

**Story 4: Teacher Niu Ye**

*My coming to Shenda was in a way very simple. No interviews, no letters. I was a top student and somewhat an eccentric character at Beijing Famous University. (My name means wild ox). I was a “zhuangyuan” or number one in the university entrance exam in my home city in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. So when I first entered Beijing Famous, I was appointed “class monitor” or class leader. At that time [1981], college life was such that a “political advisor” was assigned to “take care of” all the students of the grade. The political advisor had supreme power over all the students as he was in charge of all aspects of students’ life other than academic; particularly he had power in the final decision where each student would be “placed” or “assigned” a job after his/her graduation. This particular advisor was nice to me at the beginning as he wanted to train me so I could belong to his group and come out “politically correct.” So he urged me to join the Communist Party by the end of the first year. Now, this should have been taken as a compliment as it showed that the “leader” had interest and trust in me. But the early 1980s was a time in China when the “reform” spirit ran high, and I guess I was by nature a “rebel,” so I was so naïve to say to him, bluntly, that I was not sure that joining the Party was such a glorious thing and that I had reservations about the Party, and that I needed to think over his proposal (which in China is wording that means “forget it.”) After that, he somehow became distant towards me, and I began to despise him more and more, so by and by we became somehow bitter enemies.*

*To be a “good student” and to ensure a good future career at that time meant you had to be both “red” (politically) and “excellent” (academically)” I was a top student academically but by no means “red.” In the last year, we faced the challenge of our fate as students’ placement was decided and we were assigned by the department. This was based largely on the recommendation of the “political advisor.” I thought my future would be doomed and that I would be punished (the usual punishment was to be assigned to a far-away frontier province like Xinjiang or Gansu). But you see, my luck was not that bad, as the general political climate was changing as a whole in the country, and we had a new department chair, who was an academic professor and who was active in student affairs. There must have been a lot of students besides me who went to him and complained about this “political advisor” who was playing favor-*

ites in job assignment. So perhaps for this reason and others I do not know, this political advisor was taken care of. As he was about to exercise his final power in deciding the future careers of students, he himself got replaced! So we got a new advisor who was much fairer and who listened to students including me. The procedure was such that we students let him know our wishes and where we wanted to go. The final decision rested with the department.

Usually, the graduates of Famous University were “assigned” to various ministries of the central government (Graduates of our department went to one ministry in particular). Most of the students wanted to stay in Beijing, as the majority of us came from various provinces. At that time, as a kind of an “eccentric,” I did not know where I wanted to go and what I wanted to do. I was kind of fed up with Beijing, as I thought the political climate was suffocating, and I did not want to become a paper-pushing civil servant, as was the vanity of most students. Neither did I want to go to a big trade company (usually belonging to a certain ministry) as it was the new fad; nor did I want to go back to my province which I believed was not so graceful a backward retreat. So I thought: Shenzhen! Shenzhen to me at that time represented “new,” “adventurous,” “capitalist!” But as I was not interested in “business,” so I said “Shenda.” At that time I knew nothing about Shenda and knew nobody in Shenzhen. I made my “wish” clear to the new advisor and got my wish in the end. I have no idea how exactly it worked. But I think it must be like this: I made my wish to the Department, the Department contacted the Ministry of Education to see if there was a need by Shenzhen University, and Shenda, as it was only three years old, must have been hungry for faculty from the best department in my field in the country, so it matched us.

It must be said that the decision to come to Shenzhen in 1985 was considered a “daring move,” because Shenzhen at that time was suffering a depression and crisis after its first jump in the early 1980s. Its political fate was by no means clear. Anyway, I was the only one to come to Shenda from Famous University, and in a new, young faculty I was among the best, if not the best, in terms of achievements in my academic field. Again, I was kind of too naïve and cocky, and later some old professors and chairs became quite jealous and resentful, and they got me into trouble. But that’s in the past now. I left Shenda after Tiananmen to pursue a Ph.D. abroad and have been trying my guts out to prove myself in the Western academic world.

I met Luo Zhengqi on several occasions. You never knew where you would see him. Unannounced, he would pop into classes or visit with

*teachers out of class. Luo was often criticized for caring too much for the students and not enough for the teachers. I had been a student only a few years before and I certainly appreciated the respect Luo showed to youth. The president, himself, was under fifty when he arrived at Shenda. He seemed to understand so many of the problems that plagued China's famous universities: the overbearing and negative influence of politics and an ancient curriculum that did not address modern needs. He left teaching and academics to us teachers. What more could a teacher ask for?*

### 3. Teachers and staff

Similar to the data on student input, published statistics on teachers and staff are less than perfect, but they still present an accurate sketch. In practice, the hiring process at SZU was less restricted by a government-approved plan than was enrollment; the former enjoyed even more flexibility and autonomy on the part of the school authorities. Just as with students, staff have been both “regular” and “irregular.” The former were those paid by the Finance Office, in other words, those whose positions were included in the staffing plan approved by the Shenzhen Planning Bureau. In contrast, irregular staff did not have their personnel files (*dangan*) formally registered with the university. In most cases, their files remained with their previous work-units. They held contracts with SZU, but since they were not permanent staff, they were not eligible for various subsidies, most notably housing. Their *hukou* (residence permit) were not transferred to Shenzhen. Between 10-20% of the staff over the years have fit into the irregular category. This group also included those who had gone abroad for study but had not formally resigned from the university staff, as well as those staff who took up jobs with companies in Shenzhen. These phantom staff were kept on the books although they no longer in fact worked at the school. Each had to reimburse the school one and a half times his/her salary in order to remain in the school’s employ.<sup>1</sup> In exchange, they were allowed to maintain their household registration and personnel file at SZU. In this way they qualified for welfare benefits and housing. In some official presentations of data these staff were considered “regular;” unfortunately, their inclusion obviously distorts statistics such as staff-student ratio or average work load.

During the early years, somewhat under 10% of the staff at any given time were classified as irregular, e.g., officially reported as 6.9% and 7.5% in 1986 and 1987, respectively. As noted, the group included personnel who had not received formal municipal approval. In many cases, these teachers were eventually formally hired when the municipal Planning Bureau increased the quota, something which normally occurred once a year. In later years, the *regular-irregular* nomenclature was abandoned in favor of the term *working staff*. That is not to say, however, that irregular staff ceased to exist. In 1991, the Finance Office reported 1,192 working staff, only 832 of whom were paid by Finance. The first figure included full-time and part-time staff as well as night school students in the part-time *zhuanke* program (Three of the latter equated to one full-time fixed staff). The first figure was

---

**Box 3.1: Teacher Xing, irregular teacher**

Hired in 1988, Teacher Xing came to SZU from Tianjin where he had had an established career teaching university English. He worked in SZU's Foreign Language Department as an irregular teacher. He was given a full work load and he participated in departmental activities, most notably in athletic contests, where he led the department's tug-of-war team to a semi-final victory in Teachers Sport Day. Xing was considered an exceptionally good teacher, and in 1990 he was one of the two teachers assigned to the innovative core course for freshmen English majors. Xing, 48, lived in a 15 square meter dormitory room in a teachers residential block, but since his *hukou* and *dangan* had not been formally transferred, he was unable to obtain residence for his wife and son. The family remained separated. By 1992 Xing saw shifts in university policy resulting in the downsizing of irregular staff and the installing of more political criteria in hiring. He realized that he would not be formally transferred, despite earlier promises, given certain hiring practices of the FLD that were based on personal connections, not merit. He accepted a senior staff position with a university-run enterprise, the Reflective Materials Factory, and was thus able to transfer his *hukou*, *dangan*, and family to Shenzhen.<sup>4</sup> The FLD had lost a teacher who was generally acknowledged as one of the best in the department.


---

also likely to include about 300 temporary workers who worked in landscaping, security, food services and transportation.<sup>2</sup> In contrast with earlier years, by the 1990s fewer of the irregular staff were teachers.<sup>3</sup> The case of Teacher Xing illustrates the change in policy (see Box 3.1).

**Staff-student ratio**

Keeping down staff numbers was a major concern of university officials during the school's first seven years. Employing as few staff as possible was one of the dozen key points in the "president running school" system.<sup>5</sup> The university in its first set of reform proposals in 1984 set a 1:3.5 target for its staff-student ratio.<sup>6</sup> This goal was supposed to be achieved by 1990, rising gradually from a 1:3 ratio in 1985, by annual increments of .1.

A ratio tends to be a very problematic statistic because it depends on the accuracy of each of its components. If both student enrollment and staff size are off, the individual inaccuracies may sometimes balance themselves off, e.g., if both are too high or both are too low. However, if one side of the fraction is too high and the other too low, the inaccuracy becomes acute. A

**Figure 3.1: Staff-student ratio**<sup>9</sup>**Table 3.1: SZU Staff-Student ratio**<sup>7</sup>

year	ratio	notes
1985	2.8	
1986	3.5	regular staff only
	3.2	includes irregular staff
1987	3.9	regular staff only
	3.6	includes irregular staff
1991	3.6	staff paid by Finance Office
	2.5	all working staff
1993	3.3	
1995	2.5	

staff-student ratio can be calculated for only the several years for which sufficient data are available. Different ratios for the same year appear in university documents, depending on whether regular or irregular staff were included in computations (see Table 3.1). Data for regular staff (in shaded boxes of Table 3.1) suggest that changes in the ratio reflect changes in regular student enrollment. Student population peaked in 1988 and 1993 after which it fell (see Figure 2.1). Correspondingly, the staff-student ratio peaked in 1987 and 1992 and then fell substantially (Figure 3.1)

As reality suggests, this ratio was not something that could be easily managed, such as in .1 annual increments, given its two independent components. No documents published after 1984 suggested any attempt to manage the staff-student ratio per se. It was merely assumed, and sometimes reported, that SZU enjoyed the lowest staff-student ratio in China.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 3.2: Teacher-student (FTE) ratios, national averages and for selected universities, circa 1996<sup>10</sup>**

Universities with complete data	teacher-student ratio	staff-student ratio
Wuyi U.	15.9	8.8
Hubei U.	12.0	5.7
Guangzhou U of Tech	11.9	4.8
Jinan U	9.2	
Chongqing Zianzhu U.	8.3	
Zhengzhou U.	7.9	3.3
institutions under local jurisdiction	7.9	3.3
Liaoning U.	7.3	
Shenzhen U.	7.7	3.4
all institutions in China	7.3	2.8
Hefei U of Tech	7.0	2.8
Jilin U.	6.9	
ministry-run institutions	6.9	2.5
Beijing Polytech U	6.6	
China U. of Geosciences (Wuhan)	6.2	1.9
SEdC institutions	5.8	1.9
Jilin U. of Technology	5.7	
Shanghai U.	5.7	
agricultural universities (1993)	5.6	
Zhongnan U Finance & Economics	5.3	
U. of Science & Tech, Beijing	5.1	1.9
China U. of Mining & Tech	5.0	
Zhejiang U.	3.3	

Given that the staff-student ratio is a troublesome statistic, comparing this measure between universities is even more problematic. Should the student part of the fraction include adults in continuing education classes? If so, how many adult students are equivalent to one full-time student? If FTE is used (at three adults equal to one FTE), it is possible to compute staff-student ratios in a way that makes for fair comparison among Chinese universities. Data included by universities on their websites may be used. In SZU's case, there were 3,566 FTE in 1995, resulting in a staff-student ratio of 1:3.4 and a teacher-student ratio of 1:7.7.<sup>11</sup> The national average staff-


**Table 3.3: 1985 staff expenditure as a percentage of total expenditures for selected Guangdong universities<sup>13</sup>**

Jinan	28.9%
Zhongshan	51
Huanan Industrial	46
Huanan Teachers	49.4
SZU	16.2
SZU (excluding equipment)	26.2

student ratio in 1995 was 1:7.3, compared with 1:5.2 in 1990.<sup>12</sup> SZU's comparison with other universities is presented in Table 3.2. The teacher-student ratio is discussed later in this chapter.

In a 1986 report to Shenzhen municipality, the university noted that it employed far fewer staff than other universities in Guangdong. Citing that its own 1:2.84 staff-student ratio favorably compared with the provincial average of 1:1.57, SZU computed that it employed 508 fewer staff.<sup>14</sup> This analysis was not presented in the form of a request for more staff, however. Rather, the data were used to stress the university's efficiency. The same document also reported that SZU proportionally spent much less on staffing than its fellow institutions spent (see Table 3.3). This efficiency was lauded by provincial officials.<sup>15</sup>

In its documents before 1994, the university never complained about a lack of teachers or other staff. As can be seen clearly from the data, staff and teacher quotas did not keep pace with enrollment. For example, the period 1986-1987 saw a 40% rise in student enrollment, but only a 26% staff increase and only a 20% teacher increase (see Figure 2.2). The approved plan for 1986 provided funds for 994 staff. By the end of that year, there were only 891 on board, a 10% shortfall. Over time the staff shortage abated slightly; irregular staff continued to be relied upon. By 1991 the number of working staff actually exceeded the quota by 13%. By 1994 it was clear that SZU wanted more staff than the municipal government was willing to provide. The Shenzhen Personnel Office gave SZU 25 new staff quota for that year and an additional 12 positions at the university's request at the end of the calendar year. Through bookkeeping adjustment it was able to get another 14 positions after removing unemployed personnel who had transferred out but still remained on the books, presumably after the maximum allowable three years had elapsed. In the same year, it tightened up regulations on personnel transfer telling departments to balance staff number

Figure 2.2: Changes in enrollment and staffing<sup>18</sup>

with the assigned quota.<sup>16</sup> Sub-work-units (i.e., departments and offices) with unused quota were told to hire more personnel and those with a quota shortage were told to get rid of staff. Failing university-run enterprises, especially, were told to stop hiring new staff. New recruits were required to have at least masters degrees and be law-abiding, morally good and attractive looking.<sup>17</sup> Each sub-work-unit was to have a 3-5 person staff recruitment review committee consisting of administrative and Party leaders. “Each member of the group should give his/her own opinions,” a veiled reference to previous practice in which leaders, not group members, wielded power. Hiring decisions were forwarded to the Personnel Office and then given to the president who had ultimate approval. New staff who changed jobs within SZU inside of three years or who quit the job (to go to another *danwei* or to study abroad) within five years would be fined an unspecified amount. The regulations also discouraged sub-work-units from hiring unemployed spouses of staff members, something which had been a common practice in some departments, including the Foreign Language Department where most support staff were related to teaching staff.

