted to developing further measures for SZU Party reform. Save for one member who was deemed to have a bad record, all Party members were re-registered after being successfully evaluated.

### Investigation by the Democratic Parties Association

The workings of the Communist Party at SZU were reviewed as part of an investigation by the Democratic Parties Association (*zhongguo minzhu tongmeng zhongyang weiyuanhui*), an organization representing China's officially approved non-CCP political parties, known as the democratic parties. These parties had their own organizations and were independent from the CCP, but they pledged support to the CCP's authority.<sup>23</sup> They were permitted to function as monitoring organizations, not like the loyal opposition, a term that describes the confrontational politics that characterize many Western democracies. The Democratic Parties Association sent a team in October 1987 to inspect SZU, after which it submitted an investigation report to Premier Li Peng.

The report commented favorably on “improved Party leadership...reformed moral/political education. It noted the efficiency (“only one Party office”) and effectiveness of the Party organization. It mentioned the steady increase in applications for Party membership: 50 in 1984, 103 in 1985, 159 in 1986, 218 in 1987’s first half, and 290 applications pending at the time of the report. Finally, it commented: “Some old intellectuals who had applied to join the CCP in other places for two or three years and had not received approval have joined the SZU CCP; they are greatly motivated.”

The inclusion of SZU students in the national chaos (*luan*) of December 1986 had prompted Beijing conservatives to raise concerns and cast doubt on the future of SZU’s reform path. There was no reported evidence that the SZU leadership specifically requested the democratic parties’ inspection, and it is not publicly known if any of the university’s dozen non-CCP Party members invited the inspectors. As a matter of protocol, however, such a visit would have been arranged, if not initiated, by members of a grass-roots democratic party at SZU; the inspection team would probably not have arrived either unannounced or uninvited. In any case, the inspection was probably motivated by the fears among SZU staff that reforms had been jeopardized by student actions of the previous December.

Evaluations in a variety of social and political environments can be greatly influenced by the beliefs of the evaluators. A cynic might argue that some evaluation reports, whether in China or elsewhere, could as well be written before the evaluation ever started. Regardless, the inspection team from the Democratic Parties Association liked what they saw. Although their report addressed the concerns reported by some teachers that students were not well-disciplined, it praised innovations such as the part-time job programs.<sup>24</sup> The report was sent to Premier Li with an accompanying letter handwritten by Fei Xiaotong, honorary head of the Association, an internationally well-respected scholar.<sup>25</sup> In a comment scribbled in the letters’ margin, Li Peng wrote that “some measures of SZU can be recommended to inland universities” and noted he would pass it on to SEdC deputy head He Dongchang for further study.<sup>26</sup> The report, therefore, had the result desired by SZU’s reformers—to discourage, if not silence, the university’s conservative critics.

### Party growth and reputation

By the late 1980s, Party membership at SZU was on the rise. The school community’s attitude toward the CCP had changed “from derision to respect.”<sup>27</sup> In the Law Department, a unit in Chinese universities that traditionally has trained students for political work, 26 students had joined the

CCP and 30 more were applying in 1987.<sup>28</sup> The Law Department, which was designated an “excellent Party branch” by the SZU Party Committee, had seen a dramatic change in students’ attitude regarding the Party. Students from the first class in 1983 had laughed when the department head suggested they join the Party. Four years later, 17 of the 38 seniors had joined up.<sup>29</sup> When SZU was first established, it had 40 CCP members. By 1987, it had registered 690, including 135 *benke* undergraduates; SZU had established 48 Party branches.

In the first five years of the university, a positive reputation had become established for the Party. The lack of confinement, in terms of regulated Party study and meetings, was especially appealing. The following were the opinions of the Party secretary of the Public Media Department:<sup>30</sup>

[SZU has] flexibility in Party study. In China after Party campaigns, each person must study documents for 120 hours. But at SZU, Party members study in their spare time. Documents are placed in reading rooms. When articles are read, you make notes and then sign your name in a book. As a result, people study over 120 hours. In April 1986, SZU had its first Party representative conference to select a new Party committee, held on a weekend. Usually such conferences have to be 2-3 days long, but the SZU conference was only 1 hour 23 minutes, and everything was done during this time. There was good preparation for the conference. This conference was criticized by some for not being serious enough. Municipality leadership praised this practice. Party members at SZU think short meetings are better.

The author illustrated how the Party’s reputation has improved by citing the example of Teacher Ma, who<sup>31</sup>

...is not a Party member. During the Cultural Revolution, he was criticized for being interested in planting and gardening because “hobbies kill your ambition.” Recently, he was invited by the SZU CCP to give a lecture on gardening. He published an article saying ‘until now I didn’t know that the Party was so amiable. Party members also love flowers and beauty. Party members are also human beings.’

## 1986 demonstrations

In late 1986 student demonstrations occurred in various Chinese cities, as noted in Chapter Three. Those nationwide disturbances had prompted conservatives in the education establishment, such as SEdC deputy head He Dongchang, to suggest that educational reforms in China had gotten out-of-hand. The participation of SZU students in protests concurrent with other students’ demonstrations had cast doubt on the wisdom of SZU reforms. In

response, SZU took several “counter-measures.”<sup>32</sup> Since only one-third of the academic departments had student Party branches, SZU began setting up branches for *benke* students in each department. It organized students to study regulations and legal documents of the National People’s Congress. In April 1987, freshmen who had been admitted the previous September were sent to Humen (Tiger Gate) Military Base in rural Dongguang outside of the SEZ for military training and patriotism education. In the summer they were to be sent to Longhua (China dragon) base in Baoan County for a refresher course.

Beginning in May 1987, the university conducted a courtesy and morality education campaign, which included a course (*liyike* or course on rites) and a system whereby points were deducted for discourteous behavior.<sup>33</sup> Management over student publications was enhanced. Special attention was to be paid to students around the politically sensitive dates of 5 April and 4 May. Implicit in SZU’s initiatives was its admission that the university was at least partly responsible for the students’ undisciplined behavior, as manifested in the *luan* of the previous December.

### Moral-political education

The Democratic Parties Association was not alone in its support for Luo’s unusual approach to moral-political education, which in other Chinese universities was handled by a special crew of political tutors (*zhuanzhi zhengzhi fudaoyuan*). In contrast, tutors at SZU, who numbered 171 in 1987, were not political tutors but rather academic tutors who were responsible for their students’ general well-being. Luo characterized this type of moral education as the “seed casting variety, not the preaching type.” The decision not to employ the traditional tutor system was based on Luo’s belief that<sup>34</sup>

Moral education in China is in a state of muck. The students hate it. They have complained to me that the CCP just tells lies and empty words and restricts them in every aspect. Many cadres who deal with moral education are also worried. Traditional methods have not worked. If you don’t teach moral education in the traditional way, you will be questioned by others. What is the way out? According to Zhao Ziyang at the Thirteenth Party Congress, we should not use political campaigns and should construct systems.

According to the CCP’s 1986 ideological and cultural guidelines and the Seventh Five-Year Plan, all Chinese students were expected to have ideals, culture, virtue and discipline—the so-called Four Haves (*si you*).<sup>35</sup> Consistent with these principles, the system of ideological education that Luo constructed aimed to develop students’ Three Selves within a socialist environ-

ment that contained competition and payment according to labor. SZU's work-study contrasted with what Luo referred to as the "traditional way [which] required students to do social investigation (*shehui diaocha*) only in vacations and then go back to the ivory pagoda and prepare a report." SZU also had vacation-time social investigation. As a requirement for graduation students had to spend 4-6 weeks in a work-unit, one in Shenzhen and the other inland. The university provided subsidies for food, travel and accommodation; students were encouraged to make their own arrangements, in contrast with the "old style of teachers' being in charge of everything."<sup>36</sup>

Political theory courses were also reformed. The department that handled them—called the Marxist and Leninist Theory Research Office after the similarly named unit in other universities—was renamed the Social Sciences Foundations Department. The traditional courses on political economy, Party/revolutionary history, and Marxism were converted into three broad course groups covering 18 courses in all. Students were permitted to choose teachers. If dissatisfied, they were instructed to complain to the university, which would tell these teachers to improve their teaching. If they could not do so within a reasonable time, they would be forced to stop teaching the course altogether. In the 1988 spring term, a course on Party Construction proved more popular than expected, with 243 rather than the anticipated 80 students enrolling. Luo attributed the rise in Party applications (more than in the previous seven semesters) to this course's popularity. Also in 1987, over one hundred students joined a Party knowledge study group.

