

Story 10: Hong Kong student Kennedy Ng

I came to Hong Kong from China when I was 15 years old, in 1978, just after the end of the Cultural Revolution. My family's name in Mandarin is Wu, but in Hong Kong our name was given the Cantonese transliteration, Ng, which is difficult for most Westerners (as well as Northern Chinese) to pronounce. It is a guttural grunt; I prefer Wu. When we arrived in the then British colony, other Mainland immigrants told me that I should have a Western name; about the only one I could come up with on short notice was Kennedy, after the American president who was killed the very day I was born.

Our family took a round-about route to get to Hong Kong. We were legal immigrants. Up until a few years before we arrived, Britain gave Chinese immigrants refugee status, which meant that anyone who could get across the border could stay. I came with my mother and sister. Our father followed in five years. He was a member of the CCP, a former soldier in the People's Liberation Army who had fought in Korea against the Americans. His paper work was delayed, we suspect because of his military service.

I was born in Beijing. My father's hometown is in rural Hebei; his father, my grandfather, had migrated to the western suburbs of Beijing just before my father was born. My dad grew up a peasant, working the fields with his family. In the late 1940s, during the winter when most farmers are forced by the weather to go on vacation, my father did errands for the PLA which at the time controlled Beijing's western suburbs. The peasants of China greatly respected Mao's army and my father became a communist even before he learned to read and write (which the army taught him). When the communists defeated the Nationalists, my father was allowed to enlist.

My mother is an overseas Chinese. At the beginning of the century, her family had moved to Indonesia from Fujian Province. In the early 1950s Chairman Mao and the Chinese leaders called on overseas Chinese to return to build a socialist China. My mother and her siblings heeded the call; she went directly to Beijing, where eventually she and my father met and got married. I think my mother became disenchanted with "socialist China," although she never talks about this. With all her overseas relatives, it was easy for my mother to emigrate to Hong Kong. She sought a better life not for herself but for us.

Was Hong Kong a better life? It was like a foreign country. I spoke no Cantonese when I arrived and all the rules (like standing in queue for the bus) were new and intimidating. As the elder male in the family, I shouldered the burden of being the provider. All of us worked so we could afford the privately-rented two-room apartment. Thus, before my sixteenth birthday, I was working 10 hours a day in a family-owned electrical appliance factory. I stayed there three years, and then went to work as a "hotel boy" in one of Hong Kong's swanky hotels. When we knew my father would be joining us, my burden was greatly reduced. I wanted to go to university. My primary and secondary education had taken place during the Cultural Revolution. I attended classes only three days a week. The rest of the time we went on social investigation; this education was valuable, but it did not help me in the subjects that were tested on the college entrance exam, mainly Chinese, history, English and geography. So I quit the hotel job and studied on my own for six months.

In the early 1980s Hong Kong had only two universities and a few colleges and polytechnic institutions. Only graduates of Hong Kong secondary schools could get into the local universities, because of the strict examination requirements. It was extremely difficult to get into one of these two universities. In fact, more Hong Kong young people attended universities in Britain, North America and Australia than in Hong Kong. Overseas Chinese like myself could attend Mainland universities if they scored high enough on the special exams that were given for these schools. My self-study, therefore, was geared to doing well on these exams. I scored high enough to entitle me to enroll in several including Jinan University, where my then girlfriend's father worked.

Jinan is a comprehensive university in Guangzhou and is known as the university for overseas Chinese because it enrolls several hundred compatriots from Hong Kong and Macau. Jinan was not an especially rich school; students, including compatriots, were charged no tuition or fees at that time. The buildings were in a state of disrepair, at least by Hong Kong standards. The dorms were crowded with six boys to a room; the dorms were so noisy that it was impossible to study in them.

One vacation in 1984, as I was returning from Guangzhou to Hong Kong, I dropped in on the new campus of Shenzhen University, which was still in the middle of construction. It had all new buildings and only two students to a dorm room. Then and there I decided that this school was for me. In September I returned to the Mainland, went to Shenda, produced my Jinan transcript and was immediately permitted to transfer in. Tuition

and fees amounted to ¥25, which was not much for someone like myself who had been working in Hong Kong for five years. Another benefit was that I was now closer to my family in Hong Kong, so I could travel back whenever I wanted.

I stayed at SZU for three years, received a degree and then returned to Hong Kong, where I worked for a company for several years. I then went to the U.S. for graduate study. On reflection, I look back favorably on Shenda. My only regret is that the school leaders placed too little emphasis on teaching. Students were busy with their part-time jobs. Classroom teaching followed the traditional mode, just like in Jinan. My graduate education in American has emphasized critical thinking. Shenda provided me a basic foundation, as undergraduate education should, but as a student I was not encouraged to think critically. Only in that way can the talent of students be given full play.

6. Foreign things

This chapter explores SZU's association with things foreign, a topic covering exchanges with academic institutions outside China, the employment of expatriate teaching staff, and the use of the American credit system. China's relationship with the outside world is a major subject of scholarship and other commentary, much of it written by *waiguoren* (foreigners, literally "outside country people").¹ The "other" perspective is what anthropologists call *etic*, in contrast with *emic*—the way one views one's own culture. This entire volume takes the *etic* perspective by the very fact the author is an American-born Caucasian, not a China-born Han.

Insight into otherness is provided by anthropologist Jordan Pollack in his discussion of being a foreign teacher at SZU. He notes:²

...the visiting foreigner is often thought to stand as a representative symbol for cultural otherness, to stand for alternative ways of life, both good and bad, in terms of which Chinese work to distinguish, and thus constitute, themselves. The foreigner stands conveniently, in popular as well as official discourse, both for what Chinese *want* to be and *don't want* to be, as they make and remake themselves. The foreigner thus embodies much that is to be emulated or avoided. In this capacity, the foreigner serves to help Chinese understand themselves, define themselves, imagine themselves.

A faculty member made me aware of an aphorism, or *chengyu*, used frequently to summarize the approach authorities advised students, and Chinese generally, to take toward foreigners: *nei-wai you bie* ("inside is different from outside," and by implication calls for different treatment).

This was the common attitude held by SZU staff about foreigners on campus. It was illustrated by the head of FLD who was himself adamantly opposed to foreign intrusion into Chinese educational culture. He wrote:³

...discrimination of insiders and outsiders, of in-groups and out-groups is essential in Chinese life. There is discrimination between Chinese and foreigners, between employees and a 'unit' and people outside it...To the Chinese, a colleague is a colleague, a friend is a friend, a foreigner is a foreigner. These are three different identities and roles, which are not to be scrambled...Friends are friends, insiders are insiders. All friends cannot become insiders. International friends have a long way to go to becoming an insider

in China. If they are not too unjustifiably hopeful, they should not be too frustrated.

The previous chapter examined several curriculum innovations at SZU; all these had been developed by individuals who were either western-educated (in the case of expatriate teachers) or western-influenced (the British Council-funded CECL course). The “other” technology of those innovations was not eventually transferred to native Chinese teachers at SZU. Chinese staff, in general, did not adopt the methods and techniques espoused in these courses; some chose not to; others who sincerely wanted to use the techniques lacked sufficient ability through training. The innovations themselves were difficult to execute, risky and time-consuming. Departmental leaders at FLD, most of whom had spent time in Western universities, chose to terminate these courses, and they deemed the western-influenced pedagogies to be “inappropriate” for Chinese learners. The foreign teachers received a simple explanation: “You must be Chinese to understand.”⁴ The decision to abandon CECL in particular was somewhat ironic given that CECL was developed by Chinese scholars for use in China. Part of the reason that these pedagogies and curriculum changes did not have a lasting effect at SZU was that, as introduced by foreigners, they were considered “other.” In some cases it was the agents, not primarily the content of the curriculum, that prevented the innovations from being accepted.

Decisions based on ethnocentricity and xenophobia are certainly not unique to SZU; they exist elsewhere in China as well as in other countries. Reforms since the Cultural Revolution have brought many alien ideas and notions through the Middle Kingdom’s Open Door, and certain elements, simply characterized as foreign, especially trouble Chinese policy-makers. No lesser a personage than Deng Xiaoping realized this in his statement before the Twelfth Party Congress in August 1982:⁵

We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of mutual equality and benefit. At the same time we will keep a clear head, firmly resist corrosion by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country.

In the view of many Chinese, the key issue, therefore, is separating the “good” foreign things from the “bad” ones. This is not a new concern. It has been around China for centuries, but has come to the forefront only since about the middle of the nineteenth century, with the rise of the Self-

Strengthening movement. The concern is summarized in the catch phrase, *Zhongxue wei ti xixue wei yong* (*ti-yong* for short), “Chinese learning for fundamental principles, western learning for practical application.” China-watchers on education frequently cite the *ti-yong* concept.⁶

The phrase is attributed to Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), a scholar/official at the end of the Qing Dynasty.⁷ Zhang probably never himself used this exact term, but his philosophy of dualism advocated peaceful juxtaposition of the old with the new, substance with function, Chinese with foreign.⁸ This balanced inequality “did not advocate complete coalescence of the two elements. Rather, the Chinese was assigned one course and the Western an adjacent course, and the two were to doubletrack indefinitely through the ages.”⁹ The *ti-yong* issue heated up around 1919 and the May Fourth era, as Chinese intellectuals realized the inescapable need for China to adopt the West’s more advanced military technology.¹⁰ Without this technology, China would continue to suffer humiliation at the hands of foreign powers and would remain the “weak man of Asia.” Adapting Western practice to suit Chinese conditions has characterized the nation’s higher education system for the past century.¹¹ This occurred at China’s experimental university in Shenzhen.

The credit system

SZU’s public relations materials which take the form of glossy brochures and leaflets have always mentioned the use of the credit system (CS) as one of the university’s major educational reforms. It has served as a rallying point around which other reform policies were based. A 1985 brochure discussed the SZU CS as follows:¹²

A credit system is practiced in the University to allow capable students to select more elective courses so that they may graduate ahead of schedule. The less capable students are permitted to choose fewer elective courses and may prolong their studies. Students are allowed to change their major course or transfer to other departments during their first years of study. Undergraduates are required to take, besides their major course, a minor one.

The credit system was mentioned in various favorable articles on SZU that appeared in the Chinese media as well as in edited volumes on education. One author reported that the arrangement emphasized student choice in that it allowed self-motivated students the flexibility to develop their individual programs.¹³ It encouraged them to seek both specialized training as well as a

broad knowledge structure. Students could ask exemption from courses if they could score over 70 on an exemption exam.

In general, a credit allocation system (*xuefenzhi*) is a form of curriculum design, a way for schools to specify the types and quantity of courses students take. Superficially, the system provides a method to count credits. A student who has obtained sufficient credits in certain required categories may then graduate. Such a system often allows students to move through university somewhat at their own pace in directions they themselves choose. The CS, however, is usually more than just a credit counting system. On a deeper level it addresses the structuring and content of education. What courses should be required? Which should be optional? How much self-direction should students experience in course selection? How far can students expand their knowledge beyond their specialty? In a national system like China's that requires students to select their majors even before college admission and that does not allow for changing majors, the structure of the CS may be extremely important, for it can provide "breadth" in education. Since the credit system is a distinctly American invention, its employment at SZU can serve as a case study of how the university adopted a foreign practice to suit its own needs.

History of the CS in China

The CS in China goes back to 1917 when Beijing University president Cai Yuanpei introduced it.¹⁴ By 1927, "[t]he credit system was used to ensure that students had an exposure to a range of knowledge areas, and most had a general first year before following more specialized courses of study from the second year."¹⁵ In 1929 the state education department required universities to adopt the CS. Such a system was also adopted in secondary schools, but was abolished upon the recommendations of a visiting League of Nations Mission of Education Experts in 1931.¹⁶ The delegation, reflecting the European view of knowledge, had criticized the fragmentation of the curriculum brought about by the use of the credit system.

In the 1950s, as China followed the Soviet model of specialization, the CS was abandoned in favor of the academic year system (*xuenianzhi*), in which students go through their courses in a fixed group (*banji shoukezhi*). Students were admitted into fields of specialization, and they studied together a set of courses for a full year. The group took another set of courses each year until they graduated. This system was characterized by uniformity, as

well as a narrowing of curriculum and a proliferation of majors/specializations and was not inconsistent with Confucian teacher-centeredness.¹⁷

With the reopening of universities after the Cultural Revolution, the CS was employed in China to replace the rigid curriculum of the Soviet model. In 1978 schools like Nanjing University, East China Normal College, and Wuhan University began readopting the CS.¹⁸ Then, in 1983, after the Twelfth CCP Conference and a national education meeting, non-comprehensive universities began introducing the CS.¹⁹ By 1986, over 200 schools employed it.²⁰

American influence

The Chinese credit system, as a case of technology transfer, has its roots in the United States. This will be examined within the overall context of outside influences on Chinese education. During this century Chinese higher education has been exposed to three disparate influences: Confucianism, Sovietism, and Deweyan philosophy. The first two of these advocate planned curricula. While the Soviet model concerns itself mostly with content (emphasis on science) and structure (the academic year system), the Confucian way strongly influences teaching methods. It focuses on teacher and text.²¹ To a lesser degree aspects of European systems have also been adapted,²² but in terms of the curriculum, and the CS in particular, only these three influences have been quite pronounced.

Chinese education has grown out of the Confucian tradition which, according to many educators, is still present especially in the form of teacher-centeredness.²³ This factor, of course, is an anathema to the CS, which lays an environment for independent study and focuses on the student who gets some degree of control in selecting his courses.

During the first four decades of this century, Chinese education came under heavy foreign influences which often tended to modify and even replace traditional education through "eclectic borrowing."²⁴ Quite influential was the American education system and, especially, the philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952). According to one scholar:²⁵

A movement for educational reforms initiated and led primarily by scholars returned from the United States, many of whom had been former students of John Dewey at Columbia University, resulted in a higher education system in China very similar to American patterns. The curriculum was organized within colleges, which consisted of departments. A general first year pre-

ceded the choosing of specialized courses of study, and the credit system was adopted to make sure that the student embraced a broad range of knowledge.

Visiting China twice, Dewey influenced a generation of Chinese intellectuals, among them Hu Shih, Chen Duxiu, Jiang Menglin, and Tao Xingzhi, who were looking for an alternative to Confucianism.²⁶ Specifically, Dewey's influence extended to curriculum issues that relate to CS design "with his emphasis on the Process of learning and the continuity of experience rather than on an unvarying curriculum..."²⁷

Educators in the United States (as in China) are forever discussing curriculum development, pondering the issue of general education versus specialization, and philosophically examining the functions of the university. Much in the U.S. debate is relevant to China's curriculum concerns and education reform, although the overall structure, size, scope, purpose and operation of the American system vastly differ from its Chinese counterpart. First, three and half times as many accredited colleges and universities, excluding 6,500 vocational institutions, operate in the U.S. than in China, making the U.S. system about six times the size of China's in terms of enrollment.²⁸

Second, American tertiary institutions serve a variety of purposes. Lately they have become vocationally oriented, and this is evidenced in their trend toward specialization.²⁹ The U.S. university plays an important role in a person's socialization because it transmits social values through the acculturation process.³⁰ Education is viewed as a means to develop one's cultural literacy.³¹ In other words, universities are to provide intellectual pleasures, not just career tools.³²

These larger goals, as presented by educators, are often considered more important than the mere acquisition of facts. The current period in American education gives greater significance to "interdisciplinary linkages, advanced learning skills, the clarification of personal values, and the broadening of student perspectives through the study of women, minorities, the disadvantaged, and international viewpoints."³³

One of China's leading educationalists has added insight to this general versus specialized education debate. In explaining how "an emphasis on specialized education dovetailed with China's system of a planned state-run economy and bureaucracy," he points out that "general education of some form or other has always existed in China, even in periods of intense specialization."³⁴ At the present, however, the major objective of Chinese education at all levels is to serve modernization.³⁵ In universities, courses should

serve jobs,³⁶ and some educators go so far as to argue that China needs specialists, not graduates with general education.³⁷ Students are expected to acquire the facts, knowledge and skills needed to move China into a modern state—the exact same operating premise at SZU.

In contrast with this pragmatic skills development approach, a prevailing view in American education believes that “[t]he end of education is not accumulation of knowledge but mental enlargement.”³⁸ In contrast, traditional education in China, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been knowledge-based and exam-directed.

Historical development of U.S. general education

General education in the U.S. is *not* a response to today’s current trend toward specialization. Indeed, it preceded specialization. For 200 years American universities had fixed classical curricula as education’s major purpose was seen as training ministers and the élite.³⁹ In the mid-nineteenth century the curricula entered a second stage and became industrial-professional oriented, with “a de-emphasis on culture in the curriculum and an emphasis on useful knowledge and employment. The requirements for a major set the pattern for curriculum and these were influenced by manpower needs.”⁴⁰ From 1960, a consumer era brought about a third stage and “more time for electives and there were more courses in the arts; more courses for non-majors in various fields; more part-time, extension, and evening courses; and more community service courses.”⁴¹

Much in China’s curriculum resembles American education’s middle stage of development. Indeed, the post WW II period was one of strong economic growth for the U.S.. Currently, America’s third stage resembles ‘post development education,’ at a time when the state has achieved sufficient economic development and when, one might argue, society has the luxury to let undergraduates focus past the basic skills-promotion aspect in favor of more general education.

Distribution system and general education

Given the comments of Chinese educators⁴² who fear the *laissez-faire* nature of U.S. CSs, one might conclude that this type of academic free-for-all pervades American education. This is not the case. Only three percent of U.S. institutions allow for wholly elective courses. Another two per cent have a core curriculum. About 95% of curriculum designs in American universities specify distribution requirements “in which students are required to take a

specified minimum number of courses or credits in several broad fields of study.”⁴³

In a curricular distribution sense, general education is the approximately one-third of the collegiate four years that complements the one-third devoted to the major course of study and the other one-third that is related to the major area. It is the civilizing element.⁴⁴

In the United States general education has evolved into a distribution system. Those who don't favor the system say:

Most general education programs resemble a cafeteria line where one can enter at any point, choose foods that satisfy basic hunger as well as a dash of dessert or anything else that strikes an individual's whim, but without guidance about those foods that are necessary for a balanced diet.⁴⁵

These distribution systems are often the result of political compromises between departments, and often no one, including the school's chief administrative officer, monitors or evaluates them.⁴⁶

The American CS in China

Curriculum development is different in China in that much of the “civilizing element” of schooling is found at the secondary level. It is not the university's purpose to train ‘general knowledge’ students.⁴⁷ What then is left for the university? In a nation where only two percent of the total population make it to university, courses outside of one's specialty might seem a misuse of scarce educational resources. Not all agree. Some Chinese educators laud the cross-disciplinary curriculum approach for the tertiary level⁴⁸ or suggest that college courses should widen the vision of college students, help them understand their surroundings, care about society and solve their individual problems.⁴⁹ General opinion in China, however, still appears weighted in favor of specialization. The concept of general education that is fundamental to the structure of the American systems is not a sizable component of Chinese systems for Chinese educators.

Today, as part of educational reforms, most schools in China have adapted some form of the CS. As Suzanne Pepper explains:⁵⁰

The American credit system, previously criticized as a capitalist-style invention that reduces course work to commodity status, became an officially recommended antidote for the ‘fixed’ and ‘dead’ features of unified curricula and study plans. But in the early 1980s, the credit system was simply superim-

posed upon the fixed teaching plan, and students still had little freedom of choice among courses. About 70 percent of all courses in any given major remained compulsory as before, and some of the electives could be selected only from among a few fixed choices. Students were granted some new freedom to select a limited number of courses outside of their majors and even their own departments. But they could not study at their own pace, another declared aim, because to graduate out of turn would disrupt the predetermined enrollment and job assignment plans. Administrators at three universities where the credit system had been introduced by 1980 acknowledged that it could not fulfill its promise so long as the unified curricula, enrollment, and job assignment plans remained basically unchanged.

Even with the credit system, the bulk of instruction remains fixed—most in core subjects, 20-25% in politics, language and sports, with only 7-10% in optional courses.⁵¹ One Chinese academic categorizes CSs according to Chinese experience:⁵²

- The planned CS, as seen in key universities in Beijing, Nanjing and Wuhan, includes required and optional courses in a ratio of 7:3, with no limit on optional courses.
- East China Normal and Jilin universities use a more traditional system with less flexibility, as students are not allowed to graduate early.
- Another type of system combines the two formats; the academic year system can be used for the first two years and the CS for the last two.
- The weighted CS, as illustrated by Beijing Aviation College, is all-inclusive and assigns different weights to different elements, such as for moral education and from work performed outside the classroom.
- The Special Zone CS allows for more freedom than the others.