The quota problem had another dimension. Some staff, either newly recruited or promoted, qualified for positions (e.g., associate professor) but the school lacked sufficient quota. Since they could not be put into the proper position, their salary could not match their qualifications. To get around this problem, the university itself made up the difference from income generated from SZU-run enterprises or from side-course offerings.<sup>19</sup> This payment was called a “qualification subsidy” (*zhi wu jin tie*). In 1994, 37 teachers each received an additional ¥300 per month of this type so they could get the salary entitled them by their position.<sup>20</sup> This policy continued through 1995.

---

**Box 3.2: Employment contract for Student Affairs Office leader, 1988<sup>22</sup>**

You are hired as vice-director of the Student Affairs Guidance Committee and director of the Part-Time Work Guidance Center from 2 March 1988 to 2 March 1990. If a cadre wants to discontinue or not renew his contract, he must give SZU three months notice. The heads of administrative offices should not be over 55 when hired. The average age of heads and vice-heads usually should not exceed 50. Assistants to office heads should not be over 40. Leaders should be economical in their life style and work and should not treat guests with banquets. The staff of each office should be strictly controlled, not be over age 40, and have at least a *zhuanke* degree. Staff should study political/ideological education and write at least one article each year. Cadres under age 35 should learn Office English's 500 Sentences and be able to operate a computer. Those cadres who do not learn and progress will not be promoted.

---

To further solve the quota problem, SZU permitted retiring staff to “borrow quotas from other work-units” so that their SZU slots could be filled before they retired. Staff receiving certain state subsidies approved by the State Council as well as staff under age 40 holding a Ph.D. and associate senior qualification were altogether exempt from needing a quota. In addition, the Personnel Office captured the quotas of 20 staff who had failed to return from study abroad. These administrative changes meliorated the quota problem.<sup>21</sup>

The university sought young staff, as illustrated in the employment contract of a leader of the Student Affairs Office (See Box 3.2). In 1986 the average staff age was 37. The teaching staff, especially, was young. The average age of teachers in 1990 was 38.9, with 49% under age 35 and 30% in the age range 36-50. The national averages for that year were 45% and 15%, respectively.<sup>23</sup> The entire staff, not just teachers, were required to be well-educated. As a result, SZU's employees attained the highest schooling of staff in any school in China (see Table 3.4). Using a scoring method commonly employed in China, SZU's staff educational level in 1986 rated 3.75, compared with 2.0 for the average Chinese university.<sup>24</sup> By the early 1990s, SZU teachers' age had risen. For 1994 the teachers' average age was up to slightly under 41, which is about one year *above* the national average. SZU was bucking the national trend over the 1980s and 1990s. Elsewhere in China, the teaching staff were getting younger while at SZU they were aging.<sup>25</sup>

**Table 3.4: Staff education level, 1986**<sup>26</sup>

education level	number	percent
college and above	616	73.4
senior/vocational high school	199	23.7
junior high school	24	2.9
below junior high school	0	0

**Table 3.5: 1995 staff, by category**<sup>27</sup>

professional	cadres	workers	unemployed	total
730	178	121	32	1,057
69%	17%	11%	3%	100%

For administrative, statistical and practical purposes, the prime divisions among a Chinese university's staff occur along the lines of professional/non-professional and teaching/non-teaching. The non-professional staff comprises cadres, workers, both blue-collar and office workers, and the unemployed. Cadres are administrative staff with university education or sufficient work experience to admit them into this classification. New graduates from Chinese universities automatically receive cadre status, which is transferred with them (via their *dangan*) when they are employed by state companies and government entities. Status and various benefits accrue with cadre status, a by-product of tertiary education, from which most graduates traditionally have gone into government jobs. Post-Mao free market reforms, however, have allowed graduates to work in other than state work-units (e.g., self-employment, private Chinese companies, foreign-capitalized or joint-venture firms). Cadre status in the 1990s, therefore, was not universally possessed among recent college graduates. But among government controlled entities, such as SZU, employees still held cadre status, and it provided a way to upgrade worker qualifications. Holders of *zhuanke* certificates who furthered their education were allowed to be re-qualified as cadres and to receive promotions. The professional class includes teachers and non-teachers. The latter classification comprised those with advanced qualifications who work in support units, such as the computer and audio/visual centers, the library, research institutes, and other administrative offices.

**Table 3.6: 1995 professional staff, by category**<sup>28</sup>


---

462 teachers (63%)
37 professor (8%)
151 associate professor (33%)
206 lecturer (45%)
68 assistant lecturer (15%)
120 teaching assisting (16%)
18 senior (15%)
68 mid-level (57%)
34 initial (28%)
85 science and technical (12%)
27 senior (32%)
37 mid-level (44%)
21 initial (25%)
63 other (9%)
20 senior (32%)
16 mid-level (25%)
27 initial (43%)

---

Full-time teachers fall into one of four ranks: professor (*jiao shou*), associate professor (*fu jiao shou*), lecturer (*jiang shi*), and assistant lecturer (*zhu jiao*).<sup>29</sup> Assistant lectures, the lowest rank in fixed staffing, were given such tasks as organizing lectures, discussion (*da yi*), job practice, laboratory work, correcting homework and managing teaching, research and ideological/political work. With the department head's approval, they could be made fully responsible for teaching courses. Under the guidance of senior teaching staff, they could advise seniors on their graduation theses. Teachers in arts were encouraged to spend one-fifth of their time in social investigation and those in science 20% of their time in laboratory, design or production work. Lecturers, the next rank up, were expected to fulfill all the duties of the assistant lecturers, to teach two or more courses per semester, and to be more involved in research. They were to contribute to an academic paper or participate in textbook development. The associate professors also taught at least two courses, one of which had to be a foundation course. They were to take responsibility over research projects and had to have at least one paper published in an academic journal at the provincial level or above. They should guide research on teaching reform and write about teaching. In addition, they were to guide seniors with their graduation theses and to teach graduate students. The full professor assumed the same responsibilities as the associate professor and was to be involved in more advanced academic

work and serve as leaders in their academic fields. The distribution of staff by these categories for 1995 is presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.

Relative to other universities, SZU had a low-ranked staff. As indicated in Table 3.7, a statistic can be compiled to show how many lower ranked teachers a university has for each single professor employed. SZU was below average. From the beginning, few senior staff were hired, and entry into the highest rank was restricted by promotion procedures, which were twice suspended at the change-over between administrations (1990, 1993).

### ***Employment contract system***

The employment contract system, put into effect by the fall term 1986, was intended to break the “iron rice bowl” (dependence on the state) so “personnel could both come in and go out, cadres could be both promoted and demoted, and salaries could be both raised and lowered.”<sup>30</sup> It fixed the number of staff positions for each department according to their work loads. The probation period for new personnel was set generally at six months, but new staff who were immediate graduates were put on probation for one year. After probation, newcomers needed to receive pre-position training and to take certain tests. Those who passed these tests could sign contracts with SZU. Contract terms generally lasted for two years. Those who failed the tests (which were left unspecified in documents) could extend their probation period for another three months. After that period, they would have to take another test, which if passed, allowed them to sign the contract. If they failed the test, they would have to find another employer. Those who held certain leadership positions before coming to SZU received a salary during the probation period equivalent to that of their previous job. After they were formally hired, an evaluation and qualification assessment would determine their future salary. During probation, there was “no possibility” that a spouse would be transferred and no housing was provided. Of course, no promotions could be given during the probation period. Those whose probationary periods expired before a formal contract was signed could receive an extension of probation, but the salary would be reduced by 5% starting with the seventh month. If the contract was not signed by October, salary would be reduced by 20%.

**Table 3.7: Comparative statistic for teaching staff ranks among universities<sup>31</sup>**

for each professor, number of...	associate profs. (1)	lecturers (2)	statistic (1) + (2)
East China U. of Science & Tech	.1	.3	.4
Dongbei U. of Finance & Econ.	1.9	2.0	3.9
Zhonghsan U.	1.8	2.1	3.9
Northeast Forestry U.	2.0	2.6	4.6
Qinghua U.	2.2	2.4	4.6
Jinan U.	2.4	2.3	4.7
Zhejiang U.	2.8	2.1	4.9
Huazhong Agricultural U.	2.6	3.7	6.3
Beijing Normal U.	2.9	3.8	6.7
Dalian Maritime U.	3.3	3.4	6.7
U. of Petroleum-East China	2.9	3.9	6.8
Chengdu Inst. of Technology	3.0	4.0	7.0
Dalian U. of Technology	3.0	4.7	7.7
Yantai U.	3.5	4.9	8.4
Guangdong Medical College	3.4	5.7	9.1
<b>SZU</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>9.7</b>
Xinjiang Agricultural U.	3.6	6.2	9.8
Wuyi U.	4.7	5.9	10.6
South China Agricultural U.	4.0	7.2	11.2
U. of Electronic Science & Tech	4.3	7.1	11.4
Nankai U.	4.0	7.5	11.5
Qinghai U.	4.4	9.0	13.4
Shantou U.	5.1	8.6	13.7
Guiyang College of Traditional Chinese Medicine	4.5	11.0	15.5

Some of these rather harsh provisions (no spouse, no housing) were moderated over time, as the university acquired better facilities to accommodate new employees. From early on, the university practiced what it called “systematic efficiency responsibility” (*xitong xiaoneng zeren zhi*) which delineated clear-cut responsibilities for each position, but permitted a certain degree of fungibility so that personnel could substitute for one another when someone was out of the office. This was intended to get rid of “passing the buck.”<sup>32</sup> Each sub-work-unit was required to compile a list of specific positions, with duties clarified for each, and to submit this to the Personnel Office.<sup>33</sup>

---

**Box 3.3: The eventual arrival of Teacher Lin**

*In September 1983, Teacher Lin read SZU's recruitment advertisement in Guangming Ribao, China's newspaper for intellectuals. She immediately sent off a letter to the SZU recruitment team, enclosing two articles she had published in state and provincial level academic journals. Within a month the university sent her back a letter of acceptance and advised her to start the transfer process, the first step of which was to obtain the permission of her existing danwei. Lin put in a formal request to her department's Party secretary, who did not agree to the transfer. The request sat on his desk for six months until the department head personally intervened on Lin's behalf and persuaded the Party secretary to concur with the transfer. Lin, who had already resigned herself to the fact that she would not go to SZU, was elated that she now had the necessary chops from the university on her transfer request. She took the next step: sending the approved papers to the provincial Personnel Bureau. One month passed with no action. Two months...seven months. After Lin had lost all hope of ever transferring, she received provincial permission. At her own expense, she telegraphed SZU, which wrote her back within the month. The department which had agreed to hire her now had an acting head, a professor on loan from People's University, where he was department chair. The head wrote Lin that she would have to be interviewed and asked her to make arrangements to visit People's University where the deputy heads of his department would interview her. She obtained her university's permission to travel to Beijing and took a two-day train ride, hard seat, which she paid for herself. Her interview lasted 30 minutes during which the deputy heads discussed with her the contents of her two published articles as well as theoretical work in the field. At the end of the interview, Lin felt she had impressed the deputy heads with her knowledge and scholarship. They told her they would "put in the right word," an ambiguously encouraging response at best. She returned to her work-unit, and was assigned courses to teach for the next semester, fall 1985. But within two weeks, she received word from SZU that she was expected to arrive as soon as possible. She would begin teaching in September. Fearing the window of opportunity would never again open, she packed three suitcases and got on the next day's train.*

---

**Disemployment**

Once a contract was signed, staff who wanted to resign needed to give SZU three months' notice. Transfers within China are often time-consuming (e.g., see Box 3.3), and departing SZU staff were advised to "work on" transfer procedures within three months; otherwise, starting from the fourth month, salary would be reduced by 20%. According to the regulations, upon contract expiration, staff should report to the Personnel Office to receive the

decision on whether their employment would continue. In the school's history, only a few full-time regular ("fixed") staff members saw their contracts not renewed.<sup>34</sup> In contrast, non-renewal of contracts of temporary, non-fixed staff, mostly teachers, was quite frequent (see Box 3.1). The matter was handled by the department heads; no oversight or formal grievance procedures existed in matters involving terminated irregular staff. Getting rid of fixed staff was an entirely different matter. If a sub-work-unit within SZU wanted to fire a fixed staff member, first a report had to be sent to the Personnel Office and approved by university leaders. Then, if the fired staff member thought that the firing was "irrational," a complaint could be filed with the "upper level"<sup>35</sup> or the SZU staff work union. SZU was obligated to continue for three months the salary of fixed staff whose contracts were not renewed. If the fired staff member was still looking for a new job after three months, the university could provide some temporary work and reduce the salary by 5%. If there was still no employment after six months, the staff person could continue with temporary tasks, but salary would be reduced by 20% from the seventh month.

Revisions in 1988 regulations provided unemployment insurance for unemployed SZU staff whose temporary salary had stopped and who had no other sources of income. Two SZU staff had to guarantee the situation of the unemployed staff person, who had to report to a university office every day. To obtain unemployment benefits, the staff had to submit a written application and complete an investigation form, which both the applicant and guarantors signed. This was then reviewed by the Finance Office and sent to the president for approval. With these conditions met, the unemployed staff received weekly payments and, to enable public scrutiny, his/her name was publicized in a list of recipients. Furthermore, the guarantors would be punished if there were violations.<sup>36</sup> The extent this system was used was unreported, but given possible humiliation that could arise from such public scrutiny, it is doubtful many unemployed staff took advantage of it. It may, in fact, have been a system that was built in such a way as to discourage anyone from using it.

From the founding of SZU, school authorities had the right on paper to fire employees who violated the law, as well as those who received low marks in their evaluations. This virtually never happened, but one reported incident provides insight into the process of dismissing employees.<sup>37</sup> On 28 March 1988 the *zhuanke* students of the Management Department in Adult Education wrote to SZU officials complaining about their College Chinese course. Upset that they had not learned anything, they wrote that the teacher's teaching level was low:

XXX just reads from the book and the students do not know what is being taught. We suggest that the Teaching Reform Committee either send members to audit the course and to instruct the teacher, appoint experienced teachers of Chinese to help him prepare his teaching, or replace the teacher.