Luo's approach of making moral education practical was not without precedent in China. But the various forms of labor education that had appeared over the history of the People's Republic were quite different from the SZU strategy. SZU's programs were publicized in several articles in national publications. An essay that had originally appeared in the university's academic journal was reprinted in the national compilation series of People's University. The article stressed that "the main purpose of students' political work is to create an environment conducive to students' self-improvement."<sup>37</sup> Another article by two journalists appeared in *Guangming Ribao*, China's newspaper for intellectuals, and was reprinted in a local newspaper. Explaining that both students and teachers were opposed to traditional teaching methods for ideological education, the authors described the diffuse methods used at SZU to manage students. The article positively reported on SZU's approach and was also included in People's University reprint series.<sup>38</sup>

## Party and administration unification

The 1987 report by the Democratic Parties Association seemed to arrest the fears of Beijing authorities, and SZU was free to continue its unique governance system. Even before the report, Luo Zhengqi had criticized the “primitive and unsound presidential responsibility system” that existed at inland universities.<sup>39</sup> Theirs was an illogical system, according to Luo, because the Party and administration were necessarily split. At SZU, in contrast, the Party and administration were unified. The Party supervised; it guaranteed that university reform was correctly undertaken. The burden of responsibility went to Party individuals, not to the organization, *per se*. “Party members in their own positions publicized the Party’s guidelines, policies and directions. They suggested to administration leaders how to make SZU practice conform with Party guidelines. This guarantee was embodied in political, moral and organizational aspects, but not in academics.” That task was left up to the Professors Committee. Limiting the CCP’s involvement to “Party matters” effectively removed it as an organization from academic affairs.

The unification of Party and administration at SZU was enhanced by the fact that one individual—Luo Zhengqi—simultaneously held the positions of president and Party secretary. Luo formally assumed the university presidency on 17 March 1986; up to that time he had overseen the school’s management from his dual position as first vice-president and Party secretary. Holding concurrently the top leadership positions in an organization—whether work-unit, university, or government—was rare, but not unique, in post-Mao China. Liang Xiang, who was appointed Shenzhen mayor and Party secretary in 1981, held both positions until his forced retirement in mid-1986. Other university presidents had also been Party secretaries during the 1980s. From time to time, however, Luo felt the need to justify the unification of power. He dealt with the issue rhetorically:<sup>40</sup>

Since the Party and administration are separated, why should the president also be the Party secretary? We believe that in higher education, the Party secretary should be part-time, conforming to the spirit of the Thirteenth Party Congress which says there should not be full-time Party cadres at the grass-roots level. If there are full-time Party cadres, they should not be part of the fixed administrative staffing and should not get a salary from administrative funds. He should get his salary from Party funds. In war time there are no political cadres who do not fight. This does not mean that the Party secretary must be the president, but it happens to be that way now because it was selected that way. This has received the endorsement of the Party Committees at both the municipal and provincial level.

Not everyone at SZU favored the Party reforms. Luo admitted that “some colleagues believe that the Party’s leadership can be enhanced only by increasing full-time cadres and organizations.” He met this criticism head-on. He defended his decision not to set up Party sub-offices, contending that “repetitious organizational structure between Party and administration in a university is one of the principle reasons for inefficiency and bloated staffing.” Party and Communist Youth League meetings were scheduled outside of the work week, usually on Saturday afternoons. Opposition to Luo’s reforms faded. When Luo assumed the presidency, the men who had served as his fellow vice-presidents left office; he became free to run the university without further internal dissent.<sup>41</sup> Luo summarized the result of reforms as follows: “Our practice has gained strong support by people both in and outside the Party. The Party’s image has been improved. Its reputation is enhanced. The Party leadership over the school is strengthened and deepened.”

For the following year the Party at SZU functioned in a steady state, and the Party received no substantive mention in 1988 published documents. The audio-visual center produced a video on Party construction entitled “The Never Ending Search.”<sup>42</sup> Guangdong’s Lieutenant Governor Wang Pingshan, Luo’s patron in the province, complemented SZU in an article for splitting the Party from school administration.<sup>43</sup>

### ***Party construction after Tiananmen***

On 22 July 1989, as discussed in Chapter Three, Luo Zhengqi was dismissed as SZU president and Party secretary. His removal came in the aftermath of the nationwide student demonstrations that culminated with military action in and around Tiananmen Square the previous month. Guangdong authorities appointed Wu Zewei as Party secretary and Wei Youhai as president. The Wei-Wu administration terminated, suspended or reversed virtually all of Luo Zhengqi’s reforms—collegiate, academic or political. It deconstructed Luo’s mechanisms of management over teachers and students in order to improve discipline and overall administration (*xiao feng*), study atmosphere (*xiao feng*), and teaching atmosphere (*jiao feng*). In practice, Wei-Wu adhered to the Maoist adage:<sup>44</sup>

Whatever our enemies oppose, we embrace; everything our enemies embrace, we oppose.

### **Opposing Luo Zhengqi**

Luo was vilified as school enemy number one, an anti-Christ to SZU communism. The new leaders made their arguments in the media, reviling the

Three -izations for having lightened the Party's leadership over SZU education.<sup>45</sup> Another attack on Luo came from his former colleague at Qinghua, He Dongchang. As deputy head of the SEdC, the conservative ideologue had been forced to accept Premier Li Peng's endorsement of the Democratic Parties Association's 1987 favorable report on SZU. With Luo in disgrace, He Dongchang was now free to reveal the deep-seeded animosities he held. He reflected on how badly Luo had treated him on his visit to SZU in early 1989.<sup>46</sup>

He lectured to me for half a day, but when I left he did not even ask for my opinions. They were just opinions. One can choose to accept or reject. But he did not even ask for them.

When he revisited SZU in April 1991, He Dongchang took revenge against Luo in an *ad hominem* attack before mid-level cadres in which he referred to the former president only in the third person or as "this person."

When talking about self-examination, I should be the first to do self-examination, because this person was recommended to SZU through the SEdC although not personally by me. But at least I approved. He and I graduated from the same school; therefore it is partially my responsibility for having made the improper recommendation that brought trouble to SZU. Although now no one is accusing me of the responsibility, I should still mention it. Since we started this topic, we have to say something about this person.

In his hour-long speech, He Dongchang took the opportunity to settle old scores:

Strictly speaking, this person knew little about teaching and academic research. Before the Cultural Revolution, he was in the architecture department, a Youth League cadre of that department. Youth league cadres are generally active, but also they do not know where the basic needs of life<sup>[47]</sup> come from. During the Cultural Revolution, he joined a certain clique, but the problem was a small mistake. After the Cultural Revolution, he continued Party work and studied in the Party school. So he does not know much about educational administration and does not know how to run a school. In hindsight, we know that he doesn't know about socialism or capitalism, either. Although he didn't know much, he wasn't humble...

He Dongchang rounded out his attack on Luo on ideological grounds, arguing his case for full-time Party work and, in passing, suggesting his own sense of inferiority.

Knowing about political/moral education is very important, but he did not know about this either. This guy always talked about part-time-ization, part-

time Party work and mentioned that the underground Party members (before 1949) always worked part-time for the Party. This is not true. First, he graduated in 1957 and never had the experience of working as an underground Party member. I did not work as a Party member for long, but at least I have experience. It was difficult to work part-time as an underground Party member but there was no choice. We had to earn a living. Frankly speaking, I did not graduate from Qinghua University. I failed the physical education course. Why did I fail it? There was a rule in Qinghua: if you were absent from several classes, regardless of how high you could jump in the test, you were doomed to fail the course. I missed several classes because working as an underground Party member I was so tired, I overslept several mornings. Isn't working for the Party and working elsewhere contradictory? Actually, many underground Party members were so tired they vomited blood and died. He knew nothing about all this; yet he talked noisily. As soon as he gave his opinion at SZU about part-time work, I gave my different opinion in Beijing. According to my memory, when I was an underground Party member, at least 20 or 30 comrades got sick or died due to the hard work. It was a busy time. The Korean war, suppression of anti-revolutionaries, etc. Since he did not understand the reality and at the same time was not humble, it's inevitable that he would go too far. I am not talking behind his back. Even if he were here, I would say this also.

