

Story 3: The Bankers Deng

Deng: *My name is Deng Nan and my wife is Huang Jianguo, but you can call her Deng Tai [Tai means wife, thus Mrs. Deng]. We met at Shenda, but we were from different departments, and she is one year younger than me. We are both bankers in Shenzhen.*

Deng Tai: *When we were at Shenda, all the boys looked for girlfriends. For some of them it was a full-time job. Deng Nan started pursuing me right after I arrived on campus. We met at a dance that was held for Shenda people from our hometown, a city in Eastern Guangdong. There are only about a dozen Shenda undergraduates from our hometown, but there are several hundred auditors, part-time night school or self-study students. Deng Nan was so pleased to meet a benke student from his hometown.*

Deng: *Even though we hail from the same city, we had not met before Shenda. My wife went to the city's best high school. I went to the second best.*

Deng Tai: *My first choice of college was Beijing Foreign Trade and Economics College, but in my year only two students from Guangdong were selected for this university. International Trade at Shenda was my second choice.*

Deng: *Shenda was my first choice, although I did not get the major I wanted. I had studied hard in high school. I did not want to make the same mistake I had made in junior high, when I had not been a serious student and consequently did not get into the city's key high school. I had to study harder because I went to an inferior high school. Students who go to the best high schools get the best teachers and have the best facilities. I studied hard. I got a high enough score on the college entrance exam to get into a Shenda arts major like English, Chinese or Law, but I was not good enough for any of the business majors: management, international trade, international finance, economics. There was a rumor when I entered Shenda that students could change majors, but that policy had been abandoned after 1989. As soon as I arrived at SZU, I lost my interest in study.*

Deng Tai: *Deng Nan pursued me full-time. If he had put that much energy in study, he would have had the best grades in the school!*

Deng: *Studies never occupied much of my time. I liked to go around with my friends and meet new friends. Not much was demanded of us as students. As long as I went to class and studied a few weeks before the ex-*

ams, I could pass everything. In my four years, I only failed one course, although many teachers threatened to fail me. Sometimes, I had to give them gifts—a ¥50 boxed package of Nescafé and Nescafé creamer was a most reliable gift. Some students gave imported cognac, but I was not that rich. If you're stupid enough to spend that much money on a teacher, you deserve to fail.

Deng Tai: *Of course, I never bribed any of my teachers. I was one of the best students in my major, international trade. I did not have to study hard. Like Deng Nan says, just go to class and prepare well for the exams. I spent only a few hours on homework a night, preparing for the next day's classes. Teachers rarely asked us questions; but you understand more if you prepare in advance for the lecture. Usually, the teacher just explains what is in the textbook. So I went to the library and read what the teacher was going to read the next day. When Deng Nan and I started dating, I required him to go to the library with me if he wanted to see me at night. He just read novels, though.*

Deng: *I love to read. Why waste time doing homework, reading what the teacher is going to say in class the next day?*

Deng Tai: *Preparation put me at the top of the class, not the bottom! That's why you study. Good students should get better jobs.*

Deng: *Nah. Two things are important in getting jobs. Connections—guanxi—and luck. When I was hired by "China National Bank," a large state-owned bank, no one cared about my grades or even whether I got a bachelors degree (If you fail three courses, you can get only a certificate, not a degree). They cared that I had social skills and how I would get along with my office mates. They didn't care about my grades, and only asked about my major. It was my introduction that was important. I had a reference from someone they trusted—a friend of my manager.*

Deng Tai: *I got my job based on my academic performance, not connections. I work in the "Special Zone Bank" which is run almost like a private bank. It pays much higher wages than "China National Bank" or any of the state-run banks. I am not considered a state employee so I don't get welfare like housing or health. My salary averages about ¥5-6,000 per month, but the exact amount is hard to compute. The bank makes payments directly into my account, and sometimes I will get a bonus, or get double salary right before Spring Festival [Chinese new year]. Sometimes they give us money and we don't know what it is for. It is like they are trying to confuse us. My husband makes only ¥3,000, including bonuses.*

Deng: *I get housing, but my wife doesn't. I am allowed to purchase a house...*

Deng Tai: *We are allowed.*

Deng: *We are allowed to purchase an apartment. We need a down-payment of ¥50,000, mostly money we have saved out of my wife's salary. (She keeps the family accounts and gives me a small allowance for cigarettes). We will then have a 10-year mortgage, with monthly payments of ¥1,000. Housing for state employees is greatly subsidized. If I leave the bank, I must reimburse the subsidy, which will amount to ¥100,000 by the time the mortgage is paid off. After we are free of mortgage, I could sell the apartment to someone eligible for state-subsidized housing and keep any profit, after paying the government back for the subsidy, of course. When my manager told me that married China National employees of my rank could sign up for housing, we immediately got married. Among my friends, there are two reasons to get married: to get housing or because a baby is coming.*

Deng Tai: *I am not pregnant.*

Deng [privately, away from Deng Tai]: *My wife and I became intimate my senior year at Shenda. Most of the boys who had girlfriends convinced them to sleep with them. I used to take turns with my roommate so our girlfriends could visit overnight. One of us would bunk in a neighbor's room so the other could entertain his girlfriend. My girlfriend and I slept together for six months before we had real sex [intercourse]. Neither of us has been with anyone else. When my girl got a job in Shenzhen, she moved in with me directly, so we have been husband and wife, in fact, for several years. This is very common among Shenda graduates.*

Deng Tai: *Even though we both work for banks, we have very different jobs. Deng Nan works in trade and settlement, while I handle savings and deposits. I have so much work every day that I must often work overtime and through lunch hour. In our bank, we have the saying that each of us has to do the job of a person and a half. In my husband's bank, each employee does the job of a half a person.*

Deng: *It's true. My work does not keep me very busy. Usually, I can do what needs to be done (including meetings) in about four hours. The rest of the time I spend reading, chatting and drinking tea. Our bank subscribes to a lot of papers. Each day I usually read the Shenzhen Tequ Bao, Shenzhen Shangbao, Shenzhen Evening News, Shenzhen Legal Newspaper, the national sports paper, the Shenzhen stock and securities paper, the Da Gong Bao and Wen Hui Bao, both from Hong Kong. Also, I am pursuing a*

bachelors degree in business through the national self-study adult education program. Fortunately, I can study on the job and during our 2½ hour lunch break. I take three classes every term and attend tutorials given several nights a week, as well as on Saturday and Sunday. My wife also helps me. For each course I must pass a national exam. I feel I can use the knowledge from these courses in my banking career. I took the wrong courses at Shenda. Many of the business courses I wanted to take at Shenda were only open to students in business majors. In any case, I learn much more in self-study than I would have at Shenda sitting in boring lectures.

Deng Tai: Deng Nan is right. The classes were boring. Sometimes we were lucky to get a teacher who gave us illustrations from his own experiences and brought in information from outside the textbooks. This was rare. Most of the courses I could have taught myself. I know how to read aloud from the text.

Deng: So do I.

2. Students

SZU's full-time undergraduates, referred to as *benke*, came generally from urban, upper middle-class families. Data from the class of 1989, collected at the time they graduated in 1993, show that 61% of the students' families lived in Shenzhen. Slightly over 53% graduated from secondary schools in Shenzhen—suggesting that the families of 8% of the students moved to Shenzhen while their sons and daughters studied at SZU. The families held high socio-economic status as indicated by parents' employment and education level (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.3.) Two-thirds of the students were male. In terms of language groups, about one-third of the students spoke *putonghua* (Mandarin or common Chinese) at home with family members and a third spoke Cantonese (see Table 2.2). More than 75% of SZU's *benke* students came from key secondary schools—those which received extra local funding, had the best teachers and sent proportionally more of their students to university than non-key schools. For key schools, the Shenzhen municipality allocated about three times as much funding per student than it spent on pupils in ordinary school. Students in the former had higher aspirations than their counterparts in non-key schools, came from households of higher socio-economic status, and spent more time on homework.²

Table 2.1: Parents' occupation, percentage¹

occupation	father	mother
legislators & administrator	26.5	12.4
professionals & technical	39.2	38.1
clerk	6.4	10.6
commerce	5.8	2.9
service	4.7	6.2
farmer	1.5	2.9
worker	4.9	10.3
others	9.3	11.5
jobless	1.7	5.0
total	100.0	100.0

Table 2.2: Dialect spoken at home (percent)⁴

Putonghua	32.0
Guangdonghua (Cantonese)	33.0
Kejiahua (Hakka)	13.0
Chaozhouhua (Chiu Chao)	10.6
Shanghaihua	2.0
other	9.4
total	100.0

Table 2.3: Parents' education level (percent)³

education level	father	mother
primary school	4.1	10.4
junior school	8.0	12.4
high school	11.3	13.3
technical school	9.8	16.2
<i>dazhuan</i> certificate	15.0	16.9
<i>benke</i> or above	50.0	28.8
other	1.7	2.0
total	100.0	100.0


Will the real student please stand up?

The seemingly straight-forward question “how many students did SZU have?” is not easily answered, even after the researcher takes a trip through data hell. Accurate data are hard to pinpoint and often must be gleaned from narrative reports, which suffer from selective, *ad hoc* use of statistics, excessive rounding of figures and typographical errors. Furthermore, data in plans sometimes misrepresent themselves as actuality; unfortunately, plans often do not reflect reality.

In contemporary China, how exactly is university student (*daxue xuesheng*) defined? The term normally refers to the several thousand full-time undergraduates who live in campus dorms and receive bachelors degrees at the completion of their studies. Like their counterparts elsewhere in China and around the globe, these SZU students usually advanced to university directly from high school. The fact that they have met strict admissions requirements puts them in the élite of the population (2% in China's case).⁵ The enrollment of this type of student is represented in Figure 2.1.

This élite group, in fact, represented only about half of the SZU student population. In the evenings, while these “regular” young adults studied, worked or relaxed, their classrooms were filled with older students in adult education programs that provided degrees which were supposedly equivalent to the regular diploma. Most of these older students, usually in their mid- to upper-twenties, commuted to the main or branch campus several evenings a week. Some were in degree-granting programs; some are in arrangements that conferred junior college (*zhuanke*) certificates. Others attended short-

Figure 2.1: Student population, *benke* and *zhuanke*, 1983-1997⁶



term, intensive training programs designed to provide local personnel (*rencai*) with continuing education. The most prestigious of these were referred to as cadre training classes (*ganbu zhuanxiu*) designed to give advanced knowledge to managers and senior staff in state industry and businesses. Adult education at SZU took place during the daytime as well as at night and served both full- and part-time students, with most in the latter category.