The university's response came in the form of a public notice that detailed the situation, but omitted the actual name of the teacher. The Teaching Reform Committee appointed a three-person team, who audited the course on 4 April. They confirmed the teacher's reading only from the text and reported a poorly organized lesson, empty-worded teaching, unclear blackboard writing, and a generally incomprehensible classroom presentation. The following day the investigators recommended that the teacher's qualifications be revoked. They chided the *Zhuanke* College, the Chinese Department and the Management Department for their lenient evaluation methods. They wrote:

Department heads should learn a lesson from this case: monitor teaching quality, especially of those who offer new courses, and of those whom students complain about. Heads should organize class auditing, and ask for students' opinions. If any problems are found, proper measures should be taken.

Most, if not all, dismissal of teachers resulted from follow-ups of student complaints. This was in line with President Luo's mandate that teachers listen to students. Almost all evaluation came in the form of an annual assessment during the ability-qualification review, discussed below. Until the mid-1990s no systematic soliciting of student's opinions was in place, and student review was handled only on an *ad hoc* basis, despite "public opinion" being one of three required methods of evaluation.<sup>38</sup>

### **1988 personnel policy revisions**

The firing of the College Chinese teacher cited above was unusual and may well have been documented, and perhaps even initiated, in order to make a point to all teaching staff (*sha ji jing hou*, killing the chicken to scare the monkeys). In 1988, in the words of the head of the Personnel Office, SZU was "still confined by the old systems. Implementation of the employment system is difficult or becomes superficial."<sup>39</sup> He attributed this to a host of factors: the undeveloped Chinese labor market that restricted job mobility, the unavailability of unemployment insurance, the powerlessness of leaders to fire employees, and the all-out efforts by department heads to increase

their staffs. Regulations in July 1992 presented detailed information on the firing of employees.<sup>40</sup> Possible conditions leading to termination included:

Lack of obedience to the leadership, poor work which causes ‘serious’ damage to the state and to the interests of SZU; corruption or theft of state property; actions which cause bad influences among the masses; corruption, bad morals, spreading malicious rumors that negatively affect a work-unit, in which case the employee does not correct behavior after repeated warnings; violation of state laws, university regulations; if found unqualified<sup>[41]</sup> and refuses to take an alternative job. An employee cannot be fired because of serious illness, work injury, pregnancy permitted within family planning or during a vacation or academic leave.

One reported firing occurred in the spring 1995, in the run-up to the 1995 accreditation, when SZU dismissed one teacher for violating teaching discipline and reported this to the SEdC inspection group.<sup>42</sup> Elsewhere in its report, the university reported that 34 teachers since 1992 had been dismissed (*jie ping*) “due to lack of devotion to teaching or serious violation of teaching discipline.”<sup>43</sup> These included staff who did not have their contracts renewed, but the category was broad enough possibly to cover those who were formally terminated after they had resigned in order to study abroad or to work for private companies. The actual number of reported firings during SZU’s history remains two: one in 1988, the other in 1995.

To improve efficiency while raising teaching quality, the Personnel Office in 1988 developed a policy that was intended to counter the existing situation where “most employees become permanent and the university loses the chance to get the best employees.” The new policy aimed to create an atmosphere of fair competition and fabricated five categories of employees:<sup>44</sup>

1. fixed staff, the number of which is strictly controlled by Shenzhen municipality, on contract with the SZU president, Rank IV or above in ability qualification, salary and welfare provided by SZU;
2. staff whose salary and welfare are paid by a sub-work-unit, but housing provided by SZU. The number in each department is set by a formula which rewarded those sub-work-units which remitted more money to the university and, to a lesser extent, those whose rate of increase of remitted funds had increased over the past year;<sup>45</sup>
3. staff whose sub-work-units take care of salary and SZU only issues certificates;
4. temporary staff, job-practice staff, part-time teaching/research assistants and visiting scholars;
5. unemployed staff from category # 1 who still remain SZU staff.

Despite its mathematical complexity—several pages of formulae were provided in the regulations—the proposed staff categorization system stratified along simple lines—regular and irregular staff. Those in the former category would get housing and were the only ones who could become officially disemployed, in other words, downgraded from the #1 to the #5 category. Those thus affected faced several possibilities: they could leave SZU; they could become non-fixed staff in categories #2, #3, and #4; or they could transfer into SZU's labor service company, which would provide them with a temporary job and salary. The non-fixed staff, however, were not pleased with the stratification, and the categorization scheme was never implemented to any degree.

The 1988 policy revisions also included provisions on visiting scholars, teaching and research assistants, as well as on unemployment insurance, discussed above. The visiting scholar system was overseen by the Professors Committee, a presidential advisory group, with applications initiated by sub-work-units. The president gave final approval. Individual departments who refused to accept the visiting scholars they were assigned could lose some fixed staff. The visiting scholar's research was supposed to meet the department's needs, and the possibility existed that the visitor could be transferred to SZU on a permanent basis. As it turned out, academic departments had on average only about one visiting scholar every five years. Another proposal, the employment of teaching and research assistants (RA/TA), also attempted to increase teaching quality. Assistants could unburden fixed teaching staff from various chores (which the regulations did not specify) and increase their lecture hours, thereby augmenting teaching efficiency. The RA/TA system was seen as a step in line with the university's desired expansion of graduate intake and met the criticism that SZU relied too heavily on unqualified assistant lecturers. An article in the university's internal journal suggested eliminating assistant lecturers altogether and replacing them with graduate students who could be given a chance to do actual teaching.<sup>46</sup> Working with lecturers, the graduate students could even improve the lecturer's teaching, as the latter would be forced to do exemplary work. Although the 1988 regulations envisioned teachers of each course having a research or teaching assistant, the policy was never implemented because there were never more than a dozen or so graduate students at SZU at any time. Until after the 1995 accreditation, SZU never received SEdC approval to offer graduate degrees. Graduate students before that time could receive only certificates, not masters degrees.

### **Story 5: Teacher Han, returned overseas student**

*What separates me from most of my comrades is that I have earned a Ph.D. from abroad. Most overseas Chinese doctoral students never return to the Motherland. I didn't return for patriotic reasons. I just could not find a good job abroad, and I did not believe that I would have had a successful career in an English-speaking country. I write in English adequately and I can do research acceptable by Western standards. But I write in Chinese at the highest level, much superior to all but one or two of my colleagues at Shenda. I write quickly, in the Chinese way, not using references or footnotes. I published two books in my first years at SZU, and I author about two dozen published articles a year. I can be much more productive in China because language, more so than content, is important in essays. Thus, because of my high level of Chinese language skill, my academic future here is secured. Also, teaching in the West brought with it much too much risk. That is another reason I returned to China.*

*When I came back with my foreign Ph.D. I went to Shenda because, quite frankly, it paid better than inland institutions. Located next to Hong Kong, Shenda could offer me more doors and windows to the West. In fact, in the six years I have taught at Shenda, I have already taken a sabbatical to the UK. Returned students in China are treated relatively well. The Shenzhen government gives us an annual party; when we were hired, we were given promises about salary and housing (which eventually came true). I am often commanded to go to banquets for visiting dignitaries when the university wants to show off one of its returned scholars. I am always being praised.*

*At first, when I started teaching at Shenda in 1989 (I returned to China just after June Fourth), I realized that the university did not focus on education. Few teachers did scholarly research, and I could carry on intellectual conversations with only a few of them. This was good for me because it meant that there would be little competition. Promotion was secured. But, on the downside, it meant that teaching would be boring. Shenda does not have graduate students, and the undergraduates are not interested in studying. The undergraduates all disappoint me; I have never met even one at Shenda whose intellectual capability comes up to my standards. Nevertheless, I must teach. Fortunately, I have to teach only 12 hours—I never choose to teach extra hours. That means commuting to campus three morning a week. The rest of the week I spend at home on my*

*own scholarship. I never have to meet with students and I don't any longer participate in administration.*

*For several years I was the deputy head of my department. The department was in a state of political crisis, and I was appointed by the president to try to make sure we still functioned despite the crisis. I did not get along with the other department heads, who were stealing money from the teachers. I was in charge of curriculum development and inherited a teaching plan that was modeled on a Western approach. I did not like it. It was too difficult to teach (it took at least an hour to prepare for each class), and it required us teachers to force students to carry on dialogues with us by using the Socratic method. This type of teaching is only useful for graduate students in China. The Shenda students were not capable of carrying on a high level of conversation with me, so the whole goal of the course was unobtainable. The course had been recommended by a foreign teacher who thought he knew how to teach. We only have foreign teachers at SZU because we want to show off how rich we are and that we are an open university and because the students demand them. Almost none of the foreigners are at the same intellectual level of Chinese teachers. If we had good foreign teachers—scholars from American universities instead of preachers, backpackers or high school teachers—they would embarrass us. We certainly don't want that to happen. The best foreign teacher is one who just shows her face in class and doesn't say anything to the students outside the classroom. I know foreigners who have been teaching ten years in China. They don't know the language or culture; and worst of all, they don't know the subjects they are teaching. One, who claims to have a Ph.D., pretended to teach psychology but did not even pronounce Carl Jung's name correctly. The students, who knew more about Jung than she did, laughed at her and considered her a "foreign fool."*

*Still, the students love their foreign teachers. In some cases, they literally become lovers; some students marry their teachers and emigrate. On the other hand, the students don't like me very much. They sit in my classes with blank expressions on their faces. They are from rich families in Shenzhen, and many of them live on allowances that are larger than my own salary. They cannot wait to finish their education so they can go out and make a lot of money, probably with their parents' help. When I was deputy department head, I was in charge of a requirement from above to have the students evaluate the teachers. Now, this really was a foolish idea: what do students know about teaching! I gave several classes the required form which they filled out anonymously. They gave me very low*

scores, but they gave the foreign teacher high scores. This just shows how unreliable students are when it comes to evaluating teaching.

When I first came to Shenda my salary was very low. I was living in an on-campus one room apartment built for unmarried teachers. But I had a wife and soon I had a daughter. We were given an adjacent room so we had two single rooms. At that time, we were offered the opportunity to buy a public housing flat. I had saved some money from my overseas study, but I still had to borrow money for the downpayment. At that time, Shenzhen treated us college teachers miserably. Some of the foreign teachers were making much more money, and they were given air conditioners, refrigerators and televisions. The students wanted to know why I did not prepare for class like the foreigners or spend extra time with the students. Simply, Shenzhen did not pay me enough. The city got only what it paid for.

I moved into a new flat in the teachers complex downtown before Spring Festival 1993. Since I have moved away from campus, I have been bothered much less by students and have been able to publish more. In 1995 I was chosen as a “backbone teacher,” an honor which brings with it one trip abroad, the right to order books for the library, and a ¥10,000 per year payment as well as other subsidies. I am permitted to teach less and this allows me to publish more. It is about time China began to treat us intellectuals with decency.

### **Ability-qualification system**

For the first several years of SZU's existence, the nationwide *zhi cheng* evaluation system for staff and teachers that assessed their qualification status was under state-level review; in fact, it ceased altogether for two years. SZU thus felt obliged to create its own ability qualification system which it called *nengli zige zhi*. When the *zhi cheng* evaluation was undertaken in Chinese tertiary institutions (*gao xiao*) in 1987, SZU did not have a corresponding method for evaluating teachers.<sup>47</sup> The system it had developed was characterized as "double track" with position qualification and teaching ability qualification. The former consisted of four position ranks: professor, associate professor, lecturer, assistant lecturer. These were beyond university control as the determinations were made by upper levels (on the university's recommendation, of course). The university could, however, decide the teaching ability ranks completely on its own. General criteria used for promotion, as set in 1985 regulations, were political performance, academic level, and work performance, with the evaluation "aiming to reflect teachers' contributions toward the Four Modernizations."<sup>48</sup> Other assessment criteria added later included foreign language ability, research accomplishments, teaching level, and computer knowledge. An evaluation included opinions of students and fellow teachers, who audited class sessions. Academic writings were to be evaluated by outside referees. All the evidence was considered by a commission, where majority vote ruled; its decision went to the president for his approval. Since this track was unique to SZU, the position or rank could not be transferred by staff members who changed jobs outside SZU.<sup>49</sup>

Workers at SZU were able to upgrade their qualifications also through a promotion evaluation.<sup>50</sup> Those wanting to be raised to Rank IV needed either a *zhuanke* certificate or equivalent knowledge. Those with such a certificate were tested on ability. Those without a certificate were given a make-up test in six subjects—Chinese, politics, and computer, and three subjects chosen according to the employee's major interest. Cadres holding rank IV also needed either to hold a *zhuanke* certificate or to pass the six tests.

**Box 3.4: Teaching qualification point system (1987)****teaching:**

- 10 points for smoothly finishing the year's work load
- 15 points each for new courses, two or more different courses, teaching in a foreign language (for non-foreign language teachers), teaching graduate courses, or for 'remarkable' achievements in teaching
- 20 points for winners of excellent teaching awards
- 5 points for teachers who do not finish their work load or are bad teachers

**publishing:**

- 10-20 points for publishing in state-level or foreign journals
- 5-10 points for articles in provincial level journals
- 3-5 points for articles below provincial level journals
- 3-5 points every 10,000 characters for state-level published books
- 5-7 points for provincial-level books
- 3-5 points for books below provincial-level

**editing teaching materials:**

- 6-10 points for state-level materials per 10,000 characters
- 4-6 points provincial level
- 2-4 points for school level

**translation:**

- 6-10 state level
- 4-6 provincial
- 2-4 under provincial level

**patents:**

- limited to 100 points.

**research grants and awards received (prorated for group members):**

- 60-100 for state level per item
- 0-60 for provincial level
- 20-30 under provincial level

**Non-academic articles and essays:**

- 8-15 state level each piece
- 4-8 provincial level
- 2-4 under provincial level

**foreign language:**

- 10 points for passing the foreign language test for promotion
- 15 points if test score is 85 or over

**graduate tutoring:**

- 5 points for one graduate student
- 8 for two graduate students
- 2 points for each additional graduate student over three

**special awards:**

- under 50 points

**return from overseas training:**

- 10 points

SZU developed a point system to determine teaching qualification. Each teacher completed forms which were submitted to an evaluation committee at the departmental level. The committee then assessed and matched these point scores against a five point ranking system (each with half ranks), which had corresponding salary levels. A minimum length of stay at each level was required before a teacher qualified for further promotion.<sup>51</sup> A score of 550 points placed a teacher in Rank I, 270 for Rank II, 75 for Rank III, 10 for Rank IV, and 0 for Rank V, according to the criteria in Box 3.4.