Thus, the implementation of the CS in China permits enough flexibility to allow for a certain degree of experimentation among operating units. It classifies courses into: (1) required (*bixiuke*), which usually includes major, public and basic courses; (2) restricted-optional (*xianxuanke*) courses that are within the major, and (3) *renyi xuanxiuke* (abbreviated as *renxuanke*) courses that are cross-departmental optional courses. Academics disagree on how courses should be distributed between major and non-major subjects. Some suggest that required courses should constitute about 85% of total courses taken. Specialized courses account for the remaining 15%, in which elective courses are placed.⁵³ Others support the 7:3 ratio between required

and optional.⁵⁴ Among optional courses, a suggested ratio of cross-departmental optional to restricted-optional is 2:1, thus allowing students to take most of their optional courses outside their major.⁵⁵ But at Jinan University in Guangzhou, where core courses take up 70-80% of all hours, the credit system appears not to allow students to take many electives; this has resulted in an imbalanced structure of knowledge.⁵⁶

Advantages of the system as transferred

Compared with the academic year system, the CS offers a flexibility that better tailors to students' individual needs. Students can select the courses they want in the areas they desire to study. The academic year system is seen as too rigid. In contrast, students in the CS can move more at their own pace. Some can graduate early—175 of Nanjing University's 1978 class. Courses can be better coordinated and teaching hours reduced. Bright students can graduate earlier by taking more credits or by being excused from subjects they have already mastered. The top students at Jiaotong University and at a Wuhan polytech were exempted from class attendance to pursue independent study. On the other hand weaker students are allowed more time to study. Work and practical experience can be integrated into more flexible schedules.⁵⁷

Allowing for double-majors permits students to study in related fields, as was the case at Zhejiang University.⁵⁸ Students can expand their knowledge beyond their specializations.⁵⁹ The CS also provides a mechanism for measuring overall student achievement. Students can be assessed according to grade-point averages where credit is computed according to the grades achieved in a course.⁶⁰ Also, teaching can be improved. Instructors can design optional courses that relate to students' specific needs and the demands of the work-place. The system encourages teachers to develop additional marginal and new subjects. CS adoption forces an overall examination of education and teaching methodology and promotes education reform. Finally, it can help develop a reasonable and instructive teaching plan, shorten teaching hours and encourage careful selection of courses.⁶¹

Problems with the system as transferred

Many Chinese authors have pointed out problems that may occur in a CS. Some students seek credits only for meeting graduation requirements, and they care little about what they learn. In order to get credit, students will choose easy courses, select courses blindly, or follow the crowd to popular

courses. They will do only what's required to achieve the minimum passing grade, which is 60. This creates the "long live 60" phenomenon.⁶²

Basic courses can be neglected. In this regard the *taotailü* is high for the U.S., but low for the academic year system. *Taotailü* is a term commonly used when discussing Darwin's evolution theory. It refers to those who don't survive, in other words, those who should be selected out. The term also refers to the elimination process for competitors in sporting events. Chinese educators use it to refer to students who don't master the minimum required knowledge, in other words, those who fail.⁶³

The CS creates other problems. Knowledge may be only superficial; a student becomes a 'Jack of all trades, skilled in none,' lacking systematic knowledge. Not only will some graduates not be qualified, but the variation in qualifications among similar degree holders will be greater. Students will not get sufficiently specialized education to meet national needs. Student-teacher relations will deteriorate, as students will become too independent and not seek or follow faculty advice. Teachers face a greater burden, in defining student needs and in devising new courses to meet these needs. Finally, the system can become administratively chaotic, an academic free-for-all.⁶⁴

SZU's credit system

The credit system was mentioned in Shenzhen City's first report on establishing SZU. In June 1984 Luo Zhengqi announced the decision to implement a credit system for the semester scheduled to begin on the new campus that September. By May 1985 SZU had become such an authority on the CS that it hosted a meeting on credit system implementation for its fellow Guangdong universities. It hosted a similar seminar in April 1994, participated in by officials from 50 tertiary institutions in the province.

The credit system played a major role in SZU's overall educational reform because it provided the structure (and indeed the legitimacy) in which to implement the concept of the Three Classrooms. Credits from work in all three classrooms went toward meeting graduation requirements. In addition to credits earned from classroom instruction—the first and primary classroom—students received credits for their part-time jobs (second classroom) and extracurricular activities (third classroom). In this way, the SZU system was unique among Chinese universities.

From 1984-1987 the SZU CS operated under a fairly confusing set of regulations which were intended to guide students, tutors and staff on how to

compute credits.⁶⁵ Full-time *benke* students needed 460 credits for graduation (other interpretations in official university documents put the number between 450-480). Credit was given for passing the final exam; class attendance was not mandatory. Of all credits, 94% were to come from the first classroom, and 6% from practice and investigation. Students were encouraged to spend less time studying in formal settings, take more courses outside their major and even to shift majors and departments if they desired. According to SZU's reform proposals of 1986, classroom work was to be limited to 24 hours/week. These hours were divvied up as indicated in Table 6.1. Part-time jobs (the second classroom) earned students 12 credits, for a total of 180 hours; at least 45 hours of participation in extra-curricular activities were required, for three credits. The regulations, unfortunately, are not instructive on how exactly to convert hours into credits, and mathematical inconsistencies surface when computations are attempted. The Academic Affairs Office left interpretation and implementation to the departments, which computed students' credits in order to figure out who was to graduate when.

Table 6.1: SZU credit allocation by course type (percentage)⁶⁶

	1986	1988	1993	1994
first classroom	94	90	100	100
<i>of which</i>				
required	70	<50	60-70	<80
restricted-optional	20	30-40	20-30	
optional	10	10-20	>10	>20
second and third classroom	6	10	-	-
<i>of which</i>				
short-term jobs		44		
military training		22		
part-time jobs		27		
third classroom		7		

1988 reform

A 1987 general report on SZU by an inspection team from the Democratic Association's national office alluded to student's lack of discipline "because of the credit system and optional courses." According to a university official almost a decade later, the late 1980s was a period which "over-emphasized quantity and students only pursued high credit numbers...and "long live 60."⁶⁷ Thus, a reform in 1988 attempted to tighten up the management of the

CS, while making it more flexible. Regulations specified the general tasks that were expected of the CS.⁶⁸

to make the educational system more flexible, so as to eliminate the restriction posed by four years' limit on accumulation of credits

to give students more choices and freedom in choosing courses. Then they will be more active in their study. Furthermore, the credit system aims at widening the scope and range of students' knowledge.

to make the courses more practical and to combine practice and learning together, so students can choose courses that they are interested or expert in, or courses which are useful for their future jobs.

In stipulating exactly how to count credits—a deficiency in the previous version—the new regulations cut required credits by almost 29% (see Table 6.1). Some of this cut was an accounting manipulation as public courses such as politics and PE were moved from the required to the restricted-optional categories. Whereas the former rules had considered PE a required course, the new regulations defined it as a restricted-optional course because it allowed students to choose between tennis, ping-pong, and other sports. The PE requirement had not changed, just the category in which it was placed. Within first classroom credits, almost 10% (40 credits) were earmarked for a minor (90% of students were reported to have a minor in 1988⁶⁹), 6% for the graduation thesis or design, and the remainder (84%) for the major (which also included the restricted-optional courses). The 1988 revisions omitted the wording from 1986 concerning the option to skip class, self-study, and pass the final exam. The new regulation, however, did *not* prohibit the practice; it just omitted it as a recommended option. In fact, in 1988, 10% of the students were reported to be taking over 70 hours of classes per week⁷⁰—almost three times the 1986 recommended academic dosage of 24 hours. Compared with their earlier permutation, the 1988 regulations made the credit system more workable and somewhat simpler, but students still needed staff assistance to figure it out. The system included both *credits* and *credit units*, a distinction which is not clear in the wording of the regulations. To figure out the value of employment hours, for example:⁷¹

If work-study is done during the term, 60-100 hours is equivalent to one credit unit—which means 3-5 credits. If work study is done during vacation, 120 hours are equal to one credit unit. This must be certified by the Work-Study Counseling Center.

In any case, not many students chose to graduate early: only a reported three in 1988 and 10 in 1989.⁷²

Post-Tiananmen rectification

Within its first months in office, the Wei-Wu administration issued regulations to gain more control over student affairs management.⁷³ The rules acknowledged the existence of the CS with the sentence: “Our school practices the credit system.” Omitted were sentences from earlier rules that had allowed students to change majors and departments. The new regulations included additional graduation requirements. There could be no failure in political or legal education courses for future degree holders. Students who failed to hand in over one-third of their homework or laboratory assignments received automatic fails. Whereas earlier rules had permitted students to study (i.e., accumulate credits) for up to seven years, the new edition did not actually address early or late graduation.

The regulations were rushed through (prepared within a month), and at first glance they appear not to be well thought-out. Actually, they were the result of numerous meetings and much confrontation between professional staff and the new school leaders—in the vein of politician-versus-civil service skirmishes. The compromise that resulted did not so much state a clear policy, but rather it avoided specifically prohibiting the enforcement of pre-existing policy. Viewed this way, the new rules were a mild non-endorsement of the existing credit system, and its elements of flexibility. For the next several years, the CS remained in limbo. The *1991 Yearbook* failed even to mention it. In actuality, no longer were students allowed to change majors/departments or allowed to take double degrees. (This policy became retroactive and SZU refused to award double degrees to the graduates in 1991 who had fulfilled all requirements under the previous revision). Now, students found it increasingly difficult to get an instructor’s permission to take courses outside their own departments, and few instructors would allow students to skip class and merely sit for the final exam, a far cry from the early years that encouraged students’ self-teaching.⁷⁴

The *1990 Student Handbook* indicated this directional change.⁷⁵ It mentioned nothing about the CS’s previously stated educational goals of flexibility, independence and self-study. The emphasis was on counting the number of credits (now equal to weekly class hours): 25 required to be taken each semester and seniors took 20; no more than 30 allowed unless with permission. A discussion of majors, minors, double degrees, and elective courses

Figure 6.1: Optional courses as a percent of total offerings⁷⁶




Table 6.2: Optional courses⁷⁷

time period	total courses	% optional
fall 1986	320	13.8
spring 1987	314	10.5
spring 1990	317	20.2
fall 1991	455	7.0
fall 1991	365	9.0
spring 1994	393	13.7

was absent. Students were allowed to take public-optional courses freely and should take no less than one optional course each semester.

A number of factors account for why the school's new administration in 1989 changed the system. First, the Wei-Wu administration denounced all reforms associated with their predecessor.⁷⁸ Luo Zhengqi's ideas were considered *ipso facto* educationally detrimental. Each of his policies was required to undergo a thorough review before it could be re-activated. Second, at that time, there was a growing concern among faculty that students were not being properly educated. Many students did not attend class. According to my staff colleagues, those who attended were not as motivated as those during the school's early years. Many of the best students skipped class altogether. SZU had emphasized work-study in the form of the second classroom since the school's inception, but by 1990 many faculty felt that students' education was being supplanted by their business activities. The second classroom had become the first classroom.

Third, the CS posed some administrative problems because it required considerable staff time to manage students who constructed their own class plans. The school approved 32 shifts in majors in 1988,⁷⁹ a time-consuming procedure requiring numerous chops (official red seals). Computing the credits took thousands of staff hours. The shifts among majors and moves between departments produced complaints among faculty and administrators. Transferring students were creating one-way flows between departments. To illustrate, half the students admitted as Mathematics majors in 1985 transferred to the Management Department.⁸⁰ Quality was not guaranteed. For example, in September 1989 ten students passed an exam and transferred into the Foreign Language department. These students, for the most part,

remained at the bottom of their class for their next three years of English study.

Finally, departments were not offering sufficient optional courses, and the most popular departments and courses became inundated with enrolling students. Optional courses are a key element of any credit system. Optional offerings varied at SZU from year to year, as indicated in Table 6.2 and graphically represented in Figure 6.1. One of the effects of the CS rectification was the elimination of elective courses, something which occurred by 1991. Thus, for the three years from 1990-1993 the underlying philosophy and mechanisms of the initial CS were virtually abandoned. The academic year system was instituted, in practice if not in written regulation.


1993 CS reforms

In June 1993 Cai Delin's administration promulgated new academic regulations.⁸¹ These rules encompassed many areas of educational reform, including transfer from *zhuanke* to *benke*, probation, examinations, double degrees, double majors, minors and concentrations, and the establishment of a grade point mechanism. The rules, in their preamble, stressed the commonly enunciated virtues of the CS: flexibility, student and teacher activeness, competition and students' curriculum individualization. The rules permitted students to graduate early, and they could extend their studies an additional year or two if they earned a double degree. Discontinuing study was permitted. Students could drop out at most two times, and the accumulated leave time could not exceed four years. Students with high class ranking (top 15%) would be able to take double majors, or take a second degree in another department on completion of the first. Students could take a second specialty within a major (*zhu fu xiu*) or get a certificate for systematic study in a concentration. Also, schooling could be interrupted by one or two years at a full-time job. Students could choose to downgrade their status from *benke* to *zhuanke*, and other regulations allowed for movement in the reverse direction.

Concerning the CS, students were to continue to take a minimum 25 hours of class per week (20 for seniors), and no more than 30 hours, except with special permission. Required courses counted for 60-70%, restricted-optional for 30-20%, and cross-departmental optional for not less than 10%. This meant that students had to take at least 2½ hours of courses outside their own department, which really equated to four hours (two courses) since individual courses at SZU were each two hours long. Only classroom hours,

not those from homework or second classroom activities, were counted for credit. Departments were given the authority to determine whether the required-to-optional ratio should be 6:4 or 7:3.

Figure 6.2: SZU credit system continuum, flexibility over time



On paper, the 1993 regulations attempted to reinstate some of the policies that the Wei-Wu administration had suspended, but they also left standing various policy modifications made from 1989-92: denial of credit for second and third classroom activity, the elimination of inter-departmental transfers, abandonment of self-study that permitted student truancy, and the prohibition of unlimited credit accumulation. These reforms received support from the municipal government, which listed CS reform among its ten measures for SZU,⁸² after which it was frequently mentioned in speeches and reports by university officials.⁸³ In perspective, the 1993 SZU reforms brought the SZU CS relatively closer to, but still far away from, a *laissez-faire* model. CSs vary according to flexibility and may be placed on a continuum with the Soviet-styled academic year system and a *laissez-faire* system as end points (see Figure 6.2). Both the advantages and disadvantages mentioned below are more likely to be found as a CS approaches the *laissez-faire* paradigm.

The regulations were further amended in 1994 to allow students to take more required courses (up to 80%) and fewer optional (a few as 20%).⁸⁴ Maximum permitted course load was raised 17%. In addition, certain restrictions—e.g., placement in class standing—were eliminated in an attempt to expand the pool of candidates for double degrees and double majors. Limitations, however, were put on students who suspended their studies: permitted accumulated leave was halved to two years. Students were given five days to choose courses (down from 10 days). Despite official rhetoric to suggest otherwise, the sum of 1994 changes amounted to trying to push more

students through, quicker. The university was trying to “market” double degrees and double majors. In terms of bringing in general education, the 1994 revision was a more restrictive system, in other words a conservative reform. The changes could be construed of as a liberal reform only in the sense that students were given more flexibility to take additional required courses or to attempt “doubles” for which they were possibly not qualified (as measured by class standing). At the time of this writing (1998), the extent that these regulations influence students’ study is not known. It is unlikely, however, that they will have much effect. In the past, few students at SZU have chosen to increase their work loads in order to earn “doubles,” and few had condensed their studies in order to graduate early. Only 44 students in the first seven enrolled classes were reported to have chosen to graduate early. Based on enrollment figures, this represents fewer than 1% of all students.

The CS underwent a minor tinkering in 1996.⁸⁵ Students were allowed to take more required (85%) and fewer optional (15%) courses. Whereas the 1994 rules had specified that part-time jobs and social practice should amount to 25-40% of total credits, this was lowered to 5-25%, further dismantling the second classroom. The new regulations removed some flexibility in terms of second degrees, no longer permitting students to take two degrees at the same time.

Language in the 1996 regulations required first-year students to take “generally 22” credits, rather than “at least 20.” Return to study for students who had dropped out was less tolerated. The new rules permitted only three, not six, courses to be retaken, within one year, rather than within the two years allowed in the earlier regulations. Fewer credits were required for graduation—160-175 versus 170-180 for the four-year *benke* and 130-40 versus 140-145 for three-year *zhuanke*. In sum the 1996 rules made academic life both less demanding and less flexible for SZU students.

Educational issues raised

Insufficient optional courses, as noted above, plagued SZU’s credit system. The lack of optional offerings happens often in Chinese tertiary education.⁸⁶ (In contrast, U.S. universities have an often confusing array of courses, sometimes with total courses offered outnumbering the total available faculty.⁸⁷) In 1993, SZU opened only about a dozen public-optional courses to all students (see Table 6.3, next page). The most prestigious department, IFT, offered none. Other courses were open to non-majors, only with per-

Table 6.3: Public-optional courses actually offered by department, 1992-1993⁸⁸

Architecture: painting pen and ink drawing, architectural drawing, photography, famous architects and masterpieces.
Chinese: Kejia culture, history of science, Taiwan/HK literature; I ching.
Civil Engineering: real estate management.
Economics: labor economics, accounting fundamentals, marketing.
Foreign Language: college English for non-majors, advanced English, Japanese, English literature, Canadian economic selections.
Law: introduction to law; foreign economic law; HK law; international law.
Management: management psychology, economic analysis, capital investment.
Mechanical Engineering: Japanese for science.

mission of the instructor. Most instructors, especially those in IFT, refused to allow non-majors to take their courses. In addition, the university did not publish a catalogue with course descriptions, so students were provided little information on which to base course selection. Departments did not provide educational counselors who could advise students on optional courses, double degrees, minors or concentrations because such information was not shared between departments.

The interdisciplinary nature of the credit system goes against the departmentalization of curriculum.⁸⁹ Compartmentalization in academia results in a lack of professional dialogue among teachers. A Fulbright Fellow who taught history at Northeast Normal University, in Changchun, Jilin Province, has noted that his Chinese colleagues “seldom talked with and frequently did not even know other faculty members teaching in the same general field but in different departments or units of the university.”⁹⁰ This problem is not unique to Chinese tertiary, however. A study of Columbia University found that “departments in the university exist in inglorious isolation from each other, intellectually as well as organizationally,” prompting its author, sociologist Daniel Bell, to fear “intellectual provincialism” and the specialization of knowledge.⁹¹ On the administrative level, these problems of department turf tended to disable the CS at SZU. For example, in 1991, when IFT students wanted to study Japanese in the Foreign Language Department, they were charged fees. Subsequently, IFT instructors refused to let English majors enroll in trade and finance courses.

In 1994 the Foreign Language Department was approached about opening university-wide courses to be taught in English in the subjects of eco-

nomics and business. Using U.S. college level texts donated by the Asia Foundation, San Francisco, these courses would be open to students with a sufficiently high level of English language proficiency. Academic Affairs opened the course and the Foreign Affairs Office agreed to allocate an expatriate teacher. Foreign Language, however, refused to include the course in its curriculum. As the assistant head explained: "We don't want students from other departments. If students want to take this course, they should have to pay fees to do it."

Departmentalization produces other problems. Students have reported considerable interdepartmental overlap and duplication in offerings between majors, especially in the areas of business, economics and administration/management. One student likened these courses to a "heap of loose sand." Overlap also existed within a major, as teachers within a department often would not coordinate their course offerings. One year's courses, however, were not necessarily prerequisites for the next. Logical progression eluded some course sequences. Sometimes, freshmen took the same courses as seniors.

A major adjunct to the CS as practiced in the U.S. is an advisory system. Because of greater flexibility and less administrative control, students in the American system possess much freedom of choice and have to make a lot of decisions: choosing a major/minor, selecting courses and choosing electives. Either a student must be self-directed or rely on expert advice. This advice usually comes from a professional course advisor, either a faculty member in the major department or someone who works out of the student affairs or dean's office. Advice may be offered by the individual advisor from the student's first arrival on campus. Individual faculty may also advise students, and fellow students, of course, provide help.

Since students have little choice in the academic year system, they do not need course advisors. When the academic year system is converted into a credit-based system, however, the course advising function is often not included. Chinese educators have commented that students need academic guidance counselors and should be provided the necessary information to choose courses.⁹² After post-Tiananmen rectification, SZU lacked such a guidance system although one existed during the school's first years.⁹³ Departments were left to advise their own students and, in the absence of a course catalogue, they had little advice to offer. Few teachers were knowledgeable about courses offered across departments.

Given faculty-student detachment at SZU and the absence of knowledgeable advisors, students relied on their peers for help in picking optional

courses, something consistent with the “importance of friends and classmates over that of teachers and political counselors in shaping the activities and decisions of college students.”⁹⁴ SZU students, however, enjoyed only a small circle of friends and had little interaction with those outside their immediate circle. Since students took all their classes with their fellow majors and lived, ate and relaxed with them as well, they did not have easy access to information on optional courses; they generally relied on hearsay, not facts.

Conclusions on the credit system

The structure, but not intent, of the American CS was transferred to SZU. In the American setting, credit systems are a means for providing and coordinating general education. SZU has never purported to provide general education. The big omission in the school’s curriculum rests in the social sciences, subjects which are also not taught in the Shenzhen secondary schools. In contrast, the American system requires college students to sample these fields via distribution requirements. For example, the University of Texas, San Antonio, in 1985 required students to take 12.5% of their credits in the social sciences, 7.5% from physical sciences and mathematics, and 15% in languages and culture. The remaining 37.5-50% were in the major and 16-20% in the minor.⁹⁵ In comparison, SZU allocated roughly 70% of the credits to the major, and 15% each to language and moral/political/physical education. Few courses in the social sciences were available.