In addition, a variety of correspondence programs added large numbers of “students.” For example, in 1985-86 5,000 people were enrolled in a finance and accounting correspondence course run by SZU’s Part-time *Zhuanke* College. The university also conducted distance learning for Yunnan and Sichuan factory managers. In 1987 10,000 students took correspondence classes in Industrial/commercial Enterprise Management and Civil Service Development, both operated by the Adult Education Department. Public Administration’s correspondence offering attracted 18,000 students.


These divisions—immediate high school leavers versus mature students; or full-time versus part-time—help categorize the student population, but their simplicity obscures the complexity of China’s admissions process. The policy is commonly referred to as the recruitment plan (*zhaosheng jihua*). The translated term *recruitment* is somewhat a misnomer; for the most part students were not sought after or actively recruited. When taking the college entrance examination (CEE), they make university choices; then in a unified province-wide process, they are assigned by specialization to university departments according to test score.

Determining the actual size of any university’s student body is complicated by a host of factors, especially the existence of part-time and adult

education students. The preferred western term “full-time equivalent” (FTE) is not generally used in China. From the early years of the People’s Republic, under centralized planning most university students have been full-time undergraduates. Postgraduate programs were initiated only in the 1970s; even then much advanced training remained the preserve of Soviet-styled research institutes that were unaffiliated with universities. Continuing education for adults was the domain of work-units; political and ideological education was handled at Party schools. Thus, most discussions of student population have focused on those who gained admittance through the CEE, taken at the end of senior year in high school. In this regard, Figure 2.2 shows the student population for these regular undergraduates. Data come from the SZU yearbooks and exclude adult education students and those in the part-time *zhuanke* program. The computations take into account that *zhuanke* programs ran for two or three years and that Architecture took five. Enrollment figures are based on actual enrollment, not that stated in the plan, and they are not adjusted to reflect late matriculations as suggested by graduation statistics that are sometimes larger than recruitment figures (This phenomenon is discussed later in the chapter).

For only one year did SZU publish a figure for total enrollment (as opposed to the year’s recruitment of new students). In its self-evaluation report prepared for the 1995 accreditation, SZU put its regular (full-time *benke* and *zhuanke*) student population at 3,583 students. Based on published recruitment figures, however, the student body should have consisted of 2,596 individuals. The 3,583 figure is thus highly suspect and may have been fabricated in order to conform with SEdC policy. For the sake of internal efficiency in higher education, the SEdC had recommended that Chinese institutions of higher education enroll at least 3,500 full-time undergraduates.⁷ SZU’s actual 1995 enrollment around 3,000 fell below the average for Chinese higher education institutions (3,622), excluding arts and sports institutes. But in terms of FTE, SZU was above average in size. Overall, China’s colleges and universities in 1994 had an enrollment of 3,270 FTE. SZU’s FTE for 1995 was 4,085.⁸ Equivalent figures, as reported by Chinese authorities, were 3,852 for the U.S. and 4,528 for Taiwan.⁹ All this suggests a small-in-the-day, big-at-night phenomenon at SZU. During daylight hours, SZU was smaller than the average Chinese higher education institution (excluding those specializing in arts and sports), but at night when adult education was underway, SZU became larger than average.

Figure 2.2: SZU state plan undergraduate enrollment, 1983-1997



Enrollment categories, until the Chinese enrollment system was reformed in the mid-1990s, included four major groupings. The prime classifications were *benke* (undergraduates in a bachelors degree program) and *zhuanke* (a short-cycle non-degree, usually specialized, certificate-awarding program that is sometimes referred to as junior college). These “regular” students received a state subsidy. Their attending university was treated very much like a job; in a sense they worked for the state, receiving advanced education as an in-kind payment. A minority of students belonged to the *zifei*, or self-paying, group. These fee-payers scored somewhat below the cut-off line for *benke* admission, a figure that varied from major to major, year to year. Another category, *daipei*, also referred to entrance exam takers who scored below the qualifying line. In contrast with self-paying *zifei*, the tuition and fees of *daipei* students were paid by work-units (*danwei*) with whom the students were contracted. After graduation, a *daipei* student was expected to work for this *danwei*. Reforms that began with a 1993 policy document put an end to these categories. The new policy became effective at SZU in 1994, and the *daipei* and *zifei* categories were abandoned; from September 1994 all SZU undergraduates were charged tuition, which included fees for housing and utilities. Figure 2.2 shows the relative enrollment in these categories for the years 1983-1997.

Adult and continuing education

The preparatory document issued by the provincial Higher Education Bureau before SZU’s founding stated: “Adult education is an outstanding task for

Table 2.4: Adult education enrolled students and graduates¹¹

	newly enrolled	graduates		newly enrolled	graduates
1984	385	na	1991	1,042	na
1985	569	na	1992	1,125	na
1986	696	282	1993	1,200	na
1987	1,249	394	1994	na	na
1988	1,100	306	1995	958	na
1989	na	500	1996	na	na
1990	na	613	1997	1,887	na

special zone education because many cadres and workers badly need further training. It is not practical to send them outside the zone for training since most will study on a part-time basis.”¹⁰ As a consequence, about half of SZU students have been enrolled in part-time adult and continuing education courses and as such are not included in Figures 2.1 or 2.2.

Over time several different administrative units have managed these students, who are outside the regular *benke* and *zhuanke* tracks—students who are usually referred to as adult or mature students. SZU’s Adult Education Department (later known as the Open College) was founded on 3 November 1983 at the university’s start-up to manage night and correspondence courses. About one-third of its students were cadres or staff from outside Shenzhen. In 1984, when the university moved to the new campus, Adult Education stayed behind in the downtown location. That same year, the Night College, later called the Part-time *Zhuanke* College, was established. Its students included workers and cadres from Shenzhen whose employers often reimbursed the costs of continuing education. Others were unemployed, self-paying students who lived off-campus.

A third grouping of adult students populated the part-time *zhuanke* program. This group consisted of campus residents, each of whom worked for the university during the day and attended night classes. Their wages were low; they were required to work at office jobs that paid ¥1.50 (US 40¢) per hour, as a condition of maintaining their Shenzhen *hukou* (residency permit) and their enrollment. Most of these students were under age 25 and had not scored high enough on the college entrance exam to enroll in the university program of their choice. Some, however, may have chosen SZU’s part-time program as a way of emigrating to the SEZ.

Table 2.5: Adult education targets set in 1991¹²

target year	4-year program	2-year program	total
1995	400	3,600	4,000
2000	600	4,400	5,000


In October 1986 the Off-campus Courses Department was set up. It handled training and correspondence courses (but in 1988 was also in charge of regular *benke* students' social investigation, a graduation requirement to ensure that students had experienced society before they left SZU). With some 30,000 students, it had a non-completion/non-certification rate over 30%, and as high as 50% for some courses. The Open College was established in July 1988, a merger of Adult Education and the Open Foreign Language College, and enrolled 4,000 students the first year. A reorganization in 1991 merged the Part-time *Zhuanke* College, Open College and Off-campus Courses Department into a single Adult Education Department, with an intention to focus more on *benke* and graduate programs.

Adult education grew steadily from the start. At first most students participated in correspondence courses and short-term training classes, with only about 10% of the students enrolled in the certificate track part-time *zhuanke* program. Over the first three years, 1984-1986, almost 2,000 students enrolled in adult education programs, including 1,838 in the *zhuanke* track. By the early nineties, about 3,000 students were enrolled at any one time just in the part-time *zhuanke* program (see Table 2.4). Over the Night School's first dozen years, 8,421 students were awarded graduation certificates. In 1996, 2,677 students were enrolled, which included 2,438 in the *zhuanke* program and 239 second major students. It operated 25 majors and had 35 administrative staff.

Given that these students proceeded at their own pace, it is difficult to ascertain when the enrolled students actually graduated, if they did indeed finish the program. Completion rate was reported as slightly above 70%. The university's long-term development plan of 1991 set a goal of training 1,000 students in the 4-year program and 10,000 in the 2-year program for the 1990s decade (see Table 2.5). Estimates provided five years later during the SEdC accreditation decreased by 1,000 the 5,000 enrollment target that was set in 1991 for the year 2000. Major changes in adult education that year were intended to provide it with more rigor and structure. Not only were the three units responsible for adults consolidated into one, but they were directed to take care of problems that had resulted from "randomly of-

Table 2.6: 1990 student population (September 1990)¹⁵

program	students	full-time equivalent	%
<i>benke</i>	2,988	2,988	46
<i>zhuanke</i>	519	519	8
Part-time <i>Zhuanke</i> College	3,200	1,280	20
Open College	2,871	1,148	18
short-term training programs and correspondence	10,000	500	8
Total		6,435	100

Figure 2.3: *Benke* and *zhuanke* enrollment

fering courses without careful consideration.”¹³ In 1996 Adult Education underwent an evaluation by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau. It passed with an “excellent” rating.¹⁴

SZU enrollment planning history

The university’s creators in 1983 envisioned the scale of SZU by 1986 to be 2,000 undergraduate (*benke*) students and 4,000 undergraduate and junior college (*zhuanke*) students by 1990.¹⁶ An unspecified number of students were to be in adult education and short-term training programs. What really happened?

At the end of 1986, SZU had 2,352 *benke* students, about 15% over expectation. By the fall of 1990, there were 3,507 *benke* and *zhuanke* students, about 12% short of the initial target.¹⁷ At that time, however, over 6,000 students were enrolled in adult education: 3,200 in the Part-time *Zhuanke* College and 2,871 in SZU’s Open College (see Table 2.6). An estimated

Table 2.7: 1991 projected enrollment for 1995 and 2000¹⁹

Target year	1995	% annual increase	2000	% annual increase	(1990-2000)
<i>benke</i>	3,320	5.2	4,550	6.3	8,000
<i>zhuanke</i>	680	8.1	1,250	10.5	3,500
adult education <i>benke</i>	400		600		1,000
adult education <i>zhuanke</i>	3,600		4,400		10,000
graduate	60		120		260
total					22,760

10,000 people were participating in short-term training and correspondence classes.¹⁸ In all, full-time and part-time students combined to equal about 6,500 full-time students, slightly over half of whom were state-plan undergraduate and college students.