The qualification review process occurred annually, except for the period 1989-90 when, after the arrival of the post 4 June leaders, promotions were altogether suspended for one year. Provisional regulations were issued in June 1990 and revised several times in the ensuing six months. Qualification review was expanded to include categories in addition to teaching ability qualification, and ability qualifications were made available in academic research, engineering/technical, library, accounting, editorial, clinic, economic management, and translation. The five-rank system was retained: initial level as Rank IV and senior as Rank I. Each rank had requirements; the ranks are as follows, listed from the lowest to the highest:<sup>52</sup>

- Rank IV: *zhuanke* certificate, three years work experience after graduation, or one year's experience after graduate study or double degree.
- Rank III: four years work experience after obtaining Rank IV ability, with certificate of assistant lecturer training, or with proof of having grasped knowledge of masters courses, ability of major subject, or two years after having obtained Rank IV with masters degree, or Ph.D.
- Rank II: five years after obtaining Rank III, or two years after Rank III with Ph.D. Promotion to Ranks II and III requires foreign language test or translation publication of at least 30,000 characters. Those without *benke* cannot obtain Rank II.
- Rank I: Those with special contributions in academic research or teaching are not limited by these regulations.

Candidates for promotion to Ranks II, III and IV applied directly to the sub-work-unit leader. With the leader's approval, the candidate could obtain a qualification review application form, which was to be completed and sent to the review office. In addition, candidates for Rank II needed two references, one from outside SZU. Before 1989 the review committee's decision was forwarded to the president for approval. After 1990 a committee appointed by university leaders (usually one professor per department) judged departmental recommendations for promotion.

The review process covered much of a year and began in April with the study of documents. Before the end of June candidates were selected for the foreign language exam, articles submitted for expert examination, the evaluation group formed, and recommendations made before the end of June. Over the summer, non-teaching senior qualifications were reviewed; medium and initial qualifications were reviewed in the autumn and senior qualifications at the end of the year.<sup>53</sup> In 1991, 109 staff applied for senior level promotions, 70 (64%) of which were forwarded for upper provincial and municipal approval. In 1992, 79 applied, of which 61 (77%) were forwarded to the upper levels. The year 1993 saw 72 applications, of which 58 (80%) were forwarded. For the years 1994 and 1995, 66 and 65 staff applied for senior promotions. In 1991 the university recommended 60 and 64 promotions at mid- and initial-level ranks, respectively.

Even from these incomplete data, it is apparent that the review process was not *pro forma*. The university's internal review of departmental recommendations rejected anywhere from one-third to one-fifth of all applications for promotion. It is unknown to what extent Guangdong educational authorities rejected university-approved applications; some applications were delayed, but generally most got approved by the upper level. Both the review within SZU and at the provincial level involved committees, but in fact usually only one or two members of the committee read the writing samples submitted by the applicant for promotion. Often, promotions relied heavily on the judgment of a single individual, an expert in the same field or discipline as the applicant. Several informants reported to me on the seemingly arbitrary nature of decisions. But in discussing them, it became apparent that the decisions were not arbitrary at all. They were political. Decisions at the department level sometimes involved leaders acting against staff who they opposed in other matters, or just plain disliked. Despite the on surface fairness (and mathematical precision) of the promotion process, in an unknown number of cases it actually became a vehicle of campus politics.

### **1992 Staffing reform**

What was billed as a major reform in SZU's staffing system appeared around the time of the change of administrations from Wei-Wu to Cai Delin, who formally assumed office on 1 November 1992. Two July 1992 documents proposing comprehensive reform articulated reform directions in personnel policy.<sup>54</sup> In order to perfect the employment system and create a better team structure, Three Fixed [things] were required. SZU needed fixed staffing, fixed positions for staff, and fixed responsibilities for staff. Staff

were not to be assigned positions, but instead were to be hired on the basis of “two-way choice.” Those with high qualifications received high salary; those with low qualifications received low salary. The diligent were to be rewarded, the slackers punished. Employees who made “serious” mistakes could be fired, and in general payment would be made according to labor.

An annual plan specified the amount of funds given each sub-work-unit for salary. This amount was fixed and did not vary according to the actual number of employees. The units could decide not to employ as many staff as called for in the plan and retain the unused salary, so long as the number not employed did not exceed 15% fewer than allowed. The early draft of the proposal included some sections omitted from Cai’s subsequent presentations to staff meetings. One omission was the “full-load working principle” which stated that the work load of each person should be at least 80% of the average work load, a figure that could be lowered to 60% if the staff experienced health problems. Cai’s proposals also replaced the term “position responsibility system” with “employment system.”

### **Mobility**

There was much mobility in the university’s staff population. Teachers and staff changed offices within the university, some retired, and many left to work in companies in Shenzhen or to study abroad. Retirement did not become significant until the early 1990s. By 1994, eleven years after the school was founded, 107 staff had retired (and were still alive). Retirements

**Table 3.8: Staff hiring**<sup>55</sup>

1991	33
1992	99
1993	72
1994	99
1995	72
1997	79

reported for certain years included: 19 in 1993, 13 in 1993, 32 in 1994, 20 in 1995. Few staff stayed on after retirement (age 55 for women, 60 for men); most enjoyed their leisure days in university-provided housing, receiving a pension that included various subsidies and 50% of the salary assigned to their position. The year 1994 illustrates staff mobility. Excluding 32 staff who retired that year, 152 staff transferred, including 32 between departments and 21 transferring out. That year SZU hired 99 new personnel, which included 41 teachers and 13 researchers. Of the new hires, 25 came from Shenzhen, 44 from outside Shenzhen, and 30 were immediate graduates from domestic and foreign universities. The new researchers and teachers included 11 at senior rank, 30 at mid-level and 11 at initial qualification.

**Table 3.9: Status of teachers hired, 1983-1994<sup>57</sup>**

status	number	percent
abroad	87	13.5
left SZU	97	15.1
retired	44	6.8
not in post	10	1.6
still teaching	405	63.0

As a new university, SZU saw large numbers of transfers during its foundation years. Transfers slowed dramatically in 1990, as the new administration undertook a university-wide rectification.<sup>56</sup> For that year only 33 staff were hired, while 29 left the university. The following year experienced a tripling of new staff, partly in response to the previous several years' sluggish hiring. The 99 new recruits included 39 teachers, 31 researchers and 29 non-teaching staff, most of whom were hired on political criteria, as the new Party secretary and president put their political stamp on SZU. Hiring for the early 1990s is reported in Table 3.8. Staff continued to leave SZU during those years. In 1992-93, more staff actually left SZU than were hired. The attrition rate (excluding retirees) lowered to around 1:5 for 1994-95.

Almost from its beginning, SZU lost teachers and other staff who went to work for companies in Shenzhen or went abroad to study. This group included 180 full-time teachers by 1995, a number that equaled almost one-third of all new teachers recruited by the university over the same period. Ninety-five percent of those who left were lecturers or assistant lecturers under age 40. Over half of them held graduate degrees.<sup>58</sup> As reported in Table 3.9, SZU hired 643 teachers from 1983-1994 (excluding those who in 1994 had moved into administration). Some of the teachers reported as leaving SZU may have subsequently emigrated abroad, so the causes of teacher departure appeared to be equally divided between study abroad and work in Shenzhen. Very few teachers who went abroad for course work ever returned to SZU. The *1986 Yearbook*, for example, lists the names of 25 teachers who went abroad that year. Only one of them was a SZU teacher in 1994, according to that year's annual. At any given time, about 8-10% of SZU staff had left their positions but were still formally employed by the university; they were put under the categories of *jie ping* or *ju ping*, literally "refused to be employed." In 1990 there were 26 teachers in that category, 14 in 1995.<sup>59</sup>

## The teachers

Teachers represent slightly above 40% of SZU's total paid regular staff, a number that belies their real importance. Teaching at SZU was a one-way process that treated students as receptacles. The administration—president, Party secretary, and department heads—permitted teachers much autonomy, granting them the authority to tell students what to learn and how to learn it. The developing of teaching plans, setting of exams and constructing of pedagogy were largely left to individual teachers, with loose oversight provided by the department head. This aspect of academic freedom, which characterizes higher education elsewhere in the world, is due to the fact that almost all of the top administrators in universities (in China and elsewhere) were themselves at one time teachers; their personal experience helps them relate to the teaching staff. They deliver to their faculty the same independence they themselves relished as teachers. In terms of teaching, the contrasting sets of university leaders at SZU had one—perhaps only one—feature in common: they shared a hands-off approach vis-à-vis what occurred in the classroom. The hiring and management of faculty, however, differed considerably over the years.

Guangdong Province's request to the State Council for setting up SZU stated that the new school's "teacher's team should be built through a combination of employment and transfer, with stress on employment."<sup>60</sup> In choosing this path, policy-makers opted not to build a mini Beida (Beijing University) or mini Qinghua, with complete departments transferred in from China's prestigious institutions. The Xi'an Jiaotong model, in which the teaching staff of the new university in Xi'an almost entirely came from Shanghai Jiaotong University, was not followed. Rather, the designers of SZU intended to create a self-standing university with its own characteristics. It would have a unique teaching team, not a replica of any other university's faculty. Less than three months before the formal opening of SZU, an official from the Ministry of Education visited Shenzhen and reported on the university's preparation.<sup>61</sup> He, too, stressed that SZU should have its own teachers' team:

Teachers mainly consider three factors when they come to a university: the future for their majors; the payment and living conditions; and whether the environment provides good schooling for their children. Beijing University used to have a branch in Changping County. But because the primary and middle schools were not as good as in Beijing, teachers wanted to return to Beijing town. Finally, the Changping campus was closed; over 100,000

**Table 3.10: Teacher qualification ranking, 1987 and 1994<sup>62</sup>**

qualification rank	1987		1994		
	number	%	number	%	% of teachers in post
#1—professor/senior engineer	25	4	42	12	7.7
#2—associate professor/engineer	147	25	121	35	29.9
#3—lecturer/associate engineer	315	53	24	47	50.1
#4—assistant	77	28	2	7	11.9
average (1=prof...4=assistant)		2.79		2.48	

square meters of accommodation was deserted. Any university must consider these three aspects in order to attract advanced intellectuals. Hiring should consider the potential contributions of teachers toward the Special Zone's development; teachers should be concerned with more than just money. Chinese intellectuals are patriots and not attracted only by money. Money can only attract Rank III and Rank IV teachers.

In September 1983 when SZU opened its temporary site in downtown Shenzhen with 212 students, out of necessity its teachers were mostly borrowed from famous universities. Qinghua, People's University, Beida, Zhongshan, and Huanan Polytech each lent SZU teachers and cadres. Departments were set up under the leadership of famous scholars in their field on loan from their institutions.<sup>63</sup> The first teachers—those who arrived by late 1983—found the procedures for getting to SZU expeditious, so long as they had the approval of their current work-unit. Although paperwork prevented some teachers from arriving in the first batch, enough were in place so that the opening took place on schedule. During the following two years, faculty members were recruited to SZU through a more formal, nationwide application process which generated some 10,000 applicants for 200 places.<sup>64</sup> The intent was to put on permanent staff certain young teachers (under age 40) from the best universities in China. Some of these successful applicants arrived in 1984; others encountered delays and rocky roads (see Box 3.2).

When the university moved to its new campus in 1984, personnel included 250 fixed staff and another 40 listed as *jieping* (borrowed employee). Many of these staff came from China's prestigious universities: architects and engineers from Qinghua, the social scientists from Beida and People's University. By 1986, SZU had 615 fixed and 109 borrowed staff. Eighty-eight (14%) of the fixed staff held qualifications of Rank I (full professor and

**Table 3.11: Teachers holding advanced degrees (percentage, selected years)<sup>66</sup>.**

	Ph.D.	masters
1987	3%	28%
1990	4	30
1994	9	37

senior engineer) or Rank II (associate professor, engineer or researcher). In 1986 the university had only eight full professors and 15 senior engineers, seven in Architecture alone (Luo Zhengqi, himself, was then only an associate professor). Only 10 of the staff holding senior qualifications were borrowed; the rest had transferred in as permanent staff. Even by 1987, the year in which the initial phase of staff hiring was completed, under 30% of the teachers held Rank I or II qualifications. As the school aged, this proportion rose to just under 40% (see Table 3.10). Over time, the percentage of teachers who had undergone advanced study also rose. For China as a whole, in 1991 only 12.7% of full-time teachers had Ph.Ds, masters or graduate study certification, while about half of SZU's teachers fit into that category. The biggest jump in advanced degrees occurred in the early 1990s (see Table 3.11). By 1992 SZU had defined targets for qualifications. Thirty-five percent of teachers with masters were to be in the senior qualification, 50% in the medium and 15% in initial.<sup>65</sup> In other words, SZU expected half of its masters to be associate professors, 70% of the remainder full professors, and the rest lecturers. A masters had become a requirement for all new teaching staff, except for political tutors, many of whom were recruited right out of college. Having a masters was neither necessary nor sufficient for promotion to full professor. The regulations specified that the senior/medium/initial qualification split for teachers with bachelors degrees should be 33:50:17, suggesting that with just an undergraduate degree, one could still become full professor. This grandfathered in those faculty hired at the beginning of SZU, before advanced degrees became a hiring requirement.

### ***Teacher team construction***

SZU always made an effort at recruiting teachers and staff with advanced degrees, but in its early years this was hampered by several factors. Graduate degrees were only awarded in China from the late 1970s. Moreover,

many older teachers who had the interest and ability to pursue graduate education were prevented from further study during the Cultural Revolution. As a consequence, in the first years of the university, many arriving teachers who were in their '30s or older had teaching experience and research accomplishments, but they did not have degrees. It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1987 only 3% and 28% of the teaching staff held Ph.Ds and masters, respectively. Non-teaching staff who worked in research units or teaching assisting units (such as the library, computer and audio/visual centers) even employed staff with advanced degrees (36%).<sup>67</sup> By 1994, SZU had been able to attract more teachers with higher degrees, largely from domestic universities. Based on the teachers' listing in the *1994 Yearbook*, Ph.D. and masters holders represented 9% and 37% of the staff, respectively. This reflected rises over seven years of 300% for doctors and 32% for masters.