Should those educated in the SEZ be exposed to sociology, psychology and other social sciences? Current education policy responds in the negative. In fact, SZU’s general education included only two hours per week of physical education and four hours of required moral and ideological courses. The university’s actual training of *rencai* revolved around specialties, not general education; but the associated rhetoric stressed other needs, as in the preamble to the 1993 reforms, noted above. Those regulations’ requirement that students spend a minimum of 25 hours in class per week is an *ipso facto* denial of many of the preamble’s goals. Spending so much time in class precluded independent study. Even if the pedagogy had allowed for the methods discussed in the previous chapter, students themselves could not have found sufficient time to prepare essays or term papers or do readings related to their courses. Furthermore, the goal of widening students’ knowledge was contradicted by the fact that departments were not required to offer public-optional courses, nor were instructors required to admit non-majors to their classes. The stated goals suggested that education should involve more than

cramming information and regurgitating it for exams. Yet nothing in the rules prodded faculty to give term papers, take-home essay-type exams or exam papers with a substantial essay component. The 1993 CS reforms, therefore, may be viewed as *necessary*, but not *sufficient* to reform SZU's closed system—one that transmitted knowledge but did not train ability.

In sum, the reform of the CS at SZU served only as one part of an overall educational reform geared toward flexibility. Other components were early/late graduation, changing majors, double degrees and double majors. Outside the larger context of educational reform, the CS was merely a way to manage students' schedules. Ten years after the credit system was initiated, it still remained under reform with the good intention of moving students from "You want me to study" to "I want me to study," as reported in the Shenzhen media.⁹⁶ The problems noted above have continued to impede reform and, in other words, sustained the need for perpetual reform.

Foreigners at SZU

"Foreigner" (*wai guo ren*) is a designation that covers persons who are not citizens of the PRC (either ethnic Chinese or members of one of the nation's 50-plus ethnic minorities). In common usage, however, the term excludes Chinese who live outside of the PRC. Residents of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau are considered "compatriot Chinese" (*gang ao tai tongbao*⁹⁷); ethnic Chinese who live elsewhere in the world, including the U.S., are often referred to as "overseas Chinese" (*haiwai huaren* or *huaqiao*). For the purposes of this volume, the term *foreigner* generally uses the race-based definition that applies in the PRC.

The largest foreign presence at SZU, in terms of sheer numbers, involved visitors to campus. From 1984-86, 2,457 foreigners visited SZU. In 1987, 900 guests arrived from 21 countries. Some were individual visitors, but most came in delegations, with 52 educational groups accounting for 500 visitors. Over 1,100 foreign visitors came to SZU in 1988. The post-Tiananmen rectification saw a drastic decrease in visits by foreigners. In 1989 and 1990, SZU received 213 and 574 visitors, respectively. School authorities preferred small, officially-sanctioned delegations (they averaged seven people in 1990) and did not want random visits. Regulations issued in May 1990 informed all departments that receiving foreign guests without prior approval from the Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) was strictly prohibited.⁹⁸

If there is a need to invite foreigners or Hong Kong people for lecturers or research, work-units must submit the number of visitors, their identities, lecture content and other details. With the approval of the leaders, invitations can be sent out.


This particular provision was enforced with much discretion. The head of FAO, Zhang Ye, was a CCP member and former English teacher whom President Wei Youhai chose for the job. Zhang's decisions on who could lecture were based on subjective factors, which he chose rarely to explain; thus, some foreigners were allowed to visit, and others were not. For example, an American professor, who was widely published, was refused permission to lecture on "Trends in American Literature," with the explanation that literature as a subject lent itself to too much politicization (Zhang's own field was American literature!). Rectification's impact on visitors declined over time; in 1991 SZU received over 1,000 foreign visitors. During 1992-1993, about 2,400 foreigners visited SZU, of whom 768 came from overseas schools, including 603 students. In subsequent years, visits by foreigners leveled off to about 1,200 per year, with an average of two nine-person delegations visiting each week. To put this number in perspective, famous universities in China also report receiving 1,000 or more foreign visitors a year. But in the case of Beijing Normal University, for example, many of these 1,000 guests attended one of the 10 international conferences that the university sponsored that year. Most of SZU's foreign guests, in contrast, visit as tourists, rather than as scholars. Among the tourists have been over 90 principals of foreign educational institutions. The in-flow of foreign visitors is presented graphically in Figure 6.3.

Management over foreign affairs

The Guangdong expert group that initially recommended setting up a comprehensive university had suggested that only foreign-related majors (e.g., foreign-related law, foreign trade and finance, foreign language) be established. This idea was quickly modified by the municipality to include subjects like Chinese, engineering and the natural sciences, but the notion that SZU was to be closely connected with foreign things had been clearly established.⁹⁹ Almost from the start, the university encouraged a foreign presence on campus as a demonstration of its determination and commitment to educational reform. Functionally, foreign affairs work was run out of the President's Office with three or four fixed staff and several work-study students.

In 1986 the International Cultural Exchange Center was set up to take over foreign matters, which included handling foreign teachers and students, sponsoring conferences, arranging for foreign visits by SZU staff, research exchanges and relationships with overseas institutions, and inviting these insti-

Figure 6.3: Inflow of foreign visitors¹⁰⁰



tutions to offer training courses at SZU. The Center and the FAO were basically synonymous, in both personnel and function.

After 1989, the SZU CCP Committee took over “important foreign affairs issues” and management of foreign affairs formally became one of the president’s functions. For the first time, a full-time manager (Zhang Ye) at the department-level was appointed. In 1990 director Zhang wrote that in the past SZU had experienced “lenient management and chaos in foreign affairs.”¹⁰¹ Many school authorities dealt directly with foreigners and willfully did whatever they wanted: *duo tou dui wai*, multiple heads facing foreign. Thus from 1990, to ensure accountability, each work-unit in the university was required to designate one person in charge of foreign affairs work. Under Zhang’s leadership, FAO expanded in many areas: overseas students, overseas trips by SZU staff, and exchanges with foreign institutions, which are discussed below. FAO staff in 1991 increased to five fixed staff, two temporary personnel and three work-study students. By 1993, there were six FAO staff, all CCP members. No other office could boast an equally high Party membership. In 1994 Zhang Ye left SZU to take a job with local government (he later went to Australia for doctoral study). His replacement was Tan Zaixi, the head of the Foreign Language Department who was forced to


change jobs because of a corruption investigation. Under Tan, the FAO was formally renamed International Office; fixed staff expanded to eight, aided by five full-time personnel and two part-time employees.

The most visible on-going foreign presence at SZU took the form of overseas teaching staff and foreign students. Teachers from abroad were hired after the university moved to the new campus, and they numbered about a dozen per year. Overseas students were a later phenomenon. Through the 1980s, foreign students numbered fewer under twenty at any time; enrollment expanded so that by the mid-1990s, several hundred students (mostly from Japan, South Korea, and North America) were living at SZU while enrolled to study Chinese language.

Foreign students

Foreign students at SZU were of two types: private students and those in exchange programs. In the latter category, exchanges have taken place with several schools including Kumamoto University of Commerce (Japan), Central University of Central Lancashire (Preston, U.K.), Griffith University (Australia), Macau University, and a French commercial college. These exchanges were regulated by signed agreements. For example, the “sistership” agreement with Kumamoto, signed in December 1987, provided for both student and teacher exchange. Regarding the former, two students were to be exchanged annually. No tuition, accommodation or medical fees were charged either party, and academic credits were transferable between institutions. Although students paid their own air fares, SZU provided the Japanese students ¥180/month and the SZU students received J ¥70,000.¹⁰² The first two students arrived in September 1988, after which the exchange became routine. The year 1988 saw the first of what was to become large-scale Kumamoto student visits. In December a 65-student group from the Japanese sister school visited with five teachers, stayed for several days and even played baseball with the SZU team. Thirty Kumamoto students visited SZU in 1991 and took several classes in international trade. That same year the exchange agreement was extended in perpetuity, amended so either party could withdraw after giving one year’s notice. The third group of SZU students had returned from one-year study by May 1992. They reported that they had adapted to the Japanese style of teaching within one or two months.¹⁰⁴ The Kumamoto exchange represented more foreign students than the other schools’ programs combined.

Figure 6.4: Foreign student enrollment¹⁰³



Most foreign students, however, paid private tuition. The program at SZU started off informally on a tutorial basis, but as student numbers grew, formal classes were set up. Enrollment of foreign students is presented graphically in Figure 6.4. In its 1995 accreditation self-evaluation, SZU set a target for the year 2000 of taking 200 foreign students annually; it achieved that goal in 1997. This approximates the number of overseas students at Nanjing University or Shanghai University. (Other universities have even more foreign students—e.g., 600 at Beijing Normal, 400 Suzhou, 350 Fudan, 260 at Liaoning.) Besides teaching Chinese to overseas students, some foreigners who are already fluent in Chinese are enrolled in undergraduate or graduate programs in the Chinese tertiary system.¹⁰⁵ But by 1994 SZU had enrolled and awarded a bachelors degree to only one foreign student—a Sudanese in the Management Department.

From the start teaching foreign students Chinese at SZU was fraught with problems. First, there were no teachers trained to teach Chinese to non-native Chinese speakers. The FAO hired staff fluent in English or Japanese to be teachers, but not one of them (until 1994) had received instruction in how to teach Chinese as a second language. Second, students constantly complained that the FAO paid little interest to their studies and was only after their tuition and room rent. These concerns are reflected in the comments by René LeBlanc, in the ethnographic account that appears later in this chapter. A percent of tuition was retained by FAO for operating costs and

bonuses for personnel. Indeed, the welfare of FAO staff was directly related to foreign exchange tuition—the office’s side-business—and much effort was devoted to marketing, including advertising in Japan and Korea, the countries which by the mid-1990s supplied the bulk of students. Tuition, which had to be paid in foreign exchange, was valuable because it could be recycled to pay the expenses of SZU leaders who traveled abroad, an endeavor which, described below, required considerable cash. A year’s tuition for Chinese language students in 1996 was US \$1,800 and US \$1,900 for a foreigner who wanted to be an SZU undergraduate. Daily room rates were US \$4.25-6.00 for a double room (priced higher for air conditioning) and US \$8.50 - 12.00 for a single. Tuition and accommodation prices were generally in line with what is charged foreign students at other Chinese universities.¹⁰⁶ The profit generated from foreign tuition, estimated by an insider to exceed US \$200,000 in 1995, went into the president’s discretionary fund; the payment was a private, non-transparent transaction between the FAO head and the SZU president.

The third problem in teaching foreigners was that many foreign students did not take their study seriously. Some students with ulterior motives were consumed with activities such as proselytizing or searching for a mate or sexual partner. Native English speakers usually found jobs on or off campus teaching conversational English. The Japanese students were the least serious, and most of them stopped going to class within several weeks of their arrival. Japanese universities, in sharp contrast with the country’s secondary schools, are not demanding of their students; college life serves as a relaxing hiatus between high school and the workplace.¹⁰⁷ Many Japanese university students, even before graduation, have informal commitments from future employers for permanent jobs after graduation. While at university they hold down full-time jobs, from which they take an occasional break for a few weeks to cram for exams. Japanese students at SZU brought with them this academic non-work ethic. They had plenty of cash and were enjoying Shenzhen’s low cost-of-living (relative to Japan’s, of course). Many Japanese students, who lived in the Chaoxi complex housing foreign teachers, stayed up late into the night, signing karaoke, playing cards, and drinking.

Another category of foreign student is the research scholar. SZU did not draw many foreign scholars who used the university as a base from which to undertake their research. A few academics had selected the university as their sponsoring *danwei* (work-unit), and they were usually associated with the SEZ Economics Institute. Most overseas scholars, however, preferred to use one of the universities in Beijing, Shanghai or Hong Kong, which offered

better research libraries. Another disincentive was cost. Scholars who sought SZU sponsorship in 1993 were told by FAO that they had to pay US \$3,000, an amount generally in line with what other Chinese universities charge. (In 1997, Liaoning charged \$2,500, Nanchang \$4,000, and Fudan, \$4,800).

Foreign teachers

Overseas teachers such as Jane (see the ethnographic boxed story, next page) were never part of the regular SZU teaching staff because most fixed staff in Chinese *danwei* are required to be Chinese citizens; foreigners are excluded. For that reason, none of the statistical analyses in preceding chapters has included expatriate teachers in their computations. SZU's foreign teachers signed different contracts from their Chinese colleagues, were generally housed together in Chaoxi Building that was run exclusively for foreigners, and were precluded from participating in the management of teaching or student affairs. This situation occurs in all Chinese universities; in fact, an internal document circulated to university foreign affairs offices explains how and why foreign teachers should be treated differently from local staff.¹⁰⁸

In the years before 1988, however, expatriates at SZU were somewhat integrated into the university. At that time, SZU hired four or five "foreign experts" (*waiguo zhuanjia*) annually along with a variety of short-term lecturers. These teachers were expected to teach courses for which there were no available SZU staff; exchange was designed to "build a solid foundation for SZU to establish and develop new subjects and extra-curricular courses."¹⁰⁹ A secondary benefit was that teaching in English could train SZU students to think in English. The hiring and management of foreign experts was handled by individual departments. Thus, Economics hired a specialist on political economics, Architecture hired a designer and an engineer, Law employed an American to teach American contract law, Hong Kong residents taught about markets and personnel management, and Foreign Language hired an anthropologist to teach culture and language. In these years the employment of full-time foreign experts was administrated by SZU, but the process had to conform to the regulations of the Foreign Experts Office of the State Council, which loosely oversaw policy. The SZU experts signed a standard contract drafted in Beijing. The agreement was similar to those in use throughout China for expatriates hired to work as teachers in universities or as consultants to government or state companies. Normally, the standard contract provided for a salary that exceeded that of

Box 6.1: Jane - young whirlwind

Jane is single, in her early twenties and loves her work. She plans to stay for a year to experience China and then move on. Not interested in a teaching or academic career, Jane holds a degree from a undistinguished American college. Jane works with students out of class, and has become good friends with them. They consider her a good oral English teacher because she is entertaining and makes class-time fun. Jane started teaching the day after she arrived in China; her department has given her no textbooks; she “wings it” not following a class plan. Individualizing instruction, she redivided her class according to student’s ability and gives the better students more difficult assignments. The weaker students get remedial help. Sometimes she is fortunate to rely on materials left by previous teachers. Still, the department is not sure if Jane’s students are learning anything. Since she does not know her Chinese colleagues or even the identity of the head of her department, she is unable to develop strong relationships with her colleagues. She finds China, especially the crowding, at times stressful; this stress is complicated by the fact she is romantically involved with one of her students.

Chinese colleagues (the amount varied from region to region), and part of it had to be paid in hard (convertible) currency, such as U.S. dollars. Experts were furnished accommodation above the local standard, that included a color television, air conditioning and a refrigerator. Most importantly, they also received an annual return air ticket to their home country, and an allowance for shipping baggage upon departure.¹¹⁰

The foreign experts hired by SZU before 1988 included several academics who were associated with American universities. A faculty member from Purdue University taught design in Architecture, and he was responsible for recommending the equipment that the department later purchased to set up a computer-aided design laboratory. An expert in the Economics Department taught bilingual economics courses—on international economic organizations, for example—for which there were no available SZU teaching staff. While at SZU, he collected data for a dissertation that he later completed at Columbia University. Another expert taught in the FLD; he too collected data for his dissertation, which was in anthropology at the University of Michigan. These three individuals were examples of foreign experts who, on the basis of training and scholarship, were on at least the same intellectual plane as their SZU colleagues. They were also integrated into school affairs. Some attended faculty meetings, and one provided editorial assistance to the

Shenda Tattler, the semi-weekly broadsheet of the English Club. They were accommodated among Chinese faculty, and their integration into campus life was aided by their familiarity with China, its language and culture.

After having taught at SZU for several years, these three experts returned to the U.S. around early 1988. At that time, the SZU administration stopped hiring foreign experts. In a move designed to demonstrate the university's autonomy from state control, SZU administrators decided to delink the school from Beijing and the modest amount of oversight that had come from the Foreign Experts Bureau. When the three foreign experts left, the hiring of new staff provided a convenient opportunity to downgrade the level of expatriate staff from foreign expert to foreign teacher. At that time, foreign teachers in China generally received less salary than foreign experts and were usually not given return air tickets or a baggage allowance. They were not expected to be experts in academic disciplines, but rather native English speakers who could teach oral English. In early 1988, SZU hired three expatriates. All three accepted foreign teacher terms, an act that assured the university that it no longer needed to provide the incentive of expert status in order to attract foreign teachers. Two of the newly hired teachers, who had enjoyed expert status in Shanghai, longed to move close to Hong Kong, and they were willing to accept less favorable terms. The other new teacher, a proselytizer, was willing to accept whatever terms SZU offered. Often, English teachers in China receive supplemental funding from religious organizations in their home countries; salary from the Chinese university is not a major concern to them. Over the years, about half of SZU's expatriates received this type of support; the FAO in one instance even negotiated several teachers' contracts with a religious service organization in Hong Kong.

In 1988 more departments opted for a foreign presence, hiring in total 15 foreign teachers. Representatives of the State Council's Foreign Experts Bureau visited campus in October and gave their approval of SZU's method of managing foreign teachers. FAO acknowledged in its 1988 report that "foreign teachers had been helpful in improving students' English levels" and the presence of foreign teachers was mentioned in the 1990 recruitment brochure given secondary school seniors. But departments themselves were generally not pleased. According to the Physics Department's annual report, for example:¹¹¹

in the beginning students were interested [in the class taught by the foreign teacher], but then because of improper teaching methods, many students, especially those with poor oral abilities, dropped out. So the department as-

Box 6.2: Jim - pensioner

Jim thinks of himself as an old China hand. He has been a wholesaler of stuffed toys from China for a dozen years. Now a pensioner, Jim and his wife decided to retire to Shenzhen, where he still does a little business on the side. He teaches several management courses he designed himself. Yet, he is frustrated because his promised textbooks have not yet arrived from Beijing. The levels of English among Jim's students vary widely. Many in the class understand little of his lectures. He assigned research papers but, after students protested to his department head, was forced to give an exam. Rather than a multiple choice exam, he gave students take-home essay questions. Again the students protested and the department told the students the exam would not count. "This isn't higher education," he complains. Jim also teaches some conversation courses which resemble "free talks" with no structured curriculum whatsoever.

signed a Chinese teacher to assist and improve teaching content; the method and result improved.

Problems such as those encountered in Physics and indeed *all* departments employing foreign teachers happened for various reasons. The fact that inexperienced, non-professionals were hired to teach English as a Second Language (ESL) was not an issue that the university addressed. Instead, a structural solution was imposed: foreign teacher management was put under the auspices of the FAO.

Edgar Porter in his monograph *Foreign Teachers in China* explores the motivations of individuals who come to the Middle Kingdom to teach. Through surveys and interviews for his dissertation, Porter discovered that teachers in Beijing in the late 1980s came to China primarily "to experience China." Most were not educators or scholars, but neither were they proselytizers. SZU in the years from 1988-1994—a period over which 33 foreign teachers worked at the university—received very few academics or scholars. Sixteen of the 33 were primarily interested in "experiencing China," and nine had come to China for missionary work. Over the period studied, fewer than 20% of SZU's foreign teachers had been trained to teach ESL. During these years I, myself, taught; I, too, had come to China for the experience and, like many of my colleagues, had had little teaching experience before my arrival (I had taught several planning courses while I was a graduate student).

The foreign teachers at SZU were equally divided between men and women. About 75% of them were unmarried; there was always at least one family with children. SZU teachers came primarily from the U.S., U.K., and Australia; about one-third could converse in Chinese; and for about half of the teachers, SZU was their first experience in China. Only nine considered themselves professional teachers (five of whom were actually retired teachers). There was a mismatch between foreign teachers' skills and their teaching assignments. For example, a Survey of Economic Magazine Articles in Foreign Trade was taught not by an economist, but rather by a registered nurse! Accountants taught English in the Chinese and Economics Departments. A Taiwan-born American, as mentioned in the previous chapter, attempted to teach composition in Foreign Language. The most extraordinary mismatch involved a famed linguist—himself a former student of Noam Chomsky—whose major teaching assignment in the FLD was to teach video. This was not a class in film criticism, however. The students requested that the teacher not discuss the films, just operate the VCR. This Chomsky protégé, who himself had developed internationally recognized linguistic theories and while teaching at SZU had attracted 80 scholars to a lecture he gave at Hong Kong University, spent four afternoons a week watching English language feature films with his Chinese bride and his students. When told of his underemployment, the FLD head replied that the department already had too many linguists for too few courses and that there were no available Chinese teachers to operate the video equipment. (Students could not be trusted to watch movies without a teacher present).

The SZU standard contract for SZU foreign teachers required them to spend twelve hours per week in the classroom, and either party could terminate on 30 days notice. No return airline ticket or baggage allowance was provided; teachers were charged rental for their dormitory room (amounting to 20 m² per person before 1991, 40-60 m² afterwards), and although they had to pay rental on furniture (including television, refrigerator and air conditioner), a monthly subsidy more than covered both room and furniture rental. Base salary was the highest for foreign teachers in China, but since remuneration excluded ticket and allowance, it was lower than what most foreign experts in the country received. Contractual base salary for three ranks in selected years appears in Table 6.4, page 399. Full professors were required to hold a Ph.D., regardless of field, and associate professors had to have masters. Lecturers had to have completed an undergraduate degree. Academic experience and ability, however, were not usually considered at

Box 6.3: Dr. Roberts - professional teacher

Dr. Roberts, whose spouse works on a two-year contract in a local company, is an American secondary school teacher by training. He teaches composition and literature. Roberts has taught elsewhere in Asia and feels he is more successful than he would be back home. "The students here are brighter...and they don't carry guns." Dr. Roberts (the students do not use his given name) is considered demanding and has a deserved reputation for strictness. "Sometimes it's like teaching primary school," he jokes. Since his wife's salary is enough to support their family, he is financially able himself to provide all the resources he needs for teaching. For example, when he needed textbooks, his wife's company air mailed them to China. Because of family obligations (The Roberts two children go to a local international school) Dr. Roberts spends almost no time with students out of class. He is considered a bit of an "old fogey" who does not relate much to Chinese culture. He and his wife live a Western lifestyle among the local ex-pats—in China, but in a world outside China.

the time of hiring. Rank (and thus pay) was based solely on academic credentials, which were often not verified.