Still, *benke* has remained the major student category, both in terms of size and prestige. Higher entrance exam scores were demanded of *benke* students; the students were more demanding and challenging to teach. *Zhuanke* enrollment began in 1987 and rose over the next seven years. During the same period *benke* experienced a downward trend (see Figure 2.3).

Revisions of projections

In 1991 enrollment figures were revised in the university's Ten-year Development Plan. Despite its flawed arithmetic, the plan called for increasing *benke* and *zhuanke*, 5.5% and 9% respectively. The adult education population was projected to rise 10% and 5% for *benke* and *zhuanke*, respectively (see Table 2.7). These projections came after a failed attempt by municipal educators to substantially downsize the university. The city government's 1991 *Strategic Report on Shenzhen's Educational Development* forecast the economic zone's needing 90,000 *rencai* with university degrees over the decade.²⁰ Only 6,200 of these were expected to come from SZU, the rest being trained at inland universities. This report drew intense criticism from a SZU official, who wrote his objections in a letter to the editor of the *Shenzhen Tequ Bao*. The report's policy recommendations concerning SZU were never effected.²¹

A second revision of the enrollment plan appeared at the time of the 1995 accreditation.²² Going into the evaluation, the following targets were set: 5,000 *benke*, 3,000 *zhuanke*, 4,000 adult education, 200 graduate stu-

dents, and 200 foreign students. Based on a criticism from the SEdC accreditation team that too many resources were being given over to junior college, *zhuanke* enrollment was revised and cut to half of *benke*, making it in other words one-third of the total.²³ The university appears to have accepted this new policy. For example, the newly created Economics College (an umbrella over the Economics Department and the International Finance and Trade Department) in its 1997-2000 budget estimated that *zhuanke* enrollment would decrease over a four-year period, from 39% in 1997 to 26% in the year 2000.²⁴

Recruitment plan

The recruitment plan is a hold-over from the days when central planning dictated university admissions. For most universities in China, those days ended in the early 1990s. For SZU the plan controlled actual admissions only during the school's first several years, since the official plan addresses only *benke* and full-time *zhuanke* student intake. By the mid-1980s, actual enrollment comprised adult education, training classes and fee-paying "out-of-plan" students, categories that accounted for about half of the students. Still, the plan has continued to dominate discussions of admissions, although it provided the framework for letting in only a part of the student population. Enrollment data according to state plan are presented in Table 2.8, which shows that over SZU's history about 18% of the students have been either *daipei* (9.3%) or *zifei* (8.6%). In this regard SZU exceeded the national average. In 1993, for example, fee-paying students in China accounted for 14% of admissions,²⁵ but they represented 27% of SZU students.

From the 1950s to the late 1980s enrollment policy in China was closely connected to job allocation (*fenpei*); educational authorities admitted students in anticipation of labor needs four years later at time of graduation. The traditional plan refers to full-time "in plan" (*jihua nei*) undergraduates for both degree (*benke*) and certificate (*zhuanke*) programs of shorter duration—two or three years. A few self-paying (*zifei*) students were included as well as *daipei* students whose future employers were paying for their education. Nationally the *zifei* category permitted enrolling students whose examination scores were no more than 20 points below the *benke* cutoff.²⁶ A separate SZU plan dealt with students in the formal adult education programs.

None of the enrollment plans, however, covered the various fee-paying programs, which were referred to as outside-plan (*jihua wai*) or side-businesses (*banban banxue*). In addition, departments allowed non-registered

Table 2.8: Entering class enrollment in state plan, 1983-1997, by student type²⁷

year	regular		<i>daipei</i>		<i>zifei</i>		total	% change
	<i>benke</i>	<i>zhuanke</i>	<i>benke</i>	<i>zhuanke</i>	<i>benke</i>	<i>zhuanke</i>		
1983 ^a	212						212	
1984 ^b	488						488	130.2
1985 ^c	609		301				910	86.5
1986 ^d	589		132		21		742	-18.5
1987 ^e	557	202	202	54	38	96	1,149	54.9
1988 ^f	554	205	123	6	56	98	1,042	-9.3
1989 ^g	499	203	55	5	33	51	846	-18.8
1990 ^h	459	236	40	1	18	23	777	-8.2
1991 ⁱ	501	225	29	2	24	82	863	11.1
1992 ^j	495	297	16	18	17	122	965	11.8
1993 ^k	465	245	14	34	102	179	1,039	7.7
1994 ^l	653	580					1,233	18.7
1995 ^m	570	329					899	-27.1
1996 ⁿ	784	556					1,340	49.1
1997 ^o	804	441					1,245	-7.1
total	8,239	3,519	912	120	309	651	13,750	20.1 ave

Notations ^a through ^o are in Endnote 27.

students to audit courses. They were referred to with terms like *sui du* (accompanying study) or *pang ting* (side-listening) and were not officially recognized by the university. Such students in the Foreign Language Department, for example, were charged ¥1,050 (US \$182) for tuition per term in 1993—five times what in-plan students paid; they were also made to pay market rent for on-campus accommodation, and they had to negotiate with various offices for such items as meal tickets and library cards. One auditor reported paying the SZU Housing Office ¥500 per month for a single dorm room, which was about double what the same-sized room would have cost one kilometer from campus.

The annual state plan, at SZU as well as at other Chinese universities, covered only the four formal categories *benke*, *zhuanke*, *daipei* and *zifei*. It was submitted to the upper level (in SZU's case, formally to the Provincial Higher Education Bureau and also to the municipality) and implemented, unless specifically disapproved. Some negotiation occurred, but provincial

Table 2.9: Data inconsistencies, 1987 state plan entrants²⁸

Source	State Plan		<i>Daipei</i>		<i>Zifei</i>		sub-total		grand total
	<i>bk</i>	<i>zk</i>	<i>bk</i>	<i>zk</i>	<i>bk</i>	<i>zk</i>	<i>bk</i>	<i>zk</i>	
State Plan ^a	544	160	204	60	30		778	220	998
Source 1 ^b	557	202	202	54	38	96	797	352	1,149
Source 2 ^c	563	202	203	53	37	97	803	352	1,155
Source 3 ^d	563	204	203	59	37	1	803	264	1,067
Source 4 ^e	558	220	202	54	33	85	793	359	1,152
Graduates ^f							761 ^g	247	1,008

bk = *benke*; *zk* = *zhuanke*; notations ^a through ^g are in Endnote 28.

authorities oversaw too many institutions to micro-manage the admissions of any individual school. Although the plan has continued to be called the “state” plan, during the post-Mao era most authority has devolved to individual schools, which have been given freedom to determine departments and specializations, as well as to decide which types of students are to be chosen.

Data inconsistencies

Even for the categories to which they were limited, the recruitment plans, as published in the SZU annuals and internal journal, are confusing.²⁹ A standard chart was not used, and many of the data were presented in prose, embedded in reports and speeches by leaders. Terms often lacked precision. *Graduates* usually referred to those who received degrees, but on occasion the term included those who did not actually meet the qualifications for graduation and were awarded only diplomas, not bachelors degrees. The year 1987, as Table 2.9 indicates, proves a particular troubling year for the data collector. Students from Hong Kong and Macau, who were admitted by different criteria from Mainland students, were exempt from the college entrance exam. In some data, they were placed within the state plan as either regular students or fee-paying (whether they had to pay fees depended on a quality assessment by admissions officers). Since these compatriot students did not take the entrance exam, however, they should not have been included in data that pertained to college entrance scores; nevertheless, they were sometimes included. Furthermore, data are not internally consistent. The published chart of the recruitment plan in the *1987 Yearbook* listed no students in the junior college, fee-paying (*zhuanke zifei*) category, but 96 students belonged to this group according to actual enrollment figures presented

on another page in the same yearbook. Another table in that yearbook listed only one student in this category. The Academic Affairs Office's published report in the university's internal magazine placed the number at 85. All these figures conflicted with data provided to the author by AAO which reported 97 students enrolled as *zhuanke zifei*.

Output figures on graduates do not clarify the confusion for 1987. Each year the SZU yearbook included name lists of graduates for the *benke* and *zhuanke* programs. Data in Table 2.9 reflect an attrition rate, as would be expected. The 761 names on the list of *benke* 1987 graduates are fewer than the enrollment figures according to any of the sources. The *zhuanke* total is less than any actual enrollment (but more than the plan). SZU students failed to complete their studies on time (or at all) for various reasons. Some dropped out; others went abroad after only a year or two at SZU. The '87 entrants who graduated early would have had their names for the purpose of graduation lists included with the '86 entrants. In contrast, those who delayed graduation would have been listed with '88 entrants, or with later classes. A few graduates received double degrees (on average less than a dozen per year until this flexibility was suspended altogether in 1991); these students would be listed twice as graduates, but only once as enrollees. Some students transferred from *zhuanke* to *benke*; others were demoted from *benke* to *zhuanke*. A few students transferred in from other schools. (There were no reported cases of SZU enrollees leaving for other universities in China).

Each year, many graduates did not receive degrees (column 4, Table 2.10, next page). About 23% of the students who entered SZU from 1987-1992 left with a certificate but not a bachelors diploma. These included students who failed to meet graduation requirements—those who acquired insufficient credits, failed compulsory courses, exceeded the number of permitted failures, or failed the graduation thesis/design. The group also included students who were not formally enrolled according to state plans, e.g., transfers. Auditors and other “irregular students” may also have been included. These inconsistencies indicate a looseness associated with the keeping of data. They also suggest a policy of augmenting enrollment in excess of quotas set by the state plan.


Table 2.10: Statistics on graduates, by year enrolled³⁰

	<i>benke</i>					<i>zhuanke</i>		
	enroll	grads with degree	%	grads w/o degree	total	%	enroll	grads
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1983	212							
1984	488	486 ^a	99		486	99		
1985	910	651 ^b	72		651	72		426 ^j
1986	742	684 ^c	92		684	92		
1987	797	486 ^d	61	275 ^e	761	95	352	247 ^k
1988	733	561 ^f	77	152	713	97	309	166 ^l
1989	587	477 ^g	81	104	581	99	259	152 ^m
1990	517	421 ^h	81	82	503	97	260	252 ⁿ
1991	554	402 ⁱ	73	121	523	94	309	290 ^o
1992	528	453 ^r	86	121 ^s	574	1.09	437	421 ^p
1993	581	481 ^t	83	152	633	1.09	458	446 ^q
1994	653						580	523 ^u
1995	570						329	315
average %			80					

Notations ^a through ^u in Endnote 30.