Teachers arriving at the new university in the early 1980s entered uncharted terrain. About the only thing everyone knew for certain was that it was uncharted. When hired, most early recruits were probably unaware of a suggestion by a visiting Ministry of Education official that teachers' salaries should be sufficiently high to reflect qualifications and could be supplemented with border-region and other subsidies. His recommended levels of subsidy were: ¥200 monthly for professors, ¥150 for associate professors, and ¥100 for lecturers, which would have placed SZU's salaries at the top of the scale in China.<sup>68</sup> He had also mentioned academic sabbaticals, the sending of teachers abroad for training, and teaching loads of two courses (6-8 hours per week) for associate professors and three courses (4-6 hours per week) for professors. At the same time the official said that he expected teachers who chose to be pioneers at SZU would make their decisions for various reasons; salary was a minor concern, if of any importance at all.

Once the school was established at its new campus, the faculty started to take firmer shape, with the president given the power to hire and reward teachers.<sup>69</sup> Year-long "academic vacations" with full pay would be earned after six years of service,<sup>70</sup> and teachers were encouraged to study abroad on a fee-paying basis. Professors and lecturers served as tutors to help students in study and with life's problems. By 1988 there were 115 tutors for students, half of whom were Rank I and Rank II professors.<sup>71</sup> Entry level teachers (assistant lecturers) who arrived after 1984 would be given a maximum six years employment, after which they were to be reviewed according to the ability qualification system and either promoted to lecturers or dismissed. Lecturers hired from 1984 were also given six years within which to be promoted to associate professors.

**Table 3.12: Teacher-student ratio**<sup>72</sup>

	SZU	national average
1986	8.1	
1987	9.5	
1990	8.3	
1991		5.2
1992	9.5	5.6
1993	9.4	6.5
1994	8.2	
1995	7.7	
2000 (est)		7.0

### Teacher-student ratio

The teacher-student ratio is one of the most widely used statistics in education. The difficulties in compiling such a figure are even more troublesome than the hurdles on the path to composing an accurate staff-student ratio, as noted earlier. Such problems also obfuscate developing a statistical indicator of teaching efficiency. While temporary professional non-teaching staff were rare at SZU—and the classification almost always led to permanent employment—the part-time teacher rubric often provided a terminal hiring status. Some teachers hired on a temporary basis taught at SZU for over five years. For statistical purposes, was this group included in the reported teacher-student ratios? Sometimes, yes. Sometimes, no. Indeed, there seem to be two quite different teacher-student ratios, depending on whether the swing group of temporary, full-time teachers was included. When it is included, the ratio is as low as 1:20.<sup>73</sup> Teacher-student ratios for full-time students and full-time teachers for the years with sufficient data are reported in Table 3.12, along with national averages.

These ratios are considerably lower, meaning less efficiency, than the comparable figures reported for institutions elsewhere in the world. In the U.S., for example, the ratio varies by type of college and university (i.e., research versus teaching, public versus private), but the ratio is usually about half the SZU figure (i.e., double the students per teacher). In its early reform proposals, SZU set a 1:7 target.<sup>74</sup> By 1992 this had been revised to 1:8.<sup>75</sup> The latter figure mirrors the recommended goal of the SEdC. Using FTE data, the teacher-student ratio at SZU for 1995 compared favorably with both those at other Chinese institutions (see Table 3.2) as well as the 1:7 predicted as the national average in the year 2000. SZU was still not close to the

rather unrealistic goal of 1:12 set by educational economist Min Weifan for Chinese universities for the year 2000.<sup>76</sup>

### **Expectations for teachers**

By 1986 a fairly clear picture of the first SZU administration's expectation of faculty was emerging. It emphasized teaching; within teaching, innovation was fundamental:<sup>77</sup>

The department head is responsible for the general teaching plan, and teachers are responsible for course teaching plans. SZU should not require unified teaching materials for teachers who prepare a course together. Teachers are encouraged to compile their own teaching materials and to use original English versions of teaching materials...Teachers are encouraged to employ special teaching methods. If an experiment fails, teachers will not be held responsible. If it succeeds, they will be rewarded. We encourage new teachers to go to the platform [start teaching] as soon as possible. All teachers should offer new courses. Administrative cadres are encouraged to teach, and teachers are encouraged to participate in administration. Teachers with qualifications above lecturer will offer at least two courses. Professors and associate professors' major task is to teach. Department heads should take the lead in offering courses or their teaching-ability qualification will be canceled.

The new system combined teaching, research and ideological education. Integrating faculty members into aspects of the university that were prohibited to them in many Chinese universities (notably, serving as tutors in moral education, developing their own course materials, doing research independent of research institutes) was intended to create a basis for the faculty's running the academics of the university. The policy sought to avoid the shortcomings of dualism that existed elsewhere in Chinese higher education, "where teachers either focused solely on teaching and paid no attention to research, or vice-versa... either teachers paid no attention to students' ideological education or else they were in charge of ideological education and paid no attention to teaching." It attempted to avoid the phenomenon vividly described by the Chinese idiom: each person has his own trumpet, each trumpet sounds its own tune (*yi ren yi ba hao, ge chui ge de diao*).<sup>78</sup>

Such innovation demanded of a young and green staff required experienced leadership, and the university brought in noted scholars to set up most departments. Each of these department heads signed a personalized contract directly with the President Luo Zhengqi, as illustrated in Box 3.5.

**Box 3.5: Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu**<sup>79</sup>

Your term will be from March 1987 to September 1989. All professors must teach. No excuse exempts one from teaching two semesters in a row. Professors should prepare teaching materials and should ask students their opinions about teaching. Besides class teaching, professors should approach students. Professors should do research. As you become the department head of the Chemistry Department, education should focus on application and meet the three First Rates.<sup>[80]</sup> Develop a good teaching force. Chemistry will not recruit any teachers over 40, and all must be good in a foreign language. Employ the 3-in-1 system [teaching, research and production]. There should be one academic salon [seminar] every two weeks. Every two weeks you should meet with a teacher or graduates or visit a student's family. You should participate in student activities every two weeks. At the expiration of your contracted term, please recommend a successor. Simultaneously, you will be employed as a presidential assistant for the same term. In that job you will assist the president, raise opinions about reform, and provide consultation on science teaching and research. You are also to assist President Luo and Vice-president Ying with foreign affairs. You are free to criticize the president's work and point out his mistakes. 10 July 1987.

The university set up several vehicles to obtain input from teachers in the policy process. A Teaching Reform Committee, headed by President Luo, consisted of the vice-presidents and a few professors and associate professors. A Committee of Professors served as the "supreme academic organization of the university... in charge of all academic activities, serving as a consultant to the President."<sup>81</sup> As originally envisioned, its scope was comprehensive: it organized academic activities and provided a place for academic dialog among teachers; it evaluated SZU's academic achievements; it made recommendations to the upper level. It also set degree requirements and participated in the teachers qualification evaluation. The committee was supposed to guarantee proper directions in research and teaching and to stimulate faculty to improve teaching quality and research. It was designed to improve communication between departments, especially between the social sciences and the natural sciences. The 100 members on the committee included all full and associate professors and senior researchers. Its chair, who was nominated by the President and approved by the members, had to be under age 60.<sup>82</sup>

The Professors Committee was discarded by the Wei-Wu administration in favor of a Teachers and Staff Representatives Conference (*jiao dai hui*) consisting of departmental leaders and their selected ordinary staff.<sup>83</sup> Terms of office lasted two years and the Conference met annually over a several day

period. Much of the work between the conference sessions was done by a work committee elected at the closing of the first session. The Representatives Conference was less a body elected by rank and file teachers and staff than an entity composed of administrators and their personal choices to represent teaching and non-teaching staff. Furthermore, the 21-person work committee elected by the 1994 conference consisted of no ordinary teachers or staff; everyone selected was deputy department head level or above.<sup>84</sup> Sometimes the representatives conference ran concurrently with the annual meeting of the Work Union, such as in December 1995 when the second session of the third teachers Representatives Conference met together with the second session of the fifth Work Union conference. The university leaders addressed the opening and closing meetings of the session and presented their work reports in speeches that usually each lasted over one hour. The meetings had a set agenda prepared by the administration. The program of the 22-23 December 1994 conference, attended by over 200 staff (171 of whom were voting representatives), included listening to the president's work report and approving the minutes of the previous meetings of the staff conference and work union. In addition, the representatives were scheduled to approve resolutions concerning democratic management, democratic monitoring, deepening reform and SZU's proposed work plan. They were also to select committee members and work union representatives.<sup>85</sup> Cai Delin described the representatives conference as the monitoring organization of the SZU administration. "Leaders and party cadres at all levels should hold a democratic meeting and carry out criticism and self-criticism according to requirements of 'preventing and correcting the unhealthy phenomenon of selecting and appointing cadres.'"<sup>86</sup>

From the beginning SZU relied on leaders and senior academics to guide the young staff. By the president's own admission in 1986, however, the school lacked a training system for new recruits and failed to help them get acquainted with school surroundings. "It was not a system for learning and improving." In addition, uneven work loads resulted in uneven distribution and unfair payment.<sup>87</sup> Certain innovations were tried. In summer 1985, for example, classes were arranged in one-hour periods, rather than for two hours, the traditional practice in China. This change was intended to allow teachers more flexibility in creating teaching plans. But according to the president, "many teachers were not able to adapt to the new system, and departments were allowed to decide their own arrangements. By the first term 1986 most departments had changed back to the old system."<sup>88</sup> President Luo was not alone in his concerns over the failing of innovations aimed at improving teaching quality. The Party vice-secretary also wrote that teacher

quality was not adequate. As a new school SZU was not burdened by tradition, he pointed out, but the teaching method was still the same for every student. He spoke for the entire staff when he said that educational reforms required adjustment time and that “radical steps should not be taken too quickly.”<sup>89</sup>

Teachers’ work loads were stipulated in 1985 at 6-8 teaching hours per week.<sup>90</sup> Teachers of difficult courses were to get lightened loads; those with basic public courses such as Public English and physical education would be given 10-12 hours. Research should represent one-third of a teacher’s work time. Teachers who were involved in administration or Party affairs could experience a 30-50% lighter load. In reality, teachers in almost every department were required to teach a minimum of 12 hours per week. The average for the late 1980s was more likely between 15 to 20 hours, with some lecturers teaching as many as 25 hours per week. Regulations in July 1992 implemented a system that weighed courses according to difficulty, using a system of coefficients, in order more fairly to treat teachers who taught burdensome courses.<sup>91</sup> The average course, defined as one without homework, received a coefficient of 1.0. More difficult courses included writing courses (1.4), lab and computer courses (1.35), and design or math courses (1.3). Courses with homework received the coefficient 1.2. Courses that were considered simple to teach received low coefficients: .9 for Public English, the required course for non-English majors, and .8 or .6 for courses that teachers repeated. In addition, large classes (above the standard of 40 students) received an added coefficient of .5 (per 40 extra students). Courses taught for the first time received a coefficient of 1.2. Credit was given for teachers’ participation in students’ social investigation and practice and thesis supervision. The department head and Party secretary could take a 60% less work load and the assistant head and secretary 40% less. A department’s academic head or lab supervisor also got a 10% reduction.

### ***Concerns over teaching***

Improving teaching quality has been a major concern throughout SZU’s history. In 1988 the Academic Affairs Office reported that a “minority of teachers were not well-prepared before class and that teaching discipline was not strict.” It continued to call for teachers to use new methods and boldly carry out teaching reform, but no specific strategy was presented.<sup>92</sup> The major critique of teachers and teaching came as part of the 1990 rectification campaign with the aim to improve teaching atmosphere (*jiao feng*). About

the time he completed his first year in office, Wu Zewei, the Party secretary, rebuked teachers in a long speech at a school-wide meeting.<sup>93</sup> After he praised a few dedicated teachers, including ironically Architecture professor Liang Hongwen, the wife of Wu's nemesis, disgraced President Luo, Wu launched into an attack. According to Wu, teaching "mistakes" included:

- the absence of a serious teaching attitude and the treating of their SZU jobs as part-time rather than full-time;
- unsystematic teaching content;
- teachers' being absent without proper reasons; some leaving without telling leaders, or asking others to take their places, or going out on business;
- teacher's refusal to follow the teaching discipline, with late arrivals or early departures having become more and more frequent;
- teachers' lack of dedication, with some always wanting to go abroad, to "be a monk for one day, ring the bell for one day" (*zuo yi tian he shang zhuang yi tian zhong*);
- teachers' neglect of students moral education, with some refusing to be political tutors, seemingly reluctant to even talk with students or answer their questions.

The Party secretary was particularly annoyed with the increasing importance placed on generating additional income through side teaching businesses (*chuang shou*). This was corrupting the relationship between the individual and the collective, according to Wu. He criticized teachers for being irresponsible, and gave generalized examples of teachers violating exam discipline, for example, giving the wrong exam papers to students and changing an exam after it had been distributed to students. He cited AAO statistics reporting 71 teacher absences without adequate excuses during the spring 1990 semester.<sup>94</sup> Teachers were damaging the school's reputation, he said, referring to a comment from an official from an unspecified company that a "certain SZU teacher" who took students on their social investigation more resembled a businessman than a university professor. "It is commonly known that many teachers are not well prepared for class, do not have a good teaching attitude in class, and design very simple test papers. A lot of students who have been working hard are dissatisfied with this situation." Wu castigated teachers for being unable to recognize and handle the relationship between freedom and discipline.

Some teachers think that SZU is too strict with them. I think that for some teachers we are, in fact, too easy. Some do not follow the educational disci-

pline or even the rules of the Party and school. Some teachers not only dismiss students early during the fourth period [right before lunch], but also the second period. In the past, early leaves did not exceed several minutes, but now it is common to have half an hour early leave. Some teachers leave the school and do not return, paying no attention to their teaching, and going out to do business. We have to seriously handle those who do this. If you don't want to be a teacher in this school, then you can leave SZU through proper procedures. 'Stepping on two boats' is very selfish. Some people who already have accommodation try to get an additional dorm room and rent it out. SZU forbids teaches from keeping dogs but some teachers keep them as pets and walk the dogs on campus in the evening. Teachers doing this imitate foreigners, showing their leisure and wealth. These teachers lose their dignity. Some might say: this is my freedom. But we are talking about the freedom of socialism, not that of individualism and not that of anarchy.