With conservative educators in their corner, the university's new *lingdao* undid many of the reforms instituted during the school's first six years. The arrival of the new leaders caused the dissipation of any support teachers and staff had given Luo's reforms. Some of Luo's supporters, such as the deputy Party secretary and vice-presidents, immediately reassessed their views via *biaotai* (taking a stand openly) and suddenly became his chief critics. Other supporters left the university altogether, many to go abroad. The rank-and-file teachers who stayed at SZU either backed the new administration or kept a low profile, fearing that criticism of the new policies would jeopardize their careers.

Even four years after Luo's dismissal, Party secretary Wu still blamed his predecessor for the university's problems:<sup>48</sup>

Instead of teaching the *si you rencai* [Four Haves talent], the major leader of SZU in 1986 advocated the *san hua* [Three i-zations]. In terms of ideological and political work, the major leader advocated 'we don't deal with ideological things'...The poison of lightening the ideological/political work still remains.

Wu's quotation from Luo was in all probability fabricated. In any case, it misrepresented Luo's stated political philosophy. Wu's construction of Luo's beliefs suggested that Wu himself misunderstood the difference between means and goals. Luo's stated goal for SZU was to produce capable

*rencai* for the modernization of China. This required, in Luo's opinion, sound political/ideological education. The means he chose to reach the goals, however, were not through traditional meetings, documents, Party structure or political tutors. Both Wu and Luo shared a strong belief in Chinese socialism and the value of the CCP. They differed absolutely on means. Either Wu failed to understand their differences or he chose to misrepresent Luo's ideology as part of a blame-the-past strategy for explaining SZU's problems that were occurring during his own watch.

### Opposing Luo's associates

Shortly after Wei-Wu's arrival it became clear to SZU staff that anyone perceived as a "friend" of Luo would not face a bright future on campus. That perception influenced many of Luo's supporters to change their allegiance to the new management team. Wei-Wu revoked *chu*-level appointments that Luo had made in the first six months of 1989, going so far as to bring back out of administrative retirement department heads who had stepped down to make way for their appointed successors. These lame-ducks were told to take back their former jobs while Wei-Wu vetted Luo's appointments, a process that took six months. As a result decision-making in several departments came to a virtual halt.

Luo's half dozen closest associates and advisors stood firmly in support of the ousted president's policies and refused to *biaotai* to the new leadership, as had the two vice-presidents who were allowed to retain their jobs. Consequently, each of these officials loyal to Luo, within days of Wei-Wu's assuming control, were removed from their positions. Each was forced into a state of limbo, not formally fired, but not reassigned either to administrative or teaching positions. In several cases their salaries were suspended, to be returned only when they filed a formal complaint with the municipal Personnel Bureau.

One of Luo's "friends" whom Wei-Wu found especially difficult to deal with was Li Ruisheng, an artist who had built a popular art gallery and restaurant known on campus as the Ghost House.<sup>49</sup> Professor Li had arrived at SZU in 1984 when the university moved to its new campus. He contracted with the university to build his gallery/restaurant, with SZU providing the land and Li contributing everything else. His contract with SZU provided that 3% of income generated would go into the President's Fund to be used as rewards for outstanding students. Li's project was approved by the university in a document dated 19 November 1988. Attached to the chopped document was a "red-lined" drawing (the color red denotes survey lines in China) that established the borders of the project, which was located at the

edge of the student dormitories, near the future site of the Sports Center. On the basis of these documents, Li obtained a business license, borrowed funds and built what was to be known formally as SZU's Chinese Folk Art Center. This cluster of buildings, which Li designed and built himself, without any engineer or working drawings, has received international attention as an example of "architecture without architects."<sup>50</sup>

In 1989 the Wei administration revoked Li's license, stating that the revocation was part of the leader's policy of strengthening control over companies run on campus. In March 1990, the university, in a partial about-face, restored Li's business license on condition he agree not to operate a restaurant. Li then signed an agreement with the SZU Culture and Technology Service Co., a campus-run enterprise, permitting him to operate the company. In the following months, the university promulgated a new policy that permitted campus businesses to use, for three years, buildings that work-units themselves build. Acting on this new policy, Li obtained a license to build and operate a restaurant. After the restaurant was built, but before it opened for business, the university refused to allow Li to open it, cutting off power and water. With a personal investment of over ¥1 million in the Ghost House, Li decided to take SZU to court.

The Shenzhen Mid-level People's Court ruled in favor of Li in 1991. SZU appealed the civil judgment, and in 1992 the Guangdong Higher Court reaffirmed the lower court's opinion. It ruled that the contract was lawful and binding, but noted that company should have been established as a private enterprise, not a university-supported one. The university was ordered to permit Li to operate the gallery and restaurant.

With the retirement of Wei and Wu, the harsh policies towards Luo and his friends, such as Li Ruisheng, were revoked. During his first days in office as SZU president, for example, Cai Delin reversed the Wei-Wu policy on the Ghost House and instructed the university's Enterprise Management Department to apply for a new business license for Li's Folk Art Development Company, including a restaurant. The university also agreed to provide an unspecified amount of funds for remodeling.<sup>51</sup> Thus, five years after Tiananmen Luo and his former associates began to be treated according to the university rules and regulations and subjected less often to Party directives which were not subject to administrative review. Their salaries were returned, and they became eligible for welfare entitlements such as subsidies for housing.

## Restoring tradition

Development of a new SZU CCP more along traditional lines became the manifest destiny of the new leadership. It advocated three basic changes: changing the Party's role from lightened to reinforced, changing its status from being an appendix to becoming nuclear, and changing the overall direction of running the university from being derailed to being on-track.<sup>52</sup> Specifically, the new leaders were upset that the Party organization they inherited was "incomplete" and that "under the previous major leader" Party activities included only paying Party fees and organizing some outings. Party membership management was "chaotic," with many non-Party members holding jobs that should have belonged to Party members. Many Party members, it argued, lacked strong concepts concerning Marxism. "Some even betrayed the Party and State for the sake of money. Some steal money and go abroad or hide away in China." It was also concerned about the staff's loose discipline and loose political direction in the social disorder surrounding 4 June.

Party re-construction took place in three stages, lasting two years (or three times longer than the 1985 rectification). August - December 1989 was a period for "unification of thoughts" and post-Tiananmen self-examination. Before the start of classes in autumn 1989, Wei-Wu oversaw two weeks of obligatory political study for all students, staff and teachers, as mandated by provincial authorities. This was the first organized, non-coursework political study SZU students had ever experienced, although most teachers and staff had received similar re-education in previous employment or during the Cultural Revolution. The year 1990 was a time to resurrect a foundation, setting up Party organizations, writing regulations, and organizing the Party's administrative staff. From September to November 1990, the qualifications of all 386 Party member were reviewed one-by-one. The third stage, lasting throughout 1991, aimed to improve SZU Party quality. Over this period, Party leaders advocated the Seven Stick To's (of which only six were defined):

Stick to: (1) clear cut responsibilities of Party committee and principals; (2) democratic centralism, in which the minority follows majority, and oppose the 'one speech hall' (*yi yuan tang*) [in which everyone must listen to one leader speaking] and 'paternalism' (*jia zhang zhi*, or family head system); (3) democratic meeting system, once each semester for self-examination, in which Shenzhen municipal departments attend; (4) study of theory; (5) working with the masses closely; (6) anti-corruption construction.

Wei-Wu were pleased with the overall results of rectification. The new CCP leadership acknowledged in 1991: “Two years ago, few attended Party meetings. Now, in Party meetings, attendance is guaranteed.” By 1991 departmental Party branches featured regular activities, and “education for socialism” had become a university slogan. In the three years following Tiananmen, 2,000 students took part in social investigations “to experience the advantages and priorities of socialism.” Students were educated about the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Also, 388 Party members took a unified test on Party knowledge, with an average score of 93.3%. A “democratic” evaluation of Party members in May-June 1991 was attended by 429 members, all but one of whom passed. In addition, Party cadres were subject to a combination of discipline monitoring and monitoring by the public. “Bad cadres”—those who ruined the reputation of the Party by using power and manipulating the bureaucracy for personal gain—were to be punished. On the afternoon of the twentieth of each month, the Party leaders received visits from the public and were encouraged to report against corrupt cadres. In addition, the Party had assumed more direct control over the Work Union and Youth League.