The figures from Table 6.4 do not include a ¥1,400 travel bonus, departmental bonuses, or a monthly SEZ cost-of-living adjustment, which when added together could easily double one's salary. Thus, the contractual salary under-reflected real pay, the amount deposited directly into a staff member's university bank account. For example, my draft contract in 1994 (I actually worked my final year without a formal contract) stipulated a salary of ¥2,535. The same document specified a starting salary of ¥1,750 for my rank, associate professor. My pay stub—a thin strip of paper scissored off from the FLD computer print-out—for June 1994 reported a gross payment of ¥5,602, which included a ¥1,000 "other" amount, which was a subsidy to offset apartment rent (¥169.20) and furniture rental (¥312). The remaining "other" was due to a cost-of-living adjustment, although this was not provided for in the type of contract foreign teachers signed.

In addition, individual teaching departments could choose to supplement foreign teachers' salaries. Some departments gave their expatriates cases of soft-drinks or a "liquids bonus" for the hot months. FLD usually gave its overseas hires an annual bonus of ¥1,000 and a gift box of Nescafé and Coffee-mate. Architecture, however, in effect paid foreign teachers the equivalent of what a foreign expert would command elsewhere in China. A baggage allowance was provided upon departure, and supplemental bonuses (the department's profit-sharing plan) amounted to the price of a return air ticket

Table 6.4: Expatriate salary (in ¥)¹¹²

contract year	professor	associate professor	lecturer	annual rate of increase	annual rate of inflation
1988-1989	1,200	1,000	800	-	-
1989-1990	1,600	1,400	1,000	.33	.25
1990-1991	1,600	1,400	1,000	0	-.03
1991-1992	1,800	1,575	1,175	.12	.01
1992-1993	2,000	1,750	1,350	.11	.07
1993-1994	2,000	1,750	1,350	0	.20
6-year average				.11	.10

home. Architecture continued to hire its own foreign experts; they were never put under FAO jurisdiction and were not included in SZU-sponsored activities for resident foreigners. Unlike FAO which did not get involved in foreign teachers' professional or personal lives, Architecture manifested concern in various ways. The Department arranged and funded teacher's conference participation and once, when one of its foreign teachers became ill, Architecture staff made home visits and took over grocery shopping chores until the teacher recuperated. At various times, staff from other departments also took it upon themselves to befriend or come to the aid of needy foreigners, tasks not undertaken by FAO itself after 1990. By 1996, an expatriate associate professor in Architecture had a net salary of around ¥6,500 (accommodation and furniture were provided free). In contrast, lecturers in other departments reported salaries of around ¥3,000 a month, raised in early 1996 to ¥3,400.

For two academic years, SZU hired English teachers through the Project Trust, an organization in Scotland that placed British teenagers into teaching positions around the globe. These volunteer teachers possessed only secondary education and were taking a year off to teach before they entered a U.K. university. From 1990-1992 SZU hired six Project Trust volunteers, whose teaching quality, maturity, and adaptability to China varied greatly. All in all, neither SZU departmental administrators nor the students of these volunteers evaluated them as effective teachers, although one was rated by her students as the best teacher they had. That particular teacher had developed and used several of the innovative teaching methods described in the previous chapter. In contrast, other volunteer teachers failed to prepare at all for class; several had psychological problems, as perceived by their students, and one went drinking with her students at night and often canceled her

Box 6.4: William - preacher

William is a devout evangelical Christian, sponsored by his hometown congregation to spread the Word of Christ in China. An optician by training, he teaches a required listening and reading course in the English Department. In his 40s, William will remain in China as long as his church supports him and he feels he is successful. His teaching department provides textbooks—part of a set curriculum—which bore both him and his students. Since William teaches one section of a required core course, if his department changed texts for William, it would have to change texts for the other sections, which are taught by Chinese staff. Thus, William's complaints have gone unaddressed; rarely can he even find anyone in his department who speaks English. Still, William's department and his students are pleased with his teaching. He brings characteristics of an informal Western style. He, himself, is dissatisfied with his teaching, but his sub rosa missionary work is proceeding smoothly.

classes with them during the day. Despite the program's problems, the FAO was pleased with it, for each of the volunteers cost the university only about one-third as much as a regular foreign lecturer. In 1992, the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau, in response to a directive from the SEdC, required that all foreign teachers employed in Chinese universities be university graduates. Future Project Trust volunteers, thus, had to be assigned to teach English in Guangdong high schools.

Rectification and beyond

Regulations issued by SZU in 1990 centralized the hiring of foreign teachers. Departments, who had previously located, hired and paid expatriates on their own, were required now to take teachers provided by Foreign Affairs. (Several departments skirted these regulations, including Architecture, as noted above.) The FAO hiring process was assigned to the handler of foreign teachers, a young staff member who, when hired, had had no academic experience and little experience dealing with foreigners. Hiring expatriates entailed his sifting through scores of resumes and decisions were often based only on the submitted photo or the recommendation of a SZU leader. Little regard was paid to the prospective teacher's academic background or experience; credentials were never checked, and referees never contacted. (One hired teacher claimed the title "Dr." despite apparently never having earned a Ph.D.¹¹³)

During the rectification period, FAO was primarily concerned with foreign teachers' behavior. The overall policy was reflected in Zhang Ye's 1990 report:¹¹⁴

On one hand, we should provide careful services to [foreigners] so that they perceive the friendliness and hospitality of the Chinese people. On the other hand, we should have them understand that Chinese policies, regulations and customs of Chinese people are to be respected during their stay on this piece of land [SZU]. Those foreigners who raise offensive political issues and proselytize and violate school regulations should be seriously handled. Foreigners should not enjoy illegal privileges in school which even Chinese people do not enjoy. We should totally change the situation of the past of not controlling their behavior. Within legal confinements, foreigners should have freedom to do all sorts of things.

One small incident at SZU in 1990 had escalated into a diplomatic matter involving the Foreign Ministry of China and the U.S. State Department. On the first anniversary of 4 June 1989, a teacher displayed on the exterior of his front door a piece of black silk with the Chinese character *dian*, meaning "respectful grieving." The foot-square sign was removed from the door by the FAO staff member known as "dragon lady." When questioned, the foreign teacher demanded back his sign, which had been interpreted by FAO as a denunciation of Chinese domestic policy, specifically government action taken to quell the student protests of the previous year. SZU reported the incident to the upper levels; eventually the Guangzhou U.S. Consulate General was contacted by Beijing. The teacher and the FAO never had substantive discussions on the incident; his property was not returned. The teacher completed his teaching for the term and the Foreign Language Department arranged his teaching plan for the autumn term. A few weeks before the new semester was scheduled to begin, however, the teacher was informed that his apartment had to be immediately vacated for his successor. In this way, he was told that his contract was not being renewed.

In about a half dozen cases over the years, foreign teachers at SZU were fired in a similarly abrupt matter. Reasons for dismissal were often implicit, rarely explicit. Several firings seemed related to proselytizing and others to teaching quality, but many concerned personality conflicts between the foreign teacher and his/her department head. In several cases, students' complaints led to the school's decision not to rehire teachers, but more often than not, student complaints were dismissed. For example, an elective course taught by a foreign teacher was canceled when no students selected it. The

teacher had earned a reputation as dull and tedious, but she was favored by the department head. Subsequently, the department assigned the teacher to teach the same course as part of the required curriculum. The very students who had rejected the course as an elective one year were forced to take it as a requirement the next. In another instance, a single student complaint regarding teaching methods was used as justification for dismissing a foreign teacher. In sum, firing decisions by departments and FAO were made by individual leaders based on evaluative criteria that remained unstated and seemed to many observers to be nonexistent.

Foreigners at SZU operated under different rules and conditions than Chinese staff. A quote from Tan Zaixi, the FLD head who was to succeed Zhang Ye, is insightful for it raises many of the issues facing foreign handlers:¹¹⁵

When foreigners come to China to teach, because the cultural atmosphere is different and social and ideological system is different, it is inevitable that they have some conflicts with us. Based on my several years experience studying in the U.K. and working with westerners and my understanding of western culture, I have gradually developed a whole set of methods working with foreign teachers. In arranging their work and helping them solve problems, we are always full of enthusiasm and consider them part of our family, treated the same as Chinese teachers, especially not letting them have a sense of being discriminated against by Chinese people, and provide all sorts of conveniences for them, especially assigning a young teacher to be the foreign affairs secretary. *However, after all, they are foreigners.* In many respects we have to separate them from Chinese teachers, for example in terms of politics. But in terms of work plans we do not give them freedom to willfully arrange courses and change teaching content. If they want to change teaching content, change teaching locations or ways of examination, written reports are required. They have been working hard and accomplished some achievements. The university gave two of them awards of excellence several years in a row.

The phrase “separate but equal” sums up how FAO and department heads wanted to treat foreign teachers. FAO attempted to make foreign teachers feel special as its 1993 report stated:¹¹⁶

We try our best to create a good condition for foreign students and teachers, so they do not feel much inconvenience although far from home...we send cakes and birthday cards when foreign teachers have birthdays. When foreign teachers got sick, we sent them to hospital with delicious food...All foreign teachers work hard and are well prepared before class and are popular among

students and teachers of their respective departments. Teachers with foreign nationalities have been an important force in the teaching team at SZU and have contributed much to the improvement of SZU's English level. Good performance in Band 4 would not have been possible without foreign teachers job and the job of the FAO.

Only a few foreign teachers, in fact, taught Band 4 students, a fact that appears to have escaped FAO, at least as implied in the above quotation. In general, school authorities were ignorant of what and how foreign teachers taught. Their overall teaching was not supervised in a methodical way. Foreign teachers were included in the paper loop (class plans had to be filed, exemption from exams requested, grades turned in on time, etc.), but their performances were not evaluated in terms of substance. In fact, in 1993 the FLD head was unaware that a course described in the plan as European Geography was actually World History. The substantive content of courses did not matter as long as foreign teachers showed up at the assigned classrooms at the appointed times. Department heads took notice only if students raised specific complaints. As transient staff (average stay 1.7 years), they did not figure in departmental management, and their input was usually of little consequence. Most of them, who were English teachers and not scholars, had no interest in the research of their colleagues. As noted earlier, the few courses designed by foreigners never became permanent fixtures. The FLD, in assigning foreign teachers a special liaison, further isolated them from their Chinese colleagues. The liaison, a young teacher preoccupied with stock market investments and a new wife, failed to inform the foreign teachers of departmental activities such as outings or banquets. He was characterized as "clueless" about FLD foreign teachers, according to several under his management.¹¹⁷ Effective communications between expatriates and the FLD department rarely existed.

When Tan Zaixi took over FAO's helm, the emphasis shifted away from foreign teachers to other areas. The university sought to increase the number of foreign students and the foreign exchange their tuition generated. Another development involved exchanges with foreign universities, especially the "twinning programs," discussed below. By 1995 foreign teachers had, in budgetary terms, become a bargain. Although their ¥5,000 average monthly salary was about 50% greater than that of the average SZU teacher, they did not receive the hidden housing or welfare subsidies that the municipal government provided to SZU fixed staff. These subsidies could well average ¥5,000 per fixed staff member per month.

Foreign teachers in China overview

In general foreign teachers in China enjoy a love-hate relationship with their job and often with Chinese culture itself. The varied individuals' stories of SZU's expatriate staff which I collected over six years appear to mirror what has been published in several narratives by former teachers who worked elsewhere in China.¹¹⁸ Take the following quotations, for example:

It was clear that I was being watched, not for security reasons but for sport...Xenophobia, racism, rumor, and collective mistrust were deeply rooted elements of Chinese society...resigned myself to the fact that wherever I went in China, people would stare at me and try to practice their English on me...At times I felt like a walking target, and though English was my language, and though they had to struggle to keep from tying themselves up in their own sentences, the Chinese seemed to hold all the power in these encounters.¹¹⁹

Like a circus animal, you are an object to be handled, fed, exercised, amused, but isolated and watched. You are expected to perform your act, whether teaching or doing business, then go back into your reasonably comfortable cage for the night. You will be groomed and tended for the next performance but not allowed to stroll around the grounds or cause trouble among the customers. You are special. You get more hunks of meat, and your more commodious cage is cleaned and serviced. But, try to behave like a human being and leave your Barbarian cage, and the handlers will grab their whips, will send out dragoons to fetch you back and discipline you. The [foreign affairs office's] whole purpose in life is you. Your whole purpose in China is to escape from them unless, of course, you enjoy being a circus animal. Simply because you are called a Barbarian is no reason to act like one. Barbarians obey orders; humans don't.¹²⁰

'Free talk' involved relentless, vigorous conversation of absolutely no import that drove me to near-madness.¹²¹

It's the same at every level from planning courses to requesting paper: protracted negotiations, stalling, then everything happens in a rush; the clash of our 'go get 'em' culture which wants things done by yesterday, and the slow but sure Chinese method which wants things done in their own good time and according to the rules, which seem to be partly subconscious social codes, partly a very creaking bureaucracy, mainly the fact that no-one seems prepared to take responsibility for anything in case they get it wrong.¹²²

But every criticism—the hate element—is offset by a pleasure—the love element. The same four authors write:

I thought little of the Chinese university, but I was impressed by its affectionate, respectful, hardworking students. I told the group of engineering students that most of all I was impressed with the remarkable patience and good-naturedness Chinese college students maintained in the face of adversity. Each day passed was a day endured for them, and they passed their days without a murmur—without a thought—of dissent.¹²³

Those twenty-five [students] (and my other classes - all) are among the most delightful, curious, and intelligent human beings I have ever encountered. They are a teacher's dream; they are what I went to graduate school to find. They are not sophisticated; they have never travelled, have seen nothing; they have read and mastered everything put in front of them—but books are almost unavailable in China: no foreign exchange, old cultural xenophobia, sexual puritanism, Marxist dogmatism—the reasons are numberless. But those students want to read—to think (though no one has encouraged them)—to know.¹²⁴

My students told me again and again that if I ever wanted to see them I could walk into their homes any time of day or night. 'But what if you are busy?' 'It doesn't matter! If you come, I won't be busy anymore!' 'But what if you are asleep?' 'Then wake me up!'¹²⁵

I am always touched by the warm and natural affection that the students seem to have for one another and by the supportive nature of a close community where you never have to struggle with a task on your own...¹²⁶

At SZU, as well as at other institutions, students provided teaching's saving grace.

One major difference between SZU and most other Chinese universities, however, was that from the beginning there was never a concerted effort by SZU leaders to isolate and engage the foreign experts, who basically fended for themselves in terms of the matters of every day life. This was a marked contrast with other places in China, such as in Hangzhou, where Naomi Woronov lived in the Hangzhou Hotel for a time, while teaching at Zhejiang University. Guards at the gate, she reported, intimidated students as well as her colleagues, who needed signed and sealed letters from the FAO if they were to visit her. Isolation in Wuhan around 1984 took another form. Charles and Jill Hadfield, who taught in this heavily industrialized city in central China, wrote:¹²⁷

...all our meals have taken place behind screens, even in the campus dining room, where we are not allowed to go and queue up at the main mess hall with staff and students, but have meals served to us in a small dining room separated from the main one by a folding hospital screen. This image of The Screen has become a symbol in my mind for the elaborate measures taken to insulate the foreigner from ordinary Chinese life.

Re-accommodating SZU foreign teachers

Before 1991 about half of SZU's foreign teachers had lived in staff housing, occupying rooms on the third floor of a six-floor single-room dormitory, Yunpeng. The rest had lived in a newer dormitory, Chaoxi, which was set apart from other staff buildings. In its 1989 report, SZU's Security Office recommended that all foreigners, teachers as well as students, be assigned to a single building and that anti-theft devices (e.g., window bars, gates, etc.) be installed and that security personnel be earmarked for foreigners.¹²⁸ This did not happen until 1991 when SZU's Chinese staff who lived in Chaoxi were evicted to make room for foreign teachers relocated from Yunpeng, as well as foreign students relocated from campus hostels. Chaoxi was newly renovated and teachers were allocated more spacious accommodation. FAO told the foreign teachers that the Shenzhen government had required SZU to house foreigners together. This was not true; SZU had itself recommended the move to the city government; relocation was primarily intended to improve the management of foreign teachers. The reason was admitted in the *SZU 1991 Work Summary*, which reported that "the old situation of foreigner's living scattered and being hard to manage has changed."¹²⁹ Because of its location and layout, Chaoxi Building could allow for better monitoring of teachers and their visitors, but there is little evidence that this occurred. Visitors were not required to sign in; there was no restriction on overnight guests. Only the most blatant case of proselytizing resulted in disciplinary action. From 1988-1991 one teacher ran three congregations: one downtown, another in the nearby town of Nantou and the third on campus. Students would come to his apartment to sing hymns and pray in the evenings. The teacher had been warned by FAO over three years, but he had continued to preach as well as to baptize converts (using the bathtub). Public Security had discovered the teacher's activities in a province-wide investigation of unsanctioned religious activities (China requires that all religious activities be part of state-approved churches) and issued an expulsion notice, giving him and his family (which included a wife, three children, his sister-in-law,

and his wife's parents) three days to pack and leave China. Ironically, foreign teachers learned about the impending expulsion even before FAO. We were informed a week in advance by a student whose father worked for local government. Although Public Security initiated and handled the matter, SZU nevertheless took credit for expelling the teacher, boasting that the university "had proposed to relevant departments to send him away."¹³⁰

Evaluating foreign teachers at SZU

Department head's evaluation of foreign teachers at SZU was not structured, but rather it was impressionistic. Using the ethnographic cases presented in boxes in this chapter, an impressionistic evaluation might rate all the teachers positively:

Jane makes learning fun and the students enjoy speaking English with her. Jim, an old China hand, exposes his students to information he has acquired from years of experience in business. In following the mandated curriculum, William performs exactly as his department wants. Dr. Roberts, a professional teacher, gets the most out of his students.

Another evaluation of the same individuals might rate them all negatively:


Although they enjoy themselves, Jane's students learn little of value in her unstructured course. The English level of Jim's students is so low that they learn little in his class. William's students remain unchallenged by mediocre teaching materials. Dr. Roberts' students find both him and his course rather tedious and have lost interest in learning English.

The point made here is that different subjective evaluations based on identical data can be quite contradictory. Although both of the above assessments raise valid points, they do not substitute for methodical evaluation. Both provide incomplete and misleading analyses. A more systematic and rational evaluation framework is required. Some of the variables identified in the above cases relate directly to the teacher and his/her course while other factors remain outside the control of the teacher or department. All factors, however, contribute to the success or failure of the individual's teaching. These factors fall into four categories: the first two of which address what the teacher teaches and how s/he teaches it; the latter group includes factors not of the teacher's doing, e.g., requirements and constraints imposed on the teacher by the department, the university or the larger environment.

Teacher-specific variables relate to the qualities of the individual teacher. Jane was young, dynamic, inexperienced, stressed, a mediocre intellect, and in love. Jim was an old China hand, frustrated because he overestimated students' abilities. William obediently followed the rules (except for the anti-proselytizing regulations) as he strove to help his students spiritually and academically. Dr. Roberts, a trained teacher, tried to challenge his students but was detached from them.

The way teachers and their courses interface with their academic departments make up *department-related* variables. Jane received no guidance from her department; her oral English class was a required conversation course, the content of which was always left up to the individual instructor.

Figure 6.5: Variables affecting foreign teachers' effectiveness



Little more was required of her than to attend class and turn in grades based on a final exam. Jim taught advanced courses that did not fit into the department's curriculum. William's courses were coordinated with other courses in his department. Dr. Roberts' class was in his department's class plan, but he provided his own teaching materials.

Departments set the quality of foreign teachers' students, especially their English-language abilities, and this was usually beyond the control of the teacher. Sometimes, an instructor was permitted to give an elective course and thus able to control entry to the class. Usually, however, a teacher was assigned an entire class (all third-year computer majors, for example) and s/he had little control over the range of their abilities. Departments could also decide whether expatriates taught regular students (those admitted through the standardized admission tests) or whether they were assigned classes of fee-paying students and auditors, whose English level was often very low.

Certain factors rest on a different plane, beyond the control of the teacher or his/her academic department. These are *education system* variables that result from university directives, SEdC regulations or the culture's educational norms. Often the exam-based, rote-learning characteristics of traditional Chinese education which is "organized to inculcate conventional

ideas and a passive orientation to knowledge¹³¹ conflict with the teaching style of Westerners. For example, in dividing her students according to ability, Jane met opposition from her department. "All students should be treated equally," she was told. Jim wanted to assign students term papers and a take-home final. His students, however, who were required to sit in class for thirty hours per week, could find little time for independent study. In contrast to Jane and William, Dr. Roberts used a classroom style more closely resembling the native teachers. He taught grammar through repetition and exercise work. His literature course was really literary history—the memorization of facts about important Western authors and their works.

A final set of factors that affects the success of Western teaching at SZU has little to do with classroom activity. Rather, certain environmental factors serve as *exogenous* variables, which are not greatly affected by the teacher, academic department, or even the university. These factors influence the teacher's level of satisfaction and environmental comfort. Young Jane's teaching was affected by stress. Likewise, Jim could not reconcile his expectations of China with reality. William constantly had to balance his missionary zeal with restrictions placed on him by Chinese law, which prohibits proselytizing.