Wu's remarks certainly did not make friends among the teachers, nor was he able to influence staff to change their attitudes. Most teachers shrugged off his remarks, which were considered little more than a "peasant's harangue," in the words of one informant. Indeed, the delivery overshadowed and blotted out the content. Despite a flaw in basic logic—using a few carefully selected illustrations to represent the norm—the speech dealt with serious issues over which the Party secretary and many teachers as well were quite concerned. The school's response to these problems came in the form of a move to strengthen teachers' moral and political education that started shortly after the new administration took over. Leaders complained that teachers put insufficient emphasis on teaching and were themselves very undisciplined, even violating laws and regulations. Regulations attributed many teaching problems to loose moral and political education.<sup>95</sup>

Perhaps nowhere were these concerns better articulated than in a strongly worded article in October 1990 in the university's internal journal, written by its well-respected associate editor, Zhang Zhongchun.<sup>96</sup> According to the author, the most serious outside criticism of SZU was that its teaching and research atmospheres were "broken," that the university was not considered a serious place for study and research. His wide-ranging critique distributed responsibility among students, teachers and administration (implicitly at least), but its common theme was the lack of enforced regulations, specifically on student class attendance, monitoring of teaching and research and on distributing rewards and punishments rationally. The article reiterated many of the points made in Wu's speech, but on an intellectually higher, less abrasive, and more even-tempered plane. Zhang pointed out that

the pressure from side-courses required young teachers just starting out to take work loads of over 20 classes per week. “How can good teaching quality possibly be achieved,” he asked. He suggested the setting up of a publishing fund and allocating more of the university’s resources to research.

The administration’s censure of teachers continued in 1991. President Wei Youhai, in his annual work report, called for continued rectification of the teaching atmosphere.<sup>97</sup> He attributed lenient teaching directly to teacher’s laziness—*jiao bu yan, shi zhi duo*, citing part of an idiom taken from the *Sanzijing*, the famous book of three-character sayings.<sup>98</sup> In his first year in office, Wei had not openly denounced teachers, a job which was assumed by the Party secretary. Many teachers then found Wei’s changed attitude disappointing. Since his arrival at SZU, the president had been considered the “good cop” in contrast to Wu’s “bad cop.” By 1991, however, the duo was seen, in the words of one observer, as “devil cop, double devil cop.” Wei reported on a weak teaching foundation and said that despite the teachers’ high academic level, few were motivated to spend much of their energy on improving teaching quality. Still, Wei showed a deeper understanding than Wu of the teacher’s situation. He admitted that staff and teachers “don’t have much confidence in SZU’s future and are skeptical about rectification.”<sup>99</sup>

Some comrades believe it is difficult to get out of the mysterious circle of *yi fang jiu luan, yi luan jiu tong, yi tong jiu si* (once let go, chaos; once chaos, rectification; once, rectification, rigidity.) Once rigidity, leniency returns, completing the mysterious circle. Other comrades think SZU’s strong measures on side-courses and certificates are not reform but are backward steps. Still other comrades think that some old problems are too intricate and confusing, and defy solution. This shows that in the new year, we must change people’s concepts by making positive accomplishments and improving work efficiency so that everyone regains confidence.

A year later, the school leaders reported that they had accomplished much towards improving teaching quality.<sup>100</sup> The first university-wide meeting on teaching had been held in March, attended by all teachers with qualifications of associate professor and above. Departmental teaching plans had been thoroughly revised, research organizations had been set up in “advanced” academic departments, textbooks and labs had improved. There was no explicit mention of classroom teaching quality improvement. At the end of the year, a provincial inspection group visited SZU to examine Party construction, a term that now encompassed all aspects of the university. In its report, the group commented that the relationship between teaching, research and

side-businesses should be properly handled, but that the school should also try to reduce teachers' burdens. It also noted the existence of under-employment in SZU's research institutes, *ren fo yu shi* (people floating above things to be done).<sup>101</sup> By the end of 1991, there was a general call at SZU for emphasizing teaching work, something "which should be more central at SZU." The head of AAO wrote:<sup>102</sup>

We should respect teachers, support their initiatives, encourage them to devote their major energy to teaching, and develop favorable policies, including those on transferring teachers, funding, professional qualification evaluation, and the distribution of side-income. We hope that students and teachers can work together to make teaching the center of the school's work. We must strengthen SZU's administration of teaching. School leaders should spend their main energy on teaching, since teaching is the main function of the school...Important teaching issues should be included in the agenda of the Party's main issues. School leaders should have teaching targets each year, and periodically should audit teaching. Over the past year, much has been achieved in rectification. However, some leaders do not have a strong concept of teaching and they often forget to address teaching as a result of their busy work. When they face many matters, teaching is pushed aside. In the professional evaluation qualification, the research essays have been unduly stressed, yet the importance of teaching gets ignored...Department heads spend too much energy on side-business income, rather than solving the existing problems in teaching. The teacher is the key to improving teaching quality. It is impossible to improve SZU's teaching without a fully devoted teachers' team.

Academic Affairs referred to the common notion that teachers were the engineers of human souls—*jiaoshi shi renlei linhun de gongchengshi*, the guardians of culture. But classroom teaching, of course, did not exist in isolation, and the teacher needed to be viewed in context. For AAO, this meant that the SZU leaders should enhance political and ideological education among the staff, encourage them to do a good job, take their problems seriously, care about their lives, and solve past problems so teachers need not worry about their reoccurrence, avoiding *hou gu zhi you* (look-back worries).<sup>103</sup>

The next SZU administration, headed by Cai Delin, adopted a conciliatory, sometimes deferential, attitude towards teachers. Cai gave staff a monthly ¥300 payment (later raised to ¥700) from the president's discretionary fund and also set up a teaching materials fund to encourage teachers to edit their own texts. In sharp contrast with Wei/Wu, Cai did not criticize teachers, although from time to time he criticized policies and situations that

teachers were responsible for. His Ten Measures of Comprehensive Reform in 1992 mentioned teachers only once in passing. In calling for the enhancement of competition in teaching and study, he noted that optional courses with special economic zone characteristics were halted because teachers had not worked on them as hard as they should have.<sup>104</sup> Cai kept an even disposition when dealing with teachers. When necessary, the job of house critic was taken by Vice-president Zhang Bigong, appointed in 1994. In the preparation for the 1995 accreditation, Zhang worried aloud that SZU lagged behind China's prestigious universities in teaching atmosphere (*jiaofeng*).<sup>105</sup>

In Beijing I visited big universities like Beida and Qinghua and was deeply impressed by the fact teachers there compete with one another in scholarship; students compete with one another in ambition. We visited some small schools, Jisou and Wuyi, and were impressed by the work ethic and responsibilities of staff and teachers. Compared with them, our life and payment are better here, but we lag behind them in *jiaofeng*. We have to admit this and be ashamed of this. Many of our teachers are irresponsible and privately ask others to conduct their classes, and in other practices they violate the teaching discipline. Some even cheat on exams.

The pending 1995 accreditation prompted school authorities to devote more attention to teachers and teaching reform, as illustrated in Party Vice-secretary Wang Songrong's Five Emphases.<sup>106</sup>

1. all the work of SZU should emphasize creating eligible socialist *rencai*;
2. all work must emphasize teaching;
3. course programs emphasize *benke*;
4. staff emphasize teachers;
5. review of school work should emphasize teaching quality.

By 1994 strengthening the teachers team had become the administration's mantra. Various aspects of academics became the targets of the 1994 work focus.<sup>107</sup> They included curriculum and textbook development, setting up a teacher monitoring office to work with the university's somewhat dormant Higher Education Research Institute, improving the credit system, developing key courses, improving teaching plans, and establishing a teaching work committee. The university also started in earnest to send academics and senior staff abroad for lecturing, research, training or on delegation travel. From 1991 to 1994, teachers made 400 such trips, starting with those who held the highest qualifications and who had the best relationships with the

**Table 3.13: Teacher training fund (¥)<sup>110</sup>**

1992	80,000
1993	80,000
1994	300,000
1995	650,000

president and vice-presidents. The regulations on attending international conferences required participating teachers to hold at least a masters degree or a mid-level professional qualification. SZU would pay for transportation and conference registration fees.<sup>108</sup> The foreign language level of the attendant had to have achieved the Four Abilities (reading, writing, listening, speaking), but this provision was usually not enforced. Other teachers were sent for further study in China, such as two from the Management Department who went to South Central Finance and Economics University (Zhongnan Caijing Daxue) as graduate students. In 1994 SZU paid ¥69,000 (US \$8,000) in tuition alone for teachers' further training.<sup>109</sup> The entire teacher training fund had grown over the 1990s decade, especially in the two years prior to the accreditation (see Table 3.13). This fund was supposed to amount to 10% of SZU's discretionary fund disbursement. The money was earmarked for excellent teaching and research awards and would provide funds for publishing, book acquisition and academic activities.

This fund enabled 33 young teachers to undertake research, become visiting scholars, or to study abroad between 1992 and 1995. During the same period 96 young teachers went to inland universities to study for masters or Ph.Ds or in non-degree programs. By the beginning of the 1995 fall semester 20 young teachers had returned from abroad and 94 had come back from inland universities. The investment in textbook development had also paid off, at least in terms of quantity. SZU teachers had compiled 87 textbooks between 1992-1995, which amounts to slightly over 8% of all published course materials used.<sup>111</sup>

The SZU branch of the CCP considered academics as one of the areas where it, too, should be involved. New regulations placed teacher's team guidance under Party purview and required that it be subjected to collective discussion.<sup>112</sup> The Party's Propaganda Department decided to publicize teachers' accomplishments in the display windows outside of the administration building.<sup>113</sup> The university also promulgated regulations on teaching discipline, prohibiting teachers from carrying pagers into the classroom (no mention, however, of mobile phones) and restricting them from asking for

leave for private business at the end of a semester.<sup>114</sup> Requests for leave under three days went to the department head; the Personnel Office handled requests involving 3-10 days; only the president could approve leave over 10 days. Cases in which students successfully persuaded teachers to raise exam scores were to result in the teacher's punishment, according to the seriousness of the case.<sup>115</sup>

Thus, by 1995 SZU had started to address the needs of ordinary teachers. It required training for its young teachers. Those who held only *benke* degrees were encouraged to get graduate training. The university said it would "try its best to provide conference funds for all teachers so long as the conference benefits teacher's academic level and reputation and would provide opportunities for teachers to go abroad for visits and training."<sup>116</sup>

### ***Creating a teaching élite***

An emphasis on the élite is a common thread that runs through all of Chinese education, but this theme was not enunciated so clearly at SZU until the recruiting of key scholars began in 1993. One of the major initiatives taken to improve the quality of the faculty involved the recruitment of nationally known scholars into the SZU community. A recruitment advertisement ran twice in the *Guangming Ribao*, China's newspaper for intellectuals.<sup>117</sup> The Personnel Office sent staff to Beijing during a snowstorm for permission to place the ads, which covered 10 majors, including International Trade and Finance, Food Chemistry, Hong Kong/Macau Economy, Real Estate Management, and Industrial Design. Applicants had to be under 50, with over ten years of teaching experience in higher education. The university received over 400 letters of interest. By the end of April, the Personnel Office had selected 69 professors and 91 associate professors as candidates, with 20 majors covered. A shortlist resulted in 26 names. After interviews, 15 were selected, some of whom did not meet the specifications in the *Guangming Ribao* ad. By the end of 1993, five professors, one senior engineer, and one associate professor had reported for work.<sup>118</sup> By 1995 12 in total had reported. Ensuring further training for key teachers was one of Cai Delin's Four Keys.<sup>119</sup> The recruiting of these so-called academic dragons received both national and local press attention. Reports in the Shenzhen newspapers commented that SZU had "lacked famous professional scholars, without whom its academic status cannot be improved"<sup>120</sup> and that "raising the reputation of the university requires a lot of famous academic leaders for building education theory...teachers are the main aspect of education."<sup>121</sup>

SZU employed a new class of teacher—leading teachers (*zhu jiang* or chief lecturers)—in its self-evaluation report to the 1995 SEdC accreditation team.<sup>122</sup> It defined 358 of its 462 full-time teachers as leading (77%), and 91% of the 188 teachers who held senior ranks as leading. Although it did not disclose the criteria used in creating this “leading” class, SZU gave itself the mark of A in this category on the SEdC self-evaluation.

Major initiatives in creating a teaching élite were part of SZU’s responses to Guangdong’s 1000-100-10 project, which was intended to name 1,000 backbone teachers, 100 provincial-level academic leaders and 10 state-level educational leaders from the province.<sup>123</sup> Thirty of these were to come from SZU. Conditions for becoming a backbone teacher included:

- If lecturer or above, age not over 35. If associate professor or above, not over 40. Healthy.
- With at least a masters (if graduated after 1990, must hold a Ph.D.).
- Foreign language and computers skills.
- Major lecturer of at least one course. Teaching quality evaluated as good, two years in a row.
- Must have a clear research direction.
- Must have achieved three of the following:
  - a) book published since 1992 which, if in arts, has at least 80,000 characters;
  - b) eight articles published in arts since 1992 or at least five in science;
  - c) at least three arts or two science articles in famous journals;
  - d) a completed research project at city level or above;
  - e) at least one major academic achievement award at provincial or ministry level or at least third place award from the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau;
  - f) Guangdong excellent teaching award;
  - g) success application for provincial or ministry project of natural science or social science fund key project.