Many of the extra graduates—those who do not show up in enrollment data—were in the Economics Department and International Finance and Trade Department. The former enrolled *daipei zhuanke* students who transferred into the *benke* program; the latter was a “hot” major with students knocking at the front and back doors (*hou men*, a colloquialism suggesting corrupt practices) to get into it. Other departments saw attrition in their *benke* classes entering between 1988 and 1991. This leads to the conclusion that most of the hidden enrollment occurred in the *zhuanke* program, at least for those four years. In a few reported cases, some students simply materialized, ready to graduate. One departmental staff member observed that a student who had enrolled as *zhuanke* had actually taken all the courses needed for a *benke* degree. The department was not concerned with this until it had to decide how to give a degree to a student who had never formally entered the program but had completed the requirements. Intense negotiations occurred with AAO; the student was finally awarded a degree.

Figure 2.4: Percentage change in recruitment, 1984-1997



Another source of these mysterious extra students is explained by a set of 1992 regulations.³¹ These rules permitted the enrolling of training students (*jin xiu*), but the same rules were moot on whether such students could ever graduate. The regulations allowed cadres or workers with Shenzhen *hukou* or temporary residence and with the “necessary education foundation” to take at least 20 credits per semester (below the regular student’s requirement of 25-30). They were charged fees according to the number of credits taken, with a minimum charge for 20 credits. The *jin xiu* student was required to have clear intentions for study, a reference letter from a work-unit, and a guarantor who was a SZU teacher. Conditions like these would require the student to employ *guanxi* (social relations), a factor that at SZU contributed to corrupt practices.³²

Enrollment trends

Figure 2.2 shows the state plan enrollment for *benke* and *zhuanke* by the categories of regular, *zifei*, and *daipei*. Another way of looking at these numbers is to examine the percent change in recruitment, which appears in Figure 2.4. There were three periods of negative growth: 1986, the 1988-1990 years, and 1995. Student population expanded rapidly in the early years; the years 1991-1994 saw slow, steady growth.

Table 2.11: Plan versus actual enrollment³³

year	regular		daipei				zifei		total					
	benke	zhuanke	benke	zhuanke	benke	zhuanke	benke	zhuanke						
1983	(212)	212								(212)	212			
1984	(488)	488								(488)	488			
1985	(609)	609			301					(609)	910			
1986	560	589			129	132		21		689	742			
1987	544	557	160	202	204	202	60	54	30	38	96	998	1,149	
1988	510	554	200	205		123		6	52	56	80	98	842	1,042
1989	500	499	180	203	80	55	25	5	20	33	30	51	835	846
1990	500	459	200	236	60	40	20	1	25	18	45	23	850	777
1991	500	501	245	225	60	29	30	2	25	24	20	82	880	863
1992	(495)	495	(297)	297		16		18		17		122	(792)	965
1993	(465)	465	(245)	245		14		34		102		179	(710)	1,039
1994	700	653	560	580									1,260	1,233
1995	620	570	340	329									960	899
1996	800	784	580	556									1,380	1,340
1997	880	804	400	441									1,280	1,245
total	8,383	8,239	3,407	3,519	533	912	135	120	152	309	175	651	12,785	13,750

Plan data in **bold**. Actual data, in parentheses, substitute for plan when latter are unknown.

How did actual enrollment compare with the plan approved by provincial and municipal authorities? This information, provided in Table 2.11, indicates that for almost every category in every year actual enrollment exceeded the plan. Over 14 years, SZU took in 7.5% more students than permitted by the state approved plan. Overall, Chinese universities admit 17% more students than the approved plans call for.³⁴ Generally, the SZU plan overestimated *benke* recruitment. Although *daipei* data for only a few years are available, the number of contracted students also appears to have fallen short of the recruitment target. In contrast, *zhuanke* and *zifei* exceeded expectations.

Tuition

Table 2.12 shows tuition and accommodation charges for SZU students in the degree tracks. To conform to nationwide policy,³⁵ the university in 1994 abandoned the categories of *zifei* and *daipei*, and all students were charged

Table 2.12: Tuition and accommodation charges³⁶

	<i>tuition (¥) per semester by student type:</i>						
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1991	1994	1996
regular	20	30	100	300	200	3,500- 4,000	4,000- 5,000
<i>zifei</i>		600		1,050	1,050		
<i>zifei</i> transfer to <i>benke</i> (total)		2,400					
<i>daipei</i> transfer to <i>benke</i> (total)		4,700					
on campus adult		40					
	<i>accommodation (¥) per semester by student type:</i>						
regular:	5	7.5	10	50	50		
<i>zifei</i>		150		200	200		
<i>zifei</i> transfer to <i>benke</i>		600					
on campus adult		10					

tuition. SZU's tuition structure was the highest of any university in China (see Table 2.13).

Student quality

Universities in China are categorized by the administrative level to which they report. Many schools directly under the control of the SEdC and state ministries are referred to as state-run institutions and are generally the most prestigious educational units in the country. They are followed by the lower status *gao xiao* (tertiary institution) which are overseen by provinces or provincial level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin).³⁷ Finally, units run by local officials generally rest at the bottom of the prestige pyramid. Institutions near the top usually receive the most funding and attract the best teachers and researchers. Even more important, they receive the best students.

Table 2.13: Tuition at selected Chinese universities, 1996 (in ¥)³⁸

Beijing University	1,500
Qinghua University	1,200
Chinese People's University	1,200
Fudan University	900-2,300
Shanghai Jiaotong University	2,000-2,500
Tongji University	2,400-3,400
Chongqing University	1,400-2,100
Southwest University of Politics and Law	1,700-2,000
Southwest Jiatong University	1,400-1,600
Xi'an Jiaotong University	1,100-1,400
Lanzhou University	1,400-2,100
Central China Normal University	400-1,900
Wuhan University	2,000-3,000
Nanjing University	1,300-2,100
Zhejiang University	1,600-2,400
Xiamen University	1,500-2,000
Nankai University	1,900-2,300
Zhongshan University	1,500-3,500
South China Polytechnic University	2,500-3,500
Guangdong Foreign Language and Foreign Trade University	3,500-4,000
Zhongshan Medical University	3,000-3,500
Shenzhen University	4,000-4,500

Before taking the college entrance exam, high school seniors completed a form, under close supervision of their tutors and parents, on which they indicated their preferences for tertiary education. The form consisted of three boxes into which institutional preferences were written. The upper box was for key schools, such as Beijing and Zhongshan University; the middle, for average institutions, including SZU; and the lower, for *zhuanke* and other lower status programs. Each grouping was associated with a “score line” which represented the lowest score for which a candidate would be accepted for admission. High school seniors who expected to do well on the college entrance test would likely put their preference in the top box. Tutors discouraged seniors of lesser ability from attempting to enter this level. In contrast, some seniors of high ability preferred to go to a specific institution in the middle category; they would leave the top box empty. Yet the ultimate decision of school choice rested not with the student, who was able to give

Table 2.14: Benke entrance examination scores³⁹

year	arts average			science average			Guangdong key score line		
	high	low	ave.	high	low	ave.	arts	science	% SZU students above
1986	530			581			455	510	53
1987	552		515	643		543	513	535	62
1988	823		705	853		682	691	656	63
1989	892		707			677	698	649	69.3
1990	867		700	811		670			64.5
1991	757	675	702	736	642	678			55.8
1992			703			667	698	649	56.2
1993			703			658	699	648	48.6
1994	801		681	761		637	666	630	44.6
1995	831		670	790		638	668	628	50.8
1996	766	592	652	785	443	615			33
1997	725		645	734		612			

only a preference. He or she was assigned an institution during the uniform recruitment process, which lasted several weeks in a Guangzhou hotel.


Each year in the first half of August, SZU transported department leaders and admissions staff by school bus to Guangzhou for recruitment. In 1986 a 35-person contingent spent one week at the Zhujiang Hotel. As SZU expanded departments and majors, the process lengthened, to 11 days in 1992 and then to 15 days in 1993. The procedure was overseen by the vice-president in charge of academics. In 1992 President Wei and his designated successor Cai Delin took time to visit the recruitment and lend their moral support. In 1989 Wu Zewei, then the new Party secretary, visited to lend political support. Except for the advent of computers, unified recruitment has not changed much for several decades. It was a tedious process with each department head reviewing hundreds of applicants. The AAO reported that recruiters worked overtime, during meals and in the evenings. The computer staff, which included several students, slept on couches, not in their hotel rooms, and each worked past 2 a.m. inputting data.

In general, recruited students were sometimes taken on the basis of the college entrance exam scores, although other factors such as gender and geographic distribution were taken into account. Key schools were given the

first pick of students, those who scored above the score-line for key schools. Many of the files SZU recruiters examined were for students who were not accepted into the top category. These hand-me-downs came from key schools which would have examined the files before SZU got them. In turn, folders rejected by SZU for *benke* programs were later culled through by recruiters from schools in the bottom classification, which included *zhuanke* and teacher education programs. Students put their preferences by major for a specific department and university, but the admissions process was done by department so some flexibility was possible in large departments that offered multiple majors. At the advent of the recruitment process, score-lines were set: the key school score-line, a threshold for middle category schools such as SZU, and a bottom line for third category schools. Universities tried not to take students below the score-line in their category, except when permitted in the case of *daipei* and *zifei* students. The quality of an entering class, thus, was measured by their scores relative to other's institutions during the same year; this percentage can be compared annually.

Some of the details of the exam procedures varied by year, but in general the picture looked as follows: From 1988, exams have been scored on the basis of 900 points. Students in Shenzhen high schools studied in several groupings: arts, sciences, foreign language, and most recently design arts. Altogether, students took exams in politics, geography, history, Chinese, English, math and sciences, but the arts and sciences majors took a different collection of tests over the two-day examination period which occurred in July. Also, the English exam for foreign language majors included an oral component. Each individual test was scored on a 900 point basis; the test scores were then averaged together. Since their components differed, arts and sciences test scores are not comparable. The tests varied a bit in difficulty from year to year so the averages were not strictly comparable over time either, as are the SATs⁴⁰ in the U.S. Consequently, the most accurate comparison is restricted to any particular year, comparing a school's average score with the score-line for key schools that year (see Table 2.14 and Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5: SZU entrants scoring above provincial score-line (percentage)



As noted, for the purposes of recruitment, SZU was placed in the middle category. Many students, especially those from Shenzhen who wished to remain in the SEZ close to their family, had sufficiently high test scores to gain admission to key schools. Instead, they chose SZU.