### **Leadership and structure**

A new seven-person Party Committee included the Party secretary, president, two vice-presidents and three other leaders. The Party was given the highest authority in all aspects of university management. Even the ordering of chapters in SZU’s annual reports was reshuffled so that the CCP sections appeared before those about the president, administration, teachers or students. Several dozen regulations were promulgated on Party branch work, moral/political education, cadreship, and political tutoring.<sup>53</sup> The CCP drew a clear hierarchy of authority in Party management.<sup>54</sup>

The SZU Party committee will instruct the branches, and the branches will instruct the sub-branches and the sub-branches will instruct Party members. From the upper to the lower level, from one level to the next, we must totally change the past situation of weak Party leadership at SZU, correct the mistakes of neglecting Party construction, strengthen overall Party organizational development, improve people’s perceptions of the Party, and increase the Party’s importance in SZU’s work style, discipline and systems.

In its first year in office the Wei-Wu team set up six offices under the Party Committee: the committee office itself, as well as departments for organization, propaganda, *tongzhanbu*, student affairs, and security.<sup>55</sup> In subsequent years each of these offices would become a power center in its own right, but upon establishment they were just names on paper. By the end of 1990, 20

Party general branches (*dang zong zhi*) had been set up, including 14 in academic departments. It took several years before they were fully staffed; at first the leaders held dual positions as staff were seconded from other sub-units. In addition, 19 general branch committees (*zong zhi wei yuan hui*) were functioning, as well as 53 sub-branches (43 for teachers and staff, and 10 for students).<sup>56</sup> The Party's administrative staff was divided into three teams: (1) Party affairs cadre team that consisted of 17 full-time and 27 part-time staff, many of whom were picked from the academic ranks;<sup>57</sup> (2) political tutors team that included over 23 full-time staff, many of whom were university graduates from SZU and elsewhere; and (3) a collection of over 100 part-time tutors—teachers who were Party members.

### *Division of labor*

Generally, management structure within Chinese universities uses an important 1985 *Decision* by the CCP for its guideline.<sup>58</sup> As the major policy statement on educational reform in the post-Mao era, the 1985 *Decision* put into formal effect guidelines that had circulated several years prior to the release of the document. The *Decision* articulated that “the principal or president assumes full responsibility,” but as Jordan Pollack notes, the change was mostly cosmetic and symbolic since presidents were themselves Party members in good standing.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, the *Decision* instructed Party organizations to focus on certain tasks, none of which were primarily managerial nature. The CCP was to:<sup>60</sup>

- concentrate on strengthening Party building and improving ideological and political work;
- unite the teachers and students;
- strongly support the principals or presidents in the execution of their functions and powers;
- guarantee and supervise the implementation of the Party's various principles and policies and the fulfillment of the state's educational plans;
- persist in educating the teachers and students in Marxism;
- inspire them with the resolve to forge ahead courageously and contribute to the prosperity of [the] motherland; and,
- guarantee that students develop morally, intellectually, and physically, so as to help make the schools truly sturdy bulwarks against the corrosive influence of capitalist and other decadent ideas, and firm

bases for the building of a socialist civilization of a high cultural level.

SZU's political system, set-up before formal release of the 1985 *Decision*, authorized the president to take full administrative responsibility—at least, that was Luo's interpretation. After 1989, however, a more ambiguous concept was introduced: presidential responsibility under Party leadership. Precisely because of its vagueness, the resulting dual-track administrative structure—administration and Party—had to be worked out and negotiated by participants. After several years in development, regulations on the separation of power were published in 1991.<sup>61</sup> The 1991 regulations gave the SZU CCP a broad mandate, empowering it to make decisions on:

Guidelines for school development, reform, teaching, research, and administration; long term development planning, financial budgets and big projects, important reform measures, changes of staffing, curriculum adjustment, income and distribution of school funds.

The Party was made responsible for the ideological education of Party members and their management and monitoring, including anti-corruption work. The SZU Party Committee supervised the work of all cadres *vice-chu* level and above. The Organization Department of the Party oversaw lower-level cadres and the Personnel Department managed administrative staff at lower ranks. *Chu* and *vice-chu* level staff came under the charge of both the Organization Department and the Personnel Department, regardless of whether they were Party members. In effect, the regulations put the SZU CCP in charge of cadres with associate senior qualifications (e.g., associate professors) and above, and the Personnel Department oversaw lower-level staff. The Party's role was all-encompassing. It was authorized to:

discuss and make decisions on the matters reviewed by the university's committees on academics, degrees, qualifications and general school affairs. It was responsible for the general principles of qualification review and teacher team development, as well as important issues on auditing and security. It oversaw the implementation or termination of regulations. Finally, it was to listen to the president's reports on recruitment and graduates' job getting. It was to make decisions on important foreign affairs issues, the annual work plan, expenses over ¥100,000, the establishment or cancellation of administrative organizations above *chu*-level and other important issues proposed by the president.

The 1991 regulations also specified the functions of the president, noting throughout how he was to relate to the CCP (here italicized):

The president is the legal person appointed by the government and *reports to Party Committee*. [Duties]: *implement the Party's guidelines and policies*, stick to the socialist orientation, and guarantee the school's nature of socialism. Work out the long-term development plan, annual work plan, and semester work plan and *report to Party Committee for approval*. Strengthen ideological and political work; work out reform plans for teaching, academic research and campus service management, and *report to Party Committee*. Make arrangements for teaching, library management, equipment acquisition, family planning, sports, hygiene, landscaping, production, basic construction, etc. Work out regulations, make administration scientific and standardized. Select and train academic leaders. Strengthen teaching staff and management over them; develop measures for further training. Carefully plan the financial budget; work out budget for funds given by upper level and school funds and *report to Party Committee*. Periodically, report to staff representatives conference. Work out plans for changing staff as well as curriculum and *report to Party Committee*. Work out plans for qualification review *according to general principles set by Party Committee*. Manage academic committee, degrees committee, qualification review committee, school affairs committee. Manage foreign affairs, send out students and teachers abroad, receive overseas students and visiting scholars, and hold international conferences, *according to Party Committee decisions*. Manage auditing and security work and life of retired staff. Work out recruitment plan and students' job-getting plan, and *report to Party Committee*. Publicize announcements; strengthen school atmosphere and discipline construction. *Implement tasks given by Party Committee*. Handle unexpected problems or emergencies in a timely fashion.

Given that the president was also on the Party Committee, the regulations permitted for a unified school management, but quite the opposite was the case. In practice the dual-track system often caused delays in decision-making and led to factionalism. Turf disputes among the leadership over appointments resulted in compromises and an increase in staff hiring. Trade-offs worked like this: Wei's recommended staff were to be hired only if the Wu faction could also make staff appointments, and vice-versa. In total, over one hundred new staff were hired in 1989-1991 for political duties.

## Rectification

Rectification after Tiananmen required that all SZU CCP members re-register. (The rectification was referred to by the politically neutral term Party member re-registration [*chongxin dengji*] rather than rectification [*zheng dun*]).<sup>62</sup> This was in accordance with central government instructions that the qualifications of Party members in areas that experienced *luan* be reviewed. Its purpose was comprehensive:

Re-registration is important for Party construction and enhancement of the Party's leadership over school, and it is important for eliminating potential political danger, eliminating corrupted elements within the Party, getting rid of unqualified Party members, maintaining the purity and advancement of the Party, and fortifying the battle strength of Party.

Overseeing the rectification were the Party secretary, president and a Shenzhen municipal representative. Party branches were installed in academic departments, administrative and teaching support units, SZU-affiliated factories and enterprises. All Party members, regardless of whether working or studying, or whether fixed or borrowed staff, were required to belong to one Party branch and to take part in its activities. Attendance was to be recorded. Members with absences were to be seriously criticized. Leaders of the Party branches were instructed to play more important roles, no "*ma hu liao shi*" [finishing something with a non-serious—*ma ma hu hu*-style attitude]. To encourage these efforts, the Audio/visual Center produced videos on the Party with titles like "Following the Footsteps of the Party" and "The Wind is Blowing, the Sail is High."