The successful applicant would be entitled to the “backbone” status for four years, subject to an annual review and a comprehensive evaluation every two years. Backbones in arts received ¥10,000 (US \$1,200) per year, ¥15,000 (US \$1,800) in science as well as a ¥100 (US \$12) monthly subsidy which, if the mid-evaluation were passed, would be raised to ¥150. Opportunities would be given to take courses domestically and abroad in key research in-

stitutes and universities in order to acquire the most recent knowledge in their fields. Over the four years, backbones could take 2-3 tours out of SZU, including one abroad, but the accumulated academic visits should not exceed two years. Each backbone teacher could employ a tutor, someone qualified to supervise doctoral students and the tutor could receive a monthly tutoring fee of ¥100. Priority would be given for foreign language and computer training. Requirements for passing the biannual evaluation, in addition to finishing all SZU tasks and showing good teaching quality, included any two of the following five accomplishments:

- finish a Guangdong key research and pass its evaluation;
- publish one book plus one article;
- publish no fewer than three arts or two science articles in famous journals or six arts / four science articles in Chinese registered journals;
- at least one city level academic achievement award;
- provincial level excellent teaching award.

By the end of the four years, the backbone teacher should have accomplished three of the following items:

- one provincial key project;
- one solely obtained provincial or ministry project funded by natural science research funds, key project funds, or social science research fund, or if applied with others, the same type of project at state level;
- one academic research project awarded at provincial level or above;
- published books or university textbooks at provincial level;
- received Guangdong excellent teaching award;
- named as provincial-level expert with outstanding contributions.

Another program funded 100 “trans-century academic leaders.” The criteria here were stricter than those used for selecting backbones. Trans-century applicants had to hold senior professional qualifications. SZU was expected to support ten leaders, each of whom had to be under 50 if a professor, 45 if an associate professor. The compensation was ¥20,000 (US \$2,400) a year for teachers of arts, ¥25,000 (US \$3,000) in science.

**Table 3.14: Salary (¥), associate professor, 1997**

income	3,591
standard salary	365
flexible salary	156
special zone subsidy	1,305
price subsidy	195
housing subsidy	688
retained subsidy	467
air conditioning subsidy	400
book subsidy	15
deductions:	285.62
work union	1.82
conditional evaluation	37
medical coverage	44.92
pension	112.30
tax	89.58
president's discretionary fund subsidy	550
total monthly payment	3,855.38

Note: air conditioning subsidy paid for hot weather months (May-October) only.

### **Remuneration**

Salary is not equivalent to total income. This holds true for the U.S. where income (as supposedly reported to the IRS) includes earnings from investments, savings and inheritance, as well as a paycheck. In China salary is only a small part of remuneration from an employer. Work-units give a number of subsidies and bonuses to employees, and together these amounts tend to dwarf actual salary.<sup>124</sup>

Staff salaries at SZU quadrupled over the school's first decade. From the mid- to late-1980s the average monthly base SZU salary was reported as ¥230, a figure that included state subsidy but excluded any on-campus subsidy.<sup>125</sup> The biggest changes occurred in the early 1990s. In 1992 the university upgraded each staff person one grade in salary. In 1993, a housing subsidy was added as well as temporary position and life subsidies. Teachers' income doubled from the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1993. In 1993 the Personnel Office reported to the author that the average staff monthly

salary was ¥816.88 (US \$140), a figure which included a ¥490 (US \$85) living allowance, making the base salary about ¥330 (US \$60).<sup>126</sup> The ¥816.88 figure excluded the numerous subsidies, allowances and non-salary income which amounted to ¥278.52 (US \$48) per capita.<sup>127</sup> Thus, the average SZU wage in 1993 was about ¥1,100 (US \$190), exclusive of bonuses and other payments issued from presidential discretionary funds.

In addition, departments and institutes also gave special payments (bonuses) to their staff, a practice eventually authorized by 1992 regulations.<sup>128</sup> These amounts varied by office according to the financial condition of each. Payments to employees were not to exceed ¥300 per month unless the unit remitted to the university an amount equal to half of the subsidy over the permitted level.

Table 3.15 represents the 1997 monthly salary (US \$250) of an assistant lecturer, the entry level teaching qualification at SZU. Table 3.14 shows the pay slip for an associate professor for the same year (US \$430). Neither of these amounts reflects payments to teachers from their individual academic departments, based on side-business income. In sum, they suggest that salaries at SZU probably doubled between 1993 and 1997.

Salaries, as illustrated by Tables 3.14 and 3.15, are very individualized, and it would be rare for two staff members who held identical positions, with similar lengths of service and educational qualifications, to receive the exact same pay. The 1992 regulations delineated three broad categories of subsidy: position, achievement and special.<sup>129</sup> The position subsidy was further classified according to eight ranks, the amounts based on the lowest rank (see Table 3.16). Thus, the president (the top rank) received three times the base salary of the lowest ranking clerk, in 1995 about ¥450 and ¥150, respectively.

The special zone subsidy reflected Shenzhen's high cost of living, and the price subsidy related to inflation, based on something like a Consumer Price Index. In addition to these payments issued by the Finance Office, as authorized by the municipal government, departments provided their own subsidies/payments. These depended to a large extent on the financial well being of the sub-work-unit and the leader's method of distribution. Thus a cash-flow rich department like Architecture might give a senior staff member ¥10,000 a month while income-poor departments like Physics and Math gave their staff almost nothing, except for the occasional bag of oranges or case of cooking oil.

**Table 3.15: Salary (¥), assistant lecturer, 1997<sup>130</sup>**

income	1,887
standard salary	179
flexible salary	77
SEZ subsidy	690
housing subsidy	363
retained subsidy	263
material subsidy	195
book and newspaper subsidy	15
annual bonus (prorated)	101
late marriage subsidy	4
deductions	
work union	.90
housing	58.24
conditional (10% salary withheld)	18.00
cleaning	.50
medical	23.64
pension	59.10
tax	49.76
total deductions	210.14
President's fund subsidy	550
total monthly payment	2,226.86

**Table 3.16: Position subsidy ranks, 1993<sup>131</sup>**

rank	position	coefficient
1	president	3.0
2	vice-president, professor	2.5
3	associate professor, department/office head	2.25
4	vice department/office head	2.0
5	lecturer, sub-office head	1.75
6	associate sub-office head	1.5
7	office member, assistant lecturer	1.25
8	clerk	1.0

### Awards and punishments

During the school year, SZU presented a number of monetary awards to staff, totaling ¥300,000, ¥376,800 and ¥801,000 (US \$60,000-90,000) in the years 1990, 1991 and 1994, respectively.<sup>132</sup> Even more than other schools, SZU has attempted to use awards and punishments as the major way to improve teaching. From 1988 the university has retained 10% of teacher's individual salaries. This money went into the president's discretionary fund and was later returned to teachers in the form of staff awards.<sup>133</sup> This regulation, like others, offered a certain mathematical precision, something that attempted to correct for, but actually probably merely belied, the overall subjective nature of evaluations:<sup>134</sup>

Each semester an evaluation will be based on performance. There is a basic award as well as 'heavy' awards for extra contributions in teaching and service. The basic award is the 10% reservation, unless the teacher is absent from classes, in which case 10% will be deducted from the 10% reservation for each class missed. If the teacher is absent from work for one day, 20% will be deducted. If the teacher violates exam discipline, 30% will be deducted. If the teacher speaks rudely, uses dirty language, or exhibits other improper behavior, 40% will be deducted. No reservation will be returned if the teacher disobeys the upper level, acts irresponsibly in the job, violates rules or ignores family planning guidelines. Teaching awards have five ranks, ¥500, 400, 300, 200, 100. A service award follows the same five groups, for those who provide service to staff or students. The department head does not participate in the 'heavy' awards.

Once or more each year, usually around Teachers Day in September, a meeting on teachers awards bestowed prizes upon outstanding teachers. The nature of these awards has changed over the years. In the 1980s they were based mainly on merit, according to the regulations above. By the early 1990s, however, they had deteriorated, as Editor Zhang pointed out:<sup>135</sup>

Rational awards and punishment for different performances are needed. Many sub-work-units do not link evaluation to performances at all. Those who should be rewarded are not rewarded. Those who should be punished are not punished. In the campaigns that select excellent elite workers and the like, everyone knows that few are serious about this. Most such campaigns are done *ma ma hu hu*, (so-so, literally horse-horse-tiger-tiger), casually and do little good to improve the situation...The honor of excellence should be given to those with actual achievements and contributions.

The 1992 excellent teaching awards included three grades of prize (each which included a monetary award) for a total of 31 items, shared by 116 people: first prizes, 10 items, 36 teachers, ¥5,000 (US \$900) each; 16 second prize items, 64 people, ¥2,500 (US \$450); 5 items, 16 teachers for ¥500 (US \$91) “encouragement award.”<sup>136</sup> With few exceptions, the first prizes went to department leaders, many of whom were not personally involved in the projects or courses for which they received awards. The other prizes were shared by leaders, sub-leaders, and ordinary teachers. This type of distribution, which awarded those who supported the leadership, was based more on politics and position than individual contribution. It produced a general cynicism among ordinary teaching staff. One teachers’ comment reflected outright bitterness: “The leaders wouldn’t know good teaching if it bit them on their bottoms. But they well know when their bottoms are being kissed.”

By 1995 the university had coined the term *jiang jiao jin* (award-teaching-money) which it modeled after the common expression used for scholarship, *jiang xue jin*, or award-studying-money. Whether money as an incentive can buy better teaching is, of course, suspect; but such a causal relationship was implicit in SZU policy. Several informants confirmed that they would “try harder” if there were the possibility of a monetary reward (e.g., see Story 5). Awards in 1995 came twice. Awards for advanced work-units and individuals, judged at the provincial, municipal and school levels, were given to over 250 individuals, including some leaders of particular work-units.<sup>137</sup> At the end of the year, awards under the title of “SZU’s First Contribution Awards,” were publicized in the university’s magazine.<sup>138</sup> Those awards went to 126 teachers and staff (8 first prizes, 31 second prizes, 87 third prizes). At that time the awards had returned to a merit-basis, but in each case the three levels of prizes were generally stratified by rank and length of service, and not awarded purely on academic or service achievements. Ordinary teachers mostly received the third prize; the inclusion of recently hired teachers suggests criteria other than rank and seniority.

An evaluation procedure initiated at the end of 1995 maintained the existing review process but specified that the number of “excellent” teachers should not exceed 15% of teachers being evaluated in any single department.<sup>139</sup> Those who were judged as only “basically qualified” would receive a “yellow card” and be sent for three-months’ training. Anyone who refused to receive training or failed the post-training evaluation would be fired. The basis for the year-end bonus was an extra month’s salary. Those who passed

the evaluation as qualified got the regular bonus. Those evaluated as excellent received an additional 30%. Those judged as only basically qualified or unqualified would receive no bonus at all.

In sum, the various efforts in the run-up to the 1995 accreditation paid off. In the university's view, they had accomplished their goal: to improve SZU's *jiao feng*, or teaching atmosphere. This is the picture SZU presented to the SEdC accreditation team:<sup>140</sup>

As a neighbor of Hong Kong and Macau with their developed market economies and financial markets, the temptation of money worshipping is great. Once, this used to influence our study (*xue feng*) and teaching (*jiao feng*) atmospheres unfavorably. In recent years, by practicing the employment system, improving payments, adhering to stronger teaching discipline and carrying out ideological and political work, the *jiaofeng* has made progress. Random courses have stopped; the part-time businessmen phenomenon has decreased. Most teachers are devoted to teaching and cherish the good reputation of SZU. They care about school development, strictly follow teaching regulations and the teaching manual. Two teachers were awarded as national labor exemplary models and state level excellent teachers. Fifteen persons have been awarded as advanced teachers at the provincial level, 45 persons at the municipal level, and 731 at the university level. A minority of teachers have been punished for violating teaching disciplines.

### **Concluding thoughts**

A Chinese idiom describes a person who, while holding a precious watermelon, eagerly stoops down to pick up a valueless sesame seed, losing the melon in the process (*jian le zhi ma, diu le xi gua*). This is what happened in teacher development at SZU.

The above quotation on *jiao feng* illustrates the university's approach to teachers, something characterized as teacher management rather than teacher development. The term in the west is faculty development, but as one of my colleagues pointed out to me, SZU really did not have a faculty. This colleague envisioned a faculty to be some sort of collegial body through which teachers controlled themselves and their teaching. This happened only during the Luo Zhengqi tenure. Even during Luo's time, SZU administrators were preoccupied with "teaching discipline" rather than teaching quality. Only when facing the SEdC accreditation did the university initiate procedures to train new teachers, something that was sorely absent during SZU's first decade. Over the years rules on teacher management were promulgated continually. The leaders worked on pruning the trees, not aware of what was happening in the forest (Chinese has the trees/forest idiom, also).

SZU's development of a young, inexperienced teaching staff, without adequate training or mentoring, resulted in poor classroom pedagogy, a subject discussed in Chapter Five. The university was so concerned with efficiency during the early years that the resultant shortage of teachers created insidious side-effects. Teachers were forced to teach as many as 20 hours a week. Their low salaries and pressing financial needs forced them to disengage from research, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. At the end of the day, the university was left with a plethora of speeches, regulations and mathematical formulae on teacher management but not much to show for them. In other words, a lot of sesame seeds, but a spoiled watermelon.