The dramatic decline in scores in 1996 indicates SZU's inability to attract high scoring high school seniors. This is attributed, in part, to the fact that students went to other universities where tuition was lower. SZU's Teachers College, however, was able to attract higher quality students than those admitted to many of SZU's *benke* programs. In fact, entrance test scores for almost all Teachers College majors in 1996 and 1997 were higher than the average scores for freshmen in corresponding majors in the regular *benke* degree program.⁴¹ The students at Teachers College came from outside the SEZ; and most of these students, because they were studying to become teachers, were not charged tuition. (A small number of students, all design majors, paid tuition because their study did not involve teacher training). Teachers College students were part of a sandwich class. Those from low-income families could not afford SZU's *benke* tuition; at the same time they did not score high enough on the entrance exam to get scholarships to key universities. Even though they might not want to become teachers, they were sandwiched in by income and test score, and Teachers College offered them an alternative. It allowed them to live in the SEZ and go to college tuition-free.

Local versus non-local students

When SZU was created it was permitted to recruit province-wide and even nationwide in order to accomplish its prime directive: generate *rencai* [human talent] for the SEZ. During its early years recruitment outside Shenzhen was necessary because the zone's population was small and its middle schools undeveloped. The SEZ catchment area was unable to provide enough high quality students for the university. The latter years saw increasing numbers of better qualified students applying from outside the economic zone. The ratio of local to non-local students fluctuated over the years, as indicated in Table 2.15, next page. From the late 1980s, the municipality required that at least 70% of SZU students be Shenzhen residents. Given this quota, qualified non-locals were denied admission in favor of Shenzhen residents who had lower scores on the entrance exam.

From the start, SZU was keen to get non-local students, those from outside Shenzhen as well as from outside Guangdong. The presence of non-locals enhanced the school's reputation, for generally only key universities undertook nationwide recruitment. At the very least, province-wide recruitment could reinforce the perception that the school was a provincial-level university, although actually it was under municipal leadership. Authorized by the SEdC to recruit across China, SZU took in non-Guangdong students from 1983-86. After an eight-year hiatus the policy resumed in 1994 when the municipal government approved the school's request to recruit outside Guangdong.

In 1986 all regular *benke* students hailed from Guangdong, but about two-thirds of the *daipei* (employer-contracted) students came from the North. These students did not take the regular Guangdong entrance exam; rather, they took the appropriate local provincial exam, which was scored somewhat differently from the Guangdong exam. In planning for 1987 recruitment, the admissions group vowed to undertake better nationwide promotion; as a result *daipei* students for that year came from 23 provinces or province-level cities. But, by 1988, active recruitment of non-Guangdong residents stopped, apparently in response to the city's desire that SZU spend its resources to recruit and educate graduates of local high schools. When extra-Guangdong recruitment resumed in 1994, 44 students (80% in science) were taken from Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. In 1995, 95 students were taken from Beijing, Shandong, Liaoning, Hebei, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui. Most of these were to enroll in the newly established SZU Teachers College. The 1996 plan also included 60 regular *benke* students from Bei-

Table 2.15: Benke local recruitment and scores⁴²

year	%	% above Guangdong	
		score-line	
	from SEZ	SEZ	non-SEZ
1988	50	na	na
1989	67	na	na
1990	71	na	na
1991	68	55	58
1992	65	51	66
1993	64	44	55
1994	71	31	74
1995	66	na	na
1996	54	na	na

jing, Hubei, Tianjin, Futian, Jilin and Anhui, allocated strictly by department. For example, Architecture according to the plan was given one student from Tianjin; Mechanical Engineering got two from Anhui; Chemistry, two from Hubei. The Teachers College took freshmen from Guangdong, Hunan, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanghai.

The university's conflict with the municipality over local/non-local admissions was continuous. It occurred each year during the annual negotiation over the recruitment plan. In 1987 high school seniors from around the province showed a keen interest in SZU, with 900 students making the university their first choice, the equivalent to a rise in applications in the North American context. "Applications" were 1.7 times actual enrollment, a 40% increase over 1986. For that year, all SZU applicants who passed the threshold were recruited, but "many" non-local students with better scores were rejected. In its report to the city, the university suggested that the local-non-local quota should be 40:60. The next year's increase in applications was exponential. Ten times (10,000) more exam-takers chose SZU as their first choice in 1988 than in 1987. For that year, the city had agreed to a 50:50 local/non-local ratio.

In 1989 the municipality required that all local applicants who scored above the threshold be accepted. That year's total planned enrollment was lowered 20% as the result of national policy in the wake of 4 June. In order to attract as many Shenzhen residents as possible, adjustments between categories were made. The regular *benke* quota was increased; *daipei* was

minimized and shifted to *zifei*. Sixty-eight of the 84 fee-paying students were from Shenzhen. Before actual recruitment, the Academic Affairs Office input the names, location, scores, and major preference of all who chose SZU into a computer program and required departments to take any Shenzhen student who scored above the threshold. This was done so that departments could not fill their quotas with high scoring non-residents, automatically rejecting lower scoring Shenzhen students. Since SZU had not announced a quota in advance, many non-locals selected SZU as their first choice, figuring that a high score would automatically gain them admittance. Some students even left blank the key school preference and listed SZU as their first choice. Thus, 180 non-locals above the key score line were rejected; some ended up as *zhuanke* at other institutions. As a result, rejected students, their parents and high school counselors as well as provincial authorities were upset with SZU's recruitment. In its annual report, which reads like a self-criticism, AAO admitted that recruitment "had not been done well." Some departments ended up with too many students, others too few. Also, AAO had not consulted with the municipal Planning Bureau when it sought and received Guangdong's approval to increase the *benke* quota by 20, resulting in the taking of more non-locals. From 1990, the university became more deferential to municipal planners.

The AAO expected that non-local students' interest in SZU would sharply decline in 1990 as many would be "scared" of choosing SZU as a result of 4 June.⁴³ As a counter-attack it decided to print recruitment information early, and it made video programs. The publicity materials explained the attraction of SZU for non-Shenzhen residents. It mentioned that all graduates recruited by Shenzhen work-units were given automatic residency in the SEZ and that the Shenzhen Personnel Bureau would provide them cadre status, something important for obtaining housing and welfare benefits. That year, once again, the AAO recommended a 60:40 local/non-local split and said that local students should be chosen from high to low score. It opposed automatic recruitment of locals just because the threshold was reached. It also recommended that 10% of the *zhuanke* quota be reserved for non-locals, in order to increase quality in that program. In reality, the 1990 recruitment plan used the 70:30 ratio, as mandated by Shenzhen. In 1991 SZU continued to argue for the 60:40 ratio, mentioning that, although excellent students from Shenzhen could go out to attend key universities, SZU was being unfairly restricted from taking good students from outside the economic zone. At the same time it adopted the somewhat contradictory policy

that children of SZU staff be allowed to enter if their scores were only 20 points below the cutoff.

In 1992 and 1993 recruiters were unable to fill the 70% local quota with students above the key score line, resulting in shortfalls of 60 and 40 students, respectively. The line was lowered for 34 local students admitted in 1992. *Zhuanke* became popular among fee-payers and was enlarged. Its popularity was due, according to the AAO report, because the alternative for these applicants would be a Guangdong teachers college (the score lines were identical). Paying one's own money to go to SZU to get a short-cycle certificate was much more appealing than tuition-free study outside the SEZ to become a credentialed teacher. In 1994 SZU suggested that the geographic ratio be eliminated altogether. That year's shortfall of 40 local students was related to the fact that 170 high school seniors in Shenzhen chose universities outside the zone. The quota restriction continued in 1995, with SZU again criticizing the policy, which that year resulted in SZU's rejecting 200 "very qualified" non-local students. This was the greatest disparity to date: 30% of SEZ students scoring above the key score line, compared to 74% of non-locals. That year delegations of recruiters went to Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang; 58% of these northern students recruited passed the key score line.

Over the years recruitment inside Guangdong took various forms, always with efforts to "enlarge the applicant pool and thus improve quality." In the early years, SZU sent its own students with flyers back to their high schools in order to recruit freshmen. This was done during the week-long break around the time of the 1 May national holiday. In 1986 at the end of May the heads of 17 key middle schools were invited to SZU. The same year, in the month between the date scores were reported and actual recruitment began, President Luo Zhengqi sent university officials to visit eight key high schools in order to generate interest and meet with possible applicants. In 1987 the Guangdong and Shenzhen television stations and newspapers provided the university publicity. The school also printed up a fancier brochure with pictures, which emphasized the beauty of the garden-like campus and its freshness and innovation.

In 1989 key middle school principals were also invited to campus for a seminar. The university printed a flyer called "Friend of Exam Takers Who Aim for SZU." The revised brochure updated the inventory, listing details for its language labs, computer center and library, as well as information on tuition, academic staff and scholarships. It described the Social Science Foundation Department, the entity at that time responsible for the post-4

June political/ideological education courses, as “not an academic department, but a service department with the same status as the library and computer and audio visual centers.” Perhaps this discussion was added in an attempt to arrest the fears of prospective students who had heard about the university’s rectification and political re-education. Or, on the other hand, perhaps the mention of political education was intended to scare away any high school seniors who were expecting SZU to be a seedbed for dissidents. Like the earlier brochure, it was also directed to exam-exempt students.