In their self reviews, staff were required to talk about the 4 June events and their own participation in them. They were required to identify the main causes of their own mistakes and address ways to prevent these from reoccurring. By the end of the review, 381 of the 386 Party members were reaffirmed. One was suspended, one refused to be registered, one member canceled, and two were expelled. Only a handful of staff were demoted or reassigned to less powerful positions. Staff who had not been closely associated with Luo were promoted to the new political posts; others, including the two vice-presidents who had served under Luo, were allowed to retain their positions once they had agreed to renounce his policies.

The Party was determined to "open up a new situation for Party work at SZU."<sup>63</sup> It was concerned that "some students, as well as teachers and cadres, do not well understand the advantages of socialism or the harms of capitalism's excessive freedom [freedom-ization]." "Loose moral and political education" under the Luo administration was a major cause of SZU's problems:<sup>64</sup>

Teachers have put insufficient emphasis on teaching, are very undisciplined, and even violate laws or regulations. Students are freedomized [*ziyou zhuyi*] or hooliganized [*liumang xiqi*, hooligan habit]; there are fights, corruption, co-habitation, damage of public properties, and cliques. Many students have a vague understanding of the Four Cardinal Principles,<sup>[65]</sup> democracy and the law, the Four Haves and Three Selves.

### Political/moral education

Under Luo's tenure, students took political/moral education courses as required by state guidelines; they were allowed to choose among a total of 18 courses offered. Luo's successors did not greatly change the courses themselves, as they were required to adhere to the national syllabus. In 1994 students took five ideological courses, in the order they chose. Each 2-hour course was offered each semester, but given students' tight schedules (25 hours of classes a week), most students were forced to take these public courses together with their classmates. The five courses were titled: Chinese Revolutionary History, Marxism, Political Economics, Chinese Socialist Construction, and World Political Economics/International Relations. In addition, four required moral education courses covered Legal Education, Cultivation of Life, Current Affairs, and Professional Ethics. They were taken in order, one per year. Textbooks were given to the students, who were expected to attend several lectures by tutors and devote other time to self-study.

### Political tutors team

In 1989 the new leaders established a political tutors team.<sup>66</sup> One of its first jobs was to lead students on social investigation (*shehui diaocha*) during spring 1990.<sup>67</sup> All junior students went in class groups on one-week organized excursions usually to rural districts around Shenzhen to "approach the masses and learn about the national situation and gain a better understanding of the Party's guidelines." These field trips were intended to "enhance ties between school and society...enhance [students' and cadres'] ability to resist the wrong train of thoughts and capitalist freedom-ization and peaceful evolution." Students were required to write a 2,500 character report and were permitted to select their topics from the following list:

Over 10 years of reform/opening, what big social-economic changes have occurred in the place of investigation? How have people's lives been greatly improved? What sort of important roles has the Party organization been playing in reform/opening implementation? How are Party members and cadres serving as models in the reform/opening? What are examples of their selfless and upright contributions? What changes show the advantages of socialism?

By regulation, students going on investigation were warned beforehand "to listen to teachers' and cadres' instructions, not to cause problems for the locals, not to push while getting on and off vehicles, not to scatter rubbish, not to be late or leave early, and not to play chess or poker." Informants attend-

ing these field trips reported to me about their “week-long vacation from classes,” in which “the girls went shopping and the boys played cards.” Of several dozen students interviewed, none reported a better understanding of the Party’s guidelines or an acquired aversion to capitalist freedom-ization. The largest gain was reported by one student; he had won ¥75 by the end of the week-long card-playing session.

During the semester, Wednesday afternoons were set aside for political study and tutoring. Over 240 students in 1990 joined Party Constitution study groups.<sup>68</sup> Party branches were instructed to give lectures on the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics, in line with Deng Xiaoping’s philosophy. Staff, by departments, studied upper level documents with Party Committee members.<sup>69</sup> From September 1990 the university set up study groups and reestablished the Marxism and Leninism Research on Teaching office. Political tutors were instructed to make friends with the students and to visit their dorms frequently. The tutors accompanied students on field trips, tree planting excursions, and set up English corners and weekend evening parties.<sup>70</sup> In some cases the tutors served as homeroom teachers (*ban zhuren*) “to be seen as their friends rather than as someone sent by the school to supervise them,” in the words of one tutor. “Most students are young, inexperienced and lack strong abilities to take care of themselves. They are far from parents, relatives and friends so they need more help and care in terms of ideology, study and life. This is the role of the tutor.”<sup>71</sup> The Chinese Department even reached out to parents and worked with them on their children’s political/ideological education.<sup>72</sup> The university attempted further to strengthen moral education by “enhancing the function of posters on noticeboards and radio announcements.”

The Party wanted to recruit new members, but with stricter review for those wanting to enter. Applicants were required to be sponsored by two Party members and had to have sufficient social investigation experience. Probation lasted one year, with a review by the branch committee every three months.<sup>73</sup> All Party members were expected to attend the SZU Party school. As in Luo’s time, the Party school was not an actual institution with a fixed staff and curriculum per se. By 1990, it had acquired an office and physical presence, but it remained a set of instructional guidelines and specific plans, with classes given on an ad hoc basis. From September 1990, Party members of different branches took turns going to the Party school for organized study and discussion. The study theme was “sticking to the Four Cardinal Principles and anti-capitalist freedom-ization.” The training content included the basic principles of Marxist philosophy. The Party school gave lectures to Party members on current political topics. In 1992 four cadres were sent

**Table 6.1: Party membership**<sup>75</sup>

Year	Party members						applications		
	full total	staff	probates stu	total	staff	stu total members	total	staff	stu
1983	46 <sup>a</sup>				46	0	46	0 <sup>k</sup>	0 <sup>k</sup>
1984			15 <sup>k</sup>					35 <sup>l</sup>	15 <sup>h</sup>
1985	464 <sup>b</sup>	52 <sup>j</sup>	48	100 <sup>k</sup>			564	35 <sup>j</sup>	105 <sup>j</sup>
1986	535 <sup>c</sup>	180	23 <sup>l</sup>	203 <sup>l</sup>			738	5 <sup>l</sup>	154 <sup>h</sup>
1987	690 <sup>d</sup>					108 <sup>s</sup>	690	25 <sup>l</sup>	265 <sup>h,m</sup>
1990	410 <sup>e,n</sup>			108	417 <sup>e</sup>	101 <sup>e</sup>	518		
1991	473 <sup>f</sup>		30 <sup>o</sup>				473		
5/91-4/95			274 <sup>o</sup>						600 <sup>o</sup>
'91-'94		41 <sup>q</sup>	203 <sup>q</sup>	244 <sup>q</sup>					
1994	601			101 <sup>q</sup>	588 <sup>g</sup>	114 <sup>g,p</sup>	702 <sup>g</sup>		
1995			19 <sup>r</sup>	148 <sup>r</sup>					

Sources in note 75.

to towns and enterprises for training, and 78 were sent to villages for “rural village socialist education.”

The years 1990-1991 saw the promulgation of several dozen regulations. The university's Party branches were required to meet monthly on the first and third Wednesday afternoons. This fit into a specified university meeting schedule that included meetings for Party and administration leaders, Party and administration mid-level cadres, Party committee on democratic life, Party committee masses reception dates, Party committee leaders contacting grass roots, tutors' Wednesday work, Party committee and democratic party meetings, and Party committee meetings with staff and students.<sup>74</sup> The Party Committee also set up a central study group, meeting the fourth Monday afternoon monthly, which explored two topics in fall 1991: improving productivity through the development of science and technology, and theory about socialism.

The SZU CCP worried about ideological deficiency. Sixteen months after the Tiananmen events, the Party said it still needed to “unify people's knowledge about the nature of anti-socialism in the 1989 riot.”<sup>76</sup> By October 1990, SZU had in place a team of 32 full-time political cadres, 18 full-time political tutors, 11 part-time political work cadres and 105 part-time tutors. Originally, political tutoring under Wei-Wu was not supposed to require additional staff and was to be fully integrated into teaching affairs. Provisional regulations mandated that “all qualified teachers take turns as tutors, for a

term of 2-4 years. Tutoring can substitute for 30 hours of teaching over a year. The work performance of the tutor is put in the *dangan* and is a major consideration for promotion.”<sup>77</sup> But few teachers or staff wanted to be political tutors, so the university had to hire new staff, mostly recent university graduates, to fill these positions.