The educational system and the exogenous factors described above, that lie outside individual teachers' control, illustrate how these outside elements vary from teacher to teacher. Jane's department left her alone, gave her no text. Her course was part of the departmental sequence for majors, but every year a new instructor taught it differently—no continuity in texts, assignments or class plans. Accordingly, there was no consistency in what was learned. William's department was at the other end of the involvement spectrum. He was given texts and a teaching plan and his course content was the same as his Chinese colleagues taught. Unfortunately, William's western style of teaching was inappropriate for the course. In contrast, the course that Jim taught was not part of a regular curriculum. It was taught because Jim was available to teach it. Without Jim, there would have been no course. His difficulty in getting books was a problem his department was unable to overcome. Dr. Roberts solved the textbook problem by buying them himself, not an unusual solution for Western teachers in China.

To sum up, these variables are greatly entangled. A fair and honest evaluation requires a framework that shows an understanding of their interrelationships. Impressionistic evaluation, which was the only evaluation that existed for SZU's expatriate teachers, was inadequate in this regard.

Whether SZU enjoyed competent teaching from its expatriate staff over the years is not possible to ascertain, given the absence of adequate evaluation. An informal survey in 1990 asked junior English majors to evaluate their English language teachers, both native and expatriate. They expressed dissatisfaction with both groups of teachers. In terms of expatriates, the most common complaint was that the foreigners treated them as primary-school children and failed to challenge their intellects. One student expressed the views of her classmates in describing most courses taught by foreign teachers as “insulting our intelligence.” Another student noted that Chinese faculty members, themselves, did not consider SZU’s foreign teachers on the same intellectual plane.

Even if SZU managed to hire competent teachers, there was no incentive for them to stay. Merit-based promotions were not available (ranks were assigned according to the level of education obtained) because, as noted, only in 1990 and 1991 did any foreign teacher receive merit rewards based on performance, but the contract provision allowing for such merit awards was scrapped the following year and replaced by an automatic bonus, an unearned award given to each foreign teacher at completion of the annual contract.

At SZU evaluation scared foreign teachers. To some, especially to the risk-averse, evaluation meant criticism. Suggestions for improvement were interpreted as personal reprimands. Many teachers, especially those who lacked confidence, didn’t want new ideas thrust at them. Some considered old curricula and dated textbooks like family—not to be discarded. For academic evaluation to be successful, the very concept must first be accepted. If the intended beneficiaries of evaluation—teachers and administrators—are hostile from the start, the chances are good that the process cannot be successful.

In sum, successful overseas teaching is influenced by a variety of elements, involving personality traits, cultural sensitivity, excellent teaching skills, and knowledge of the subject being taught.¹³² Many factors that affected Westerner’s teaching quality at SZU were beyond the control of the individual instructors. These included how well a course meshed in the departmental curriculum, whether suitable texts were available, and whether the English level of the students was adequate. These factors varied greatly from teaching situation to teaching situation. Any fair evaluation of individual expatriate teachers would have to take this variation into account. The use of models, as discussed next, failed to be an effective substitute for systematic evaluation. In general, SZU’s FAO was not concerned with quality

among its expatriate teaching staff; the office at the very least failed to realize that, in regards to teaching, “not all foreigners are experts.”¹³³

Model foreign teachers

Models (such as honest Abe Lincoln) are a standard means of instruction in moral education. China’s most famous model, Lei Feng, was often brought out by SZU authorities during the semi-annual ideological education drives. SZU also used foreign teachers as models, mostly as exemplars for their foreign colleagues. Anthropologist Pollack explains:¹³⁴

Officials sought to preempt the occurrence of problems [caused by resident foreigners] with a time-tested method, used on Chinese themselves, for gaining relative control over people’s conduct. By providing foreigners with examples of worthy behavior..., authorities hoped to regulate their activities and minimize the negative effects of their involvements. Through rather diffuse channels, our hosts provided us with the rules of the game as they would have us play it. Our task, we were expected to realize, was to transform ourselves into living analogies of the proffered models.

Pollack elaborates on the case of a particular foreigner who worked at a Shenzhen hotel...“a favorite subject of Chinese journalists...[who was] written about and interviewed on more than one occasion.” This model “often said quotable things—the right kinds of things—which Chinese officials would, in the best of all possible worlds, have every foreign resident also saying (if not genuinely thinking) in their respective working contexts.”

Shenzhen journalists found a similar model among SZU’s foreign teachers. One particular SZU foreign teacher was singled out by both the FAO and the local media for special attention. Her picture appeared numerous times in the local press, often around the time of National Day, Teachers Day, or Women’s Day. An article about her appeared in a national newspaper in July 1995. When *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* launched a special English language edition in 1997, she was pictured as one of a handful of carefully selected foreigners. Although she herself did not read or write Chinese and knew little about Chinese culture, she provided an endorsement that was included as the forward of a bi-lingual dictionary of Chinese idioms edited by the head of Foreign Affairs. Her statements in the press provided a litany of quotes. In *China Daily*: “respecting old people means so much here. We respect the youth in our culture.” “Chinese students are diligent and quiet. They write well. But they’re not as talkative and active as students I have taught in Canada.”¹³⁵ In *Shenzhen Commercial Daily*: “I don’t want to

leave; Shenzhen is just like my home...I live happily here. Students are diligent and nice; colleagues are friendly. Many of my former students are working at their proper positions. I am contributing my own bit to the development of this city. I am proud of this city.”¹³⁶

FAO chose this teacher as a model for various reasons. She was purely an English language teacher and did not teach any subjects that might have created turf wars with her colleagues. In the words of a Chinese colleague, she “was not an intellectual threat to us.” Her lecture style was quite similar to the predominant pedagogy practiced in the FLD, where she taught. Although students gave her poor evaluations, they never complained to department leaders. She was accepted as a fixture, and she taught courses that no Chinese teacher was willing to teach. Unlike younger foreign teachers at SZU, she did not socialize with students and rarely met with students outside of class. Most importantly, she did not concern herself with educational matters or issues relating to SZU, and she gladly took whatever teaching duties she was assigned. For being a model teacher, she was rewarded with a light teaching load: a weekly average of six hours, although the contract called for double that amount. Although this teacher never fell from FAO’s grace, her contract was not renewed in 1998 because of a SEdC directive that prohibited foreign teachers from teaching more than five consecutive years.¹³⁷

Two of the teachers referred to earlier—the proselytizer and the man who displayed the *dian* poster—at different times had each served FAO as models, that is until their falls from grace. Both had been selected by FAO as the foreign teacher best suited to represent and speak on behalf of the expatriate community at the annual banquet given to campus foreigners.

No selection as model teacher, however, was more ironic than the choice of Ottavio Angotti, who taught at SZU using several names, including Ottavio Ponte and Pan Yiqiao (both Ponte and Qiao mean bridge, Yi stands for Italian). In 1994 Angotti was chosen by FAO to represent his colleagues at a “Foreign Friends Evening” buffet/karaoke hosted by SZU.¹³⁸ Angotti, who taught juniors for two years in International Finance and Trade, remained a mystery to his foreign colleagues because he gave different foreign teachers bits from his past which, when put together, never computed. The mystery was cleared up in June 1996 when Angotti’s picture appeared under a banner headline in a Hong Kong English language newspaper. The headline read: “Swindling banker fled to China: Fraudster taught finance at Shenzhen University.” A smaller picture of the SZU administration building was cap-

tioned: “Idyllic retreat: Shenzhen University provided the ideal hiding place for fugitive Ottavio Angotti.¹³⁹

Angotti, a man of charm, flair and persuasion who belonged to a prominent family in Italy (his father had been a senator), wooed over the FAO. According to press accounts, he was hired immediately after “he showed up on the university’s doorstep and presented himself as a scholar and businessman in international finance.” As per normal, FAO did not bother to check his credentials or references.¹⁴⁰ Had they done a background check, they might have discovered that Angotti’s last job had been chairman, president and chief executive officer of Consolidated Savings Bank, a tiny thrift bank in Irvine, California. The lender operated for only two years before it was closed down by federal regulators in 1986. After a 11-day trial, Angotti was convicted in May 1993 by a federal jury in connection with a loan scheme to steal more than U.S \$1.6 million through fraud.¹⁴¹ The thrift’s failure cost the U.S. taxpayers \$43 million, which went to repay depositors. While awaiting sentencing, Angotti was dropped off at a San Diego hospital for cancer tests. He jumped bail and disappeared.¹⁴² At the time he also faced indictments for loan fraud and money laundering involving a separate thrift. In that case Angotti’s 37-year-old older son, Antonio, was convicted and sentenced to 41 months in prison for conspiracy, money laundering and making false statements to obtain a \$480,000 loan on a condominium in a project his father was developing. The elder Angotti was captured 19 June by Interpol officers as he tried to cross into Hong Kong. He was using his real name and an Italian passport. Aged 60 at the time of his detainment, Angotti remained in a Hong Kong prison cell until November when he either waved extradition or agreed to be extradited.¹⁴³ The article on his run-in with the law noted that:


Angotti fought the investigators furiously and blamed their interference for causing the bank to go bust. At one point he even taunted regulators by standing for election to a seat on the local branch of the regulatory board.

Federal regulators claimed in a lawsuit that Angotti made death threats against them during their probe of the banking scandal—a charge he denied in a 1989 interview with *Playboy* magazine.

Angotti’s sudden and mysterious disappearance from campus was not publicly acknowledged by FAO until it was reported in the Hong Kong newspaper (The FAO head had the article containing the Angotti arrest story removed from the SZU library). A FAO handler is quoted in the news article

as saying: “We are very unhappy he has disappeared. He has designed the final examinations for July and we need him to grade the papers.”

Figure 6.6: Foreign exchange types



Academic exchange

SZU’s academic exchange with foreign educational institutions developed through several stages, as displayed graphically in Figure 6.6. Each stage supplemented, rather than supplanted, the previous one, and there were no firm temporal boundaries between them.

Trips abroad by SZU leaders were felt necessary to show respect for (give face to) institutions with which SZU wished to develop relationships. As a new university seeking foreign exposure, SZU needed to send its leaders out to learn from the experiences of these institutions. Over time these schools were repeatedly visited by delegations of successive SZU leaders. The average annual cost of delegation travel over SZU’s history was an estimated US \$100,000, some of which was picked up by Shenzhen government when municipal officials were included in the entourages. Reciprocally, the foreign institutions sent their own leaders to SZU for visits, and this gave SZU face. The stated purpose of many of these trips was to negotiate and sign letters of understanding and exchange agreements with the foreign universities. In 1991, FAO drafted eight agreements or memoranda with foreign universities. These signings reaped a public relations bonanza. After SZU signed an agreement with the Hong Kong Polytechnic, for example, reports appeared in both Hong Kong’s pro-China media (*Wen Hui Daily* and *Da Gong Daily*), the then colony’s more independent press (*Xianggang*

Shibao, *Ming Bao*, and *Chengbao*), as well as the China's state-controlled *Overseas Chinese Daily* (*Huaqiao Ribao*). *Macau Daily* reported on SZU's agreement with the University of Macau in late October. In 1992-93, SZU signed 16 cooperation agreements and memoranda, of which 10 were formal agreements, two letters of intention, three memoranda, and one draft agreement. By 1995 SZU had executed over 30 agreements with overseas and compatriot educational institutions in the U.S, U.K., France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Hong Kong and Macau.

The second stage, discussed in greater detail below, involved the travel of lower-level leaders and high-ranking teachers who were permitted to go abroad to present papers at conferences or for research/training. In the third stage SZU students were sent to overseas institutions as part of "twinning programs" in which courses were taken both at SZU and the foreign institution. The course work led to certificates or degrees being issued from both institutions. Not all agreements led to substantive arrangements. Take the case of Griffith University, which is located outside Brisbane, Shenzhen's sister city in Australia. On 19 October 1991, the principal of Griffith visited SZU and signed an exchange agreement. Within two weeks, SZU was visited by a seven-person delegation from Brisbane, headed by the city's mayor, which was touring the SEZ. After that, several scholars from Griffith resided at SZU while they collected data for their research, but there were no other substantial developments in exchange between the two universities, although delegations continued to be exchanged at the rate of two every three years.¹⁴⁴ (In 1991 Brisbane received about one delegation from the PRC every week, the major attraction being a local koala reserve where tourists could pet and be photographed cuddling the fuzzy marsupial.) In fact, most of SZU's exchange agreements with foreign institutions did not yield substantive results. Most activity did not go beyond the delegation exchange and banqueting stage.¹⁴⁵

Leadership delegations

SZU leaders initially went abroad in delegations to inspect and observe how overseas universities operated. These trips also provided opportunities to develop the university's enterprises. Luo Zhengqi headed a delegation that traveled to the U.K. and Italy for 19 days in August 1987. Accompanied by the general manager of the Reflective Materials Co., and SZU's director of procurement, Luo and his team undertook market research and project negotiation. Luo visited Japan in December to pave the way for an exchange with

Kumamoto Commercial College. During the same summer Vice-president Ying Qirui also toured Italy as a member of a delegation of Chinese scientists who saw Paloma University and various electronics enterprises. The other vice-president, Zheng Tianlun, visited the U.K. for 13 days along with the head of the Law Department, who was interested in establishing a relationship with the University of London.¹⁴⁶ In 1988 the university sent out five official delegations, which visited U.S., Japan (Zheng), West Germany (Luo), U.K./France (Ying) and Australia (Luo). These trips lasted two weeks on average. Additionally, nine staff presented papers at international conferences that year.

In early December 1988 SZU hosted reciprocal delegations from both the University of Central Lancashire (known then as Lancashire Polytechnic) and Kumamoto. Leaders from both institutions planted trees of friendship in an area near to the SZU administration building designated as Friendship Forest. Agreements regarding faculty and student exchanges were also re-consummated, this time on Chinese soil. The head of SZU's Institute on SEZ Economics visited Kumamoto in December 1990, three years to the day from when Luo had first visited. Another university leader, Yu Zhongwen, who had served Luo as deputy CCP secretary and then rallied behind the post-Tiananmen leaders, spent part of 1989 and 1990 in Japan for training. Wu Zewei, SZU's CCP secretary, and Vice-president Zheng visited the U.S.S.R. before the fall of communism; delegation travel in 1990 continued at the pace of two trips per leader per annum, but it went largely unreported in SZU publications.

In 1991 the FAO organized three "big scale" delegations to travel abroad. Zhang Bigong, head of the CCP's propaganda office and a leading force of SZU's under-50 generation who was being groomed to become vice-president, was part of a nine-member delegation which toured the U.K and France for 16 days in May. The group was headed by Shenzhen's vice-mayor in charge of education. Universities such as Lancashire and Manchester that had previously been visited by the now discarded and disgraced leader were revisited by his politically correct successors, who sought to confirm SZU's desire for a continuity in international relations and delegation travel. Party secretary Wu, a member of the delegation, reported on the trip in an article in *Nanfang Daily*, a CCP newspaper, Guangdong's equivalent to *People's Daily*.¹⁴⁷ Wu, who over his career had written scores of articles for the Party press, reported that the team had been successful in overcoming the situation in which "foreign friends had stopped cooperating with China because of vicious propaganda from anti-rational forces abroad."¹⁴⁸ In Oc-

tober, SZU hosted a delegation from Kumamoto, which came to modify and ratify, as noted earlier, the existing cooperation agreement. The visitors took the opportunity to visit Shenzhen's newest theme park, Cultural Villages, as well as the new securities exchange market.¹⁴⁹ President Wei led a delegation in December of the same year that toured the U.S., coast-to-coast, visiting schools such as Connecticut State University and California State University, Fresno, for banquets and agreement signing ceremonies. In June the following year, Wei, accompanied by Ying and FAO staff, visited Japan to check up on the Kumamoto exchange. They also visited other Japanese universities and several corporations, including Epson Company, which had earlier donated computing hardware to SZU. They stopped by to visit the president of the Chinese University of Hong Kong on their return.¹⁵⁰

One of the largest and most ambitious delegations traveled to the U.S. for 22 days, beginning 17 April 1993. Central government regulations limited university staff to two foreign trips a year, and by mid-1993 SZU leaders had used up only part of their quota. The new president, Cai Delin, felt obliged to visit the same universities that had hosted his predecessors, despite various problems facing his new administration. (Over his tenure, Cai would spend a full month away from campus, primarily in Europe, North America and Australia.) In April and May of that year five university officials took in 10 American cities, visiting or revisiting schools such as Edmonds Community College (Seattle), Fresno State, University of Montana (Missoula), and the University of Toledo. The trip raised concern at SZU because so many university leaders were away during a time of crisis (they had left six weeks after one campus murder and were away for the 4 May murder involving 11 students). To explain (and justify) the trip to the campus community, the leadership published an article in the university's internal journal written under the pseudonym Wu Ren (five people), which mentioned the significance of celebrating the University of Montana's anniversary and touring various cities, which were located near the schools visited.¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, the next month Zheng Tianlun headed a four-person delegation to the U.K. and France to renew acquaintances and revisit institutions with which he was well acquainted as well as to introduce new SZU cadres to their Western counterparts.

Despite teacher and staff concern about leaders' not attending to their duties on campus, delegation travel continued. For example, from 9-28 May 1995, Cai accompanied by his protégé Tan Zaixi, took a tour of the American West Coast (Edmonds, Stanford, San Jose State) and prestigious institutions in the East (Harvard, Yale, MIT, St. Johns, George Washington Uni-

Table 6.5: 1996 travel abroad by the SZU community¹⁵⁴

travel purpose	individual groups	persons
international conferences	33	47
academic visits	39	80
exchange relationships	53	135
international exhibits	4	15
training	2	5
funded study	24	24
self-paying study	129	212
total	299	753

versity).¹⁵² For three weeks in October, 1995, SZU's deputy Party secretary, accompanied by the FAO head and others, visited the usual places (Lancashire, Manchester, Paris, etc). That trip, like most of the trips that leaders took, occurred during the school term.¹⁵³ Actually, fall 1995 was an exceedingly busy time as the university prepared for the SEdC accreditation and several student exchange programs experienced crises and required special attention. SZU staff complained that these leaders' extended absences caused delays in carrying out school affairs.

In 1996 53 groups, involving 135 people, went abroad for the purpose of discussing exchange relationships (see Table 6.5). This exceeds the number of individuals who went to international conferences, for training, and for academic visits, combined.

Teacher travel

In 1992, SZU reported processing documents for 323 trips abroad, including to Hong Kong. Perhaps an estimated forty of these involved delegation travel led by top level leaders (president, vice-president, CCP secretary, and deputy secretary) who were accompanied by department level leaders and FAO staff.¹⁵⁵ The remainder (283) involved cadres who journeyed to Hong Kong and Macau, students and teachers who left SZU for overseas study, as well as teachers who went abroad to deliver papers at conferences. Reported data do not hint at how the number was split, but the third category was clearly the smallest. In 1992 the university did not fund conference travel except for leaders, and most ordinary teachers themselves did not have the means to support academic efforts by themselves. Staff, however, could afford a few days in Hong Kong or Macau, and several units organized trips

for staff to these territories, which required only a travel permit, not a passport (the former being a less bureaucratic procedure). Student/teacher emigration for study probably accounted for as many as 50 people in 1992.

The following year, 510 staff went out for work, study or inspection. Student/teacher emigration may have actually dipped for 1993, but staff travel to Hong Kong and Macau expanded. The number of travel documents processed in 1994 declined to 445, which included 35 staff who were sent for training or study. According to 1995 data, SZU staff made 717 trips out of China, 286 of which were for business or conference presentations. That number included 431 trips which staff paid for themselves. In addition, 12 teachers and seven students were sent abroad to study at public expense; two teachers and 62 students went abroad as private, self-paying students (excluding the 56 students who were in joint exchange programs).

As incomplete as these data are, they indicate several trends. First, ordinary teachers in the mid-1990s began going abroad to attend conferences. The university by 1995 had sufficient funds to cover the transportation, conference fees and accommodation for any teacher who had a paper accepted for presentation at an international conference, provided that the trip was approved by the department head and did not interfere with the teacher's assigned tasks. Second, students and teachers continued to emigrate for the purpose of study. By the mid-1990s many of the teachers who had wanted to emigrate for study had probably already done so; and many of SZU's more recent hires already possessed higher degrees or, in the case of recruited "dragons," held high ranks even without advanced degrees. Nevertheless, the outflow continued. Even if the rate of departure had remained steady for SZU students—and there are some indications that the national craze of foreign travel had tapered off as China's economy steadily developed in the mid-1990s¹⁵⁶—given that the university's student population had declined, a decrease in emigration would be expected. Apparently, the opposite occurred. Third, more staff were going to Hong Kong and Macau, and an estimated half of SZU's fixed staff and two-thirds of its teachers had been to one of the two territories.

Story 11: René LeBlanc, foreign student

The general emphasis at Shenzhen University was on money. I arrived at 5 or 6 in the evening on a Sunday in November, and bright and early Monday morning there was a knock on my door. It was the woman I later learned was called Dragon Lady. She told me to go immediately to the Shekou ferry pier and exchange all my money into Hong Kong dollars so I could pay her tuition and room rent for the next semester. Everything seemed to be about money; I was not given so much as a “hello” for welcome. The Dragon Lady told me how much I would be charged if I wanted to use the kitchen for foreign students, how much I would have to pay for using the washing machine, how much a ride into Shenzhen would cost if I wanted to hire the car owned by Foreign Affairs, the cost of meal tickets, etc. I felt more like an object that was giving them hard currency and that is why my barbarian presence would be tolerated. Of course, when they learned that my European university was interested in setting up an exchange program in China, they melted a bit. Instead of being downright hostile, they were just pleasantly rude. That’s how I would characterize the Foreign Affairs Office over the six months I lived at Shenda.