In 1991 public relations work advanced further. In April principals of key middle schools visited; and during the spring, local high school seniors visited in large groups, touring the library and taking lunch in the student canteen. Over 10,000 brochures were printed for a June education fair in Guangzhou during which the SZU recruiters received over 1,000 parents and students. In late June 1992 admissions officials went to eight key high schools in Guangzhou and six Shenzhen high schools for recruitment, on the look-out especially for athletes and students with singing or dancing talents.⁴⁴ This routine continued for the next several years, supplemented by visits to a half dozen key high schools—including Guangya in Guangzhou, Zhuhai #1, Foshan #1, Jiangmen #1 and Zhaoqing Secondary in western Guangdong. Another 10,000 flyers were printed in 1992 and 5,000 the next year. By 1994 Guangdong recruitment efforts had become routine. By 1996 SZU’s homepage on the Internet appeared, and new efforts were made to recruit students from northern China, Hong Kong and Macau. Recruitment booklets lost their glossy edge and became more fact-oriented, presenting introductions to academic departments and university facilities.⁴⁵

Recommended and test-exempt students

SZU faced difficulty in recruiting students during its first years before a reputation of any sort had been established. Thus, school leaders asked high schools to recommend students (*tui jian*). Some of these “excellent” students recommended by their high schools became exempt from the college entrance exam; a select few were allowed to arrive on campus several weeks before the other freshmen so they could take special English and computer courses.⁴⁶

In 1986, one-quarter—182 students—were exempted from taking the CEE. Some departments had to forego high-scoring students to make room for recommended ones. Electrical Engineering, for example, could have obtained a freshman class with 90% of its students scoring above the key score-

line. But given recommended students, the figure reached only 80%. Another problem was that many different schools were recommending students. The 41 new students in the Chinese Department came from 28 high schools. One school had recommended seven of these students, five of whom scored below the departmental average. With the university's reputation improving, Academic Affairs saw the need to control the number of recommended students; "otherwise they will bring more harm than benefit." The AAO instructed department heads to strictly review recommended students. In no case should they accept low-scoring students recommended *after* the entrance exam. However, departments were permitted to take students as regular *benke* who scored 15 points below the recruiting average, as long as the score was above the threshold for second level institutions. If applicants scored more than 15 points below, they would become self-paying *benke* or be placed into the *zhuanke* program.

The AAO continued to voice concerns in 1987, writing in its annual report that too many students entered through the back-door (*hou men*), something that negatively affected recruitment work. It stressed that recommended students still had to take the entrance test. Exam-exempt students that year were required to be interviewed in English by a SZU teacher. Test-exempt students averaged about one per class, 35 in 1987 and 25 in 1988. Thirty-eight of 60 candidates interviewed were selected in 1989. Beginning in 1990, test-exempt places were set at 20, and SZU teachers no longer went to interview the students at their middle schools. Instead, the students were required to come to the campus. In 1991, 20 of 37 candidates were selected. In 1992 SZU was prohibited by the local government from accepting test-exempt students from places other than Shenzhen.⁴⁷ (That year two students from Shenzhen were enrolled without taking exams.) By 1996 test exemption existed only for Teachers College freshmen (11% in *benke*, 3% *zhuanke*).

Compatriot students

From its inception the university was eager to recruit students from Hong Kong and Macau. In the 1980s Hong Kong had only two major universities—Hong Kong University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. (Macau's single university was not up to either Chinese nor international standards.) More Hong Kong residents went abroad for tertiary education than stayed in the colony, especially those who went to high school abroad or to the international schools in Hong Kong which adhered to North American

or European curricula. The U.K., Australia, Canada and the U.S. were popular with many Hong Kong students. Others went to Mainland universities, especially Jinan University in Guangzhou.

In 1984 SZU received 300 applications from Hong Kong and Macau (about one-third of the total number of students who applied to Mainland schools). Of those, 90 listed SZU as their first choice. Over 50 attended the university (Story 10 relates the tale of one such student). After that, however, the number began to dwindle: 16 in 1986, 4 in 1987, 1 in both 1989 and 1991, 6 in 1994, 1 in 1995, and 1 (from Taiwan) in 1996. The drastic drop can be explained by several factors. The most important reason for the decline in compatriot enrollment was that Hong Kong expanded its own post-secondary education and began upgrading its colleges and polytechnic institutions into universities, following the pattern that occurred at the same time in the U.K. By the mid-1990s, Hong Kong had seven universities, and secondary school students faced less competition in striving for university degrees. Another possible factor concerned SZU's reputation, largely based on word-of-mouth. SZU's students from Hong Kong went back home almost every weekend, able to enter and leave with no more identification than their Hong Kong ID card. What they said about SZU remains unknown, but their statements were apparently not sufficient to lure more students in the following years.

Despite annual remonstrations from AAO that more intense recruitment of compatriots was needed, the years 1986 and 1987 provided the only effective recruitment of students from Hong Kong and Macau. Hong Kong students who wished to study at SZU followed the same arrangements set for seven key universities: Beijing, Qinghua, Fudan, Zhongshan, Zhongshan Medical, Huanan Polytech and Xiamen. High school seniors who applied to these schools or to SZU put down their choices and were recruited according to test score. Applicants deemed "especially qualified" by SZU could, however, be exempt from the test. A brochure summarized the formal application procedure and described the majors which accepted Hong Kong students. All applicants were given interviews. The brochure stated the grades required on the Hong Kong tertiary qualifying exams as well as the high school courses required of Hong Kong applicants. Tuition was set the same as for domestic students—¥20 tuition and ¥5 accommodation—but it had to be paid in foreign exchange. This was a small fraction of the cost of Hong Kong tertiary education at that time.⁴⁸ Hong Kong students were treated basically the same as other students. They were eligible for all majors except Household Appliances, Chinese Secretary and Statistics.

Daipei

Daipei provided one of the ways to enroll students from outside the economic zone. In 1986 one-third of all *daipei benke* students came from Guangdong; the rest hailed from 15 provinces and provincial-level cities. Most *daipei* students had contracted to work for the Ministry of Water and Power, the China Petroleum Company, or the state-owned Ocean Petroleum Company. The school found it easier to get students from Guangdong than from outside the province where⁴⁹

parents are not familiar with SZU and have mistaken ideas that it charges more than other universities, that it has special regulations, or that it recruits only from Hong Kong and Macau. Some worry about the high consumption level, that part-time work will affect study and that there is no job assignment.

Still, SZU was able to recruit *daipei* with respectable test results, using score lines higher than the thresholds in the various provinces. The two arts *daipei* recruits that year from Guizhou Province, for example, scored 467 and 455, well above the 424 provincial threshold. Clearly, the problem in 1986 was insufficient quantity—not quality—of *daipei*. The following year presented a different picture.

In 1987 admissions officials raised concerns about a quality gap between regular and *daipei benke*, given that the latter were permitted 30 points lower on test scores. For example, the average science score in International Finance and Trade was 126 points higher than the *daipei* average, and 68 points higher in arts. The quality problem had corrected itself by 1989 when the school reported that *daipei* obtained higher scores than the regular *benke* score line of their own provinces. As a result of post-4 June concerns, only four of the 41 *daipei* entrants came from Guangdong. Admissions officials repeated their earlier suggestion that the *daipei* quota be lowered and that the slots be used instead for fee-paying students. Ocean Petroleum had notified SZU that it was bowing out of *daipei*; the school announced it would generally curtail the program; the contracts SZU signed with the employers of future *daipei* recruits would be revised. At the same time, the school said it preferred fee-payers. It argued that *zifei* students worked as hard as, or even harder than, regular *benke* and that they were “much better” than *daipei*.

Another concern over *daipei* rested not with test scores but with the students’ psychology. The head of Economics, the department which took most of the *daipei* students,⁵⁰ represented the concerns of many of his colleagues:

Table 2.16: Benke-zhuanke score comparison—arts⁵²

major/department	<i>benke</i>	<i>zhuanke</i>	difference
Chinese secretary (Chinese)	687.0	606	81.0
Accounting (Economics)	689.5	614	75.5
IFT	730.5	616	114.5
Management	662.5	595	67.5
English (FLD)	651.0	630	21.0
Public Administration	683.0	600	83.0

We have two types of students: those from Shenzhen and those from inland. Shenzhen students get greater care from their parents and do not have to worry about money. Since they have to find their own jobs, they study hard and perform well academically. Their problem is that they don't care much about the big events of the country. Inland students don't get enough money from their family, and they are not ready for part-time jobs. They admire Shenzhen's work conditions and salary, but they are on *daipei* [and cannot stay here]. They are not balanced psychologically. They take part in a lot of fights and play mahjongg. Some who are punished or persuaded to drop out are this type of student. But even *daipei* students are improving.⁵¹

Several events helped force *daipei* into extinction. In July 1992 the Shekou Public Security Bureau arrested a *daipei* graduate as the leader of a counterfeiting ring that produced bogus SZU degrees. Around the same time, the Shenzhen Planning Bureau told the university it would no longer be responsible for providing food subsidies for *daipei* or paying for transferring their *hukou*, shifting these burdens directly onto the university. Thus, as concerns over student quality, psychological imbalance, and costs conflated, *daipei* at SZU was terminated after 1993.

Benke-zhuanke ratio

Just below the surface of the debate on local versus non-local students was the issue of whether SZU should focus on the *benke* or the *zhuanke* program. The resolution of the issue was mostly beyond university control. An insufficient number of high-scoring students applied to SZU to make the case for expanding *benke* majors. Meanwhile, local high school graduates were expressing greater interest in *zhuanke*. Secondary schools in the SEZ were producing more graduates who aspired to go to university, but there remained only one comprehensive university in Shenzhen, and its limited expansion

Table 2.17: Benke-zhuanke score comparison—sciences⁵⁴

major/department	<i>benke</i>	<i>zhuanke</i>	difference
Mechanical Engineering	633.5	591	42.5
Electronics	660.5	576	84.5
Physics	633.0	582	51.0
Chemistry	629.5	589	40.5

was nowhere near the rate of increase for the zone's ballooning population. *Zhuanke* students scored lower on the college entrance exams than their *benke* peers. Tables 2.16 and 2.17 compare *benke* and *zhuanke* exam scores for 1993, taken at the time of recruitment.

Zhuanke students were believed to require a lower level of teaching and were considered easier to teach and less costly to manager than four-year students. Thus, *benke* declined as *zhuanke* expanded. This trend was obvious by 1990, when the municipal government published its strategy for educational development. An article in the report characterized the structure of the SEZ's higher education as "unreasonable," criticizing the *benke-zhuanke* ratio as "improper."⁵³ The author, a staff member of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau, argued that there were too few majors in the SEZ higher education system, which included teacher and adult education as well as SZU. The system offered only 53 unique majors, while the labor market demanded *rencai* for a total of 82 fields. Moreover, an imbalance existed between sciences and management majors in Shenzhen's higher education. The science-to-management ratio in Shenzhen was 1:1.1, thus under emphasizing science, as compared with ratios in foreign countries (Japan 2.4:1; U.S. 1.5:1; West Germany 3.9:1; South Korea 1.8:1).