In Party construction, the Party committee saw the need to “enhance the revolutionary-ization of the leaders’ group (*lingdao banzi*).” The implementing units were the branch offices, which were instructed to Take the Ten Leads in:<sup>78</sup>

1. studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. Each person should write an essay on an original Marx/Lenin/Mao work each semester, based on the bibliography given by propaganda department. The essay is handed into the branch which monitors.
2. protecting democratic centralism, obey the leadership of the collective, and finish tasks set by collective;
3. going deep into the grassroots level and have close contact with students, teachers and staff, practice open reception days for students staff, teacher and Party members;
4. following state laws and regulations and school rules, never take advantage of the position of authority for personal interest;
5. carrying out criticism and self-criticism. Meetings about democratic life should be normalized with visits from upper level leaders at least once a semester;
6. maintaining unification of school and make friends with democratic party members, which will be checked by the *tongzhanbu*;
7. being part-time tutors and moral teachers;
8. caring about staff’s lives. Each person each semester should visit at least 3-5 staff households to help solve their problems;
9. attending compulsory collective labor. Branch Party secretary should record attendance, Party committee office will check and publicize attendance on campus;
10. having a good double organizational life [Party and academic].

Within a few years, the Party branch management responsibility system had replaced Luo Zhengqi’s *modus operandi* in which departments’ academic heads were held responsible for their work-units. Despite Wei-Wu’s intentions, rule by the collective actually resulted in the development of cliques and a high degree of factionalism within the university. The importance of the individual departments and their *lingdao* abetted corrupt practices. The Wei-Wu administration’s decision-making process is best characterized as the CCP’s running the university. This was made possible because the president was also a leading member of the SZU CCP. Three years of fac-

tionalism took its toll on the university. In some departments, most notably the Foreign Language Department, staff from opposing factions were hardly civil to one another. By 1994, when both Wei and Wu had been retired by provincial and municipal authorities, the Party's reputation had deteriorated. Membership for the years immediately after Tiananmen, in fact, declined as student members graduated and few students or staff applied for membership (see Table 6.1). Membership did not pick up until Cai Delin took on the dual role of president and Party secretary.

### ***Reintegrating the Party***

One of president Cai Delin's major objectives was to reestablish the reputation of the CCP at SZU. The Wei-Wu strategies had not generated members' respect for their Party. Cadres were weary from continuing meetings and re-education endeavors. Thus, regulations in 1994 required meetings to be short and small-scale. The quality of documents was to be improved, their quantity limited.<sup>79</sup> Around 1 July, the anniversary of the founding of the CCP, monetary awards were given to "excellent" Party members and work-units.<sup>80</sup> Cai stopped the vituperative attacks that had occurred against Luo Zhengqi and even opened up an informal dialogue with the former president to seek out his opinions on school affairs. Cai also needed to put an end to the incessant bickering that took place between Party and administration. He accomplished this task, at least at the highest level, by concurrently taking the role of Party secretary and president.<sup>81</sup> He instructed Party and administrative cadres to start working together more harmoniously. Leaders were changed in 22 sub-work-units. Discussions at Party meetings, which were to be held once or twice a month, were to be<sup>82</sup>

...democratic but should follow the principle of majority rule. Once resolution is reached, individual differences can be reserved but implementation should be complete and different practices are not allowed. Issues internally discussed in Party committee should not leak out. Violators will be held responsible.

Harmony within the university was partly made possible because the Party disengaged from some purely administrative and academic issues. The Party moved in this direction because another item was put on its agenda—an item of utmost importance that preoccupied members' time: the recruiting new members.

## Building the Party among students

In 1993, for the first time, the university articulated a goal for student CCP membership, which it set at 4%. The next year the goal was raised to 5%, which was also the goal for 1995.<sup>83</sup> At the same time, a longer range objective was set for 1997—that 8% of all students should belong to the CCP by the year Hong Kong returned to China. How could these goals possibly be achieved? In 1991 and 1994, respectively, only 1% and 3.6% of students were Party members.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the 1994 achievement fell slightly short of the 4% goal that had been set for 1993. Undaunted by this failure, higher goals were set for the future. The CCP under Cai Delin was determined to increase student Party membership dramatically by the November 1995 accreditation; all academic department Party branches, the Youth League, the propaganda office and the Party's student affairs department were directed to fulfill this quota.

Party construction among students was one of the prime objectives of the Student Affairs Office (SAO). As the office in charge of students' comprehensive evaluation (*zonghe ceping*), the document upon which scholarship awards were based, SAO sat in a good position to stress the importance of political participation. Party membership could translate into a higher score on the evaluation; if the score were high enough, the student would be eligible for certain scholarships and awards. The SAO was also in charge of student management. To carry out its duties, it heavily relied upon departmental political tutors, student Party members, student cadres and Youth League cadres. These individuals formed an "information network that reaches to each grade, each class and each dorm building to collect and pass relevant information expediently. Good deeds and students are praised and awarded; evil things are extinguished at their beginning."<sup>85</sup> The more opportunistic students realized that entering the information network as the investigator, not the investigated, could prove advantageous.

The Youth League participated in the CCP membership drive.<sup>86</sup> Its small office, which consisted of only three permanent staff, oversaw the university's 3,209 Youth League members (90% of the total) through its 119 branches, one for every class. It helped set up CCP branches in each freshman class, helped organize Party Constitution study groups and partook of various ideological activities, including blood drives, Project Hope fundraising events, and other Lei Feng-inspired volunteer activities. Youth League members were encouraged to seek Party membership, a logical step in political advancement.

Many students began to realize the importance of Party membership, and they believed it would enhance job opportunities and develop social relation-

ships to draw upon in the future. Many had seen their parents advance their careers through belonging to the Party (The parents of half the students were Party members). Students were encouraged to attend discussion groups on the Party Constitution. In 1994 some 360 students attended these study groups, including three-quarters of students from the Public Administration Department. As a result, 600 students applied for Party membership from 1993 to 1995. Between May 1991 and April 1995, 274 students joined. By the end of 1995, 6.8% of the students belonged to the Party, surpassing the objective by 36% (or 1.8 percentage points).<sup>87</sup> This upward trend continued so that by 1997, 8.7% of students were CCP members.<sup>88</sup>

By 1994 the CCP was well established within SZU. The previous year the university had set up its own Ideological/political Education Research Association, which was in charge of the Party school and student and staff study in these areas.<sup>89</sup> By then 59 Party branches had been set up and 20 general Party branches. In terms of SZU's reform and development, "Every achievement was attributed to the leadership of the CCP."<sup>90</sup> The university adopted new policies aimed at achieving democratic centralism or "collective leadership with individual responsibilities."<sup>91</sup>

Politics at SZU had become systematized by 1995. Moral education relied heavily on the use of upper-level models, such as Kong Fanseng, Jiao Yulu and Chen Guanyu (a local grandmother known in the political press as Shenzhen's Lei Feng).<sup>92</sup> China's paramount model, Lei Feng, was resurrected in 1990 as part of a national Learn from Lei Feng campaign. SZU in its internal journal reminded the campus community that Lei had advocated that one should "treat enemies as cold as it is in winter and we should treat our comrades as warmly as springtime."<sup>93</sup> Implicitly, Lei Feng justified Wei-Wu's cold treatment of Luo Zhengqi. The model served another purpose: to help SZU develop an atmosphere of volunteerism.<sup>94</sup> Twenty-seven years earlier, on 3 March, Mao Zedong had called on the nation to "learn from Lei Feng." On that day's anniversary in 1990, over 400 SZU students and teachers participated in volunteer activities. Some went to the Shenzhen railroad station to help passengers with baggage, or to the Shenzhen Grand Theater to fix the public's broken appliances. Others planted over 700 trees in a Yuanling residential area where city cadres lived. Law Department students dispensed curbside legal advice to passers-by in need. Many more students wanted to participate than the university had anticipated. School leaders had assigned each department a quota of student volunteers to fill, but there was a larger spirit of volunteerism than the university had anticipated. The department of International Finance and Trade, for example, found its initial quota of 100 students insufficient and applied for an additional 100.