It was always hard to get anything from Foreign Affairs, even to get answers to simple questions. But when they wanted something—like my translating an article from one of the half dozen European languages I spoke—they were all smiles and gifts. I soon learned to avoid the second floor of the Administration Building [where Foreign Affairs was located]. Always they found me, and I never knew immediately if they were coming to give or to get. Did they want something from me, like money or passport for their recurring paper processing? Or did they want to give me something, like a box of stale mooncakes as a token of their appreciation. I could never turn down gifts, as much as I wanted to. To reject a gift in China is seen as an insult. I saw how they treated foreign students (and even some foreign teachers) who were not held in their favor. The wrath of Confucius could not have been stronger! But to take a gift, such as a plastic bag of apples or oranges, enslaved me to future obligations. Gifts were considered downpayments for tasks to be assigned sometime later. It was a vicious circle that could never be broken.

They clearly did not care about my academic advancement. I had studied Chinese for several years at university, and they could not figure out what to do with me—that is, once they had taken my money. So they

first put me in an advanced class, with Japanese students whose written Chinese was better than mine, but whose oral abilities were inferior. We had to memorize Chinese jokes and recount them the next day in front of the other students. After several weeks of this, they removed me to the beginner's class. The Japanese, I was told, said my Chinese was not up to their level. In any case, I was relegated to a class of all Caucasians [those discussed below], like myself. After a short time, I stopped going to that class, which had material I had covered years before. Nobody ever bothered to come and ask me why I quit classes or if anything was wrong. They just basically left me alone, figuring that they had their money so I could do what I wanted. After three months, I moved off campus to a local village and hired a tutor and studied Chinese on my own.

I moved off campus for another reason. My classmates—the Caucasian ones—were not in China to learn Chinese. Rather, they were here on a mission, sort of a personal crusade from God. They were in the Middle Kingdom to bring the Truth to the Chinese masses, starting with converting the intellectuals (a group that included college students), who in turn could preach to the peasants. Raised Catholic myself, I certainly have nothing against God, but I do not subscribe to the inculcation of religious beliefs on others, something that is more widespread in the United States than in Europe. The very first night I was at Shenda, I met one of “the Christians” as they were called by both themselves and others. I was trying to figure out how to get water from the kaishui, the sometimes working hot water machine from which Foreign Affairs removed a pad lock during its operating hours (8 a.m.-9 p.m.). Such a boiler is an inseparable part of one's life in China. A woman, Josey, volunteered her assistance, and we got to talking. About 40 seconds into the conversation, she asked: Are you a Christian? I was taken aback. Never in my life had I been asked that question, and I was not sure how to respond. I was baptized and I still take the Holy Sacrament and go to confession on occasion, so I figured that for her purposes I qualified as Christian. After I went back to my room, a group of ten men and women invited themselves in, happy to see another of their own kind. Most were so-called foreign students, but some were foreign teachers (the university did not mind them preaching as long as they appeared on time for their classes and never questioned school policy). Immediately, they told me how lucky I was to be in Shenzhen and how easy it was to smuggle in Bibles. An older, big-boned lady joked about hiding Bibles under her skirt. It did not take long for me to realize that I had been mistaken: by “Christian” Josey, and the others as well, specifically meant

non-Roman Catholic, proselytizing, Bible thumping Protestant evangelist. It took us only a few minutes to sort out our religious differences. After that, they clearly thought of me as a lost soul and as way too liberal, a label I got simply because I was European. It hurt me to see how they would prey on empty Chinese minds—those who are young and intelligent, but have a void because of the way their country is run. All these Christians could do was to grab on to that and fill that void with their own beliefs. They would especially seek out young men and women who had had failed love affairs; they were most vulnerable. Several of the Christian men were looking for Chinese wives to take back to the States.

Being a foreigner, I was in demand as a teacher. Regular foreign teachers were always quitting before their contracts were up, so most of the native-English speaking students studying Chinese doubled as teachers (which gave the Christians access to the students). Like almost everyone else, I taught as well as studied. Even after I had dropped out of formal classes and moved off campus, departments hired me to teach English conversation. Other Europeans had been hired to teach German and French to Shenda teachers, but I had arrived too late in the term to pick up such a lucky assignment.

Twinning programs

Joint programs with other universities were identified at the top of this section as the third phase of foreign affairs work at SZU. The exchange with Kumamoto University of Commerce, which was discussed briefly above, for over a dozen years had permitted about 15 SZU students and teachers, including FAO staff who served as Chinese teachers, to spend six or more months at the Japanese sister school. Delegations have been exchanged each year in both directions. The program had started with sending one SZU student every other year, but by 1991, the rate increased to sending one per year. The Kumamoto exchange was uncomplicated: students from one university resided in the other for a year where they took language courses as well as regular business courses if their second language skills were adequate. In the mid-1990s SZU took another approach toward exchange. Large scale twinning programs were developed with three universities: University of Central Lancashire, U.K.; Edmonds Community College, Seattle; and Victoria University of Technology, Australia. These are discussed in detail below.

Over the years several other exchange arrangements have come and gone, largely unreported in SZU's publications. For example, neither the yearbooks nor the internal journal mentioned a program in which Charles Sturt University (CSU) sent students to study at SZU in 1995. According to information on the CSU website, part-time students from Hong Kong were to take course work on the SZU campus and were enrolled in a masters program in Applied Science (Information Studies) at CSU, an Australian university. SZU's role was to¹⁵⁷

provide administrative and tutorial support for the students while CSU will provide the distance education materials. The research component of the course will utilise supervisors from both CSU and Shenzhen University ensuring students have access to research expertise from international and local levels.

Initially 18 part-time students, who were Hong Kong residents but believed by CSU staff to be SZU graduates, entered the program. They were to have face-to-face teaching weekends conducted at SZU, and they would receive credit for their study at SZU. After beginning the program, seven students transferred into another more computer-oriented CSU course, for a masters in Information Technology, designed to meet the needs of practicing infor-

mation professionals. Of the remaining 11 students (as of September 1997), only two were enrolled in the original library science program, which was in fact being phased out by CSU. According to Australian staff familiar with the program, a second intake planned for February 1996 was stopped because Guangdong Province never approved it, although it is unclear why provincial approval was necessary since SZU involvement seemed limited to providing a facility and perhaps a teacher. (SZU has occasionally offered library science courses as part of adult education). The SZU-CSU exchange falls under the rubric "offshore education;" in their most developed forms these exchanges involve Australian universities' setting up entire campuses in foreign countries. Offshore programs are becoming increasingly popular in Australia, for they generate revenues that help to make up the shortfall caused by government's decreasing investment in higher education. Critics of these programs contend they churn out degrees rather than dispense knowledge; it is not clear to what extent the CSU-SZU exchange did either.

Lancashire

Besides the Kumamoto exchange, SZU's most enduring and steady relationship was with Lancashire, involving in travel alone about 30 SZU staff in some dozen delegation trips. The relationship started at the highest levels, with Luo's visiting the U.K. in summer 1987, and the Lancashire principal's calling in at SZU that October, followed by a six-person team in December the next year. In May 1990, the cooperation exchange agreement was extended to run to the end of 1995, the clause that had restricted exchange to certain engineering subjects was removed, and the exchange was increased from two to three students each year. SZU and Lancashire executed agreements in April and November 1991 during reciprocal visits, and again when the Lancashire principal visited in September 1992. By 1994 SZU had sent five teachers for short-term stays at Lancashire. Included was one who returned to SZU to become associate dean in Electronics, but the rest did not return to China. One went to the U.S. and another stayed in the U.K., both for graduate study. Two ended up in Singapore. Students started to be exchanged from 1989. A Lancashire undergraduate went to SZU, and two SZU Electronics majors went to Britain for a year. When the first students sent to Lancashire refused to return to China, FAO director Zhang made a special trip "of persuasion." He was unsuccessful; both students stayed in the U.K. upon completing their studies at the sister school. In 1991, places for two additional SZU students were opened at Lancashire, this time for six

months study. Interested students had to sit for an English exam and then be interviewed by a Lancashire representative. The interview process (which weeded out a SZU leader's daughter who did not even speak much English) selected two able students for a year at Lancashire. These students returned to Shenzhen when their study ended, but afterwards they both returned to the Lancashire to pursue doctoral study. Both completed Ph.Ds at Lancashire and have remained abroad.

In the early 1990s SZU and Lancashire undertook a "twinning" program which works as follows. Undergraduates were admitted to SZU as special *benke* students. They were to take their first two years at SZU and then another year at Lancashire. At the end of the program they would receive bachelors degrees from both institutions. Programs of this nature took several years to arrange, for they required prior approval of the SEdC. Details of the program were worked out between various parties at Lancashire and members of SZU's Electronics Department, to which all the student and teachers in previous Lancashire exchanges had been attached. Although Electronics was aware of Lancashire's curriculum and general situation, it could find no existing SZU program on which to model its new program. The Management Department had since 1987 offered a certificate program in conjunction with Hong Kong Management Association, but this program was quite different from the Lancashire proposal as the former was for adults who came to SZU once a week, and the latter was for full-time undergraduates residing on an overseas campus. Without a model, Electronics relied heavily on Lancashire, which itself had had only limited experience at that time with offshore programs.

At the same time Electronics was planning to operate a one-year applied computer night course with National Computer Centre of Singapore (NCC).¹⁵⁸ Students who successfully completed the course would receive a professional certificate and would be encouraged to sit for NCC's exam, which would be given in China. Hong Kong Polytechnic promised to accept students who held these certificates for a degree program in information technology. The NCC program charged ¥6,000 (US \$700) tuition, was intended to draw its students from Hong Kong, and was scheduled to begin August 1994. English was the medium of instruction for both this and the Lancashire program. SZU's FAO was only peripherally involved in either of these endeavors. The NCC program never developed.

The Lancashire twinning arrangement received SEdC approval in November 1992. This approval was necessary because *benke* students in a Chinese university—SZU—were to be given credit toward their SZU degree

for courses taken in universities outside of China, and the SEdC reviewed such arrangements on a case-by-case basis. The first intake of 43 students arrived at SZU September 1993.¹⁵⁹ Students took an entrance exam and had to show proof of Guangdong residency. Tuition was $\text{œ}1,250/\text{HK } \$15,000$ (US \$1,925) per year. Students were warned that if they failed a single course during their two years at SZU, they would not be permitted to proceed to Lancashire. As the program progressed, Lancashire took a hands-on approach, working closely with Electronics in designing the program, providing curriculum/syllabus and sending textbooks, arranging for teachers (including ones sent from the U.K.), and assessing various elements. Students were made aware of Lancashire's involvement right from the opening ceremony. For the second intake in 1994, for example, Lancashire officials personally handed out Lancashire school badges to the new class. They also presented awards to the excellent students from the previous year's intake. In 1995, the third class was enrolled. Out of 24 students from the first class who had successfully completed the program, 21 got visas for the U.K., for which they departed on 16 August 1995. By that year the program had become routine; the fourth entering class was being recruited for 1996, and 22 students went to Lancashire in September of that year. The program received favorable press coverage in Shenzhen.¹⁶⁰

The program's 50% attrition rate is attributable to the low quality of intake as well as to the rigor of the program. The English abilities of almost half the students when they entered were not up to standard. No matter how hard they studied, two years of instruction at SZU proved insufficient for them to obtain the English level required by Lancashire. Generally, the students, who mostly came directly from Shenzhen secondary schools, had not achieved sufficiently high entrance scores to enroll in SZU. A few students had higher scores because, in fact, they were enrolled in SZU's *zhuanke* courses before they shifted to the Lancashire program. Generally, for those students who went to Lancashire, the program was viewed as a success. Upon completion of the Lancashire courses, some of the students stayed in the U.K. for further study.

Edmonds

Several years after the Lancashire program got underway, SZU launched a twinning program with Edmonds Community College, Seattle, Washington. Contacts were initiated when Edmond's dean of international services contacted a Malaysian Chinese who, in turn, introduced the dean to someone at

SZU who, in turn, introduced him to SZU's FAO. Representatives of Edmonds, founded 1967, informally visited SZU to discuss an exchange relationship that would involve SZU's students' finishing off their study at Edmonds. The Foreign Language Department expressed no interest in such a program so Edmonds turned to SZU's Chinese Department, whose department head, Zhang Bigong, was immediately enthusiastic. The Chinese Department, of course, did not specialize in English teaching and, in fact, only a very few of its teachers were fluent in English. The department, however, had run a Chinese-English Secretary major for some years, and it had always stressed the importance of English as a second language. The department, as noted in Chapter Four, was one of the most innovative at SZU, constantly revising its major structure and searching for new educational frontiers. FLD's refusal opened the way for the Chinese Department to expand its horizons beyond the country's borders.

The Edmonds course was approved by the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau on 6 September 1993, and formally inaugurated in an opening ceremony 24 November which was attended by the chairman of the Edmonds Board of Directors. Recruited students took an entrance exam (in Chinese and English) on 1 December and classes began later that month with 40 students enrolled in four majors: Advertising, Public Relations, Tourism and Secretary. Later students were added in Finance and Accounting. Like the Lancashire course before it, the Edmonds twinning program advertised for students in the local media (and was even publicized among overseas Chinese).¹⁶¹ The program was different in nature from Lancashire's in that it did not end with a bachelors degree, and thus it did not come under SEdC overview. It was supervised by provincial and municipal authorities. Students would study at SZU for 1½ years and top off their course work at Edmonds for six months. In brochures and press accounts, several major points were made. Students had to pass all their exams at SZU before they could go to Edmonds. If they completed the two years, they would receive a *zhuanke* certificate from SZU and the equivalent junior college "associate degree" from Edmonds. Enrollment was expected to be around 30 students. Students would come from three main sources: immediate secondary graduates, transfers from SZU *zhuanke* programs, and others who had taken jobs immediately upon completing secondary school and now wanted to go to college. Tuition in the program was set at ¥40,000 (or about US \$900 per term) for the two years, and total costs ran about US \$3,000 per year. Admission to Edmonds required students to obtain a 500 score on TOEFL, which is basically equivalent to a low pass on Band 4. The flyer and news-

paper advertisement said that a student, upon successful completion, could transfer to an American college as a junior. SZU reported that the program had been “filed” with the U.S. Embassy, Beijing, and with the Guangzhou consulate.

At first the Chinese Department alone operated a rather compact Edmonds twinning program, including handling students’ tuition and fees. After the first intake, FAO became heavily involved in the program, and two additional departments—Economics and IFT—were permitted along with Chinese to enroll students. About 200 students, the majority female, were enrolled among the three departments over the program’s three-year history. They were not regarded as regular SZU students; for example, they were exempt from SZU’s required courses, such as physical and moral/ideological education. Edmonds stood firm on the 500 TOEFL requirement, despite protests from FAO which wanted to lower the threshold score to 475. In April after a year and a half of study, students applied in a group through FAO for their U.S. visas. They were told by FAO to sit tight.

The program hit an impasse when the U.S. consulate in Guangzhou initially refused to issue study visas to the first group of students who had completed the course. Consular officers argued that the program did not involve a legitimate undergraduate or graduate degree, as required for student visas; furthermore, Edmonds twinning had never been sanctioned by the U.S. government. In other words, “filing” was not deemed equivalent to being sanctioned. U.S. State Department representatives routinely deny Chinese nationals permission to study in the U.S., often citing “unlikely to return to China” as a reason. In general the granting of visas appears to rely heavily on the discretion of consular officers (two must concur on a denial), and many Chinese view the process as quite arbitrary (“If this is your rule of law, I prefer China,” I was once told). Clearly from the start, the publicity on the Edmonds twinning program had told students they did not have to return to China, at least not immediately, if they were able to transfer to a four-year college to complete a bachelors degree.

In September, the Guangzhou consulate agreed to grant visas to the students. Given political intervention, about-faces in policy implementation at the lowest levels of American foreign policy are not rare. In general, members of the U.S. Congress are given a direct channel for communicating their constituents’ complains to the State Department. It is unclear to what extent and at what level Edmonds intervened, but intervention seems the only plausible explanation for why consular officials issued visas three months after their initial, adamant refusal. SZU gave Edmonds two weeks notice (after

SZU had purchased air tickets) to prepare for receiving the students. The community college sent its staff scurrying to arrange for teachers, class schedules, room assignments, and students' accommodation. Thus, in fall 1995, 32 students from the first Edmonds class were sent to Seattle for six months. They were assigned to live with host families, who they paid US \$400/month for room and board.

In approving the visas, however, the consulate informed both SZU and Edmonds that it was requiring SZU to submit a letter within six months stating that 100% of the students had returned. Unless such a letter was received, the consulate declared, no further visas would be issued to students in any future Edmonds twinning program. The first group of students completed their studies and graduated from Edmonds on 20 March 1996. Holding private Chinese passports, each of the students, with Edmond's help, succeeded in transferring to a American college to complete the degree. All had been able to revise their F-1 visa status, with the help of the university they were transferring to. Not one of the students returned to China, despite the fact that SZU had given the SZU teacher who accompanied the students instructions to bring them back. The teacher was powerless, for the students' visas gave them the right to transfer to other U.S.-based programs. Thus, the Edmonds twinning was suspended after 100% of the first intake *failed* to return to China within the required six months. From the beginning, no one really believed the students would return in the time specified. A rumor circulated around SZU that one of the Guangzhou consular offices had wagered \$100 that the students would not return, and none of his colleagues had taken him up on the bet—even at 100-to-1 odds!

Was Edmonds twinning a success? The program at SZU used course materials identical with those on the home campus. One teacher who gave a test that was equivalent to one used in Accounting 101 at Edmonds reported about the same passing rate as classes on the home campus. Students were required to maintain a 2.5 GPA, pass six five-credit courses, plus an additional two PE credits. Early in the program some students failed to reach the necessary English level. Edmonds' visiting language teachers managed to weed out those students who failed to attend class. The remainder tended to be motivated. Many had been working for a few years and were more mature than the normal undergraduate. The students who remained in the program produced acceptable results. About half of the entering class went to Edmonds, completed the program, and then transferred to undergraduate programs around the U.S. (e.g., Utah, New York, Washington, Tennessee, Minnesota, Oregon). Since 32 students—eight from IFT, seven from Eco-

nomics, the remainder from Chinese—finished their studies in the U.S., the first intake of 1993 can be regarded as completing the program successfully. In 1994 the program's scale was reduced. Instead of 120 students, only 60 students were admitted. The number of majors was cut from four to two. Another 109 students (120 by plan) entered in 1995. After the first intake, no class would continue their studies abroad, despite the fact that a few students in 1995 successfully completed the SZU leg of the program and scored over 500 on TOEFL. They were denied visas to the U.S. Their failure to go to Edmonds tainted the program's success.

As suggested in the above accounts, the Edmonds exchange was not administered as smoothly as the Lancashire twinning program. The latter had direct involvement from a continuous group of individuals, in the Electronics Departments of both SZU and Lancashire, who had developed a working relationship over several years. Edmonds twinning was not managed by a single person or even a single group of people, at either end. FAO had different individuals overseeing the program during its short life, and often the leaders who made important decisions were out of China when decisions were required. None of the managers shared information with his successor. Teachers from Seattle flew in for month-long stints, each bringing in an individualized pedagogy, course materials and instructions from the home office. Students were given conflicting information. At one point, students in IFT and Economics were told that they could not get a certificate from SZU if they failed to meet the TOEFL requirement (Only 27% of IFT students had scored over the required 500). Yet, this condition was not in the signed agreement with Edmonds. Some students had been told that those who passed all course work would get a SZU certificate and that those who passed TOEFL would be eligible to study in the U.S. These difficulties arose, in part, because the program was rushed through. Whereas with Lancashire an entire year passed between SEdC formal approval and intake, the Edmonds program had only fifteen weeks between provincial authorization and the beginning of classes.

The implicit goals of the Edmonds program were more financial than academic. At the beginning there seemed to be an understanding among participants that the Edmonds twinning program would not require a very high form of academic instruction, taking as it did students who had not achieved sufficiently high college entrance exam scores to enter SZU *benke*. The Edmonds president, who had been in office 15 years, had built Edmonds into an institution characterized by international exchanges. It operated on different campuses around the globe, including one in pre-earthquake Kobe, Japan.

At the time SZU was being approached, the Kobe program, like other exchanges in Japan, suffered from the high cost of doing business in Japan (especially given the low value of the U.S. dollar versus the Japanese yen). It was being forced to downsize. The Edmonds president saw market potential in China, which was probably the major reason the SZU program was initiated. But in mid-course Edmonds changed the ground rules covering the program. This supportive Edmonds president retired, and his replacement was not enthusiastic over the Shenzhen twinning arrangement. Edmond's new management team, which included a half dozen personnel, wanted to refocus and upgrade Edmonds academically, away from its exchange ventures. The team insisted that exchanges adhere to the same administrative standards (documentation, financial accounting, etc.) applicable on campus and that exchange students in the programs achieve the same standards as used at Edmonds. Thus, Edmonds refused to waver on issues like language standards, despite FAO's complaints that the U.S. partner was violating an implicit agreement.