- 
1. Such staff are called *ting xin liu zhi* (stop salary, reserve position). The term of leave was supposed to be one year, but could be extended to a maximum of three. See "Rencai exchange development service center," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 350.
  2. Data for the previous year, 1990, reported 280 temporary workers: 25 for landscaping, 22 for water/power, 23 for bus team, 26 for cleaning, 41 for security, and 143 in the canteen.
  3. The figure was still probably around 10%. In 1994, for example, the Chinese Department reported 36 fixed teaching staff and four non-quota teachers, *1994 Yearbook*, p. 96.
  4. Teacher Xing died in an automobile accident in March 1997.
  5. "Key points for president running school," Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 6.
  6. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
  7. This excludes adult education. Computation is based on *benke/zhuanke* enrollment from published sources and staff size data reported by SZU. Ratio for 1985 as reported by SZU is based on 628 staff, resulting in a student enrollment figure that exceeds reported enrollment by 11% (1,784 compared with 1,610).
  8. Huang Weiping, "The spirit of the Thirteenth Party Congress," 1986.
  9. Source: SZU yearbooks. Computed for regular staff and students.
  10. Source for China-wide data: Department of Planning, SEdC, 1995, as cited in Min, "Major strategic issues for Chinese higher education," 1997, p. 4. Other sources: University websites, November 1997. SZU data from *1995 Yearbook*, p. 48, 51-2. Data are provided only for universities with websites that disaggregated their student populations into full-time and part-time students (three of whom equal one FTE). Data for agricultural institutions are from Kulander, "Agricultural universities," 1998, p. 180.
  11. Data from *1995 Yearbook*, p. 48, 51-2. Student population based on actual

- 
- enrollment, not on figures prepared for the SEdC accreditation.
12. *China Education News*, 29 March 1995.
  13. Source: "Report to Shenzhen municipality on SZU efficiency, 7 Oct. 1986," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 169. The corresponding figure for 1991 was 25.8%. See Su Nugeng, "Financial Department Report," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 156.
  14. "Report to Shenzhen municipality on SZU efficiency, 7 Oct. 1986," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 169.
  15. Wang Pingshan, Guangdong Lieutenant Governor, "Remarks at 1987 school year opening ceremony," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 9.
  16. "Provisional regulations on personnel transfer, 18 May 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 194.
  17. The regulations call for new staff to be healthy and proper looking (*wuguan duanzheng*), meaning that the five parts of the face—mouth, nose, eyes, ears and eyebrows—should be well proportioned.
  18. Source: SZU yearbooks.
  19. Details on SZU's budgets and finances can be found in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, Chapter Five.
  20. "Notice regarding position qualification subsidy for professional and technical staff, 18 May 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 192. The policy was authorized in 1991 regulations, *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 223-6.
  21. "Work plan for employing professional technicians, 21 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 241. "Personnel Department report," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 205.
  22. "Employment certificate for Liang Xueming," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 78.
  23. Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 32. That year the average age of a professor was 55, associate professor 49. The national averages were 59 and 53, respectively.
  24. 0=illiterate; 1=primary; 2=junior middle; 3=senior middle; 4=university; 5=graduate study.
  25. Nationally, the average teacher's age in 1983 was 42, lowering to 39 in 1992 (Cao Xiaonan, "Strategic role," 1998, Table 3.1, p. 38). Data for 1992-1993 put the age at 40.6 (computed from Min, "China," 1997, p. 51). The comparable figure for 1994 was 40.2 (computed from SEdC, *1995 Educational Statistics Yearbook*, 1995, pp. 28-9).
  26. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 84.
  27. Source: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 48.
  28. *Ibid.*
  29. "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42.
  30. "Regulations on implementing the employment contract system, 11 August 1986," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 240.

- 
31. Sources: university homepages, November 1997.
  32. "Second proposals of SZU's reform and innovation, abstract, 10 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172.
  33. "Systematic efficiency responsibility system, 24 February 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 185.
  34. The most notorious non-renewal involved President Luo Zhengqi, who was fired as president and dismissed altogether after the events of June 1989.
  35. This vague language characterizes SZU regulations. Here, "upper level" could be interpreted as either university leaders (president or vice-president) or officials in the Shenzhen or provincial offices that oversaw SZU.
  36. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 105.
  37. "Notice on canceling XXX's teaching qualification, students' complaint letter 28 March 1988 and reply 5 April 1988," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 145.
  38. The other two were personnel review and department head's evaluation. See "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42. Teacher evaluation is discussed more fully in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, Chapter Eight.
  39. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 105.
  40. "Provisional measures for employment of SZU staff, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 337.
  41. The term used is *bu cheng zhi* which means unqualified, but indicates the lack of capability of doing job well as opposed to being untrainable.
  42. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 51.
  43. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
  44. Wu Shulian, "Suggestions on the categorized staffing system," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 105.
  45. The formula incorporates several pages of mathematical symbols, but boils down to: category #2 staffing = category #1 staffing x coefficient x (.7x + .3y), where: x is per capita amount the sub-work-unit remits to the presidential fund minus the average for all SZU departments divided by the SZU average; y is the annual increase rate paid to the presidential fund for the year minus the average for all SZU departments divided by the SZU average; the coefficient, constant for all departments, reflects SZU's ability to provide housing and varies by year. By this formula, the average department receives no category # 2 staff unless the rate of increase in presidential fund contributions is above average.
  46. Wu Shulian & Wang Yiping, "On developing SZU's teaching team," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 6 (1988), p. 3.

- 
47. Zhang Zhongchuan, "Contemplation of a SZU person," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 366.
  48. "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42.
  49. Li Yesheng, "Reforming the personnel system, Dec. 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 136.
  50. "Regulations on workers' participation in ability qualification promotion evaluation, 8 May 1986," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 243.
  51. "Teaching qualification point system, 18 June 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 180.
  52. "Notice on professional-technical qualification review, 24 January 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 223-6.
  53. "1993 professional qualification promotion quota work plan, 23 April 1993," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 349.
  54. "Ten measures to further deepen SZU reform," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 77; "General plan for SZU's comprehensive reform," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 66.
  55. Source: SZU yearbooks.
  56. These unit-wide political reappraisals occurred in 1985 and 1989-91 and are discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998, pp. 181-2, 197-8.
  57. Source: SZU Personnel Department.
  58. Tang Hong, "Suggestions for improving teachers team development," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 28 (1995), p. 30.
  59. *Ibid.*, p. 30; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 32.
  60. "Shenzhen municipality request to Guangdong, 22 January 1983" and "Guangdong request to the State Council, 25 March 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 153, 156.
  61. Huang Xinbai, "Introduction to Shenzhen educational work [abstract, 5-8 July, 1983]," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 163.
  62. *1987 Yearbook*, p. 75, *1994 Yearbook*, p. 277. 1987 data include all staff who have qualification ranking; 1994 data for teachers only. Right-most column is computed with the Personnel Office data that was used in Table 3.9. Proportionally, more higher ranked teachers are not actually teaching, compared with their lower ranked counterparts.
  63. On 4 November 1984, a group of professors from Qinghua, Beida, People's University—Wang Tan, Tong Shibai, Tang Tongyi, Li Funing, Wang Chuanlun, Gao Minxuan, Wang Yang—visited SZU and were scheduled to become department and institute heads.
  64. Cleverley, *Schooling of China, first ed.*, 1985, p. 275.
  65. "Regulations on fixed staffing, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 342.
  66. "Comprehensive Report to Shenzhen municipality, 5 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 164; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*,

- 
- no. 9 (1990), p. 32; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 277 (based on teacher name list). Other figures for 1994 place 43% with masters and 13% with Ph.D. degrees: Cai Delin, "Speech at SZU second party conference, 19 October 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 57. Ph.Ds in 1994 were reported as 10.4% in data included with those in Table 3.9. Information on the number of teachers in their teaching positions for 1994 that came from the Personnel Office (data that was used in Table 3.9) puts the 1994 figure at 53%. This suggests that the published figures carry "on the books" teachers who are studying abroad.
67. Including cadres and non-teaching professionals, but excluding workers, 56 of 157 professional staff (36%) held at least masters (two had Ph.D. degrees).
  68. Huang Xinbai, "Introduction to Shenzhen educational work, abstract, 5-8 July 1983," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 163.
  69. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
  70. This was lowered to five years. See "Academic vacation regulations, 4 May 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 239.
  71. Chen Baohua, "Professors assist school administration," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.
  72. Computed enrollment (non-FTE) from previous chapter. Full-time teachers data: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 17; *1987 Yearbook*, p. 75; Feng Junying, "On training SZU teachers," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 32; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 52; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 57; *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 48-9. National averages taken from Zhang, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35; and Liu Renjing, "College and university admissions," 1995, p. 8. The year 2000 estimate comes from Zhang Huaizhi, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35
  73. Wang Pingshan, "Remarks at 1987 school year opening ceremony," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 9. He reported a ratio of 1:16 for 1988, "Remarks to commemorate SZU's fifth anniversary," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 8. For 1987, the 1:14 ratio was reported in "Comprehensive report to Shenzhen Municipality, 5 May 1987," *1987 Yearbook*, p. 164.
  74. "New proposals on SZU's reform and innovation, 25 September 1984," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 168.
  75. "Regulations on fixed staffing, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 342.
  76. Zhang Huaizhi, "Establish a high-efficiency system of higher education investment," 1995, p. 35.
  77. "Second proposals of SZU's reform and innovation, abstract, 10 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 172.
  78. Chen Baohua, "Professors assist school administration," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.

- 
79. "Employment certificate for Professor Luo Yunzhu, 10 July 1987," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 75.
  80. Chen Xiaobo, "Create the three first rates," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 156.
  81. Chen Baohua, "Professors assist school administration," in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University's Reform Path*, 1988, p. 137.
  82. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 9.
  83. Non-abbreviated term is *jiaoshi zhigong daibiao dahui*.
  84. the list appeared in *Brief # 386* (26 December 1994).
  85. Zheng Tianlun, "Speech at the opening of the third staff conference and the fifth work union conference, 22-23 December 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 33.
  86. Cai Delin, "1995 work plan, 27 February 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 11.
  87. Luo Zhengqi, "First work report of first party committee of SZU, 5 April 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 176.
  88. Luo Zhengqi, "Look at the reform from the point of view of SZU's reform, 16 May 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 77.
  89. Yu Zhongwen, "Educational reform is a complex, systematic project," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 99.
  90. "Teachers responsibilities and evaluation method, 26 February 1985," *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 38-42.
  91. "Work load for teachers, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 345.
  92. Pan Yanming, "AAO report," *1988 Yearbook*, p. 58.
  93. Wu Zewei, "Strict requirements starting from every teacher himself; further correct teaching attitude, speech at teachers conference, 26 June 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 39.
  94. This amounts to about a 1½% teacher truancy rate, given 370 teachers, each teaching seven two-hour classes, for 18 weeks the semester.
  95. "Opinions on strengthening moral/political education, 27 November 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 225.
  96. Zhang Zhongchun, "Focus on teaching, seek a good administration away from disorder," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 9.
  97. Wei Youhai, "President's work report," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 22.
  98. The full idiom runs: The lack of instruction to a son is the father's fault; teaching not strict, teacher lazy.
  99. Wei Youhai, "President's work report," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 28.
  100. "1991 work summary, 14 January 1992," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 32.
  101. Liu Xizhen, "Report of Guangdong university work union committee Party construction inspection group, 18 December 1991," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 51.
  102. Chen Guanguang, "AAO report," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 137.
  103. When moving forward, people are sometimes preoccupied with other concerns, called "look-back worries" in Chinese.
  104. Cai Delin, "Report to staff conference," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 37.

- 
105. Zhang Bigong, "Do a good job to receive accreditation, guarantee passing, and strive for good performance," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 22.
  106. Wang Songrong, "Speech to mid-level cadres, September 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 25.
  107. "1994 work focus, 9 March 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 9.
  108. "Regulations providing funds for staff attending international academic conferences, 28 September 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 191.
  109. "Personnel Department report," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 172.
  110. Source: "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 52.
  111. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
  112. "SZU democratic centralism construction, 20 January 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 81.
  113. Wang Songrong, "Speech at propaganda work meeting," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 84.
  114. Regulations on pagers and leave appear in *1994 Teachers Handbook*, pp. 47-9.
  115. "Reaffirmation of teaching discipline, 20 April 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 212.
  116. "Decision on strengthening teachers' force construction, 18 May 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 237.
  117. *Guangming Ribao*, 22 and 24 February 1993.
  118. *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 215.
  119. The others are key subjects, key courses and key labs.
  120. Qiu, "A time when dragons can swim in the big lake," *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*, 1994.
  121. Xu, "Shenzhen University is trying to be a first class university," 1994, p. 5.
  122. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 52.
  123. "Implementation plan for selecting and training trans-century academic leaders, 1 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 226; "Implementation plan for selecting and training trans-century backbone teachers, 1 June 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 231.
  124. For a discussion of the incentives and subsidies that are available in the Chinese workplace, see Bian, *Work and Inequality in Urban China*, 1994.
  125. Su Nugen, "Financial department report, 20 December 1989," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 99; "Report to Shenzhen government on SZU efficiency," 7 October 1986, *1987 Yearbook*, p. 171. The latter reports the average salary in a Guangdong university as ¥141 (¥107 basic salary and ¥34 subsidy).
  126. Personal interview with staff member. Another figure, ¥1,764.76 is derived by dividing the total funds spend on salaries (¥19.97 million) by the number of fixed staff (943), both reported in the *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 220, 53. This

- 
- result excludes non-fixed staff who receive salaries from the Finance Office.
127. This figure is derived by dividing the reported non-salary income paid by SZU by the total number of fixed staff, *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 220, 53.
  128. "Provisional regulations on the salary system and on-campus subsidy, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 352-3.
  129. *Ibid.*
  130. Notes: amounts in ¥ (*renminbi*). Late marriage is a ¥50 lump-sum annual subsidy for men and women unmarried by age 25 or 23, respectively. Material subsidy is for household goods and furniture. The annual bonus, paid in a single lump-sum, is based on SZU's evaluation and represents performance.
  131. Source: "Provisional regulations on the salary system and on-campus subsidy, July 1992," *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 352-3. The cadre classifications for these ranks are: #1, *ting*; #2, *vice-ting*; #3 *chu*; #4 *vice-chu*; #5 *ke*; #6 *vice-ke*; #7 *ke yuan*.
  132. *1991 Yearbook*, p. 24, 156; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 176.
  133. The president's/school fund budget, however, does not include this 10% retained salary as an income line item, nor is the amount reflected as an expense.
  134. "Awards and punishments for SZU staff, 15 January 1988," *1988 Yearbook*, p.186.
  135. Zhang Zhongchun, "Focus on teaching, seek a good administration away from disorder," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 9 (1990), p. 9.
  136. *Collection of Excellent Teaching Results Prizes* (SZU: August 1993), pp. 7-11. Different figures are presented in *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 46, 336-7; *Brief # 235* (5 November 1992) omits the names of award winners.
  137. "1994-5 advanced work-units and individuals," *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 222-3.
  138. "Name list of the first SZU contribution award winners," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 31 (1995), p. 11; *1995 Yearbook*, p. 85. Deeds of first prize winners in "first contribution awards," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 33 (1996), p. 7.
  139. "Notice on 1995 staff evaluation, 12 December 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 245.
  140. "SZU self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, pp. 56-7.