## **Conclusions**

The role of the Communist Party at Shenzhen University is instructive not because the case provides a typical picture of Chinese *danwei* or even of Chinese universities, but rather because of its very uniqueness. In many aspects SZU has been an experiment. It was the first university in China not to practice job allocation (*fen pei*). It was one of the first Mainland universities to employ the credit system on a wide-scale basis. Its handling of the CCP under Luo Zhengqi appears to be unique.

Luo Zhengqi set up a political system that fully integrated the CCP into the running of the university, something consistent with Maoist philosophy. Luo did this by eliminating a separate structure for the Party. Chinese universities (and other *danwei*) are characterized by a dual-track decision-making structure that resembles a railroad track or ladder. One rail is the administration; the other is the Party. At all levels, from the principals, to department leaders, and down to student organizations, both Party and non-Party entities exist. At any level dialogue occurs laterally, via the ladder's rungs or the rail's ties. When it works well, this dualism provides a system of checks and balances, or mutual monitoring. In a negative scenario, however, it results in rivalry and factionalism. Luo Zhengqi avoided the dual-track system, choosing instead to employ a monorail, in which the Party and the university were one. As both president and Party secretary, Luo served as the system's engineer/conductor.

The events of June 1989 caught Luo without sufficient upper level political support, and he was fired. The political system Luo had created was dependent on his leadership. Without him it could not continue without an upper level mandate. That mandate did not exist, and the provincial authorities chose to appoint interim leaders who would reestablish SZU according to traditional modes of political operation. The railroad structure was imposed, and the decision-making dualism produced a high level of factionalism during the Wei-Wu years. The next university administration, under Cai Delin, stopped the factionalism and achieved a railroad system in which the CCP was again fully integrated in school affairs. Negotiation occurred between the administrative head and Party branch secretary of each sub-*danwei*. At the different levels under Cai, decision-making became more collective, usually involving two or three key people.

The case of SZU shows that the university's reform system was person-dependent. It illustrates the importance of the individual university *lingdao*. SZU's system before 1989 was Luo Zhengqi's system. Next, when the leadership became split, chaos resulted, as it did in the Wei-Wu administration. Cai Delin restored order to the system he inherited. He was able to do so

because he wore both the president's and Party secretary's hats. He put politics at SZU into a steady state.

What does the SZU case report about political reform in China? Essentially, it says the obvious: that grass-roots reform is not easy. It reports the less obvious: that reform is leader-dependent. And it suggests that the establishment of entirely new systems might be possible with strong leadership, but the likelihood of grass-roots reforms becoming permanent (i.e., outliving the leaders who created them) is slight. Reforms in China flow from the upper level to the lower. When innovations appear at the grass-roots without an upper level mandate, they almost always are leader-dependent. As such, they depend on a *guanxi* network support. From about 1987 Luo Zhengqi lacked extensive *guanxi*, after his patrons had retired and his opponents—He Dongchang at the national level and Lin Zuji in Shenzhen—had become more powerful.<sup>95</sup> He had the general backing of teachers and staff while in office, but once a new administration arrived armed with an upper level mandate, Luo's support dissipated. Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policy disprove the characterization of the Chinese political system as intolerant of reform and innovation. It is more correct to say that the channels for innovation are from the upper level to the lower; political reforms that swim against the tide are unlikely to succeed. Shenzhen University serves as a case in point.

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1. Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University, 22 January 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154.
  2. "Guangdong report to State Council on the founding of SZU, 26 February 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 159; "Guangdong's reply to Shenzhen on SZU's approval, 8 March 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 160.
  3. Existence of this false impression cited in Chen Xiaobo, "Experiments in SZU reform," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 111.
  4. Source: "Ten points for SZU CCP members, 20 April 1985, revised 1 March 1988," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 135
  5. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
  6. Chen Xiaobo, "Footprints of the past three years," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 182; Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, pp. 100-37.
  7. Luo Zhengqi, "First work report of first Party committee of SZU, 5 April 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 176.
  8. *Tongzhanbu*, translated as the united front department, is charged with overseeing relations with non-Party members, members of China's legal demo-

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- cratic parties, and overseas Chinese (compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau and expatriates abroad). It aims at “uniting” these entities with the CCP.
9. Tang Cairu & Chen Jiantian, “Advocate the gloriest tradition of the Party and improve the CCP’s leadership,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 100.
  10. Crane, *The Political Economy of China’s Special Economic Zones*, 1990, p. 115.
  11. Liang was removed as mayor and Party secretary in May 1986, just before the formal submission of SZU’s second reform proposals to the municipal government. He was replaced by Li Hao. See Crane, *The Political Economy of China’s Special Economic Zones*, 1990, pp. 124-6.
  12. “Second proposals of SZU’s reform and innovation abstract, 10 July 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172.
  13. That Luo worked 10 hours a day and talked about work over meals is reported in Wang Xiaofeng & Chen Jiantian, “Never-ending search: Party work at SZU,” *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 6 (1988/89), p. 4.
  14. Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 100. In 1988 Tang headed the SZU Party Committee office.
  15. See Zhang, *Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping*, 1996, p. 140. Hu Qiaomu was a member of the Standing Committee, had edited Mao Zedong selections, and had worked in the area of ideology as a vice-director of the CCP Consultative Committee.
  16. Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 100.
  17. Luo Zhengqi, “Another view [*Liu an huaming you yi cun*], March 1988,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 104.
  18. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
  19. *Ibid.*
  20. “SZU Party committee opinions on Party rectification, 18 February 1985,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 121.
  21. *Ibid.*
  22. “Strive for a university with characteristics through Party rectification, 25 April 1985,” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s Reform Path*, 1988, p. 130.
  23. In the mid-1980s there were only about a dozen members of democratic parties among SZU staff. Membership increased from 1989 with the establishment of SZU’s *tongzhanbu*. By 1997, five democratic parties had set up sub-branches on campus, each meeting the requirement of having a minimum of five members. In all, over one hundred staff members were democratic Party members. In addition, there are some members of three other democratic parties, which did not meet the five member requirement.
  24. “Report of the Democratic Parties Association inspection team, 6 October

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- 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 5-8; Fei Xiaotong & Qian Weichang, “Letter to Li Peng, 7 October 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 3-4.
25. Fei was considered China’s father of anthropology; he had been a student of Bronislaw Malinowski, a pioneer of anthropology.
  26. Li Peng had worked with He Dongchang. Before his elevation to Premier in the organizational reshuffle that followed Hu Yaobang’s removal as Party secretary, Li had served as head of the SEdC while vice-premier.
  27. Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns, 1989*, p. 90.
  28. Peng Baoluo, “Law Department work report,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 31-2.
  29. Tang Cairu, “Student Affairs Office report,” *1987 Yearbook*, p. 99.
  30. Chen Jiantian, “Strengthen Party leadership in the course of reform,” *1987 Yearbook*, p. 101. After 1989 the author was appointed Party secretary of the #4 Party branch and in 1995 became head of the SZU Party Committee office and secretary of the #1 Party branch, concurrently.
  31. Chen Jiantian, “Strengthen Party leadership in the course of reform,” *1987 Yearbook*, p. 101. The article cited appeared in the *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* (Nov. 13, 1987).
  32. “Comprehensive report to the Shenzhen government, 5 May 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, p. 164.
  33. This course is discussed in depth in Pollack, *Civilizing*, 1997, pp. 205ff.
  34. Luo Zhengqi, “Implementation and contemplation of reform: looking forward to SZU’s fifth anniversary, April 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 83-94.
  35. *Having Ideals, Having Morality, Having Culture, Having Discipline [You lixiang, you daode, you wenhua, you jilu]* eds. *Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao lilun yanjiushi* (Beijing: *Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe*, 1986); Seventh Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development [*Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di qige wunian jihua*] eds. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo* (Beijing: *Renmin chubanshe*, 1986). These are discussed in detail in Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, pp. 91-136.
  36. “Regulations for social investigation, July 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 59-60.
  37. Chen, “A symphony of spring breeze turned into rain,” 1986.
  38. Wu & Cao, “How has the political and ideological work concerning students been reformed at Shenzhen University?,” 1986.
  39. Luo Zhengqi, “Implementation and contemplation of reform: looking forward to SZU’s fifth anniversary, April 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 83-94.
  40. *Ibid.*
  41. President Zhang Wei, who had supported Luo’s reforms wholeheartedly, retired and returned to the Qinghua vice-presidency; another supporter, vice-president Yang Yibi, was transferred to the presidency of the Shenzhen Teachers College; vice-president Fang Shen, an economist and famous scholar, was demoted to the position of vice-director of the academic committee, and he subsequently returned to People’s University; vice-president Li