The above-cited article, as well as the 1990 report itself, appeared to be calling for more practical and technical higher education. At that time the SEZ was planning to build a vocational/technical university. If this were not built, the report suggested, then SZU should bear the burden of training technical *rencai*. This became a moot point since the vocational/technical university was in fact built. Yet the underlying message of the report was quite visible: that SZU's main duty was to train skilled personnel for the SEZ. The report strongly implied that this objective was best accomplished through the *zhuanke* mechanism. *Benke*, which supplied more general education, was not as relevant to SEZ needs. Any re-orientation toward *zhuanke* and specialization, however, flew in the face of national trends as well as SEDC policy. By the late 1990s China's educational planners antici-

pate that *zhuanke* enrollment will drop from 63.9% of tertiary students in 1995, to 63.4% in the year 2000 and 56.5% in 2010.⁵⁵

Politics and recruitment

To some extent politics is embedded in Chinese higher education, and one might expect politics to influence enrollment in terms of quantity and type of students admitted. Elsewhere in China, enrollment related to job allocation. As China's experimental university, SZU was free from this constraint. Nevertheless, enrollment proceeded as if it were the initial stage of an allocation system. The quotas for majors and types of students—regular, fee-paying, contracted students, degree track, junior college—were set by a plan that was the product of negotiation between the university and the Shenzhen Planning Bureau, with ratification by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau. In so far as negotiation is the essence of politics, politics thus becomes an integral part of the enrollment system. Spring 1989 was a time the university tried to act independently by going around the municipal Planning Bureau, directly to provincial authorities, in an attempt to increase the *benke* quota by 20 places. The staff of the Planning Bureau became livid when they learned of the university's subterfuge. Nevertheless, there is not much evidence to suggest that the Planning Bureau often tried to micro-manage enrollment; on the contrary, the university was given great leeway in academic matters such as creating new majors. The only blatant political intervention of any sort came in 1989 when SZU, like other universities in the PRC, was forced to revise recruitment plans downward by 20%. This was the single, dramatic political intervention in enrollment planning, a national response to the student and faculty protests of the spring.

Enrollment at SZU was tied to national politics in so far as it related to the Shenzhen SEZ. During 1980-1981 secondary school education in Shenzhen was so underdeveloped that few students took the college entrance exams.⁵⁶ Discussions to develop the special zone's education, including higher education, proceeded from that time. However, considerations on establishing a university did not occur until later, over a brief period—from the province-issued preparatory document in late 1982 to the State Council's approval of SZU on 10 May 1983.

For the first few years of the 1980s decade, the future of the special zones remained in doubt, for Shenzhen especially was not living up to expectations. The peak of criticism occurred in early 1982.⁵⁷ At that time the political climate in Beijing would not have permitted so large an educational

investment as a university in Shenzhen. In June 1982 the State Council created a Special Economic Zone Affairs Office, headed by the Premier Zhao Ziyang, a move that “provided SEZ policy with a firmer bureaucratic foundation in the capital against potential rivals in other established ministries.”⁵⁸ By the end of the year, when discussions over SZU occurred, criticism of Shenzhen was ebbing. The CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited the zone in early 1983 and endorsed its further economic growth. The university’s very establishment was made possible in a window of opportunity characterized by political support for the zone. Otherwise, enrollment—indeed the university’s very establishment—might not have occurred at that time.

Ironically, the university’s founding, on 27 September 1983, came but several days after the launch of a national anti-spiritual pollution campaign that followed speeches by CCP ideologist Deng Liqun.⁵⁹ Shenzhen, however, was largely shielded from the on-slaught of the campaign, and the university enrolled its first students at that time. The next peak of national criticism of the economic zones came in early 1985 about the time that enrollment planning was underway at SZU. Although enrollment grew, the rate of growth declined for that year (see Table 2.4). Early 1986 saw another low peak in criticism. At this time SZU took in a small group of fee-paying students, a radical departure from higher education’s Marxist orientation which had excluded such a category. The political climate was right for such an innovation. Enrollment growth declined for this year, something not in response to political factors, but attributed instead to lack of effective publicity and the university’s overall inexperience in recruiting. Student demonstrations at SZU and other universities in December 1986 did not adversely affect success in 1987’s recruitment. The period immediately following the protests was another peak of anti-economic zone debate at the state level. By mid-1987, when recruitment was approved by municipal and provincial authorities, the protests were a thing of the past and a new, more realistic strategy for the special zones was emerging.⁶⁰ In the absence of state-level criticism, the SEZ was entering an era of expansion. This was reflected in SZU enrollment policy for 1987. Enrollment in 1988 almost maintained the level of the previous year and witnessed the beginning of the decline in *daipei*. The year marked a low peak in state-level criticism of the special zones. Following the enrollment decline of 1989, as noted above, enrollment growth steadily rose for the next five years. Deng Xiaoping’s inspection tour of Shenzhen in early 1992 marked the patriarch’s last major public outing before his death, an attempt to silence critics of his economic reform policy.

By that time, SZU's recruitment policy was firm and had moved beyond political influence from the state level. The higher education reforms of 1993 phased out the various enrollment categories based on state subsidy. Tuition was instituted for almost all students. The expansion of *zifei* and the decline of *daipei* in 1992-93 predated and accompanied this policy change.

Concluding thoughts

Regardless of the influence of external political factors, SZU never exercised much control over the quality of students it enrolled. Exam-takers had to state a preference specifically for SZU; a small pool of applicants (which happened the first four years) necessarily resulted in fewer high scoring students. An unknown (but presumably high) number of each freshmen class failed to get into key universities, and many of these "rejects" ended up settling for SZU. Despite efforts to attract higher scoring enrollees, student quality as measured by test scores declined. In part, this phenomenon resulted from interference by the upper levels of government. The Shenzhen government especially wanted a more technical institution offering short-cycle *zhuanke* programs, which were allowed to admit lower scoring students.

Several factors led to lower standards for incoming students at SZU. In the 1980s the university was forced to reject high scoring applicants from outside the SEZ in favor of lower scoring test-takers from Shenzhen. Year after year SZU fought against this policy, to no avail. The municipality, as SZU's primary financial backer, insisted on this type of affirmative action to favor local residents. Thus, from 1989 SZU experienced a decline in student quality, as measured by CEE scores. The extent to which this decline could have been slowed down if the city's affirmative action policy had not existed is unknown. Also contributing to the decline was the university's willingness to take test-exempt students who were recommended by their secondary schools. An emphasis on *zhuanke*, which by definition takes less qualified students than *benke*, also contributed to lowering overall student quality. Finally, when universities began charging tuition, fees at SZU became the highest in China. To some extent this excluded, or at least discouraged, poor but well-qualified students from applying to SZU. On the books at least the university operates a loan scheme to help underprivileged students, but none of the university's public documents has ever assessed this program. According to at least one political tutor I spoke with, even students who held loans or scholarships did not have sufficient income to be like normal stu-

dents from Shenzhen, who enjoy a high standard of living. Compounding all the factors mentioned above is the university's reputation for having "ninth rate students" despite good facilities. SZU's entrants are still in the top one-quarter of the nation's secondary graduates, but correcting this public perception of poor student quality will perhaps be as difficult as improving student quality itself.

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1. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey. Percent totals may not sum due to rounding.
 2. Huang, *The Determinants of Institutional Effectiveness of the Senior High Schools in Shenzhen Municipality*, 1993.
 3. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey. Percent totals may not sum due to rounding.
 4. Source: 1993 *benke* graduates survey.
 5. The enrollment rate for university students in China (aged 18-21) [i.e., percentage of the population cohort going into tertiary education] was 3.4%, 6.8% and 7%, for the years 1990, 1995 and 1996 respectively. Based on the state plan, that figure is expected to increase to 11-12% by the year 2010: Hu Ruiwen, "Educational development in China in the 1990s," 1997, p. 5, 11-2. The increase in college enrollment is shown in the following figures: The number of full-time college students per 10,000 population increased from 11.5 in 1980 to 18.5 in 1990, and to 25 in 1996: Min, "Major strategic issues for Chinese higher education development for the twenty-first century," 1997, p. 8.
 6. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Data include Teachers College recruitment for 1994 and 1995 and exclude part-time *zhuanke* students.
 7. Hu Ruiwen, "Chinese higher education," 1996, p. 3. This conference paper provides the national data that are used in this and the following paragraph.
 8. 3,115 + 970. The latter figure was provided by SZU in its self-evaluation report for the 1995 accreditation. In FTE computations, three part-time *zhuanke* students equal one full-time equivalent.
 9. Hu Ruiwen, "Chinese higher education," 1996, p. 3. The U.S. figure is consistent with data compiled by the U.S. Department of Education.
 10. Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154.
 11. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 131; *1987 Yearbook*, p. 244; *1988 Yearbook*, p. 168; *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 83; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 168; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 192; *1995 Yearbook*, p. 146; *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 137-8.
 12. Source: SZU yearbooks.
 13. SZU CCP, "Freshen up your spirits, march forward boldly, March 1990," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 16.