By 1995 it was apparent to both parties that the program would be short-lived. Visiting SZU in fall 1995, the new Edmonds interim president agreed with SZU that Edmonds would continue to send teachers for the students already in the pipeline. Future classes were not contemplated. SZU orally agreed to a number of items, such as book purchase, testing requirements, and especially SZU's remitting US \$40,000 to Edmonds, as per agreement, by 30 November 1995. This visit, let alone the agreement, was not reported in either the *SZU 1995 yearbook* or the *News in Brief*. Although FAO staff have privately acknowledged that the meeting had taken place, officials said it was merely ceremonial and disputed whether any understandings had been reached. SZU welcomed the arrival of new teachers from Edmonds; all other points would have to be renegotiated. One SZU staff member was quite blunt: "We just agreed to these terms so we could get your teachers. If we hadn't said yes, we couldn't get the foreign teachers." Furthermore, the ESL Placement test, which SZU had agreed to give, was delayed because the university was in the middle of the SEdC accreditation. Actually, FAO wanted to abandon the test altogether. According to one participant in the negotiations: "Correspondence was minimal, understanding vague, contact marginal."

Management of the program by the SZU partner was in a perpetual state of disarray. The vice-president in charge of foreign affairs delegated responsibility to lower levels. Academic Affairs wanted no part of the program. In its 1995 recruitment summary, AAO even mislabeled the program. It re-

ferred to it as “Edmonds *daipei zhuanke*,” improperly suggesting a formal arrangement in which employers were paying the students’ fees. Both AAO and FAO took the position that the program was administered by the three academic departments in which the students were formally enrolled. FAO’s role was merely to handle the foreign exchange, in which regard it was exceedingly efficient in collecting students’ tuition, but rather inefficient in making contractual payments to Edmonds. Students belonged to three academic departments, none of which communicated with the other. For example, as the first class was applying for transfer to Edmonds, students were required to submit valid copies of their transcripts to Edmonds. The departments refused to provide the transcripts directly to the students. (“They cannot be trusted.”) They did not coordinate this simple task between them and, instead of giving the transcripts directly to the Edmonds staff person who was in residence at SZU (“Could she not be trusted?”), each department insisted on express mailing its students’ transcripts to Edmonds. Another example of non-cooperation between departments involved textbooks. Texts, as agreed upon in the contract, were SZU’s obligation, but none of the departments agreed to pay for foreign-printed texts. One department was willing to buy a single copy and mass produce it by photocopying, but the Edmonds representative refused to permit copyright violation. Thus, the students went without textbooks, pages were parsimoniously photocopied, and funds set aside for copyright payments. Eventually, texts arrived from the U.S.

Victoria University of Technology

The Lancashire twinning program had been initiated and executed by Electronics; Edmonds had been started by Chinese and then taken over by FAO. In 1995 these exchanges were receiving high praise by SZU leaders; on their heels came a twinning program with Victoria University of Technology (VUT) in Melbourne, Australia. VUT, whose origins go back to 1915, is an amalgamation of several sub-university tertiary campuses. Initial contacts between SZU and VUT were made in 1993, and details for the twinning arrangement were flushed out when a SZU delegation visited Melbourne in early 1994. A formal agreement was signed in July, and the first students started classes in the autumn. The program had an even quicker start-up than Edmonds, about six working weeks, given that SZU staff do not work during the summer break. Unfortunately, advertisements were not placed in the newspapers until late July, *after* secondary school students had already

decided on university preferences at the time of taking the college entrance exam.

The VUT program was developed by Tan Zaixi when he headed FLD, and he retained control of it after he was appointed FAO head in 1994. In scope and scale, the VUT exchange was to be SZU's most ambitious international undertaking to date. The exchange operated under a new set of guidelines, drawn up in response to the problems, identified above, that existed in the Edmonds twinning program. In November 1994—a year after both the Lancashire and Edmonds programs had begun—SZU issued its first regulations on managing joint courses with foreign universities.¹⁶² The purposes of these courses were stated:

...to promote international higher education exchange, to learn from foreign universities their teaching content, teaching methods and management so that SZU's education gets closer to international education, to build up a good international image of SZU, to improve subject development, to raise the educational level of SZU, and to speed up training of internationalized applied *rencai*.

The new rules required that any SZU office or department interested in running twinning programs first needed formal university approval, based on the recommendations of a “foreign-related joint course leadership group” which was presumably composed of personnel from the relevant departments. Furthermore, all students enrolled in these programs were to be regarded as regular SZU students, implying that they would be subject to the same admissions requirements as *benke* or *zhuanke* entrants, and be required to take university-wide moral/ideological and physical education courses. FAO coordinated the programs, and it oversaw all contact with the foreign institutions and supervised the preparation of agreements. AAO was put in charge of recruitment, student affairs management and teaching quality review; General Affairs took care of students on-campus housing, and the teaching departments had responsibility for textbooks, teacher training and the management of students. In terms of funds distribution, 10% of income after expenditures was to be remitted to SZU, with the remainder staying with the teaching department, which had to pay for all the costs of running the course.

In initiating the VUT program, SZU planned four majors: International Accounting, International Banking and Finance, English and Real Estate Development/Management. These were covered by the departments of Economics, IFT, Foreign Language, and Civil Engineering, respectively. An advertisement which appeared in local newspapers explained the twinning

arrangement.¹⁶³ A foundation program was to be run at SZU for the first two years; then students “satisfying certain conditions” could continue their studies in their majors at VUT. At the end of the program they would receive bachelors degrees from both SZU and VUT. Students who completed only the first leg of the program would be awarded a certificate of graduation from both institutions. Two types of applicants were sought: 1994 graduates from Shenzhen secondary schools who had taken the national college entrance exam and secondary graduates from earlier years. Both groups had to take an oral English exam, and the latter group was required to take exams in English, Chinese and mathematics. Tuition was set at US \$2,500 for each of the first two years at SZU and US \$6,000 for each of the two years in Melbourne. This was considerably more than the annual tuition set for Lancashire (US \$1,925) or Edmonds (\$1,800). This income were to be divided 60-40 between SZU and VUT. The Australian partner was to cover the costs of a full-time resident staff member at SZU as well as short-term fly-in visits from VUT staff in each discipline taught. The fly-in arrangement was similar to what VUT used in its programs in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. When the students moved to VUT, VUT was to pay the salary of a SZU teacher who supervised the students in Melbourne.

Despite its high tuition costs and the uncertainty of students’ being able to study in Australia, recruitment in August 1994 drew 138 applications for 120 places.¹⁶⁴ According to FAO’s 1995 report, “in order to guarantee the students’ quality, we only recruited 70 students who were the best.”¹⁶⁵ Thus, 71 students (one was admitted in year-two through a back door) were selected in two majors only—26 Accounting and 45 Banking; English and Real Estate were dropped.¹⁶⁶ The twinning program was formally launched on 21 October 1994 in an opening ceremony attended by SZU’s vice-president who held the foreign affairs portfolio and a representative from VUT. The students’ status was not the same as a regular SZU or VUT student; they held a unique status apart from SZU undergraduates, but in most respects they were treated as degree students; for example, they were given access to the library and computer center and lived in the student dormitories.

Curriculum and management

During their two years at SZU, twinning students took 23 hours of classes in eight business subjects:

micro- and macro-economics, business statistics, business computer applications, accountancy introduction, accounting information systems, business communication, management and organizational behavior.

The Accounting and Banking majors had virtually identical curricula, but the two groups took most of their classes separately, their teachers coming from the department they had enrolled in, either Economics or IFT. Students also took other courses such as Australian Studies as well as various ESL courses, including business English, writing, listening and intensive reading. The last two SZU subjects, not designed by VUT, were taught by Foreign Language staff, who also taught other ESL courses to the students. In total, students had about 30 hours of classes per week (two-thirds lecture, one-third tutorial) and were expected to spend another 25 or so hours on out-of-class work. As with Edmonds, textbooks were by original agreement the responsibility of SZU. For reasons of practicality, this burden was assumed by the Australia partner except for English language teaching materials, which SZU provided. Courses were to equate with offerings on the Melbourne campus. Classes were assigned to regular classrooms, which unfortunately were not equipped with overhead projectors (which would have required special payments to the Audio/Visual Center). Two hours per week were reserved for computer laboratory tutorials; for other computer use, students had to use the student center, where functioning computers were not always available. The Accounting class had 27 students, "sufficiently cohesive in spirit to be manageable as a single class," according to one observer. The Finance class, however, enrolled 35 students with a wide variance in English language ability. For year-one the class was split into two sections, but these were recombined in year-two because IFT reportedly did not want to pay FLD for extra English teachers.

Another managerial problem related to structural differences between the SZU and VUT systems. Passing for SZU students is set at 60 points, but 50 points at VUT. The setting of exams follow different procedures at the two universities. The seriousness of exam proctoring and the penalties/tolerance for cheating varied considerably between SZU and VUT. Overall credit requirements for moral/ideological and even physical education were different.¹⁶⁷ Differences also existed in decision-making structure, degree of transparency and accountability, as well as general cultural differences between Australia and the PRC. In hindsight, transplanting a VUT curriculum to the SZU context appears to be a task that demanded more than the six weeks preparation that occurred.

The twinning program suffered severe internal inefficiency because the exact same curriculum was being taught independently by two sets of teachers from different departments. There was little coordination between the departments in terms of sharing teaching load, formulating teaching plans or providing collegial support. The most serious example was the “case of the young teacher who did not teach her allotted course for the first month because her colleague from the other department had simply neglected to pass on the teaching materials sent from Australia.”¹⁶⁸ Communication between SZU teachers and VUT course developers was hampered because SZU refused to allow the SZU teachers access to e-mail. Even sending faxes proved difficult. Visits by fly-in teachers were relatively infrequent, and they provided an insufficient amount of time to address problems caused by the previous months of non-communication. Coordination at the university level was not much better. SZU preferred that VUT not deal directly with the students. After the offers to study in Australia had been formally made, for example, SZU insisted that it, not VUT, be the ones to inform the students, thus enabling FAO to charge the students fees for processing their visa applications.

Teachers

For the most part, courses were taught by SZU staff, using VUT teaching materials. Each local teacher was assisted once during the two years by a fly-in teacher from VUT, who taught usually for two weeks. In all, some 19 SZU teachers served as instructors in the twinning program over the two years. The high number of teachers relative to courses (19/13) stems from the fact that Economics and IFT did not share teachers; an identical course would be taught by two separate teachers—one from each of the departments—who did not coordinate their teaching. In addition, five classes underwent a change in staff in mid-semester (two teachers lacked specialized knowledge or experience; two quit SZU; one left to take up an off-campus consultancy). The teachers were, for the most part, young and inexperienced. Ten of the 19 were in their first teaching year at SZU, and six of these had no previous teaching experience. Just like most new recruits to SZU’s teaching team, these individuals had virtually no say in what courses they taught. They were assigned heavy work loads and given courses that more senior teachers refused to teach. The twinning program was not standard fare at SZU; thus department heads gave it low priority in staffing. One teacher in the twinning program, for example, had 27 contact hours per

week. Some of the teachers were competent in the fields they were assigned to teach; others were not. The deputy head of FLD assigned “a young woman with no teaching experience and absolutely no knowledge of Australia” to lecture on living and studying in Australia.¹⁶⁹

Students

The 71 students in the program came from both inside and outside Shenzhen. Some lived in other provinces, having been informed of the program by Shenzhen residents. One was the nephew of a SZU vice-president, admitted into the program at the beginning of the second year, in violation of the very policy his uncle had formulated. Almost all students had been attracted by what was *perceived* to be a guaranteed Australian visa; the spending of family savings on foreign education was seen as a worthwhile investment. For most of the students the twinning program was just the means to that end. Given the high costs of tuition, many of the students’ families made sacrifices in pursuit of this objective. One student, whose parents ran a retail outlet, let their store’s inventory dwindle in order to amass sufficient money to enroll their daughter into the program. Entering the twinning program, without a guaranteed Australian visa, was a risky endeavor that incurred opportunity costs. By entering the SZU twinning program, students effectively removed themselves from ever going into Chinese higher education as *benke* students. If they wanted a Chinese tertiary degree in the future, they would have to enter as adult students, taking the standardized adult higher education entrance exam.

The recruiting of students was handled by AAO. VUT staff observed but did not actively participate in the interviews. As one professor explained in a report to VUT:

The interview process lasted about 10 minutes per student and involved a brief discussion, followed by the students reading a brief passage in English. It was clear that a large number of them had little comprehension of what they were reading and only one of the students I interviewed was able to engage in any significant conversation about the passage which she had read. A small number were not able to answer basic questions about where they live, how old they are and what their interests are.

The Australian observer, who himself had grave doubts about the students’ second language competence, noted that among the SZU staff, no one seemed greatly concerned with students’ poor performances on the entrance test.

The level of English demanded of these students was, in fact, greater than what was required of most regular *benke* students, including English majors in their first year or so (few SZU courses other than ESL used English-language texts). When the twinning students had completed their two years in July 1996, an English language exam was given. The English ability of many of these students was extremely poor, much poorer than their achievement levels in many of the business courses. Given that such high English standards were required, it now seems reasonable to have expected students to have had even more difficulty in the VUT program. In hindsight, the threshold language requirement should have been that associated with passing Band 6, a feat that only one-third of SZU's *benke* students could accomplish *at the time of graduation*, after more than 500 hours of classroom instruction..

Assessment

A consultant's 74-page evaluation, employing survey research and ethnographic techniques, examined the SZU-VUT twinning program, including student and teacher satisfaction with their various courses at the end of the two years of course work.¹⁷⁰ Some courses, such as accounting, computer applications, business statistics and even micro-/macro-economics, were not adversely affected by student's generally low levels of English. Tests often called for numerical answers or consisted of multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank type questions. Students in these courses, for the most part, could produce favorable exam results after exposure to the standard SZU "chalk and talk" pedagogy, with many of the courses being taught in Chinese (essential vocabulary translated to English). Nor did these courses, except for accounting, presuppose a significant experience or awareness of Australian culture or business practice. The other two business courses—business communications, and management and organizational behavior—were of a quite different nature. Each required familiarity with Australian culture, high English language skills, and a classroom culture which "should be interactive, practice-oriented, exploratory." These conditions were not met and, thus, both courses were viewed by the students, SZU teachers and Australian program staff alike as unsuccessful. These courses required a pedagogy that went beyond the mere knowledge transfer function of education. VUT describes the management and organizational behavior course as follows:¹⁷¹

The aims of this subject are to provide students with an understanding of organisational behaviour and management theory; to *assess critically* the underlying values of these theories; to *assess critically* the utility and application of the management practices informed by these theories in the Australian context; and to *analyse critically* the values of Australian managers concerning behaviour in organisations and to evaluate the effectiveness of these assumptions.

Many of the reasons the local teachers were unable to develop a critical pedagogy to accomplish the goals set forth by the course designers from VUT were explored in the previous chapter. They include lack of teacher training, the teachers' burdensome schedules and the absence of mutual support among colleagues and succor from departmental leaders. These teachers' inexperience in college teaching and students' low English levels only served to compound the matter.

There is one point to which almost everyone agrees: that the language ability of many of the students was below that necessary for successful completion of the course and advancement to VUT. Low language ability was indeed the reason given by SZU for not enrolling a second intake in 1995. That decision, which was accepted by the VUT side, in effect suspended the program. It also meant there would not be sufficient tuition fees to cover the costs of VUT's resident coordinator at SZU, and in fact the coordinator was removed after the first year.

According to FAO the decision to suspend intake resulted from SZU's inability to persuade the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau to permit advertising prior to the college entrance examination (given the second week of July every year). Early advertising was seen as a way to improve the quality of the intake, although there is only a questionable basis for this assumption. Guangdong authorities did not accede to SZU's request for one major reason: provincial bureaucrats were still smarting from SZU's earlier attempt to pull off the VUT training program without seeking provincial approval. In order to start the program in fall 1994, FAO had not sought Guangdong's permission for the twinning program. Regulations state that all degrees awarded by Chinese tertiary institutions that include course work taken in institutions outside the PRC must be approved by the appropriate upper levels. Twinning students who went to Melbourne would be taking courses whose credits would count toward the SZU degree. Shenzhen municipality easily approved this arrangement, but such approval was, in fact, not the city's to give. Thus, through its advertisement, SZU had promised to award a degree that it

had no authority to award. When Guangdong education officials learned about this, they became “more annoyed with SZU than usual,” according to one informant. Even if SZU had made amends for its previous error in protocol, it was unlikely the province would ever give its blessing to the VUT exchange. Therefore, SZU suspended the program, regardless of the language level issue.

The first year’s intake was allowed to complete the SZU part of the twinning arrangement. In July 1996, 58 of the 71 enrolled students sat for the course-final exams. Eight of these students gained six or more passes in the eight business courses and were deemed to have adequate English language levels to be offered admission to VUT’s Bachelors in Business program. In addition, 23 students passed their business subjects but had a lower level of English. They were offered entry into a specifically-designed VUT course that would result in a TAFE (Technical and Further Education) diploma. Another 23 students, whose English levels were even lower, were admitted to a general TAFE diploma course that was to be preceded by additional ESL training. Four students were given no offer whatsoever by VUT. SZU had pushed for those students who lacked English language proficiency to take a third year at SZU which would have allowed them presumably to attain high enough standards so they could go to VUT. Probably for financial considerations, VUT rejected this idea. Thus, in summer 1996 the VUT twinning students found themselves in the same position as their Edmonds colleagues had been a year before: they were waiting for visas, in this case from the Australian embassy in Beijing.

Australian context

In the mid-1990s Australians were debating the wisdom of its immigration policy that admitted non-Caucasians. By 1996 Pauline Hanson, a politician who advocated lower Asian immigration, was the focus of much press comment. The issues, however, did not put forth a new debate. Actually, at the turn of the century, Australia had adopted a “White Australia” policy, which was not officially renounced until Gough Whitlam’s Labour government took office in 1972. Arguments from earlier periods (some would say the vestiges of racism) were resurfacing in the mid-1990s debate. Although this discussion did not apply directly to SZU-VUT twinning arrangement, it loomed heavily in the background.

Until the late 1980s higher education in Australia was greatly subsidized by the state. Throughout the 1990s, however, the Australian government

was requiring universities to find an increasing portion of their funding by themselves. Tuition from foreign students (which was set higher than that for citizens) assisted tertiary institutions in this time of fiscal crunch. By 1997, 100,000 foreign students in Australian tertiary were adding Aus. \$2.5 million a year to the nation's economy. In the first six months of 1997, the Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Department issued another 100,000 visas to foreign students (some were renewals).¹⁷² Not many of these students were from the PRC, but in this regard China was seen as a market with high growth potential. In 1995 Australia issued Chinese students about 1,000 visas; the number increased to 1,500 in 1996. Immigration officials enforced more stringent language requirements on PRC nationals. This policy had been introduced in the early 1990s when "thousands of Chinese who had arrived in Australia to undertake short English-language courses had overstayed their visas and become illegal immigrants."¹⁷³ In 1997 about 3,000 foreign students were overstaying their visas, but the Chinese overstay rate was no longer in the top 10, although it was still above the international average. The higher language requirement for Chinese, however, was not abandoned as the overstay rate lowered.

At the end of May 1996 the Australian embassy in Beijing issued visas for eight SZU students to complete the twinning program; at the same time it denied entry to 22 of the students who had applied to continue the twinning program by registering in VUT's TAFE course.¹⁷⁴ Those SZU students would be allowed to enter the regular curriculum, only after they had achieved sufficient language fluency. VUT officials denounced the Australian government's decision as being discriminatory against the TAFE diploma course and for implying that TAFE studies were less legitimate than higher education tracks.¹⁷⁵ Australia was foolishly foregoing much foreign tuition, they contended.¹⁷⁶ In retort, an immigration spokesman said that VUT "went off without doing their homework" and that the visa requirements had been in effect for several years.¹⁷⁷ The issues here were complex. VUT had set up the exchange program on the basis of immigration regulations that allowed students to get a visa without first getting the requisite score on TOEFL or an equivalent test *if* the students had successfully completed an associated diploma course in their home country of at least 12 months duration taught by Australian staff who guaranteed the attainment of an adequate English level. The issue centered on whether the SZU twinning program was the type of course specified in these regulations. VUT thought it was; Australia Immigration disagreed. From the start, the FAO presumed that students could be granted Australian visas without a prior English test

and assumed that VUT would not disqualify anyone who successfully completed the course. This line of belief led the FAO to take an almost cavalier attitude toward students' English level. As it turned out one student entered the VUT course with a TOEFL score of over 600; another took TOEFL on his own account before completing the VUT course, and these two got their visas not by virtue of having done well in the course but because they had adequate TOEFL scores. The remaining students were required to sit for a TOEFL equivalency test. VUT sent over a teacher for two weeks in December 1996 to coach the students. The remaining six students who matriculated in Melbourne were those who gained adequate language test scores and had done sufficiently well in their other exams to be accepted by VUT into year-two of the degree program.

In fact, the VUT-twinning was not the only SZU arrangement affected by this Australian policy. A smaller exchange with sister school Griffith University, outside Brisbane, involved four students scheduled to enroll in a TAFE program at that school. They were also denied student visas. To add insult to injury, one journalist reported that certain (unnamed) British officials had contacted SZU to offer places in the U.K. to the rejected Australia-bound hopefuls.¹⁷⁸

The most positive spin that can be given the SZU-VUT twinning program is to suggest that it served as a learning experience, both for students and teachers, as well as for the institutional partners. More often, however, participants and observers characterized the program with terms like "catastrophe," "nightmare," or "scam." Some lessons were undoubtedly learned by both partners. First, programs of such ambition and expense require considerable planning if they are to serve as foundations for longer-term commitments. Second, exchange programs at SZU will likely be negatively affected by the same factors that adversely affect education at the university: outdated and inflexible pedagogy, excessive teacher work loads, lack of departmental coordination, an over-emphasis on the financial benefits of side educational businesses, and SZU's unwillingness to stand by its contractual obligations.