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- Tianqing for a brief period became director of the SZU academic committee until he was appointed to the honorary post of president of the University of Macau. The latter two had opposed some of Luo's reforms and were effectively demoted out of his administration when the Shenzhen CCP approved SZU's administrative shuffle.
42. The transcript of the video appears in Wang Xiaofeng & Chen Jiantian, "Never-ending search: Party work at SZU," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 6 (1988/89), p. 4.
  43. Wang Pingshan, "Commemorating SZU's fifth anniversary," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 7.
  44. *Fanshi diren fandui de, women jiu yonghu; fanshi diren yonghu de, women jiu fandui*. Mao, "Talk with journalists from three newspapers," 1939.
  45. Yang & Yang, "SZU strengthens Party construction," 1991; Wu, "Reinforcing the Party's ideological construction," 1991.
  46. He Dongchang, "Speech to mid-level cadres meeting, 25 April 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 43.
  47. *Cai mi you yan*—cooking-fuel wood, rice, oil, salt.
  48. Wu Zewei, "The enhancement of ideological work in SZU should be transformed from recovering to constructive," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 22 (1993), p. 4.
  49. Information in this section is based on an interview with Professor Li, June 1994, and a CCTV-2 story, "Who is bigger than the law," broadcast 13 September 1998.
  50. See Liang Hongwen, "The Architecture of Shenzhen University," 1991, pp. 121-4.
  51. "Meeting minutes regarding implementing the judgment of the Guangdong higher court, 11 November 1992."
  52. "Report on Party construction: striving two years to achieve three changes, 29 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 54.
  53. "Party branch work regulations, 16 November 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 223-4; "SZU cadre principals," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 229-30.
  54. "Freshen up your spirits, march forward boldly: Party Committee's work prospects for 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 11.
  55. "Functions of Party departments, 20 December 1989," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 80-2. The CCP also set up a committee for Communist Youth League affairs management.
  56. Branch #1 covered all offices under the Party Committee, publications center, and public administration department (which was in charge of moral/political education); #2—president's office, academic affairs, personnel, security, research, foreign affairs and physical education; #3—general affairs and finance; #4—library, audio/visual and computer centers; #5—all SZU-run enterprises. Adult Education also had a branch. See also "Opinions regarding

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- strengthening SZU Party construction, 30 October 1990," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 72-7.
57. These included one Ph.D. holder, five with masters, four associate professors, and five lecturers.
  58. CCP, "Decision on reform of the educational structure" (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 1985). This document is discussed throughout Agelasto and Adamson, *Higher Education in Post-Mao China*, 1998.
  59. Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, p. 117.
  60. Quoted in Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, p. 118.
  61. "Party Committee and president responsibility system," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 215-7.
  62. "Reregister Party members at SZU," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 11 (1990), p. 17.
  63. "Freshen up you spirits, march forward boldly: Party Committee's work prospects for 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 11.
  64. "Opinions on strengthening moral/political education," 27 November 1989, *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 225-8;
  65. Commitment to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought; Party leadership; socialism; dictatorship of the proletariat.
  66. "Opinions on strengthening and improving tutoring work, March 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 231-4; "Provisional regulations on tutoring work, 19 September 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 235-6.
  67. "Implementation plan for 1987 *benke* students, some teachers and cadres to take part in social investigation, 8 May 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 242-3.
  68. "Report on Party construction: striving two years to achieve three changes, 29 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 54. See also Li Chengjie, "Valuable political enthusiasm: SZU Party constitution study group," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 8 (1990), p. 21.
  69. "Party members of all units take turns to study together with Party committee leaders," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 44.
  70. He Huiming, "What do I do as a tutor?," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 11.
  71. Chen Shuni, "Class tutors should be teachers as well as friends of students," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 28 (1995), p. 14.
  72. Party branch of Chinese department, "Cooperation of the school and the family on ideological work," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 28 (1995), p. 22.
  73. "Regulations for recruiting new members," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 220-2.
  74. "Opinions regarding strengthening SZU Party construction, 30 October 1990," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 72-7. Also "Party committee work meeting system," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 218.
  75. A: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 176.  
 B: "Summary of Party rectification, 14 November 1985," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 125.  
 C: Luo Zhengqi, "First work report of first Party committee of SZU, 5 April

- 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 176.
- D: Chen Jiantian, "Strengthen Party leadership in the course of reform," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 101. Also Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, 1989, p. 17.
- E: "Opinions regarding strengthening SZU Party construction, 30 October 1990," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 72.
- F: "Report on Party construction, 29 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 55-6.
- G: Cai Delin, "Unify and strive forward for a first rate university, speech at SZU 2<sup>nd</sup> Party conference, 19 October 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 59.
- H: Tang Cairu & Chen Jiantian, "Advocate the gloriest tradition of the Party and improve the CCP's leadership," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 104.
- I: "Report of the Democratic Parties Association inspection team, 6 October 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 7. Figures are arrived at by subtracting reported total applications from student applications reported in column on right..
- J: "Strive for a university with characteristics through Party rectification, 25 April 1985," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 130.
- K: Chen Xiaobo, "Experiments in SZU reform," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 111.
- L: Luo Zhengqi, "Look at reform from the point of view of SZU's reform," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 78. Number reported as 205 in *1986 Yearbook*, p. 182 and as 154 in Chen Xiaobo, "Experiments in SZU reform," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 111.
- M: This number probably includes 121 applications in Adult Education. See *1987 Yearbook*, p. 54.
- N: This figure also reported as 386, in "Report on Party construction, 29 November 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 55.
- O: Item # 31, "Self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 58.
- P: Figure is reported as 98 in Xie Haijun, "Youth League should assist the CCP well," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 288.
- Q: *1994 Yearbook*, p. 59.
- R: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 110.
- S: Chen Hao, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, New Patterns*, p. 89.
76. "Democratic centralism construction, 20 January 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 81
77. "Opinions regarding strengthening SZU Party construction, 30 October 1990," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 72-7. The term used for riot was *dongluan*, not *shi wei* (demonstration) or *kangyi* (protest).
78. "Provisional regulations on tutoring work, 19 September 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 235-6.
79. "Party work report for 1991, 23 January 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 67.

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80. In July 1994, eight excellent Party members and nine excellent collectives received awards, "Organization department work report," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 86. At the second Party conference in October, nine advanced Party organizations and 58 comrades received awards. See "Decision on awarding advanced grass-roots Party organizations and excellent Party members," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 91. Awards in July 1995 went to 97 excellent Party members, 37 excellent Party affairs management staff and 13 excellent Party sub-work-units, "Organization Department work report," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 110.
  81. Cai became president on 1 November 1992; he was appointed Party secretary on 28 February 1994.
  82. "Democratic centralism construction, 20 January 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 81.
  83. *1995 Yearbook*, p. 14.
  84. Item 31, "Self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 58.
  85. Student Affairs Office, "Work report," *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 256-8.
  86. Youth League, "Work report," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 259-61.
  87. *1995 Yearbook*, p. 299.
  88. CCP Organization Department, "Work report," *1997 Yearbook*, p. 86.
  89. Wang Songrong, "On ideological/political education," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 46.
  90. "Resolution of second Party conference regarding Party Committee's work report, 19 October 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 72.
  91. "Democratic centralism construction, 20 January 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 81.
  92. "Notice on learning from Kong Fanseng," 17 May 1995, *1995 Yearbook*, p. 105.
  93. Propaganda Department, "The special zone needs Lei Feng spirit," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 12.
  94. Youth League, "'Learning from Lei Feng, Developing a new atmosphere' activities at SZU," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 13. The title has a nice ring to it in Chinese: *xue lei feng, shu xin feng*.
  95. In the late 1980s cadres at the municipal level were at best luke-warm toward Luo, who was seen as a protégé of former mayor Liang Xiang. The Shenzhen city cadre in charge of education, Lin Zuji, was instrumental in Luo's removal, according to informants.