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14. "SZU Night University self-evaluation report," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 16-26.
 15. The *benke* figure is based on graduation figures for the classes which were enrolled. Student population based on enrollment figures is 2,686. Both figures include 52 Architecture majors who enrolled in the five-year program in 1986. A multiplier of .4 is used to compute FTEs. Part-time students in these programs take 2-4 times longer than full-time students to complete their studies. The estimate for the training and correspondence figure is based on an even distribution over nine years. These courses last about two weeks. A multiplier of .05 is used to compute FTEs.
 16. Shenzhen Municipality and Party Committee, "Report to Guangdong Province on creating Shenzhen University," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 154. Guangdong Province and the state Ministry of Education approved these figures in documents dated 8 March 1983 and 10 May 1983, respectively, *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 160-1.
 17. The year 1990 happens to be, coincidentally, the only year for which published data exist in all enrollment categories of Table 2.6.
 18. By 1991 the school reported that 100,000 persons had received short-term training over nine years, *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 46. Assuming these courses average two weeks in duration, that approximates 500 FTEs.
 19. Source: "Ten-year development plan and eighth five-year plan," *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 11-8. The percent increases were not correctly computed in the original.
 20. Shenzhen Educational Science Research Institute, *Research on the Strategy of Shenzhen's Educational Development*, 1991, p. 126.
 21. Liang Shuping, "Opinions on the strategic report on Shenzhen's educational development," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 46-8.
 22. "Self-evaluation report, 12 October 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 61.
 23. "Teaching work adjustment measures, 20 November 1995," *1995 Yearbook*, p. 62
 24. "SZU Economics College reform and development plan, 1997-2000," *1997 Yearbook*, pp. 153-9.
 25. Liu Renjing, "Combining tracks," 1995. The corresponding figure for 1994 was 13.2%: *1995 Education Statistics Yearbook of China*, p. 20.
 26. Y.J. Liu, *Book of Major Educational Events in China, 1949-1990*, vol. 2, p. 1511.
 27. A: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197. The figure 208 is reported in *1987 Yearbook*, p.216. The figure 216 is reported in the *Shenzhen 1985 Yearbook*, p. 177;
B: *1986 Yearbook* , p. 197. The figure 481 is reported in *1987Yearbook*, p. 216. *Benke* total for 1983-1984 is reported as 689 in *Shenzhen 1985 Yearbook*, p. 493; C: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 197. *Benke* figures in *1987 Yearbook*, p. 216: 612 regular, 84 *daipei*, 3 *zifei*;

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- C: 1986 *Yearbook*, p. 197. *Benke* figures in 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 216: 612 regular, 84 *daipei*, 3 *zifei*;
- D: 1986 *Yearbook*, p. 197, 201. Regular *benke* includes 14 from Macau. *Benke* figures in 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 216: 751 regular, 135 *daipei*, 30 *zifei*; 31 *zifei* reported in 1986 *Yearbook*, p. 197;
- E: 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 242. *Benke* figures reported in 1987 yearbook, p. 216: 563 regular, 203 *daipei*;
- F: 1988 *Yearbook*, pp. 68-9 (data internally inconsistent);
- G: 1989-1990 *Yearbook*, p. 117;
- H: Huang Shuhua, "A summary of 1990 recruitment," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 11 (1990), p. 26;
- I: 1991 *Yearbook*, p. 258;
- J: 1992-1993 *Yearbook*, p. 266. The total number of *benke* and *zhuanke* given as 760 in *Brief # 215* (5 Sept. 1992);
- K: 1992-1993 *Yearbook*, p. 269. Excludes 44 teaching college *benke*;
- L: 1994 *Yearbook*, p. 204. Data are inconsistent with earlier figures: (a) 679 *benke*, 521 *zhuanke*, reported by Chen Guangguan, 1994 Recruitment, *Shenda Tongxun*, 26 (1994), p. 16, and (b) 635 *benke* [excluding 44 in Teachers College], 561 *zhuanke*, *Brief # 343* (1 Sept. 1994);
- M: 1995 *Yearbook*, p. 265. Edmonds College "zhuanke daipei" not included.
- N: 1996 *Yearbook*, p. 216. Figure does not include 160 Teachers College *benke* freshmen and 87 Teachers College *zhuanke* freshmen
- O: 1997 *Yearbook*, p. 173. Figure does not include 178 Teachers College *benke* and 91 Teachers College *zhuanke*.
28. A: 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 224;
- B: 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 242;
- C: Correspondence, Academic Affairs Office, 1995;
- D: 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 216;
- Han Yun, "Recruitment summary," *Shenda Tongxun*, no. 1 (1987), p. 13. Data within the article are inconsistent. The total figure given is 1,132, which is less than the sum of its components;
- F: 1985 *zhuanke* (1989-90 *Yearbook*, 249), '87 *benke* (1991 *Yearbook*, 203), '87 Architecture (1992-3 *Yearbook*), p. 267.
- G: 486 with bachelors, 275 without.
29. The confusion is not clarified by other data published on Shenzhen education in *A Collection of Social Development Achievements in Shenzhen 1979-1994*, 1996, pp. 176-9. Like the Shenzhen yearbooks, the data do not disaggregate higher education institutions in Shenzhen.
30. Source: graduates name lists, includes regular, *daipei* and *zifei*. Enrollment data from Table 2.8. Col. (3) is computed as col. (2) ÷ col. (1), or the percentage of enrolled students who graduate with a bachelors degree. Col. (6) is

col. (5) ÷ col. (1), or the percent of enrolled students who graduate (with or without a degree). SZU *zhuanke* operates in both two- and three-year programs. In this table some enrolled students may be assigned to the incorrect years for graduation. For the years 1987-1995 it appears that the *zhuanke* graduation rate was about 85%, higher than for *benke*.

A: 1988 *Yearbook*, p. 124; 1989 *Yearbook*, p. 244 (for 5 year Architecture);

B: 1989-90 *Yearbook*, p. 244, 254;

C: 1989-90 *Yearbook*, p. 251 (includes estimated 33 Architecture graduates for which data are unavailable);

D: "1991 AAO report," 1991 *Yearbook*; 1992 *Yearbook*, p. 367;

E: *Ibid.*;

F: 1992 *Yearbook*, p. 366, 372;

G: 1992 *Yearbook*, p. 371; Cai Delin, "Teaching work," 1992-93 *Yearbook*, p. 45;

H: 1994 *Yearbook*, p. 296;

I: 1995, 1996 *Yearbook* (includes '91 Architecture who graduated in 1996);

J: 1988 *Yearbook*, p. 127. In enrollment figures, these students appear as *benke daipei*;

K: 1989-90 *Yearbook*, p. 249;

L: 1989-90 *Yearbook*, p. 257;

M: "1991 AAO report," 1991 *Yearbook*;

N: 1992 *Yearbook*, p. 369;

O: 1992 *Yearbook*, p. 374. Includes 32 graduates among 41 enrolled in the three-year 1991 *zhuanke* Household Appliance major;

P: 1994 *Yearbook*, p. 299. Includes 91 graduates in Household Appliance, and 15 Physics 1995 graduates in the three-year *zhuanke* program;

Q: 1995 *Yearbook*, p. 335; 1996 *Yearbook*, pp. 295-7. Includes students who enrolled in three-year *zhuanke* programs in 1993, who graduated in 1996;

R: 1996 *Yearbook*, p. 292-3; includes 1992 Architecture students who graduated in 1997;

S: 1996 *Yearbook*, p. 294;

T: 1997 *Yearbook*, p. 343-5; Includes 40 Architecture students enrolled in 1992 and scheduled to graduate in 1999. Data for col. (1) and col. (4) assume that 26% of them will obtain a degree, based on the 6-year average from Table 2.9;

U: 1997 *Yearbook*, p. 346-8; by the mid-1990s most *zhuanke* programs in science and engineering lasted three years; arts programs took two years.

31. "Accepting training students, 25 April 1992," 1992-93 *Yearbook*, p. 361.

32. This is discussed in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, Chapter Eight.

33. Sources: Same as Table 2.8; 1987 *Yearbook*, p. 224; 1988 *Yearbook*, p. 62; 1991 *Yearbook*, p. 257; 1986 *Yearbook*, p. 198, reports 669 regular and 109

daipei benke in plan.

34. Data for 1993. Liu Renjing, "Combining tracks," 1994, p. 13.
35. For general discussion, see "The toll bridge into university," *China News Analysis*, no. 1602, 15 January 1998.
36. Sources: *1987 Yearbook*, p. 135, 224, 240; *1988 Yearbook*, p. 62, 198; *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 122; *1991 Yearbook*, p. 256; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 27; 1996 SZU homepage. Data for 1989 regular student tuition appear to be inaccurate. In 1996 students from Guangdong who were recruited to IFT, Economics, Electronics, Architecture and Design paid ¥4,500, while those in other departments paid ¥4,000. Students from other provinces were charged ¥2,000 and those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, HK \$4,000. Students to SZU Teachers College in teaching specialties did not pay tuition; those in non-teaching acting and drama majors paid ¥6,000 if from Guangdong and ¥3,500 if from other provinces.
37. Chongqing, China's largest city, was elevated to provincial-level municipality in 1996.
38. Source: *Dalu qiaobao*, reprinted in *Dangjian wenhui* (Shenyang) October 1996, no. 10, p. 24, cited in Rosen, "The impact of economic reform on Chinese education," 1997.
39. Sources: SZU yearbooks; Huang Shuhua, "A summary of 1990 recruitment," *Shenda Tongxun* 11 (1990), p. 26; Han Yun, "Recruitment summary," *Shenda Tongxun* 1 (1987), p. 13. These data report the average high/low scores among departments. Individual departments, therefore, can have higher or lower scores than the average high/low. *Brief # 343* (1 Sept. 1994) reported that 46.3% of SZU students scored above provincial score line.
40. Standard Achievements Tests, or college boards.
41. Teachers College scored higher averages each year; only for Physics in 1997 was the mark below the *benke* counterpart (by two points).
42. Sources: SZU yearbooks. Figures for 1995 and 1996 assume that all non-Guangdong recruits are attached to the Teachers College.
43. Recruitment report, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 120.
44. *Brief # 210* (2 July 1992).
45. See *1996 Recruitment Introduction*; and information on the SZU homepage.
46. "Regulations on teaching reform and improving teaching quality, 4 July 1986," *1986 Yearbook*, p. 61.
47. *Brief #210* (2 July 1992).
48. At that time Hong Kong universities charged about 10% of their North American counterparts; even in the late 1990s after the Hong Kong government began removing some of its subsidies for higher education, tuition remained about one-fourth that of the average American school.
49. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 203.

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50. E.g., 33% of 1987 *benke*, 87% of the 1987 *zhuanke*, 75% of 1990 *benke*.
 51. Zhang Minru, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 54; the head of the Psychological Counseling Center reported that *daipei* were involved in many campus fights, *1988 Yearbook*, p. 121. Many informants confirmed the view that Northern Chinese students were trouble-makers.
 52. Source: AAO computer print-outs, 5 September 1993, 4 October 1993. Several department majors have been averaged for Accounting, IFT and Management *benke*.
 53. Chen Luhong, "Educational structure reform," 1991.
 54. Source: *Ibid.* Department majors have been averaged for *benke* Mechanical Engineering, *benke* Electronics and *zhuanke* Electronics.
 55. Hu Ruiwen, "Educational development in China in the 1990s," 1997, p. 3.
 56. Crane, *The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones*, 1990, p. 37.
 57. *Ibid.*
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
 59. Zhang, *Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1993*, 1996, p. 85.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 143.