Conclusions on the twinning programs

How did the performance of the twinning programs measure up to the goals set in the 1994 regulations? Did SZU learn from foreign universities? Was it able to improve teaching methods and management so that SZU education moved closer to the international norm? Did it improve subject development,

raise SZU's overall educational level, or speed up the training of "internationalized applied *rencai*?"

The twinning programs had a negligible effect on the university's curriculum or pedagogy. None of the teaching methods or textbooks was transferred to SZU courses. SZU's management style and decision-making process also seemed resistant to foreign influence. Of the three programs discussed above, Lancashire was generally considered the most successful in reaching the goals stated in the regulations. The Lancashire twinning arrangement was still on-going in 1998. In contrast, VUT was considered the least successful. The SZU campus community assessed Edmonds somewhere in between success and failure, given that only its first-year students went abroad.

Managerial factors, more than others, appear to account for whether a twinning program accomplished its goals. Planning for Lancashire was deliberate, and the program ran smoothly. Planning for Edmonds was put on a faster-track; in its haste FAO failed to follow proper procedures with the U.S. government and misrepresented the program to the recruited students. In a sense, the VUT program was pushed forward so quickly that it flew off the track; it was derailed for all the reasons mentioned above. If Lancashire had been planned like VUT, it too would have likely failed. If VUT had been planned like Lancashire, it may well have succeeded. In sum, when twinning programs were taken away from a single department (Electronics or Chinese) and managerial decisions were assumed by FAO, the programs failed. Hastiness caused recruitment of lower quality students. But to explain VUT's failure solely in terms of student quality is to raise a red herring, for student quality was in fact a function of poor management. If only low quality students are available then a program should be canceled before it is ever started. With sufficient time and planning, the VUT program might have recruited qualified students; Lancashire and Edmonds did just that.

Concluding thoughts

The three areas of foreign input that have been examined in this chapter raise serious doubts as to the effectiveness of foreign intervention into SZU education. The American credit system in the SZU context was merely a transfer of sorts. At SZU a credit system served as only a credit counting system; it did not achieve its intended goal—fostering general education. The impact of foreign teachers on SZU's overall curriculum and pedagogy has been marginal, at best. In reality, foreign teachers provided only foreign window

dressing to SZU; their educational contributions were minimal. Many were much more effective as religious proselytizers than as educators. The thousands of visiting academics who came to SZU arrived as tourists, not scholars. For most of them SZU was just a tourist spot, not much different in kind from Splendid China, Window to the World or the Cultural Villages, which are all located on the Shenzhen-Nantou highway, a few kilometers east of SZU toward downtown Shenzhen. The official delegations that traveled between SZU and overseas institutions were estimated by one SZU official to cost SZU about US \$100,000 each year. The primary beneficiaries of these trips were the individual travelers. The university as a whole reaped limited benefit in terms of scholarly exchange. The twinning programs that grew out of this delegation travel, themselves, provided overseas study opportunities for several dozen students and teachers. Few of them have returned to China. The number of these individuals who will likely return later in their lives and contribute to the nation's modernization is unknown. They, as individuals, will certainly benefit from a foreign experience. To what degree China as a nation benefits is uncertain. Whether SZU benefited from foreign influence is highly doubtful. All that can be said for sure is that foreign relations cost a lot of money. A most cynical—and sadly not inaccurate—comment is one from an ordinary SZU teacher who, admittedly, had not herself been afforded the opportunity to travel overseas at public expense. The twinning relationships, she said, served primarily to justify a decade of delegation travel by SZU leaders and senior cadres.

-
1. To cite but one example which applies to Chinese higher education: Hayhoe, *China's University and the Open Door*, 1989.
 2. Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, 1997, p. 257.
 3. He Daokuan, "Chinese Privacy" [in English]. An abridged, Chinese version of this paper was published in *Journal of Shenzhen University* 13, no. 4, 1996, pp. 82-9.
 4. Or "*dangran, bu tai xiguan zhongguo shenghuo*," "of course, you are not familiar with the Chinese way of life."
 5. Cited in Hayhoe, *Contemporary Chinese Education*, 1984, p. 206.
 6. Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s*, 1990, p. 11; Pepper, "Post-Mao reforms in Chinese education," 1991, p. 9; Bastid, "Servitude or liberation?" 1987, p. 12; Abe, "Borrowing from Japan," 1987, p. 65; Han, "The development of the economics of education in China," 1987, p. 24; Ross, "Foreign language education as a barometer of modernization," 1992, p. 241.
 7. Fairbank & Teng, *China's Response to the West, 1979/1954*, p. 50, 164-74; de Bary, Chan & Tan, *Sources of Chinese Tradition* 2, 1964, p. 82; Wang, *The Chi-*

ness of China, 1991, p. 287.

8. Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China*, 1971, p. 152, 160.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
10. Yu, "The radicalization of China in the twentieth century," 1993, p. 122.
11. See Hayhoe, *China's Universities*, 1996.
12. *Shenzhen University* [bilingual brochure, April, 1985, citation in English], p. 7.
13. Lu, "Advancing Shenzhen University reform," 1985.
14. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
15. Hayhoe, *China's University and the Open Door*, 1989, p. 16.
16. Hayhoe, "The evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions," 1984, pp. 40-1.
17. Orleans, "Soviet influence on China's higher education," 1987, p. 187.
18. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992; Sun, "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," 1990; Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
19. Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
20. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
21. Yen, "Foreign language teaching in China," 1987, p. 48.
22. See Hayhoe & Bastid, *China's Education and the Industrialized World*, 1987.
23. Mao, "Stubborn tradition," p. 15; Yen, "Foreign language teaching in China," 1987, p. 53.
24. Bastid, "Servitude or liberation?," 1987, p. 14.
25. Du, *Chinese Higher*, 1992, p. 4-5.
26. de Bary, Chan & Tan, *Sources of Chinese Tradition 2*, 1964,
27. Bell, *The Reforming of General Education*, 1966, p. 24.
28. The U.S. Department of Education 1994 data on type of institution and enrollment:

type	USA		China	
	number	enrollment (in millions)	number	enrollment (in millions)
public 4-year	605	5.8	982	2.4
public 2-year	1,036	5.3	83	.1
private 4-year	1,610	2.9	na	na
private 2 year	437	.2	na	na
total	3,688	14.2	1,065	2.5

Sources: Min, "China," 1997, p. 41; U.S. Dept. of Education, 1995.

29. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, p. v, 121.
30. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*, 1990, p. 123.

-
31. Hirsch, *Cultural Literacy*, 1988. Although this book focuses only on pre-university education, its thesis seems to apply to higher education as well.
 32. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, 1987, pp. 338-9.
 33. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*, 1990, p. 76.
 34. Wang, "The concept of general education in Chinese universities," 1993, p. 357.
 35. Cui, "New target for educational reform," 1993; China State Council & CCP, "Guidelines for reform and development for Chinese Education," 1993.
 36. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," 1990.
 37. Sun, "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," 1990.
 38. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, p. 101.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 111
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
 41. *Ibid.*
 42. Cheng, "Synopsis of experience from the credit system," 1986; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Sun, "Why the credit system meets cold reception in China," 1990.
 43. Miller, *Major American Higher Education Issues*, 1990, p. 121.
 44. Miller, *Ibid.*, p. 119.
 45. Miller, *Ibid.*, p. 126.
 46. Miller, *Ibid.*, pp. 126-7.
 47. Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
 48. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems," 1990.
 49. Fan, "New ideas on the reform of curriculum for the 21st century," 1993, p. 33.
 50. Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s, 1990*, p. 137.
 51. Henze, "Higher education," 1984, p. 127. Compare this with Table 6.2.
 52. Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987.
 53. Yang, Lin & Su, *Higher Education in the People's Republic of China*, 1988, pp. 176-7; Zhou, , *Education in Contemporary China*, 1990, p. 441.
 54. Lou, "A probationary implementation of the credit system," 1987; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986.
 55. Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
 56. Chen, "From a follow-up survey of the graduates," 1993.
 57. See Cheng, "Synopsis of experience from the credit system," 1985; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986; Wang, "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," 1990; Gan, "Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country," 1990; Wang, "Credit system: pros and cons," 1986.
 58. Gan, "Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country," 1990; Cheng,

-
- “Synopsis of experience from the credit system,” 1985.
59. Wang, “Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform,” 1990.
 60. Fang, “Humble opinion on the reform of grading and evaluation,” 1985.
 61. See Cao, “Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it,” 1992; Cheng, “Synopsis of experience from the credit system,” 1985; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Lou, “A probationary implementation of the credit system,” 1987; Wang, “Common trend and existing problems,” 1990.
 62. See Cao, “Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it,” 1992; Gan, “Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country,” 1990; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Wu & Liu, “Tentative search for the construction of a credit system,” 1986.
 63. See Cao, “Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it,” 1992; Gan, “Quest for characteristics of credit system in our country,” 1990; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Lou, “A probationary implementation of the credit system,” 1987.
 64. See Cao, “Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it,” 1992; Guan, “A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system,” 1986; Sun, “Why the credit system meets cold reception in China,” 1990; Wang, “Credit system: pros and cons,” 1986.
 65. “Regulations on teaching reform and improving teaching quality, 4 July 1986,” *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 61-4.
 66. Sources: *1986 Yearbook*, p. 62; *1994 Yearbook*, p. 219; *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 272.
 67. Chen Guanguang, “Credit system reform,” *1994 Yearbook*, p. 211.
 68. “Credit system regulations, 15 October 1988,” *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 180-3. They also appear in Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 96.
 69. Wang Kelai, “Career counseling” in Tang, *Searching for Shenzhen University’s reform path*, 1988, p. 249.
 70. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 97.
 71. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
 72. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
 73. “Student affairs management regulations, revised October 1989,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, pp. 198-203.
 74. Chen, “The structure and characteristics of management at Shenzhen,” 1988, p. 20.
 75. *1990 Student Handbook*, p. 30.

-
76. Sources: same as Table 6.1.
 77. Optional courses exclude restricted-optional in all calculations. Sources for calculating percentages: Yang Jinbiao, "Review of SZU credit system," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 197; *1986 Yearbook*, pp. 188-93; *1988 Yearbook*, pp. 149-55; *1991 Yearbook*, pp. 263-77.
 78. This abandonment of reforms is discussed at length in Agelasto, *University in Turmoil*, 1998.
 79. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 101.
 80. *Ibid.* Interdepartmental flows are suggested in Table 4.3, p. 163.
 81. "Credit system implementation measures, 25 June 1993" in *1992-93 Yearbook*, pp. 272-6; *Selected Collection of Administrative Regulations in Shenzhen University*, pp. 88-97. The rules, as revised 5 April 1994, are reprinted in *1994 Yearbook*, pp. 219-23; *SZU credit system* [student handbook], July 1994, pp. 1-10.
 82. *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 61.
 83. "SZU 1994 work focus, 9 March 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 10; Cai Delin, "SZU's reform and development," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 27; Yang Jinbiao, "Review of SZU credit system," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 197; and Chen Guangguang, "Credit system reform," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 211. Note that CS reform was not in the list of Cai Delin's Ten Measures for Comprehensive Reform.
 84. *1994 Yearbook*, p. 220.
 85. "SZU credit system implementation, 16 July 1996," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 217-21.
 86. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems in the current tertiary institutions curriculum reform," 1990; Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992.
 87. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, p. 116.
 88. Source: Departmental secretaries, June 1993.
 89. Wang, "Common trend and existing problems," 1990.
 90. Pearson, "The Fulbright Experience," 1997, p. 8 [footnote omitted].
 91. Bell, *The Reforming of General Education*, 1966, p. 67, 152 ff.
 92. Wu & Liu, "Tentative search for the construction of a credit system," 1986; Cao, "Reexamination of the credit system and suggestions to perfect it," 1992, p. 39; Guan, "A preliminary discussion of some questions concerning the credit system," 1986;
 93. Chen, *New Thoughts, New Explorations, and New Patterns*, 1989, p. 98; Wu & Cao, "How has the political and ideological work concerning students been reformed in SZU?," 1986.
 94. Rosen, "Students and the state in China," 1992, p. 178.
 95. Westmeyer, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1985, pp. 118-9.
 96. Qiu & Xie, "Shenzhen University implements credit system," 1994.

-
97. Representing literally Hong Kong (as in the *putonghua* Xiang Gang), Macau (as in Ao Men), and Taiwan. *Tongbao* stands for “born of the same parents” or compatriots.
 98. “Foreign affairs management regulations, 22 May 1990,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 186.
 99. The foreign attraction is otherwise evidenced by the fact that from 1983-1994 13.5% of SZU teachers quit SZU to go abroad, presumably for study.
 100. Sources: SZU yearbooks, various years.
 101. Zhang Ye, “Foreign affairs,” *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 173.
 102. Luo Zhengqi, “Speech on Kumamoto sister-school agreement, 10 December 1987,” *1987 Yearbook*, pp. 202-3.
 103. These figures were published in Foreign Affairs Office reports in SZU yearbooks. The Arts College gave different figures in “Arts College development plan, 1997-2000,” *1997 yearbook*, pp. 143-52: 93 foreign students (1994), 107 (1995), 255 (1996), 256 (1997) and estimated 270 (1998), 280 (1999), and 300 (2000).
 104. “SZU and Kumamoto Commercial University enter into a long term cooperation and communication agreement,” *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 27.
 105. Two university cater to compatriot students: Huaqiao and Jinan. The latter enrolled 2,577 compatriots in 1997, or about one-quarter of its FTE.
 106. See Cleverley, “An Australian look at China’s export education,” 1997. Also, according to universities’ homepages, annual tuition to study Chinese in 1997 varied: US \$1,500-2,000 Liaoning, \$2,500 Fudan, \$1,500 Nanchang. The \$7/per day room rate for a double at SZU compared with \$6 Nanchang, \$3-4 Liaoning, \$7 Hunan, \$3.50-8.00 Fudan (depending on building age and location).
 107. Urata, “A Comparison between the Japanese and U.S. Evaluation Systems in High Education,” 1994; Johnstone, “Trouble in Leisureland,” 1989.
 108. The document is reproduced in Porter, *Foreign Teachers in China*, 1990, pp. 131-88.
 109. *1986 Yearbook*, p. 25.
 110. Several standard contracts are reproduced in Porter, *Foreign Teachers in China*, 1990, pp. 124-30. See also Woronov, *China through My Window*, 1988, p. 72.
 111. *1988 Yearbook*, p. 40.
 112. Inflation rates are taken from: *1996 Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook*, p. 294. The 1991-1992 figures are based on recollection.
 113. The library at her university indicated no registered dissertation; no thesis was recorded with University Microfilms, Inc. Having once hired her, however, FAO was reluctant to admit their mistake and lose face; the

- teacher was allowed to retain the rank of professor.
114. "Foreign Affairs," *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 173.
 115. Tan Zaixi, "Foreign Language Department," *1991 Yearbook*, p. 103. Italics added.
 116. "Foreign Affairs Office," *1992-93 Yearbook*, p. 235.
 117. For example, at the start of the fall 1990 semester, the liaison was looking for the teacher who had been let go for the *dian* sign incident. He wanted to confirm the dismissed teacher's class schedule and did not even know that the teacher had been fired. From then on he acquired the nickname "clueless."
 118. Saltzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986; Hadfield & Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon*, 1986; Woronov, *China through My Window*, 1988; Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990; Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991; Kretschmer, *An American Teacher in China*, 1994.
 119. Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990, p. 290, 161, 177.
 120. Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991, pp. 195-6.
 121. Saltzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986, p. 60.
 122. Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon*, 1986, p. 46.
 123. Mahoney, *The Early Arrival of Dreams*, 1990, p. 282.
 124. Holm, *Coming Home Crazy*, 1991, p. 201.
 125. Saltzman, *Iron and Silk*, 1986, p. 35.
 126. Hadfield, *Watching the Dragon*, 1986, p. 103.
 127. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 128. Security Office, *1989-90 Yearbook*, p. 109.
 129. "1991 work summary, 14 January 1992," p. 40.
 130. *Ibid.*
 131. Paine, "Teaching and modernization in contemporary China," 1992, p. 188.
 132. See Herman & Bailey, "Recommendations for teaching overseas," 1991.
 133. This was the title given to a letter to the editor of *China Daily* in which the author quotes a Chinese student as saying: "I have lost four years because we had teachers who just played the guitar and sing and did not know how to teach." Carducci, "Not all foreigners are experts," 1994.
 134. Pollack, *Civilizing Chinese*, pp. 60-1. Parenthetical phrase omitted.
 135. _____, "Foreign experts share their talents," 1995, p. 9.
 136. _____, "Shenzhen is my hometown," *Shenzhen Commercial Daily* (19 February 1996).
 137. The reasoning behind this memorandum (which foreign teachers in Beijing labeled the 'deadwood decree') was to force China's long-term resident foreigners to return to their home countries in order to renew their native language skills, i.e., picking up the latest idioms and cultural conventions. Thus, in 1998, SZU refused to renew the contracts of two foreign teachers

- who had each been teaching at the university for 10 years.
138. *Brief #387* (28 December 1994).
 139. Beck, "Swindling banker fled to China," 1996; Lo, "Campus gave perfect cover for fugitive," 1996.
 140. Ironically, the SZU Security Department in its 1995 report (prior to Angotti's exposure) stated that it had investigated the backgrounds of foreign teachers, foreign students and other foreign-related people: *1995 Yearbook*, p. 214.
 141. Granelli, "Jury convicts ex-Irving banker of fraud," 1993.
 142. Granelli, "Arrest order issued for missing ex-S&L official," 1993.
 143. Granelli, "Fugitive O.C. banker agrees to return," 1996.
 144. SZU sent several students to Griffith in the mid-1990s for a year's study.
 145. This appears to be the case with other Chinese universities. Universities have substantive exchanges with very few of the numerous universities with which they have signed agreements (e.g., Nanjing University, 70; Nankai University, 108; Guangxi University, 60; Central South University of Technology, 180; Shanghai University, 56).
 146. *Shenda Tongxun*, 1987, no. 1, p. 25.
 147. *Nanfang Daily* (12 July 1991).
 148. Wu Zewei, "A trip to Britain," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 28.
 149. "SZU and Kumamoto Commercial University enter into a long-term cooperation and communication agreement," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1991, no. 15, p. 27.
 150. *Brief #203* (13 June 1992).
 151. Wu Ren, "A visit to the U.S.A.," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1993, no. 23, p. 34.
 152. The trip, scheduled to coincide with the release of SZU 1995 Document 121 which indicted Tan Zaixi for embezzlement, afforded the head of FAO the opportunity to be off campus in order to avoid some loss of face.
 153. "A visit to university in U.K.," *Shenda Tongxun*, 1995, no. 31, p. 20.
 154. "Foreign Affairs," *1996 Yearbook*, pp. 181-2. Overseas travel declined in 1997 with the arrival of a new SZU leadership team who were modest in their life styles. Total visits abroad for 1997 numbered 517, a 31% decrease: "Foreign Affairs," *1997 Yearbook*, p. 269.
 155. Two trips for each of four SZU leaders on five-member delegations.
 156. Wei Feng, "The great tremors in China's intellectual circles," 1993, p. 68.
 157. <http://www.csu.edu.au/division/pubrel/vol4no8/s4.htm>, retrieved 18 July 1997.
 158. "SZU and Singapore joint program with British National Computer Centre 'Certificate in computers' course, recurring advertisement," *Shenzhen Shangbao*, spring 1994.
 159. Xie, "SZU exploring new modes of education with foreign cooperation,"

-
1993. Included in the group were nine compatriots, presumably from Hong Kong.
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.*; Lu, "SZU to implement general reform," 1994.
162. "Regulations on managing joint courses with foreign universities, 9 November 1994," *1994 Yearbook*, p. 214.
163. *Shenzhen Tequ Bao* (28 July 1994), p. 12.
164. This was agreed upon in the SZU-VUT Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, July 1994.
165. *Brief # 360* (21 October 1994) reported 79 students admitted out of 130 applications. This figure remained valid for several weeks until the program administrators checked their accounting and realized the actual number was 71.
166. At the beginning of the program's second year 62 students were enrolled (35 Banking, 27 Accounting). Of these three withdrew before final exams and one simply disappeared, so 58 completed the course.
167. Although SZU insisted during negotiations that students' timetables included moral and physical education courses, these were never taught to the VUT students.
168. Millar, *The VUT/SZU Foundation Program*, 1996, p. 47.
169. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
170. *Ibid.*
171. *VUT Faculty of Business Handbook*, 1996, p. 72 [italics added].
172. Maslen, "Visa blitz stymies student boom," 1997.
173. *Ibid.*
174. Middleton, "Chinese students refused visas," 1997.
175. Austin, "Visa refusal white-anting TAFE: uni," 1997, p. 3.
176. Maslen, "VUT in student visa row," 1997, p. 3.
177. Armitage, "Uni battles Ruddock over ban on business students," 1997.
178. Maslen, "Visa blitz stymies student boom," 1997; Maslen, "VUT in student visa row," 1997; Maslen, "Visa pain for eager Chinese," 1997. Some students eventually ended up at Queens College, Dublin.